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Self-Regulation Versus Public Regulation: An Analysis of Environmental and Safety Standard Setting in the Oil and Gas Pipeline Sector

  • Chapter
Market Integration: The EU Experience and Implications for Regulatory Reform in China

Part of the book series: China-EU Law Series ((CELS,volume 2))

Abstract

Still there occurs a large amount of accidental and non-accidental damage caused by running oil and gas pipelines. In fact, pipelines, similar to other industrial activities, cannot be kept completely safe from accidents. However, accidents caused by the pipelines are to a large extent preventable. Among the various policy instruments that are available, regulation may be considered as an appropriate instrument to guarantee the safety of oil and gas pipelines. This chapter shows that the protection of the public at large against personal injuries and the protection of the environment can be achieved through various types of both public and private standards. It is precisely this mix of public and private standards, as well as the use of a variety of different standards to regulate the safety of oil and gas pipelines, that will be the subject of this chapter. Standard setting and enforcement could also affect market integration. Indeed, regulatory reform is one of the central elements to overcome market failures in market integration. Keeping that in mind, this chapter holds that different standards should equally be considered in the regulatory reforms aiming at market integration with respect to oil and gas pipelines.

For the purpose of this chapter, we describe the various types of technical, environmental and safety regulations aimed at ensuring the safe operation of oil and gas pipelines. In addition, we provide a theory of standard-setting, distinguishing between public regulation, private regulation and co-regulation. From that distinction, we provide a critical analysis of technical, safety and environmental standards and propose an alternative “smart mix” of public and private regulation in this domain.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Dutch pronounced as “Gellingen”.

  2. 2.

    For further discussion, see Bruggeman (2010), pp. 269–271.

  3. 3.

    See South China Monitoring Post (2014) Owners never inspected the Taiwan gas pipeline, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1566101/owner-pipeline-caused-deadly-blasts-kaohsiung-never-inspected-it. Accessed 6 October 2014.

  4. 4.

    See Xinhau (2013) Death toll from China oil pipeline blast rises to 52, 11 missing, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/24/c_132913391.htm. Accessed 6 October 2014.

  5. 5.

    See Montiel et al. (1996); see also Burgherr and Hirschberg (2008).

  6. 6.

    For example, because of an oil pipeline accident in 1984 in a section between Almetyevsk and Novgorod in Russia nearly 127 tonnes of oil spilled into the Volga River. See on that Cherniaev et al. (1998), p. 246.

  7. 7.

    Cherniaev et al. (1998), p. 222.

  8. 8.

    Kandiyoti (2012), p. 36.

  9. 9.

    See for more information on gas pipeline accidents: Hirschberg et al. (2004); Muhlbauer (2004); Burgherr and Hirschberg (2005); Hirschberg et al. (1998); Montiel et al. (1996); for oil pipeline accidents, see Eckle and Burgherr (2013); Davis et al. (2006).

  10. 10.

    Shavell (1980).

  11. 11.

    Shavell (1983).

  12. 12.

    Barnard (2013), pp. 656–660.

  13. 13.

    Pelkmans (2012).

  14. 14.

    See for more information on oil and gas pipeline standards in the EU, the European Commission Directorate-General Environment report 2011. See also Papadakis (2000).

  15. 15.

    Schaffer et al. (2014), p. 329.

  16. 16.

    Zhaojie (2008), pp. 172–173.

  17. 17.

    For example in the west-East Pipeline Project which is a 4000 km gas pipeline originating in Xinxiang and ending in Shanghai, Shell was selected as a preferred partner for further negotiations. At the end, given the fact that the project was one of the major infrastructure projects, the Chinese party (PetroChina) was under pressure to conduct the project on time, hence PetroChina didn’t negotiate safety and environmental issues which could decelerate the project. On the other side, within the period of negotiation, Shell examined the EIAs conducted by PetroChina. After examination it became clear for Shell that there are significant environmental and safety issues which should be dealt with, unless the participation in the project would be difficult. In the end, although Shell was never appointed legally as a financial partner in the project, Shells participation in the project to some extent improved the quality of the EIAs and other assessments. See for more information Stalley (2010), pp. 119–125.

