Abstract
Over the years, the international community has established international courts to eliminate the culture of impunity in relation to international crimes, and to enforce a culture of accountability. A critical success factor for these courts is ensuring that they are perceived as legitimate instruments of law, to provide justice to those affected by any crimes committed and to rebuild the judicial landscape within post-conflict societies. However, the legitimacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—established following the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis—has been questioned, due in part to: its location in Tanzania, its focus on prosecuting only members of the Hutu ethnic group, the employment of former génocidaires, and the acquittals and early releases of those considered most responsible for the 1994 genocide. This chapter uses an empirically oriented approach to identify and examine the measures taken by the ICTR to promote its legitimacy and detaches the term legitimacy from its normative legacy. The chapter will focus on two specific events—the Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza case and the removal of the ICTR’s chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, in 2003—which challenged the ICTR’s legitimacy and forced the Tribunal to adopt legitimisation activities in order to repair its legitimacy. The aim is to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of legitimacy, while examining whether the ICTR’s short-term need for legitimacy affected its longer-term objectives. The chapter is based on data collected through desk and archival research, and interviews conducted between 2019 and 2020.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Interviews and archival research took place both in the field (Rwanda and Tanzania) and as part of desk research between 2018 and 2020. All interviews are anonymised. Dates are not included given that they can be used to trace back to the interviewee. Consent was asked, and forms were signed, for all interviews. This research was approved by Maastricht University’s Ethics Review Committee Inner City faculties.
- 4.
BBC (1994) http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/6/newsid_2472000/2472195.stm. Accessed 21 September 2021; Guardian (1994) https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/apr/09/rwanda. Accessed 21 September 2021; New York Times (1994) https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/14/world/anarchy-rules-rwanda-s-capital-and-drunken-soldiers-roam-city.html. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 5.
Des Forges 1999, pp. 10–12.
- 6.
The UN estimates that 800,000 people lost their lives during the 1994 genocide. UN Security Council 1999, S/1999/1257. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257. Accessed 21 September 2021; the Government of Rwanda refers to over one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu victims of genocidal violence. www.gov.rw/home/history. Accessed 21 September 2021; while Human Rights Watch places the number closer to 500,000 victims (Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16).
- 7.
Moderate Hutu are those generally considered as having supported the power-sharing agreement negotiated during the Arusha Accords, which would have enabled the Tutsi-led RPF to gain power and to work alongside the Hutu government.
- 8.
Members of the Twa ethnic group were also heavily involved in the conflict, both as perpetrators and victims. They are rarely mentioned in relation to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The ethnic divisions that were intrinsic to Rwandan society prior to and during the 1994 genocide no longer exist in Rwanda. Since 2001, identifying individuals with the ethnic labels—Hutu, Tutsi or Twa—is considered as “divisionist” in Rwanda (Rwandan Law No. 47/2001).
- 9.
Des Forges 1999, pp. 15–16; Drumbl 2007, p. 81; Moghalu 2005, p. 17. With a growing number of Tutsi refugees living in Uganda, the “Front Patriotique Rwandais” (Rwandan Patriotic Front—RPF) was established in Kampala in 1988. The aim of this political and military movement was to return to Rwanda and to overthrow the Rwandan government. The RPF launched their first major attack against the Hutu government in Rwanda on the 1 October 1990, marking the start of the Rwandan Civil War (Moghalu 2005, pp. 13–14).
- 10.
- 11.
Penal Reform International 2006, p. 1. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021. Schabas 2005, p. 883.
- 12.
- 13.
UN Security Council 1994, S/1994/1115.
- 14.
Formal name: International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.
- 15.
UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955.
- 16.
ICTR 2010.
- 17.
- 18.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter addresses “action with respect to threats to the peace breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”.
- 19.
Cryer et al. 2019, p. 127.
- 20.
UN Security Council 1994a, S/PV.3453, p. 15.
- 21.
- 22.
