Abstract
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are platforms that can perform military tasks and take decisions relating thereto on their own—using artificial intelligence. While such technology has not yet been developed, research is headed this way. Are these systems capable of complying with current rules under international humanitarian law (IHL)? Which factors of substantive legal provisions pose particular challenges and what parameters would LAWS have to meet in order to act lawfully? Core principles of IHL under treaties and custom are identified, explained and applied. As regards distinction, it is argued that research here offers the most promising advancements. However, the rule rests upon subjective determinations and ever-present doubt. One may also differentiate when examining proportionality: expected collateral damage is relatively objective and can already be calculated by software. In contrast, military advantage anticipated proves too complex and subjective. Furthermore, the open wording of this rule and its dependence on moral standards leads makes adherence to IHL currently impossible. It is suggested that extralegal issues should also be given sufficient consideration; details are however beyond the scope here. It is finally concluded that for the time being as well as the foreseeable future, LAWS are incompatible with IHL. Thus, humans must stay in or on the loop and retain (meaningful human) control in order to ensure observance of the law of armed conflict. Any technological achievement may nevertheless enhance the human-machine interface in the sense that humans and systems are partnered; thereby allowing for utilizing progress while securing lawful conduct at the same time.
Matthias Brenneke (currently Junior Lawyer at MANNER SPANGENBERG Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB; formerly Legal Advisor at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Kuala Lumpur) is seeking bar admission at the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg. He would like to thank Prof Dr. Terry Gill as well as the peer reviewers for their critical and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. This chapter was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect the views of any institution the author is or has been affiliated with.
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Notes
- 1.
For precise definitions and nuances of AI, see UN Institute for Disarmament Research 2018.
- 2.
For an overview of the pursuit of delegating jobs from humans to machines, see Singer 2009, pp. 42–62.
- 3.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature 26 June 1945, USTS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945), Article 38(1).
- 4.
See, representatively, Anderson and Waxman 2013; Asaro 2012, pp. 691, 709; Sharkey 2012, pp. 796–798; Foy 2014, pp. 63–69; Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2017) Report of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/ GGE.1/2017/CRP.1, para 16; and various position by states.
- 5.
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), para 86.
- 6.
See, representatively, Henderson et al. 2017; Margulies 2017; UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 75–81; Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 42–45; Egeland 2016, pp. 107–116; Schmitt 2013, pp. 33 f.; Singer 2009, pp. 407–411; France 2018.
- 7.
Singer 2009, p. 123, quoting Thomas Adams.
- 8.
UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 58, 62; Asaro 2012, p. 692; Meier 2017, pp. 447–456. There have also been warnings against a lowered threshold of going to war in general, see, e.g., China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; Singh Gill 2018, para 40.
- 9.
For implications, see Birnbacher 2016.
- 10.
ICRC 2013, p. 8.
- 11.
Common Article 2 Geneva Conventions, e.g. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I), Article 2; ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1 (Tadić), para 70.
- 12.
For an overview, see Kleffner 2013, pp. 44 f.
- 13.
See, e.g., GC I, above n 11, Article 3.
- 14.
Tadić, above n 11, para 562.
- 15.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1949, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I).
- 16.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978).
- 17.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005.
- 18.
See AIV/CAVV 2015, Annex II.
- 19.
NATO Standardization Office 2016, paras 0202–0208.
- 20.
Considering that the question of definition and levels of autonomy is covered in almost every academic contribution and every national view about LAWS, recourse in this section will be had only to selected documents. See, representatively, Singh Gill 2018, paras 1–9.
- 21.
- 22.
ICRC 2016, p. 71.
- 23.
US Department of Defense 2012, pp. 13 f.
- 24.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 235.
- 25.
This is the distinguishing feature according to ICRC 2016, p. 71.
- 26.
Thurnher 2016, p. 181.
- 27.
UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 40.
- 28.
- 29.
Wagner 2016, para 4.
- 30.
- 31.
ICRC 2016, p. 71.
- 32.
Wagner 2011, pp. 158 f.
- 33.
E.g. Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 2.
- 34.
Singer 2009, pp. 74 f.
- 35.
Russian Federation (2018) Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, paras 9, 11 f.; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 42–56.
- 36.