  18. 18.

    Burmese officials claimed that cracks have been found at several points on the pipeline and thus the construction of the pipeline does not comply with international standards. See About Oil (2014), China–Myanmar, breach of standards: new pipeline woes, http://www.abo.net/oilportal/topic/view.do?contentId=2200566. Accessed 10 November 2014.

  19. 19.

    Livermore and Revesz (2014).

  20. 20.

    For a detailed study on the need for and justification of safety and environmental standards, see Faure (2012). For a specific study on pipelines, see Perry and Haynes (1993).

  21. 21.

    Dudley and Brito (2012).

  22. 22.

    See Selznick (1985), p. 363; den Hertog (2003).

  23. 23.

    Black (2001).

  24. 24.

    Black (2001).

  25. 25.

    In principle, regulation can be divided into social regulation and economic regulation. Social regulation refers to environmental and safety regulation, consumer protection and labour law. Economic regulation, on the other hand, is mainly used for regulating markets. For more discussion, see Baron (1995), pp. 10–11 and 33; Ogus (2004); den Hertog (2003), pp. 7–8.

  26. 26.

    Meyer et al. (2008).

  27. 27.

    As indicated by Fliess et al. (2010), technical regulations cannot be broken down by safety and quality.

  28. 28.

    For example, in the BTC oil pipeline and SCP gas pipeline. Wawryk (2003) divides international oil and gas safety and environmental standards into three categories: standards for equipment and products, standards for environmental practices and standards to improve environmental performance.

  29. 29.

    For instance, in US pipelines, safety concerns are generally addressed by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006. For environmental concerns, actors should comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and other regulations. See Jewell (2007).

  30. 30.

    It is necessary to mention that the literature sometimes refers to technical codes and sometimes to technical standards; in this chapter both concepts are used interchangeably.

  31. 31.

    Committee on the Safety of Marine Pipelines (1994), p. 46.

  32. 32.

    Bai and Bai (2012), pp. 892–900.

  33. 33.

    See Wawryk (2003).

  34. 34.

    Antaki (2003), p. 23.

  35. 35.

    Kuprewicz (2007).

  36. 36.

    As stated by Braestrup et al.: “Design of the pipeline wall thickness is based on the classification of the pipeline”. The classification of pipeline into safety classes (location class) is mainly based on the location (human density) and transport medium. In fact, the pipeline must be designed with a sufficient wall thickness to withstand anticipated external pressures and loads in areas with more human activity. At the higher class, the more yield strength is required for the maximum design pressure because in the higher class, the greater number of buildings intended for human occupancy are located. See generally Braestrup et al. (2009), pp 78–79; and Hopkins (2005).

  37. 37.

    Menon (2005), p. 334. See for a detailed discussion of capital and operation costs of pipelines Omonbude (2012), pp. 13–14.

  38. 38.

    Seddon (2006), pp. 87–88.

  39. 39.

    For more discussion on the differences between technical standards of oil and gas pipelines see Meyer et al. (2008); Kuprewicz (2007); Muhlbauer (2004), p. 235. See also AdvancePipeliner (2010) Major Codes and Standards for Designing Pipelines. http://advancepipeliner.com/site/index.php/component/content/article/131-allcategories/16-major-codes-and-standards-for-designing-pipelines.html. Accessed 14 October 2014.

  40. 40.

    Antaki (2003), pp. 10–11.

  41. 41.

    Braestrup et al. (2009), p. 73.

  42. 42.

    See Chinese Standards (2007) Code for design of oil and gas transmission pipeline crossing engineering. http://www.chinesestandard.net/PDF-English-Translation/GB50423-2007.html. Accessed 11 November 2014.

  43. 43.