Oomen 2009, p. 184.
- 23.
UN Security Council 2006, S/2006/176, para 2.
- 24.
UN Security Council 1994a, S/PV.3453, p. 16.
- 25.
Møse 2005, p. 1.
- 26.
UN General Assembly 1996, a/51/399-S/1996/778, p. 15.
- 27.
Andreopoulos et al. 2010, p. 171.
- 28.
- 29.
Peskin 2005, p. 951.
- 30.
Ibid., pp. 950–951.
- 31.
Des Forges 1999, p. 58.
- 32.
Gacaca can be loosely translated to “justice amongst the grass”. These community-based courts, inspired by Rwandan tradition, were re-introduced in Rwanda from 2005 to 2012, in order to address the backlog of cases related to the 1994 genocide waiting for trial in conventional domestic courts (Clark 2010).
- 33.
Oomen 2009, pp. 188–189.
- 34.
Vasiliev 2015, p. 5.
- 35.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 18 June 1997, ICTR-96-15-T, pp. 3–4.
- 36.
With the exception of Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian national, who played a key role in broadcasting Hutu propaganda as a presented for the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines. In 2000, Ruggiu pleaded guilty to two charges: crimes against humanity (persecution), and direct and public incitement to commit genocide (ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 1 June 2000, ICTR-97-32-I).
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
ICTR (2003) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/security-council-appoints-separate-prosecutors-two-ad-hoc-un-tribunals. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 41.
ICTR 2003, S/2003/946, pp. 6 and 11. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-reports. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
Vasiliev 2015, p. 10.
- 46.
Nicholson 2017, pp. 658–659.
- 47.
Vasiliev 2015, pp. 11–12.
- 48.
- 49.
Plato and Jowett 2009, pp. 382, 444.
- 50.
Ibid., p. 530.
- 51.
Aristotle et al. 1998, pp. 9–12.
- 52.
Plato and Jowett 2009, p. 530.
- 53.
Aristotle et al. 1998, p. 100.
- 54.
- 55.
Rousseau 1997, p. 60.
- 56.
Ibid., pp. 138–139.
- 57.
Locke 2014, p. 7—original emphasis.
- 58.
Ibid., pp. 24–25.
- 59.
Weber 1922b; original title: Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft.
- 60.
Brinkerhoff 2005.
- 61.
Bodansky et al. 2013.
- 62.
Bitektine 2011.
- 63.
- 64.
Oomen 2009, p. 175.
- 65.
Beetham 2013, p. 20.
- 66.
- 67.
UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955, p. 1.
- 68.
Gallimore 2006, p. 2.
- 69.
Sikkink 2011.
- 70.
- 71.
Suchman 1995, p. 573–575.
- 72.
Peskin 2005, p. 951.
- 73.
Hurd 1999, p. 379.
- 74.
Shelton 2008, pp. 543–544
- 75.
Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 171.
- 76.
Helfer and Slaughter 1997, pp. 389–391.
- 77.
Schiff 2010, p. 42.
- 78.
- 79.
- 80.
Hybels 1995, p. 243.
- 81.
- 82.
Suchman 1995.
- 83.
Ibid., pp. 578–579.
- 84.
Ibid., pp. 579–582.
- 85.
Ibid., pp. 582–583.
- 86.
Deephouse et al. 2017, pp. 23–24.
- 87.
Also referred to as legitimation.
- 88.
- 89.
Suchman 1995, pp. 586, 595–597.
- 90.
Ashforth and Gibbs 1990.
- 91.
Ibid., p. 180.
- 92.
Ibid., p. 178.
- 93.
All interviews are anonymised. Dates are not included given that they can be used to trace back to the interviewee.
- 94.
Strauss and Corbin 1990.
- 95.
Clark 2010, pp. 33–45.
- 96.
Beetham 1991, pp. 15–20.
- 97.
UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955; ICTR 2010; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-and-evidence. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 98.
