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Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit

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Die Psychologie der Entscheidung

Zusammenfassung

Wir haben in Abschn. 2.1.2 bei der Besprechung von unsicheren Ereignissen darauf hingewiesen, dass grundsätzlich alle Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit getroffen werden, weil die Konsequenzen jeder Entscheidung immer erst nach der Entscheidung eintreten und daher nie in einem absoluten Sinne sicher sein können. Dennoch unterscheidet man praktisch und theoretisch Situationen, in denen die Konsequenzen von Entscheidungen als sicher angenommen werden können, von Situationen, in denen sie als unsicher gelten und in denen diese Unsicherheit für die Entscheidung eine Rolle spielt. In den Kap. 3 und 4 haben wir Entscheidungen unter Sicherheit behandelt; die Wahl zwischen Optionen wurde mit dem Nutzen der Konsequenzen erklärt. In Kap. 5 haben wir dann den Aspekt der Unsicherheit behandelt, zunächst weitgehend unabhängig von seiner Bedeutung für Entscheidungen zwischen Optionen. In diesem Kapitel geht es nun um Entscheidungen, in denen sowohl der Nutzen als auch die Unsicherheit der Konsequenzen relevant sind. In Theorien zum Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit wird die kognitive Integration der beiden Faktoren Nutzen und Unsicherheit formuliert, in der Empirie wird geprüft, ob bzw. wie gut sich beobachtbares Entscheidungsverhalten mit diesen Theorien beschreiben lässt. Gemeinsam ist allen Theorien, um die es in diesem Kapitel geht, eine konsequentialistische Grundannahme: Entscheidungen werden in Hinblick auf ihre Folgen getroffen. Auf nichtkonsequentialistische Ansätze gehen wir in den folgenden Kapiteln, vor allem in Kap. 8 und 9 ein.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Experimentelle Wirtschaftspsychologie, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Deutschland

    Hans Rüdiger Pfister

  2. Inst. für Psychologie und Arbeitswissenschaften, TU Berlin, Berlin, Deutschland

    Helmut Jungermann

  3. Hochschule für Angewandte Psychologie, Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz, Olten, Schweiz

    Katrin Fischer

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Pfister, H.R., Jungermann, H., Fischer, K. (2017). Entscheiden unter Unsicherheit. In: Die Psychologie der Entscheidung. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53038-2_6

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