Abstract
The 2020 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Weapons (NPT) will mark a benchmark 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty, which is considered the cornerstone of non-proliferation. A Preparatory Committee for the Review Conferences, which are held every five years, normally holds a two-week session in each of the three years leading up to the review conference. Three such ‘PrepComs’ convened in Vienna in 2017, in Geneva in 2018 and in New York in 2019. All indications point to a contentious review in 2020. Over the years of nine Review Conferences, States Parties have probably spent more time discussing Article VI of the Treaty than any other. It causes the most aggravation because it calls for pursuing negotiations towards disarmament, and a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which some see as tangible and others see as an elusive goal. Over the years, most States Parties have believed that the first step in that direction is the entry into force of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). States Parties decided in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely, with the understanding that a CTBT, a Middle East Zone free of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and other conditions would be met. In keeping with these demands, and after generations of calls for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament led to the signing of the CTBT at the United Nations in September 1996. Twenty-three years later there is a global norm against nuclear test explosions, the verification regime is more than 90% complete, and large-scale on-site inspection exercises in Kazakhstan and Jordan have demonstrated that those provisions in the treaty are effective. However, eight of the 44 countries specified in the CTBT that must ratify for it to enter into force have yet to do so. How to square this circle remains problematic.
Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org, and Senior Adviser at Partnership for a Secure America, www.psaonline.org; Director of the CTBT International Coalition.
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Notes
- 1.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—NPT—(1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161.
- 2.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by UNGA Res 50/245 (10 September 1996), 35 ILM 1439. See The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical issues for the United States, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/CTBT-NAS-2012-2pg.pdf.
- 3.
See Mackby 2016.
- 4.
SC Res 2231 (2015).
- 5.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (7 July 2017), UN-Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8.
- 6.
China, France, United Kingdom, United States, USSR.
- 7.
See Mackby 2011.
- 8.
Including the four States possessing nuclear weapons that are not party to the NPT: DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan.
- 9.
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf.
- 10.
Rauf T (1995) After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995, Monterey Institute, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/raufjo31.pdf.
- 11.
See United Nations, Consensus Eludes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as Positions Harden on Ways to Free Middle East of Mass Destruction Weapons, DC/3561, 22 May 2015 https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm.
- 12.
See NATO Review, Durkalec, J, The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis, 29 June 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/EN/index.htm.
- 13.
See Kmentt A, How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT, Arms Control Today, Dec. 2013, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-12/divergent-views-nuclear-disarmament-threaten-npt.
- 14.
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume 1, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/GENERAL-DOCS/2000FD.pdf.
- 15.
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume 1, Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I).
- 16.
Only the DPRK has tested in this century: 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice), and 2017.
- 17.
See Statement of Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights of Mexico, Ambassador Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo at the 9th Review Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April 2015, https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/MX_en.pdf.
- 18.
See United Nations, Consensus Eludes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as Positions Harden on Ways to Free Middle East of Mass Destruction Weapons, DC/3561, 22 May 2015, https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3561.doc.htm.
- 19.
See Sanger D, Broad W, Erdogan’s Ambitions Go Beyond Syria. He Says He Wants Nuclear Weapons, New York Times, 20 October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html.
- 20.
For the conferences and further activities on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, see https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons-and-nuclear-terrorism/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/.
- 21.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/.
- 22.
For more on North Korea testing, see Comparison of seismic signals (to scale) of all six declared DPRK Nuclear Tests, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 3 September 2017, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-sept-dprk/, Kim et al. 2016; Ringbom et al. 2014.
- 23.
- 24.
Nuclear Posture Review, Department of Defense, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
- 25.
See NATO, NATO and the Non-proliferation Treaty, Fact Sheet, March 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170323_170323-npt-factsheet.pdf.
- 26.
See Nuclear Posture Review 2018.
- 27.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (8 December 1987), https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text.
- 28.
Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol (8 April 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol.
- 29.
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.3 [https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.3] submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates).
- 30.
‘Addressing Vienna Issues’, Working Paper submitted by the ‘Vienna Group of Ten’ (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) to the 2018 PrepCom, https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5.
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‘Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’, Working Paper submitted by the Russian Federation, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.42, 26 April 2019, https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/21491764/npt_conf2020_pciii_wp42-wp42-final-190419wp-russia-on-ctbt.pdf.
- 32.
Chairman’s Working Paper, Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NPT_CONF.2020_PC.III_WP.49-WP.49.-PAPERSMART-Explanatory-Note-CHAIR-20191.pdf.
- 33.
‘SNSC Statement: Iran No More Committed to Restrictions on Enriched Uranium, Heavy Water Reserves’, Fars News, 8 May 2019, http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13980218000167.
- 34.
‘Top Lawmaker: Iran to pursue policies under JCPOA, NPT’, Tehran Times, 8 May 2019, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwi70eTs0qriAhVNo1kKHbwUBa0QFjAAegQIBRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pressreader.com%2Firan%2Ftehran-times%2F20190508%2F281668256411765&usg=AOvVaw0UYsEJFEJpCL3MeMPE_hkG.
- 35.
‘Nuclear test-ban body says ready to verify Korean site closure if asked’, Reuters, 16 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-ctbto/nuclear-test-ban-body-says-ready-to-verify-korean-site-closure-if-asked-idUSKCN1IH2E4. See also 38 North, North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Current Status and Future Inspections. 12 December 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/12/punggye121218/.
- 36.
‘Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament’, Working Paper submitted by the United States of America, (18 April 2018), NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30.
- 37.
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Decision 2, 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Part 1, Annex, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf.
- 38.
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Part 1, Annex, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf.
- 39.
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33.
- 40.
General Assembly Resolution ‘Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction’, A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1, 17 Oct. 2018, https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.22/REV.1.
- 41.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and under Water (Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—PTBT—5 August 1963), 480 UNTS 43.
- 42.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and Protocol Thereto (Threshold Test Ban Treaty—TTBT—3 July 1974), http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/ttbt.
- 43.
- 44.
See Mackby 2015.
- 45.
These States are listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, ‘Treaty Text’, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/. See also Ramaker et al. 2003.
- 46.
See Ghose 1997.
- 47.
Mounir Zahran, ‘The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the Middle East’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2–8 August 2018, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/25073.aspx.
- 48.
The regions are listed in Annex I of the Treaty, ‘Treaty Text’, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/.
- 49.
Gordon M, U.S. Says Russia Likely Conducting Low-Yield Nuke Tests, Defying Test Ban Treaty, Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-russia-likely-conducting-low-yield-nuke-tests-defying-test-ban-treaty-11559135102.
- 50.
Sonne P, U.S. military intelligence steps up accusation against Russia over nuclear testing, Washington Post, 13 June 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-intelligence-steps-up-accusation-against-russia-over-nuclear-testing/2019/06/13/2dadf2e2-8e26-11e9-b162-8f6f41ec3c04_story.html.
- 51.
See Herzog 2018
- 52.
- 53.
Carlson 2019.
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Mackby, J. (2020). The NPT—CTBT Connection. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume V. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-347-4_3
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