Cryer et al. 2019, p. 137.
- 99.
- 100.
Gallimore 2006, p. 1.
- 101.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 102.
Interviewee T18.
- 103.
ICTR 2010, Article 16. https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021; ICTR 2015, rule 33. All press-related matters were originally managed under the Press and Information Section, renamed the Press and Public Affairs Unit in 2001.
- 104.
Tribunal Voices 2008, video 89. http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/video/89. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 105.
ICTR 2010, Article 20.
- 106.
Interviewee T5.
- 107.
Dieng 2004.
- 108.
Interviewees T10, T16, T17 and T19.
- 109.
Dieng 2000.
- 110.
Dieng 2005.
- 111.
Translated from French: “Notre image était très importante. Nous en étions conscients. Nous voulions empêcher les gens de penser que nous n'étions pas impartiaux, nous avons donc fait attention à la façon dont nous nous représentions. […] L'environnement était tendu. Cela faisait partie de note vie privée. Nous devions toujours avoir un bon comportement. Nous ne pouvions pas organiser de fêtes par exemple, ni inviter de grands groupes, car cela donnerait facilement une image négative.” (Interviewee T23)
- 112.
Interviewee M2.
- 113.
Translated from French: “Il n'y avait pas de stratégie de communication. Comme toutes les grandes institutions. Les gens qui y travaillaient ne savaient pas ce qu’ils étaient censés communiquer ou comment, alors ils s’assuraient simplement de promouvoir le TPIR de toutes les manières possibles. Ils ont toujours cherché à le placer sous un bon éclairage. Le manque de ressources n’était certainement pas un problème.” (Interviewee M3)
- 114.
Translated from French: “Les Rwandais n'étaient pas intéressés, y compris du gouvernement rwandais. C'était un défaut majeur. En fait, le TPIR a conservé une image négative tout au long et n’a pas fait grand-chose pour améliorer leur image.” (Interviewee M1)
- 115.
Interviewee T18.
- 116.
Interviewees M1, M2 and M3.
- 117.
Meyer et al. 2013, pp. 169–171.
- 118.
RTML played a pivotal role in broadcasting the Hutu propaganda, inciting violence against individuals from the Tutsi ethnic group, prior to and during the 1994 genocide.
- 119.
Translated from French: “Avez-vous rencontré le juge [nom]? Il m'a dit qu'il ne ferait pas la même chose que le juge [nom]. Il était très méprisé par de nombreux Rwandais en raison des libérations anticipées.” (Interviewee CS9).
- 120.
Moghalu 2005, p. 102.
- 121.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 5–7.
- 122.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order for transfer and provisional transfer, 3 March 1997, ICTR-97-19-DP.
- 123.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 17 November 1998, ICTR-97-19-1.
- 124.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 108.
- 125.
Ibid.
- 126.
Interviewee M2.
- 127.
Moghalu 2005, p. 108; Peskin 2008, pp. 181–182; The New Humanitarian (1999) https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/179881. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 128.
Tribunal Voices (2008) video 89. http://www.tribunalvoices.org/voices/video/89. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 129.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order, ICTR-97-19-AR72, 25 November 1999.
- 130.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 3 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 108.
- 131.
Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, p. 183.
- 132.
Peskin 2008, p. 182.
- 133.
See amicus curiae brief filed by the Rwandan government on 15 February 2000.
- 134.
ICTR (2000) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/barayagwiza-be-tried-ictr. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 135.
Ibid.
- 136.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Judgement and Sentence, 3 December 2003, ICTR-99-52-T, pp. 28–29.
- 137.
- 138.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, Separate Declaration, 31 March 2000, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 7.
- 139.
Moghalu 2005, p. 137.
- 140.
- 141.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision, 31 March 2000, ICTR-97-19-AR72, para 2.
- 142.
Moghalu 2005, p. 134.
- 143.