European Union 2018, p. 2; France and Germany 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Austria, Brazil, Chile (2018) Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-binding Instrument that addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; United Kingdom (2018) Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s perspective on human control over weapon development and targeting cycles, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, paras 6, 8, 10, 15; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 1, 8.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 282.
- 40.
- 41.
For a thorough discussion of LAWS and the distinction regarding civilian objects/military objectives, see Homayounnejad 2018, Chapter 6.5.3, pp. 200–219 (preliminary pagination).
- 42.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 1 and 7.
- 43.
Foy 2014, p. 56.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
- 47.
Schulzke 2011, pp. 300 f.
- 48.
- 49.
Anderson and Waxman 2013, p. 12.
- 50.
- 51.
Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 31.
- 52.
Foy 2014, p. 59.
- 53.
Toscano 2015, pp. 210, 216.
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
Schmitt 2013, pp. 11, 18.
- 58.
- 59.
- 60.
- 61.
- 62.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 5.
- 63.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 610, para 1913.
- 64.
AP I, above n 15, Article 50(1) sentence 2; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 6, Section “Situations of doubt as to the character of a person”.
- 65.
- 66.
- 67.
Meaning that everything could be assigned a value of either 0 or 1.
- 68.
Schmitt 2013, p. 17. He also emphasizes that the problem of doubt only arises in the context of combatant/non-combatant, but not regarding civilian objects/military objectives.
- 69.
- 70.
Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 262 f.
- 71.
Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 195, 197 f.
- 72.
ICRC 2009, pp. 16, 46.
- 73.
Ibid., p. 47.
- 74.
Ibid., pp. 56 f.; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 196 f.
- 75.
- 76.
AP I, above n 15, Article 41(1). Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of the War on Land, opened for signature 18 October 1907, International Peace Conference, The Hague, Official Record 206 (entered into force 26 January 1910), Article 23(c); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 47.
- 77.
For medical personnel: AP I, above n 15; Article 15. GC I, above n 11, Articles 24–26; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II), Article 36; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 8 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV), Article 20; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 25. For military chaplains: AP I, above n 15, Article 15; GC I, above n 11, Article 24; GC II, n 77, Article 36; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 27.
- 78.
Amoroso and Tamburrini 2017, p. 6; Liu 2012, pp. 645 f.; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 259, 263. Toscano stated that measurements such as body temperature and heart rate would help the problem, see Toscano 2015, p. 216. However, such advance of technology would only help but not solve the issue and its achievement is currently doubtful.
- 79.
Homayounnejad 2018, p. 199.
- 80.
- 81.
- 82.
GC I, above n 11, Article 22(1); GC II, above n 77, Article 35(1); AP I, above n 15, Article 13(2)(a).
- 83.
See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 4; AP I, above n 15, Article 43(3).
- 84.
Homayounnejad 2018, p. 187.
- 85.
- 86.
Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 263 f.
- 87.
Schulzke 2011, pp. 301 f.
- 88.
- 89.
United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4, paras 7–37.
- 90.
Human Rights Watch 2012, pp. 30 f.
- 91.
Singer 2009, p. 76.
- 92.
- 93.
- 94.
- 95.
Foy 2014, p. 58.
- 96.
Wagner 2011, p. 161.
- 97.
- 98.
- 99.
Homayounnejad 2018, p. 191.
- 100.
Ibid., pp. 223 f.
- 101.
This view is explicitly shared for example by China, see China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3. China’s approach has nonetheless been viewed as ambiguous, see Kania 2018.
- 102.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 14 (emphasis added).
- 103.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 683, para 2206 and p. 685, para 2219.
- 104.
Aiming directly at civilians or civilian objects is prohibited, see AP I, above n 15, Articles 51(2) and 52(1).
- 105.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 625, para 1977.
- 106.
Ibid., p. 625, para 1978, and pp. 683 f.; para 2208; Oeter 2013, p. 198.
- 107.
Oeter 2013, p. 197.
- 108.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 679, para 2187.
- 109.
Ibid., p. 684, para 2209 and p. 685, para 2218.
- 110.
Oeter 2013, p. 197.
- 111.
Ibid. For the principle of distinction, see below, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 112.
- 113.
- 114.
Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 12 f.; Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 240, 264 f.; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 14. See also above, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 115.
- 116.
Thurnher 2016, p. 189.
