Abstract
The relationship between trade and environmental protection is one that has provoked much by way of debate. While there is recognition within WTO legal texts that trade liberalisation can have an impact upon environmental protection, much of the more contentious issues pertaining to the relationship between trade and the environment have been left to the WTO dispute settlement system to pronounce on. This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the WTO dispute settlement system as a forum for resolving disputes involving environmental matters. This chapter argues that while the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement system has been sensitive to the idea that countries should have sufficient policy space to enact measures for environmental purposes, significant question marks remain over a number of questions such as how non-WTO law should be treated within the WTO dispute settlement system. With an increasing range of environmental threats facing the world, not least the spectre of climate change, change is needed within the WTO to better ensure a mutually supportive relationship between trade and environmental protection.
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Notes
- 1.
For a background on the formation of the GATT, see Trebilcock and Howse 2005, pp. 23–24.
- 2.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, entered into force 1 January 1995 (WTO Agreement).
- 3.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 UNTS 194, as amended by Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1125 (hereinafter GATT 1994).
- 4.
Annex 1A at present contains 13 agreements relevant to trade in goods, including the GATT 1994; Annex 1B contains the General Agreement on Trade in Services while Annex 1C contains the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Annex 3 contains a Trade Policy Review Mechanism while Annex 2 contains the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
- 5.
Hoekman 2016, p. 1087.
- 6.
WTO Agreement, above n 2, preamble (emphasis added).
- 7.
Trachtman 2017, pp. 273–274.
- 8.
Lydgate 2012, p. 624.
- 9.
Trachtman 2017, p. 274.
- 10.
Kulovesi 2016, p. 49.
- 11.
Kulovesi 2016.
- 12.
Indeed, from the early days of the GATT, certain commentators placed significant prominence on dispute settlement and were ‘intrigued’ by using it as ‘a format for studying environment and trade issues’, see discussion in Brown Weiss 2016, p. 367.
- 13.
February 2021.
- 14.
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
- 15.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, p. 165.
- 16.
WTO, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 (1994) (DSU).
- 17.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, p. 190.
- 18.
Devaney 2016, p. 129.
- 19.
WTO Agreement, above n 2, Article IV.3.
- 20.
DSU, above n 16, Articles 4.11, 10 17.4.
- 21.
Ibid., Article 10.
- 22.
Davey 2014, p. 688.
- 23.
DSU, above n 16, Article on the procedure for consultations.
- 24.
Ibid., Article 6.2.
- 25.
Ibid., Article 8 on the composition of Panels.
- 26.
Ibid., Article 8(5).
- 27.
Ibid., Article 9(1).
- 28.
Ibid., Article 7.1.
- 29.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, p. 220.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 221.
- 31.
DSU, above n 16, Articles 12.8 to 12.9.
- 32.
Subedi 2010, p. 180.
- 33.
Davey 2014, p. 691.
- 34.
See e.g. DSU, above n 16, Article 12.8.
- 35.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, pp. 277–278.
- 36.
DSU, above n 16, Article 16.4.
- 37.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017.
- 38.
Van den Boscche 2005.
- 39.
Creamer 2019.
- 40.
Bacchus and Lester 2020, p. 186.
- 41.
DSU, above n 16, Article 17.2.
- 42.
Ibid., Article 17.4.
- 43.
Ibid., Article 17.6.
- 44.
See discussion in Pierola 2005, pp. 193–216.
- 45.
DSU, above n 16, Article 17.13.
- 46.
Three Appellate Body members are required to hear appeals; Article 17.1 DSU. By December 2019, the number of Appellate Body members had reduced to one. For discussion, see Hoekman and Mavroidis 2020b.
- 47.
And indeed, these causes have been well documented elsewhere; see, for example, Hoekman and Mavroidis 2020a.
- 48.
At the date of writing, the most recent request for consultations was November 2020; see WTO 2020b.
- 49.
In full, DSU, above n 16, Article 16.4, ‘(w)ithin 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report’.
- 50.
As, for example, has already occurred; see WTO, United States—Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada—Notification of an appeal by the United States under article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes, Panel Report, 29 September 2020, WT/DS533/5.
- 51.
WTO 2020a.
- 52.
European Commission 2020a.
- 53.
WTO 2020c.
- 54.
DSU, above n 16, Article 25(2).
- 55.
European Commission 2020b.
- 56.
WTO 2020d, para 1.
- 57.
WTO 2020e.
- 58.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, pp. 168–169.
- 59.
Ibid. This may be compared with the ICJ, which under Article 36 of the ICJ Statute cannot force States to accept jurisdiction; see e.g. ICJ, and East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90.
- 60.