ICTR (2000) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/prosecutor-outlines-future-plans. Accessed 21 September 2021; Moghalu 2005, p. 133; Peskin 2008, pp. 188–189.
- 144.
Thomson 2017, p. 185.
- 145.
The Globe and Mail (2016) https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/kagame-government-supporters-complicated-un-efforts-to-investigate-crimes/article32524359/. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 146.
- 147.
Peskin 2008, pp. 187, 212–213. The reason given for the suspension of all cooperation with the Tribunal was the poor treatment of witnesses (ibid., p. 213).
- 148.
Interviewee CS7.
- 149.
Translated from French: “Elle était surtout intéressée par son image. Pas les victimes. Ils n’avaient pas suffisamment d’informations sur ces autres crimes. Si elle avait eu cela, elle aurait porté l'affaire devant les tribunaux. Elle ne l’a pas fait. Comment a-t-elle pu s'adresser au gouvernement pour dire qu'elle voulait les poursuivre. C'était voué à l'échec. Elle aurait dû trouver un autre moyen. Nous avons une mauvaise image de Carla Del Ponte. Elle était une forte procureure italienne. Elle était habituée à la mafia. Elle voulait montrer ses compétences. Mais amener cette justice pour détruire la paix et le gouvernement? Ce n'était pas juste.” (Interviewee T9).
- 150.
- 151.
- 152.
UN Security Council 2003, S/RES/1503, para 8.
- 153.
ICTR (2003) https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/security-council-appoints-separate-prosecutors-two-ad-hoc-un-tribunals. Accessed 21 September 2021; UN 2003. https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7858.doc.htm. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 154.
ICTR 2010, Article 15(3).
- 155.
Peskin 2008, pp. 220–221.
- 156.
Translated from Italian: “cacciata dal Ruanda perché volevo fare giustizia. [...] Se mi fossi piegata sarei ancora al mio posto” (La Repubblica, 2003). http://www.repubblica.it/2003/i/sezioni/esteri/delponte/delponte/delponte.html?refresh_ce. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 157.
Translated from French: “Avec le FPR, les procureurs ont fait un choix. Ils devaient faire une distinction entre les crimes. Carla Del Ponte a mélangé les choses. Les crimes sont tellement différents. Ce sont des niveaux différents. Le TPIR voulait montrer qu'il faisait quelque chose. Ils n’ont pas poursuivi toutes les personnes impliquées dans le génocide. Le prêtre et l'évêque ont été tués par le FPR. Ces personnes ont été jugées au Rwanda sous la surveillance du TPIR. Le TPIR devait commencer par les criminels les plus importants. Les crimes les plus importants.” (Interviewee T9)
- 158.
- 159.
Jambonews (2006) https://www.jambonews.net/en/actualites/20160204-closing-interview-with-the-president-of-the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-rwanda-ictr-part-ii/. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 160.
Ibid.; Peskin 2008, pp. 224–226.
- 161.
UN Security Council 2003, S/RES/1503.
- 162.
ICTR 2003, S/2003/946. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-reports. Accessed 21 September 2021.
- 163.
- 164.
UN Security Council 1994b, S/RES/955, Article 1.
- 165.
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Order, 25 November 1999, ICTR-97-19-AR72.
- 166.
Del Ponte and Sudetic 2011.
- 167.