- 117.
- 118.
- 119.
Schulzke 2011, p. 302.
- 120.
Toscano 2015, pp. 211 f.; 217, calling for a “failsafe mechanism”.
- 121.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 256.
- 122.
Schulzke 2011, p. 303.
- 123.
Ibid., p. 302; Homayounnejad 2018, p. 272.
- 124.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 256.
- 125.
Schmitt 2013, p. 20.
- 126.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 256 f.
- 127.
Arkin 2008, p. 126.
- 128.
ICTY 2000, para 48.
- 129.
Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 12 f.
- 130.
Van den Boogaard 2015, p. 261.
- 131.
Ibid., pp. 261, 264 f.
- 132.
- 133.
- 134.
Sandoz et al. 1987, p. 684, para 2212.
- 135.
Grut 2013, p. 12.
- 136.
Ibid.; UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, para 70.
- 137.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 97; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 23(1); GC IV, above n 77, Article 28; AP I, above n 15, Article 51(7).
- 138.
O’Connell 2013, p. 12.
- 139.
UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 70 f.
- 140.
- 141.
Foy 2014, p. 56.
- 142.
Toscano 2015, p. 217.
- 143.
Foy 2014, p. 60.
- 144.
Ibid., p. 59; Wagner 2011, p. 163.
- 145.
Foy 2014, p. 60.
- 146.
Ibid.
- 147.
Ibid.
- 148.
Sharkey 2010, p. 380.
- 149.
- 150.
Egeland 2016, p. 104.
- 151.
Wagner 2016, para 19.
- 152.
- 153.
Schmitt 2013, p. 20.
- 154.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 254.
- 155.
Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 272 f. He points out that some scholars generally dismiss that the protection of own forces would count as military advantage while others argue that either strict burdens regarding concreteness and directness of such advantage must be met or that these aspects may not form the only aspects in the assessment.
- 156.
Ibid., p. 272.
- 157.
Ibid., pp. 271–275.
- 158.
Ibid.
- 159.
- 160.
ICTY, Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion, 5 December 2003, Case No. IT-98-29-T, para 58 (footnotes omitted).
- 161.
Grut 2013, pp. 12 f.
- 162.
Asaro 2012, p. 701.
- 163.
Human Rights Watch 2012, p. 33.
- 164.
Sharkey 2012, pp. 789 f.
- 165.
Wagner 2011, p. 162. Neither does the Oxford Dictionary provide any clarification since it defines “excessive” as “more than is necessary, normal, or desirable; immoderate”. See English Oxford Dictionary (2018) Definition of excessive in English. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/excessive. Accessed 11 April 2019.
- 166.
Egeland 2016, p. 104.
- 167.
- 168.
Herbach 2012, p. 18.
- 169.
- 170.
Wagner 2011, p. 163.
- 171.
Foy 2014, p. 61.
- 172.
Ibid.
- 173.
- 174.
- 175.
Wagner 2016, para 19.
- 176.
Grut 2013, p. 13.
- 177.
Krupiy 2015, p. 172.
- 178.
Foy 2014, p. 61.
- 179.
- 180.
- 181.
- 182.
Grut 2013, p. 13.
- 183.
Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 282 f.
- 184.
See above, Sect. 3.3.2.1.
- 185.
See above, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 186.
Singh Gill 2018, para 21.
- 187.
United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 15.
- 188.
See above, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 189.
NATO Standardization Office 2016, paras 0102 f.
- 190.
See also below, Sect. 3.3.4.3.
- 191.
- 192.
- 193.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 15–21.
- 194.
AP I, above n 15, Article 57(1).
- 195.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rules 16–21; AP I, above n 15, Article 57(2), (3).
- 196.
- 197.
- 198.
- 199.
- 200.
- 201.
Herbach 2012, pp. 11 f.
- 202.
Egeland 2016, p. 106.
- 203.
Ibid.
- 204.
- 205.
- 206.
Herbach 2012, pp. 17–19.
- 207.
- 208.
Herbach 2012, p. 8. He also opines that in-the-loop systems are the only current possibility since on-the-loop types do not always guarantee sufficient human action (ibid., p. 17). Homayounnejad proposes that LAWS able to learn independently could be programmed in a fashion that they are allowed to only learn “offline”, meaning not while deployed. This would yield a possibility to ensure supervision of such processes by humans. Another useful suggestion is the limitation of LAWS to strict target parameters. See Homayounnejad 2018, pp. 263, 265–267.