    For the complete list of the Chinese technical standards in the oil and gas sector see Chinese Standards (2014) List of Chinese Industry Standard. http://www.chinesestandard.net/List-PDF/SY.aspx. Accessed 11 November 2014.

  44. 44.

    See Chinese Standards (2007) Code for quality acceptance of oil and gas construction engineering. http://www.chinesestandard.net/PDF-English-Translation/SY4200-2007.html. Accessed 11 November 2014.

  45. 45.

    In China, professional standards are formulated by competent administrative authorities and should be confirmed by the standardisation committee (under the State Council). See Shen (2014), pp. 36–37.

  46. 46.

    Grishin (2005).

  47. 47.

    See for more information ASME official site: https://www.asme.org/about-asme. Accessed 23 November 2014.

  48. 48.

    Antaki (2003), p. 15.

  49. 49.

    See for example, Appendix 5, the code of practice of the Host Government Agreement Between and Among the Government of The Republic of Turkey and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) LTD. Statoil BTC Caspian AS Ramco Hazar Energy Limited TURKIYE Petrolleri A.O. Unocal BTC Pipeline, LTD. ITOCHU OIL Exploration (Azerbaijan) INC. Delta HESS (BTC) Limited. Accessible at the following address: http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/CifteVergilendirme/TC_MEP_anlasma.htm. Accessed 12 December 2013; Appendix 4, Host governmental agreement between and among the Government of Georgia and state oil company of the Azerbaijan Republic BP exploration (Azerbaijan) limited, Total finaelf E&P Caucasian Gas SA, Lukagip N.V., Statoil Azerbaijan a.s., Naft Iran Intertrade Co (Nico) limited, Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company Limited, Appendix 7, Gas sale agreement. See: http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/SHA/Eng/HGA/Host%20Government%20Agreement%20Georgia%20-(English).pdf. Accessed 16 July 2013.

  50. 50.

    See for more information Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (2014) http://www.jisc.go.jp/eng/index.html. Accessed 14 July 2014. In Australia, specific standards are provided by the public standards setting organisation for pipelines. The standards series of AS 2885 are specifically generated in relation to onshore pipelines. See note 35.

  51. 51.

    Steiner (2010).

  52. 52.

    Steiner (2010).

  53. 53.

    The British Standards Institution (BSI) standards are developed by committees consisting of government departments, research organisations, industries and so on. The British Standards Institution is termed a “non-profit distributing company” because profits are re-invested back into the business. For more information about BSI standards see Company Profile, accessible at the following address: http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/about-bsi/governance/. Accessed 14 October 2014. Although BSI is a private entity, it is recognised as the UK National Standards Body (NSB) by the UK Government. This status is formally codified in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United Kingdom Government and the British Standards Institution in respect of its activities as the United Kingdom’s National Standards Body.

  54. 54.

    See for more information the official website of the Chinese Standards at the following address: http://www.bsigroup.com/. Accessed 14 July 2014.

  55. 55.

    For example, BS standards have been set by the parties of the CPS and BTC pipelines as one of the technical standards (Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia host governmental agreements through Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline), see note 43. It is worth mentioning that in accordance with the CEN rules, BS 8010-1:1989, BS 8010-2.8:1992 and BS 8010-3:1993 have been replaced by EN 14161 since 2003. See BRITISH STANDARD. Petroleum and natural gas industries—Pipeline transportation systems, 2003. http://www.cngspw.com/Doc/WebNote/201108/Y2011M08D04H11m01s49/bs20en2014161-200320u77F3u6CB9u548Cu5929u7136u6C14u5DE5u4E1A.pdf. Accessed 14 October 2014.

  56. 56.

    See Cafaggi (2006), pp. 16–17.

  57. 57.

    See Dux (2011), pp. 116–117.

  58. 58.

    See the examples provided by Oliva (2015), p. 288 and by Schaffer et al. (2014), p. 17.

  59. 59.

    United Nations Environment Programme, Ozone Secretariat (2006), p. 92.