References
Andreopoulos G, Barberet R, Levine J P (eds) (2010) International Criminal Justice: Critical Perspectives and New Challenges. Springer Science & Business Media
Apuuli K P (2009) Procedural due process and the prosecution of genocide suspects in Rwanda. Journal of Genocide Research, 11(1), 11–30
Aristotle, Barker E, Stalley R (1998) Politics (Oxford World's Classics). Oxford University Press, Oxford
Ashforth B, Gibbs B (1990) The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation. Organization Science, 1(2), 177–194
Barnett M, Finnemore M (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Cornell University Press
Bassiouni M C (1994) Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal. Fordham International Law Journal, 18, 1191
Beetham D (1991) The Legitimation of Power. Macmillan, Basingstoke
Beetham D (2013) Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years On. Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration, 19–36
Bitektine A (2011) Toward a Theory of Social Judgments of Organizations: The Case of Legitimacy, Reputation, and Status. Academy of Management Review, 36(1), 151–179
Bodansky D, Dunoff J L, Pollack M A (2013) Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, 321–41
Bonner R (1994) UN Commission Recommends Rwanda 'Genocide' Tribunal. New York Times, A13
Bouka Y (2013) (Oral) History of Violence: Conflicting Narratives in Post-Genocide Rwanda. In: Oral History Forum D'Histoire Orale (Vol. 1)
Brannigan A, Jones N A (2009) Genocide and the Legal Process in Rwanda: From Genocide Amnesty to the New Rule of Law. International Criminal Justice Review, 19(2), 192–207
Brinkerhoff D W (2005) Organisational Legitimacy, Capacity and Capacity Development. European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Cassese A (1998) On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. European Journal of International Law, 9(1), 2–17
Clark I (2005) Legitimacy in International Society. Oxford University Press on Demand
Clark J N (2010) National unity and reconciliation in Rwanda: A flawed approach? Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(2), 137–154
Creed W D, Scully M A, Austin J R (2002) Clothes Make the Person? The Tailoring of Legitimating Accounts and the Social Construction of Identity. Organization Science, 13(5), 475–496
Cryer R, Robinson D, Vasiliev S (2019) An introduction to international criminal law and procedure. Cambridge University Press
Deephouse D L, Bundy J, Tost L P, Suchman M C (2017) Organizational Legitimacy: Six Key Questions. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, 27–54
Del Ponte C, Sudetic C (2011) Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity. Other Press, LLC
Des Forges A L (1999) "Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda (Vol. 3169, No. 189).Human Rights Watch, New York
Dieng A (2000) Special address to staff members on their ethical duties and obligations (20 May 2000). Arusha, Tanzania
Dieng A (2004) Presentation made for the Prosecutors’ Colloquium (25 November 2004). Arusha, Tanzania
Dieng A (2005) The Registrar’s presentation on the UNICTR’s Public Information & Outreach Programme. Meeting of the Registrars of the International Criminal Tribunals (8–9 February 2005) Arusha, Tanzania
Drumbl M A (2007) Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. Cambridge University Press
Epstein D Z (2014) Rationality, Legitimacy, & the Law. Washington University Jurisprudence Review, 7, 1
Ferstman C J (1997) Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda. African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 9, 857
Forsythe D P (2009) Encyclopaedia of Human Rights (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press
Galaskiewicz J (1985) Interorganizational Relations. Annual Review of Sociology, 11(1), 281–304
Gallimore T (2006) The ICTR Outreach Programme: Integrating Justice and Reconciliation. In Conference on Challenging Impunity, Kigali Novotel (pp 7–8)
Hardin R (2007) Compliance, Consent, and Legitimacy. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
Hazan P (2006) Measuring the impact of punishment and forgiveness: A framework for evaluating transitional justice. International Review of the Red Cross, 88(861), 19–47
Helfer L R, Slaughter A M (1997) Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication. Yale Law Journal, 107, 273
Hilbink L (2012) The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence. World Politics, 64(4), 587–621
Hobbes T (1998) Leviathan. Gaskin JCA
Hurd I (1999) Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. International Organization, 53(2), 379–408
Hybels R C (1995) On Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Organizations: A Critical Review and Integrative Theoretical Model. Academy of Management Proceedings. Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management
ICTR (2003) Completion Strategy Report, S/2003/946. https://unictr.irmct.org/en/documents/completion-strategy-reports. Accessed 21 September 2021
ICTR (2010) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute_en_fr_0.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021
ICTR (2015) Rules of Procedure and Evidence. https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021
Klip A H, Sluiter G K (2003) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Volume VI: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2000-2001