Subedi 2010, p. 179. Subedi does, of course, recognise that dispute settlement under the 1982 UNCLOS does have compulsory aspects, but argues that ‘both in terms of the number of cases referred to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and other arbitral tribunals and the significant exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction’ mean that the WTO is the ‘only truly’ compulsory system internationally.
- 61.
Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, p169, drawing on Article 23.1 DSU which notes that ‘When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreement or an impairment of any objectives of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding’ (emphasis added).
- 62.
DSU, above n 16, Article 5(1).
- 63.
Ibid.
- 64.
Tanaka 2018, p. 288.
- 65.
Ibid. Note that certain commentators such as Georges Abi-Saab would argue that the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system was akin to a conciliation system; see Abi-Saab 2005, p. 8.
- 66.
Busch and Pelc 2014, p. 408.
- 67.
Merrills 2005, p. 217.
- 68.
See WTO, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act—Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, Award of the Arbitrators, 9 November 2001, WT/DS160/ARB25.
- 69.
- 70.
- 71.
Lang and Scott 2009.
- 72.
See Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 289.
- 73.
See discussion in Pauwelyn 2008, p. 7.
- 74.
See generally Pauwelyn 2008, p. 7.
- 75.
See discussion in Cameron and Gray 2001, pp. 248–298.
- 76.
See discussion in Cameron and Gray 2001, pp. 248–298.
- 77.
See generally Pauwelyn 2008, pp. 7–8.
- 78.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243, entered into force 1 July 1975 (CITES).
- 79.
See discussion in Pauwelyn 2008, pp. 7–8.
- 80.
WTO, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, 29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17 (US—Gasoline).
- 81.
Kulovesi 2016, p. 57.
- 82.
See e.g. Kulovesi 2016.
- 83.
WTO, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, 18 May 2011, WT/DS316/AB/R, paras 844–845.
- 84.
Kulovesi 2016, p. 57.
- 85.
C.f. Pauwelyn 2003, pp. 473–491.
- 86.
WTO, Peru—Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, 31 July 2015, WT/DS457/AB/R, para 5.112; cited and discussed in Trachtman 2017, p. 302.
- 87.
See Trachtman 2017, pp. 302–303.
- 88.
DSU, above n 16, Article 1.
- 89.
See generally Pauwelyn 2008, p. 7.
- 90.
Though a small number of provisions exist within individual WTO covered agreements directly allocating the burden of proof, e.g. Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture; see Grando 2010, p. 152.
- 91.
WTO, US-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Appellate Body Report, 25 April 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, 335 (US—Wool Shirts and Blouses).
- 92.
WTO, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Panel Report, 25 January 2000, WT/DS152/R, para 7.14. For an excellent discussion on fact-finding and the burden of proof under WTO law, see Grando 2010.
- 93.
Grando 2010, pp. 153–154.
- 94.
WTO, US—Wool Shirts and Blouses, above n 91, para 337.
- 95.
Note that Article 17.6 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement sets out a special standard of review to be applied to anti-dumping investigations; this shall not be considered in this chapter.
- 96.
An example of a panel consulting experts pursuant to its authority under Article 13 DSU can be found in WTO, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel Report, 15 May 1998, WT/DS58/R, paras 5.1 et seq. (US—Shrimp (Panel Report)).
- 97.
- 98.
WTO, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Appellate Body Report 2 August 1999, WT/DS70/AB/R, para 187 (Canada—Aircraft).
- 99.
Ibid., para 203.
- 100.
Devaney 2016, p. 141.
- 101.
See WTO, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WTO/DS58/AB/R, para 108 (US—Shrimp (Appellate Body Report)).
- 102.
WTO, United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Appellate Body Report, 10 May 2000, WTO/DS138/AB/R, para 39.
- 103.
Eckersley 2007.
- 104.
See generally Squatitro 2018.
- 105.
WTO, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R 14, p. 97 at 107–108.
- 106.
WTO, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, Appellate Body Report, 30 April 2008, WT/DS344/AB/R, para 160, (US—Stainless Steel (Mexico)).
- 107.
WTO, United States—Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina—Recourse to Article21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, Appellate Body Report, 17 December 2004, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para 188.
- 108.
For a discussion on provisional measures within international legal processes more generally, see Miles 2017.
- 109.
Miles 2017.
- 110.
Article 19(1) DSU.
- 111.
DSU, above n 16, Article 16.4.
- 112.
Pauwelyn 2019.
- 113.
MPIA, Annex 1, para 16.
- 114.
DSU, above n 16, Article 21.3(c).
- 115.
Ibid., Article 21.5.
- 116.
Ibid., Article 22.2.
- 117.
See discussion in Van Den Boscche and Zdouc 2017, p. 204.
- 118.
Busch and Pelc 2014.
- 119.
Ibid.
- 120.
