Abstract
The concept of reason is pervasive in our ordinary practices, but there is a large and divisive disagreement about their role in the foundation and explanation of morality. Such disagreement depends on three related issues, which concern the definition of “moral reasons,” their sources and functions. This chapter first takes into account material and formal definitions of moral reasons and clarifies the role of reasons in the explanation and justification of intentional action. Second, it addresses the source of reasons and considers whether reasons are subjective or objective, personal or impersonal, and how they are related to the agent’s values, integrity, and authenticity. Moral theories differ in their account of the contents of moral reasons, but also in their epistemological account of how moral reasons are produced or recognized. Third, the chapter discusses the claim that morality is a cooperative enterprise, proposing an analysis of internalist and externalist accounts of reasons, and their prospects in addressing the phenomena of coordination and moral compliance.
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Bagnoli, C. (2018). Reasons in Moral Philosophy. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_2
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