Locke J (2014) Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government. John Wiley & Sons
Meyer M, Buber R, Aghamanoukjan A (2013) In Search of Legitimacy: Managerialism and Legitimation in Civil Society Organizations. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 24(1), 167–193
Moghalu K (2005) Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice. Palgrave Macmillan
Møse E (2005) The ICTR: Experiences and Challenges. New England Journal of International & Comparative Law, 12, 1
Nicholson J (2017) Strengthening the Effectiveness of International Criminal Law through the Principle of Legality. International Criminal Law Review, 17(4), 656–681
Ohlin J D (2005) Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide. American Journal of International Law, 747–777
Oomen B (2007) Transitional Justice and Its Legitimacy: The Case for a Local Perspective. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 25(1), 141–148
Oomen B (2009) Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: The Example of Rwanda's Multi-layered Justice Mechanisms. In: Ambos K, Large J, Wierda M (eds) Building a Future on Peace and Justice (pp 175–202). Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg
Oosterveld V, McManus J M (2002) The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court. Fordham International Law Journal, 25, 3
Penal Reform International (2006) Eight Years on … A Record of Gacaca Monitoring in Rwanda. https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WEB-english-gacaca-rwanda-5.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2021
Peskin V (2005) Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3(4), 950–961
Peskin V (2008) International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation. Cambridge University Press
Plato, Jowett B (2009) The Republic. Floating Press, Waiheke Island
Reyes A (2011) Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. Discourse & Society, 22(6), 781–807
Rousseau J J (1997) Rousseau: 'The Social Contract' and Other Later Political Writings. Cambridge University Press
Salancik G R, Pfeffer J (1978) A Social Information Processing Approach to Job Attitudes and Task Design. Administrative Science Quarterly, 224–253
Schabas W A (2005) Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 3(4), 879–895
Schabas W A (2006) The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge University Press
Schabas W A (2008) International Criminal Tribunals: A Review of 2007. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 6, 382
Schiff B N (2010) Lessons from the ICC for ICC/R2P Convergence. The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 21(1), 101–105
Shany Y (2012) Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach. American Journal of International Law, 106(2), 225–270
Shelton D (2008) Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts. Chicago Journal of International Law, 9, 537
Sikkink K (2011) The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (The Norton Series in World Politics). WW Norton & Company
Smeulers A, Grünfeld F (2011) International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights Violations: A Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook. Brill
Straus S, Waldorf L (eds) (2011) Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence. University of Wisconsin Press
Strauss A, Corbin J (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research. Sage Publications
Suchman M C (1995) Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610
Thomson S (2017) The Long Shadow of Genocide in Rwanda. Current History, 116 (790), 183–188
UN General Assembly (1996) Report, Fifty-first Session, Agenda Item 59, a/51/399-S/1996/778
UN Security Council (1994) Letter dated 94/09/28 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/1115
UN Security Council (1994a) Provisional Agenda, S/PV.3453
UN Security Council (1994b) Resolution 955, S/RES/955
UN Security Council (1999) Letter Dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/1257
UN Security Council (2003) Resolution 1503, S/RES/1503
UN Security Council (2006) Security Council Report, S/2006/176
Vasiliev S (2015) Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice: Theorising Legitimacy. The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. Cambridge University Press
Weber M (1922a) The city (non-legitimate domination). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 1212–372
Weber M (1922b) The Three Types of Legitimate Rule [Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft]. Published in an English translation (Gerth H, transl) in Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4(1): 1–11, 1958
Zimmerman M A, Zeitz G J (2002) Beyond Survival: Achieving New Venture Growth by Building Legitimacy. Academy of Management Review, 27(3), 414–431
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boost, C.M.H. (2023). The Legitimacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In: Sendze, T.B.K., Adeboyejo, A., Morrison, H., Ugwu, S. (eds) Contemporary International Criminal Law Issues. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-555-3_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-555-3_4
Published:
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-554-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-555-3
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)