  60. 60.

    Perry and Haynes (1993).

  61. 61.

    Kandiyoti (2012), pp. 32–33.

  62. 62.

    Boss et al. (2004).

  63. 63.

    See for more information the European Commission report prepared by Directorate-General Environment, Assessing the case for EU legislation on the safety of pipelines and the possible impacts of such an initiative, 2011 (hereafter the European Commission Report 2011).

  64. 64.

    Muhlbauer (2004), p. 9.

  65. 65.

    Perry and Haynes (1993).

  66. 66.

    In the Netherlands via NEN 3650. See Kuprewicz (2007). In the Malaysian Quantified risk assessment model, data including, pipeline attributes relating to design, construction, operating pressure, damage/failure histories, in-line inspection, close internal potential survey, and others will be quantified. The risk then will be assessed because of: probability of Failure x Consequence of Failure. See for further discussion bin Mohd Ali Napiah (2009).

  67. 67.

    See Chinese Standards (2004) Safety regulations for heaters used in petroleum industry. http://www.chinesestandard.net/PDF-English-Translation/SY0031-2004.html. Accessed 11 November 2014.

  68. 68.

    Singh (2013), pp. 133–135.

  69. 69.

    Singh (2013), pp. 13–14.

  70. 70.

    Boss et al. (2004).

  71. 71.

    See for example Muhlbauer (2004), pp. 162–165. For instance in the UK, the duty holder shall prepare the emergency response plan and submit it to the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). This plan should be confirmed by the DECC. The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 came into force on 20th June 1995. According to the UK Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, before the pipeline is first used, the local authority shall prepare an adequate plan detailing how an emergency relating to a possible major accident in its area will be dealt with. See the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 come into force on 11th April 1996, PART III MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD PIPELINES, para 25.

  72. 72.

    See on that, for example, Felix and Sebastian (2012).

  73. 73.

    See for example Article 10 of the Host governmental agreement between and among the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic and the state oil company of the Azerbaijan Republic BP exploration (Azerbaijan) limited, Total finaelf E&P Caucasian Gas SA, Lukagip N.V., Statoil Azerbaijan a.s., Naft Iran Intertrade Co (Nico) limited, Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company Limited, appendix 7, Gas sale agreement. http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/BTC/Eng/agmt1/agmt1.PDF. Accessed 19 November 2013.

  74. 74.

    The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), gives privileged status to international standards produced by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). WTO members are thus required to comply with ISO standards, which is a private standards setting. See for a more detailed discussion Alvarez (2005), pp. 220–222.

  75. 75.

    Kiss and Shelton (2007), p. 121.

  76. 76.

    For a more detailed discussion, see Wagner and Armstrong (2010).

  77. 77.

    An integrated assessment of all environmental standards potentially applicable to pipelines would obviously go beyond the scope of this chapter. We will therefore suffice with providing a few examples of environmental standards, especially focussing on the particular nature of those standards and the sources.

  78. 78.

    Article 2 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. Ramsar (Iran), 2 February 1971. UN Treaty Series No. 14583; 11 ILM 963 (1972); hereafter referred to as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. It pays particular attention to the Waterfowl Habitat.

  79. 79.

    Article 4 of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.

  80. 80.

    Article 6 of the Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. Official Journal L 206, 22/07/1992 P. 0007-0050); hereafter the Council Directive 92/43/EEC.

  81. 81.

    Article 3 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1936 UNTS 269; 31 ILM 1312 (1992); hereafter the Helsinki Convention.

  82. 82.

    For instance in Canada, the Species at Risk Act, the Migratory Birds Act and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act include several norms relating to the construction and operation of pipelines. In Iran, the Law of Conservation of Natural Resources and Forest Reserves (1992) prohibits cutting, destroying or injuring plants or growing trees. As a consequence, offenders may be formally charged unless they have been awarded certain permits.

  83. 83.

    Environmental impact assessment can be categorised as management-based regulation, Coglianese and Lazer (2003).