- 209.
- 210.
- 211.
- 212.
- 213.
- 214.
Oeter 2013, p. 125, referring to the St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, opened for signature 11 December 1868, 138 CTS 297 (entered into force 11 December 1868).
- 215.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 70; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n 5, paras 78 f.
- 216.
- 217.
- 218.
Van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 257 f.
- 219.
UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 106–108. For detailed recommendations for conducting LAWS reviews, see Backstrom and Henderson 2012.
- 220.
- 221.
AP I, above n 15, Article 36.
- 222.
- 223.
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 71.
- 224.
- 225.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 273 f.
- 226.
- 227.
ICRC 2006, pp. 951 f.
- 228.
Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, pp. 273, 276.
- 229.
ICRC 2006, pp. 938–945.
- 230.
- 231.
- 232.
For the principle of distinction, see above, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 233.
Toscano 2015, pp. 206–208.
- 234.
Anderson and Waxman 2013, pp. 10 f.; Schmitt and Thurnher 2013, p. 276; Thurnher 2016, p. 187. Not tied to Article 36 AP I but in general, this is disputed, see UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 89–97; Asaro 2012, pp. 696–700; van den Boogaard 2015, pp. 278, 279. See also above, Sect. 3.3.2.3.
- 235.
See above, Sect. 3.3.1.
- 236.
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n 5, paras 78, 84, 87.
- 237.
AP I, above n 15, Article 1(2).
- 238.
- 239.
Evans 2013, p. 725.
- 240.
Egeland 2016, p. 107.
- 241.
- 242.
- 243.
ICRC (2018) Ethics and autonomous weapon systems: An ethical basis for human control? UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5, para 8.
- 244.
- 245.
ICRC (2018) Ethics and autonomous weapon systems: An ethical basis for human control? UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.5, para 73.
- 246.
UN General Assembly (2013) Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47, paras 89–97; Holy See 2017; Estonia, Finland (2018) Categorizing lethal autonomous weapons systems—A technical and legal perspective to understanding LAWS, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.2, paras 11–13.
- 247.
- 248.
As Homayounnejad 2018, p. 275 frankly formulated: “context is king, […]”.
- 249.
Singer 2009, p. 396: “[a] computer has no anger to make it lash out like at My Lai, but it also has no pity, no disgust, and no sense of guilt. [Everything is] just a series of zeros and ones.” Furthermore at p. 433: “In making war less human, we may also be making it less humane.” For ethical considerations, see Holy See 2017; Estonia, Finland (2018) Categorizing lethal autonomous weapons systems—A technical and legal perspective to understanding LAWS, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.2, paras 11–13.
- 250.
- 251.
European Union 2018, p. 2; France and Germany 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Austria, Brazil, Chile (2018) Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-binding Instrument that addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns posed by Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; United Kingdom (2018) Human Machine Touchpoints: The United Kingdom’s perspective on human control over weapon development and targeting cycles, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.1, paras 6, 8, 10, 15; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 1, 8; Singh Gill 2018, para 11.
- 252.
Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, para 26(b).
- 253.
Russia agrees in principle but questions a universal standard, states should rather make such determinations independently, see Russian Federation 2018, paras 9, 11, 12. The United States has also commented rather critically, see United States 2018b Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, paras 42–53.
- 254.
Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (2018) Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, paras 32–35, 46–49.
- 255.
This is also supported by many stakeholders, see, e.g., European Union 2018, p. 2; Kingdom of the Netherlands 2018, p. 2; Republic of Korea 2018, p. 2; China (2018) Position Paper, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7, para 3; Russian Federation (2018) Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Functions of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the Context of the Purposes and Objectives of the Convention, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6, paras 2, 12; United States (2018) Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4, paras 3, 35, 40; United States (2018) Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.4, para 40; Singh Gill 2018, paras 21, 36, 41.
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Brenneke, M. (2020). Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and Their Compatibility with International Humanitarian Law: A Primer on the Debate. In: Gill, T., Geiß, R., Krieger, H., Paulussen, C. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 21 (2018). Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol 21. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-343-6_3
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