See e.g. Davey 2014.
- 121.
Busch and Pelc 2014.
- 122.
Hoekman 2016, p. 1087.
- 123.
WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), Article 27.2.
- 124.
WTO, US—Gasoline, above n 80, p. 22.
- 125.
This defence was relevant in the dispute of WTO, EC–Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, 22 May 2014, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R. The protection of animal welfare by the EU was accepted as a matter of public morality and was thereby able to avail of the GATT Article XX(a) defence, albeit the particular measures in question failed to pass muster under the chapeau to GATT Article XX.
- 126.
On this note, see Cima 2018, pp. 668–669.
- 127.
See discussion in Feld and Switzer 2012.
- 128.
- 129.
WTO 2017.
- 130.
WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002), para 31.
- 131.
GATT United States – Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, Dispute Panel Report, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155 (Tuna-Dolphin (1991)) .
- 132.
Ibid. paras 5.17–5.19.
- 133.
The panel was also asked to consider the compliance of dolphin safe labelling requirements but found they were not incompatible with US obligations under the GATT; GATT, Tuna-Dolphin (1991), above n 131, paras 5.41–5.44.
- 134.
GATT, Tuna-Dolphin (1991), above n 131, para 5.27.
- 135.
Howse 2002, p. 491.
- 136.
GATT, United States—Restrictions on Import of Tuna, Dispute Panel Report, 16 June 1994, 33 ILM 839 (1994).
- 137.
As noted by Howse 2002, p. 491 (footnote 9), while the first panel had introduced a jurisdictional limitation on the freedom of action of contracting parties under GATT Article XX, this limitation was dealt with differently by second panel; p. 491. According to Howse, in the ‘second Tuna/Dolphin ruling, the panel rejected the territorial limitation that the first Tuna/Dolphin panel had placed on Article XX, instead suggesting that Article XX(b) and (g) could not apply to measures that would only be effective in protecting the environment were other countries to change their policies’.
- 138.
Howse 2002, p. 491.
- 139.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 289.
- 140.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 294.
- 141.
Though earlier disputes had dealt with issues pertaining to trade and environmental protection; e.g. WTO, US—Gasoline, above n 80. The confines of space preclude an exhaustive analysis of all disputes dealing with environmental issues.
- 142.
WTO, US—Shrimp (Panel Report), above n 96, paras 2.6 & 2.17.
- 143.
Ibid., paras 2.7–2.8.
- 144.
Ibid., paras 2.8–2.10.
- 145.
Ibid., paras 2.11–2.16.
- 146.
Ibid., para 7.13. Indeed, the US did not dispute this aspect of the complainants’ argument.
- 147.
WTO, US—Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), above n 101, para 112.
- 148.
Ibid., para 121.
- 149.
Ibid.
- 150.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 289.
- 151.
WTO, US—Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), above n 101, para 130.
- 152.
Ibid., para 128.
- 153.
Ibid., paras 128–131.
- 154.
See discussion in WTO, US—Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), above n 101, para 127. For a useful overview of more recent jurisprudence in respect of GATT Article XX(g), see Chi 2014.
- 155.
CITES, above n 78, Article II.1, cited in WTO, US – Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), above n 101, para 132.
- 156.
WTO, US – Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), above n 101, para 132.
- 157.
Ibid. para 156; in full: ‘we consider that it embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to (j), on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand’.
- 158.
Ibid., para 161.
- 159.
Ibid., para 165.
- 160.
Ibid., para 166.
- 161.
Howse 2002, p. 505.
- 162.
Kulovesi 2016, p. 57.
- 163.
Ibid.
- 164.
Kulovesi 2016.
- 165.
See discussion in Stephens 2009, p. 344.
- 166.
WTO, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report, 3 December 2007, WT/DS332/AB/R (Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body Report)).
- 167.
McGrady 2009 provides a useful analysis of this dispute.
- 168.
WTO, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Panel Report, 12 June 2007, WT/DS332/R, para 7.53 (Brazil—Tyres (Panel Report)).
- 169.
Ibid., para 7.140.
- 170.
Brazil—Tyres (Appellate Body Report), above n 166, para 210.
- 171.
WTO, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Appellate Body Report, 7 April 2005, WT/DS285/AB/R, para 306, cited in Brazil—Tyres (Appellate Body Report), above n 166, para 143.
- 172.
Brazil – Tyres (Appellate Body Report), above n 166, para 178.
- 173.
Ibid., para 150.
- 174.
Ibid., para 146.
- 175.
Ibid., para 178.
- 176.
Ibid.
- 177.
Ibid., para 179. See discussion in Andersen 2015, p. 397.
- 178.
Ibid., para 179. See discussion in Andersen 2015, p. 397.
- 179.
Ibid., para 210.
- 180.