  84. 84.

    For example, the environment management system (ISO 14001) was used in the Interconnector UK-Belgium offshore gas pipeline. See for more information the official website of the operator, at http://www.interconnector.com. Accessed 21 May 2014.

  85. 85.

    Wawryk (2003).

  86. 86.

    For instance ISO 14001 for environmental management system and ISO 14031 for environmental performance evaluation.

  87. 87.

    Large diameter oil and gas pipelines are included in the list of the hazardous activities in the Appendix I of the Espoo Convention. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (1991), 5 February 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800; hereinafter referred to as the Espoo Convention.

  88. 88.

    Gas and oil pipelines with a diameter of more than 800 mm and a length of more than 40 km are included in Annex I of the Directive. Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment Text with EEA relevance OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, pp. 1–18.

  89. 89.

    See for more discussion Koivurova and Polonen (2010).

  90. 90.

    Mujih (2008).

  91. 91.

    The Iranian regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment of the major construction, manufacturing and services projects as amended (2011).

  92. 92.

    In the US, National environmental Policy Act as amended (2007) 1 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.

  93. 93.

    The Pipe-line Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2000.

  94. 94.

    According to the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of the People’s Republic of China, an EIA is required for any project that can have negative environmental impacts, regardless of which sector the project may fall under including oil and gas pipeline. See the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of the People’s Republic of China. (Adopted at the 30th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 28 October 2002, promulgated by Order No. 77 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 28 October 2002, and effective on 1 September 2003). Accordingly, in several national and international pipeline projects, EIAs have been implemented by project developers, e.g. the West-East pipeline project (supra note 17) or the China–Myanmar gas pipeline (supra note 18).

  95. 95.

    Final Report of the National Energy Board Action Plan on Safety and Environmental Protection (2011–2012). http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rsftyndthnvrnmnt/sfty/ctnplnrprtprgrss/prtprgrssfnl2013-eng.html. Accessed 16 October 2014.

  96. 96.

    At present, the Transitgas Pipeline system consists of 292 km (two parallel lines), which crosses Switzerland from north to south. For more information see Transitgas AG (2014) The pipeline system. http://www.transitgas.org/EN/pipeline.aspx. Accessed 10 December 2014. Indeed, in 1974 the 164 km Transitgas Pipeline (the Swiss section of the North Sea-Italy pipeline) was officially put into service. In 1997, because of the increasing demand for natural gas in Italy, the Italian natural gas company SNAM SpA decided to expand the complete transport system. This new section, which was commissioned in 2003, includes 185 km of 36 in. and 48 in. pipelines.

  97. 97.

    Plüss et al. (2000).

  98. 98.

    Examples include the BTC, SCP and Chad-Cameron pipelines. For further discussion, see Piri Damagh and Faure (2014). See also Mujih (2008).

  99. 99.

    For instance, according to the BTC host governmental agreement, the host state can only approve the EIA and other assessments in accordance with the terms of the relevant agreement and not according to the domestic regulations of the host state. Interestingly, in the BTC pipeline, the Environment Ministry of Georgia criticised BP’s EIA, accusing BP to give little weight to risks endangering the Bajori protected area which had been chosen as the route of the pipeline. See Waters (2003).

  100. 100.

    See Piri Damagh and Faure (2014).

  101. 101.

    See also the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1998.

  102. 102.

    Supra notes 46 and 54.

  103. 103.

    According to Kiss and Shelton this comes from the customary international law obligation of due diligence. Kiss and Shelton (2007), p. 120.

  104. 104.

    Kiss and Shelton (2007), p. 120.

  105. 105.

    Steiner (2010).

  106. 106.

    Article 2 of the Helsinki Convention also recognises seabed pipelines as a source of potential pollution in the marine environment.

  107. 107.

    See for more discussion on that Wawryk (2003).

  108. 108.

    This rent-seeking hypothesis has been strongly defended in the well-known work of Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan et al. (1980).

  109. 109.

    It is a point a view that has been strongly defended by (again) Nobel Prize winner George Stigler (1971). For an excellent summary of both theories of regulation see the various publications of Philipsen. Philipsen and Faure (2002); Philipsen (2007, 2010).

  110. 110.

    For a summary see inter alia Macrory (2008), pp. 157–160.

  111. 111.

    Steinzor (1998).

  112. 112.

    See, for example, Stewart (1991); Hackett (2011), pp. 222–226; Macrory (2008), pp. 157–160.

  113. 113.

    See, for example, Macrory (2008), p. 157.

  114. 114.

    See Posner (1974).

  115. 115.

    See Posner (1974).

  116. 116.

    Oliver (2010), pp. 243–245.

  117. 117.

    See more particularly Sects. 2.2 and 2.3 above.

  118. 118.

    See Steinway et al. (2011), pp. 5–6.

  119. 119.

    Fang (2012).

  120. 120.

    See for example the BTC pipeline case, in which according to Articles 17 and 23 of the Host Governmental Agreement between and among the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic and the investors, the agreement shall be governed in accordance with the substantive law of England. Supra note 78.

  121. 121.

    For instance, Eaton argues that in Nigeria, in particular in the period until 1988, no comprehensive federal environmental enforcement agency existed. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the State-owned petroleum company, was also responsible for environmental protection in the petroleum industry. Since 1988 Nigeria adopted a comprehensive environmental protection system. But still because of inadequacy of sanctions, ineffective monitoring, the lack of enforcement and so on, environmental law (public law) failed to protect the environment and oil pollution in the Niger Delta continued. See Eaton (1997). For further discussion on regulatory failure of public standards, see James (2000).

  122. 122.

    Ogus (1995).

  123. 123.

    Ogus (2000), p. 591.

  124. 124.

    Gunningham and Rees (1997).

  125. 125.

    See the contributions in Faure et al. (1993), Faure and Van den Bergh (1991), and Philipsen (2010).

  126. 126.

    See for example Scott et al. (2011).

  127. 127.

    See Curtin and Senden (2011).

  128. 128.

    Scott et al. (2011), p. 13.

  129. 129.

    Scott et al. (2011), p. 19.

  130. 130.

    See for more information The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (2012) Catalogue of international standards used in the petroleum and natural gas industries. http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/362.pdf. Accessed 15 October 2014; Kuprewicz (2007); Wawryk (2003).

  131. 131.

    In the US, for instance, 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 expressly refer to more than 60 technical standards, including and not limited to API, ASME, ASTM, American Gas Association (AGA). The BTC and Chad-Cameron pipelines are examples where voluntary standards were mandated through contractual means.

  132. 132.

    See Cafaggi (2006), p. 3.

  133. 133.

    Cafaggi (2006), p. 3.

  134. 134.

    Frydman et al. (2012), p. 133.

  135. 135.

    See Gunningham (2009).

  136. 136.

    Albareda (2008).

  137. 137.

    Senden (2005).

  138. 138.

    Utting (2005). See for more information: The UN Global Compact’s Principles (2000).

    http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGc/TheTenprinciples/index.html. Accessed 01 July 2014.

  139. 139.

    See Büthe and Mattli (2011), p. 153.

  140. 140.

    See Priest (1997).

  141. 141.

    Gunningham (2009).

  142. 142.

    The Iranian Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment of the major construction, manufacturing and services projects (2011).

  143. 143.

    An example of this is the new Swiss section of the North Sea-Italy Pipeline (Transitgas pipeline) which was commissioned in 2003. Plüss et al. (2000).

  144. 144.

    For instance, the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project. See on that Mujih (2008). There are several cases, in which MNCs as a consequence of pressure from influential NGOs responded to environmental concerns by conducting EIA. See Garvey and Newell (2005).

  145. 145.

    Cafaggi and Renda (2011).

  146. 146.

    Revesz and Stavins (2007), p. 535.