Andersen 2015, p. 397.
- 181.
For a general discussion on such issues, see Andersen 2015.
- 182.
Brazil—Tyres (Appellate Body Report), above n 166, para 227.
- 183.
Ibid., para 227.
- 184.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 299.
- 185.
Ibid.
- 186.
- 187.
WTO, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Appellate Body Report, 24 May 2013, WT/DS412/AB/R (Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, Appellate Body Report, 24 May 2013, WT/DS426/AB/R (Canada—Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report) para 4.17.
- 188.
Ibid.
- 189.
Ibid., paras 4.21–4.23.
- 190.
The reasoning of the Appellate Body in respect of the legal interpretation of Article III:8(a) was arguably narrower than that employed by the Panel; see discussion in Charnovitz and Fischer 2015.
- 191.
See WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 UNTS 14, Article 1 for the definition of a subsidy.
- 192.
WTO, Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada—Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report), above n 187, para 5.163.
- 193.
Ibid., para 5.164.
- 194.
WTO, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Panel Report, 19 December 2012, WT/DS412/R, (Canada—Renewable Energy (Panel Report)); WTO, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, Panel Report, 19 December 2012, WT/DS426/R (Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program (Panel Report)), para 7.318.
- 195.
Ibid., paras 7.318–7.327.
- 196.
Ibid., para 7.327.
- 197.
Ibid., para 7.328.
- 198.
WTO, Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada—Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report), above n 187, para 5.190. In essence, the ‘proper benchmark for wind- and solar PV-generated electricity should take into account the Government of Ontario's definition of the energy supply-mix as including wind- and solar PV-generated electricity, which implies the existence of separate markets for wind- and solar PV-generated electric’ para 5.204.
- 199.
WTO, Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada—Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report), above n 187, para 5.118.
- 200.
Ibid., para 5.187.
- 201.
Charnovitz and Fischer 2015, p. 198.
- 202.
WTO, Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report), above n 187, paras 5.245–5.246.
- 203.
See Espa 2019, p. 989.
- 204.
Charnovitz and Fischer 2015, p. 204.
- 205.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 298.
- 206.
Ibid.
- 207.
WTO, Canada—Renewable Energy (Appellate Body Report)); WTO, Canada—Feed-In Tariff Program (Appellate Body Report), above n 187, para 5.186.
- 208.
Charnovitz and Fischer 2015, p. 208.
- 209.
- 210.
Charnovitz and Fischer 2015, pp. 207–209.
- 211.
Ibid. See also Bigdeli 2014.
- 212.
- 213.
WTO, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Panel Report, 15 September 2011, WT/DS381/R (US—Tuna II (Panel Report)) paras 2.9 to 2.26.
- 214.
Ibid., paras 6.41 to 6.44. The Panel exercised judicial economy in respect of Mexico’s claims under GATT Article I:1 and III:4. This was because it considered that ‘in addressing all aspects of Mexico's claims under the TBT Agreement, including, but not limited to, its discrimination claims, we have addressed Mexico's claims in a manner sufficient to resolve the dispute’.
- 215.
WTO, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Appellate Body Report, 16 May 2012, WT/DS381/AB/R (US—Tuna II (Appellate Body Report, Appellate Body Report)) para 213.
- 216.
Ibid., para 297; ‘The US measure fully addresses the adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins in the ETP, whereas it does "not address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP"’.
- 217.
Ibid.
- 218.
For a useful discussion on the issue of risk calibration, see Coglianese and Sapir 2017.
- 219.
For a useful summary, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm Accessed 18 December 2020.
- 220.
Coglianese and Sapir 2017.
- 221.
Ibid., p. 347.
- 222.
Ibid.
- 223.
See generally Coglianese and Sapir 2017.
- 224.
See generally Baroncini and Brunel 2020.
- 225.
See discussion in Baroncini and Brunel 2020.
- 226.
Cosbey and Mavroidis 2014b, p. 300.
- 227.
Ibid.
- 228.
Quick 2013, p. 981.
- 229.
Howse 2016, p. 9.
- 230.
Ibid., p. 44.
- 231.
Kulovesi 2011, pp. 81 to 82.
- 232.
Trachtman 2017, p. 304.
- 233.
Asmelash 2015.
- 234.
Trachtman 2017, p. 274.
- 235.
Ibid., p. 274.
- 236.
Ibid., pp. 273–275.
- 237.
Drawing on insights from the excellent piece by Coglianese and Sapir 2017.
- 238.
- 239.
See generally Trujillo 2013.
- 240.
Pauwelyn 2016.
- 241.
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Switzer, S. (2022). The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In: Sobenes, E., Mead, S., Samson, B. (eds) The Environment Through the Lens of International Courts and Tribunals. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-507-2_5
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