  147. 147.

    See generally Gunningham (2009).

  148. 148.

    Cohen (1999).

  149. 149.

    Bernstein (2004), p. 142.

  150. 150.

    Victor et al. (1998), p. 1.

  151. 151.

    In the UK, for instance under the petroleum act 1987, see Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), p. 84. In Iran, the law on the prohibition of building around gas pipelines, 1971.

  152. 152.

    See for instance Article 2(d) of the pipeline safety act 2006: “(1) A person who engages in demolition, excavation, tunnelling, or construction—may not engage in a demolition, excavation, tunnelling, or construction activity in a State that has adopted a one call notification system without first using that system to establish the location of underground facilities in the demolition, excavation, tunnelling, or construction area”.

  153. 153.

    See the European Commission Report (2011), pp. 48–50.

  154. 154.

    Feintuck (2005).

  155. 155.

    Feintuck (2004), pp. 8–9.

  156. 156.

    Morris (2000), p. 9.

  157. 157.

    Feintuck (2005).

  158. 158.

    Dovers (2006), p. 96.

  159. 159.

    Kuprewicz (2007).

  160. 160.

    See Cafaggi and Renda (2011) and Green and Hrab (2003).

  161. 161.

    Priest (1997).

  162. 162.

    Green and Hrab (2003).

  163. 163.

    Ogus (1994); Cafaggi (2006), pp. 5 and 9.

  164. 164.

    Black (2008).

  165. 165.

    For instance, in the European Commission Directorate-General Environment report, 57 % of responding states requires that certain technical standards should be complied with and only 29 % refers to technical standards as being mere guidance. Of course these technical standards that national legislation refers to are mainly private standards such as ISO, DIN and BSI. See the European Commission Report (2011), pp. 50 and 69.

  166. 166.

    Berg and Ferrier (1998), p. 90.

  167. 167.

    Rugman and Verbeke (2000).

  168. 168.

    In the same way, external emergency plans, protection against third party interference and safety management systems are widely regulated through public regulations in the EU member states, see European Commission Report (2011), pp. 47 and 52.

  169. 169.

    Hackett (2011), p. 225. For example in the case of EPA-Amoco York Town Project an Amoco refinery assessed that they could be able to attain the regulatory objectives (emissions reduction) at a quarter of the cost, if it were able to use its own instruments instead of the regulatory requirements. See Amoco/EPA Yorktown Project, Lessons Learned and Future Steps (undated). http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/DOE/_conf_proc/MISC/CONF-94013319/CONF-94013319,%20Tabs%2012%20-%2018%20%28pgs.%201-35%29.pdf. Accessed 10 July 2014.

  170. 170.

    See for more discussion on that Parker (2002), pp. 8–10.

  171. 171.

    For further discussion, see Priest (1997) and Cafaggi (2006).

  172. 172.

    Miller (1985).

  173. 173.

    Coglianese et al. (2004).

  174. 174.

    Croley (1998).

  175. 175.

    Kandiyoti (2012), pp. 32–33.

  176. 176.

    See for instance Eaton (1997); Cherniaev et al. (1998), p. 222.

  177. 177.

    Weber (1978), p. 31.

  178. 178.

    Suchman (1995).

  179. 179.

    Black (2008).

  180. 180.

    See, more generally, Lijphart (1984).

  181. 181.

    Scott (2007).

  182. 182.

    Scott (2000).

  183. 183.

    See on that Black (2008).

  184. 184.

    Suchman (1995).

  185. 185.

    See Cafaggi (2006) and Stewart (2004).

  186. 186.

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Piri Damagh, M., Faure, M. (2016). Self-Regulation Versus Public Regulation: An Analysis of Environmental and Safety Standard Setting in the Oil and Gas Pipeline Sector. In: Philipsen, N., Weishaar, S., Xu, G. (eds) Market Integration: The EU Experience and Implications for Regulatory Reform in China. China-EU Law Series, vol 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48273-5_11

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