Abstract
The paper reconstructs which function senior compliance professionals of multinational companies based in the US attribute conceptually to compliance. Furthermore, the paper critically examines the subsequent consequences of these collectively shared concepts for the prevention, identification, and prosecution of rule violations within and by companies. The database consists of problem-centered interviews conducted in Germany and the USA with high-ranking compliance employees of multinational companies (n = 27). The paper addresses in particular the findings for the compliance officers (n = 12) from the US. Our study opens the black box of the theories-in-use concerning compliance as well as prevention, and discusses what kind of sensemaking is established in the compliance departments of big US firms. By using the qualitative method of collective mindset analysis, it is answering the question as to whether integrity and prevention has to be understood as a stronghold of a rational business strategy or merely as a mandatory form of window dressing for the protection of the company. Our findings are that the theories-in-use are very much dominated by a rational-choice perspective of the firm as corporate actor, in which communication, education, and monitoring is focused on the employees, adjusting their deliberative action, and helping them to avoid wrongdoings. One side effect of this rational-choice perspective on organizational wrongdoings is that compliance professionals can label rule violations as the result of decisions attributable to individuals and not as the result of organizational structures. By these means, compliance serves the purpose of avoiding criminal prosecution of the company, especially the application of corporate criminal law.
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Notes
- 1.
MAXQDA is a software designed for qualitative and mixed methods data, particularly for analyses of data from interviews, focus groups, online surveys, web pages, images, audio and video files, spreadsheets, and RIS data. The emphasis on going beyond qualitative research can be observed in the extensive attributes function and the ability of the program to deal relatively quickly with larger numbers of interviews (see Rädiker & Kuckartz, 2019).
- 2.
An understanding of how this impacts the overall risk can be gained by analyzing the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), which we will analyze further below.
- 3.
This can also be seen in the associated evaluation guide: “Has the company considered the implications of its incentives and rewards on compliance? How does the company incentivize compliance and ethical behavior? Have there been specific examples of actions taken […] as a result of compliance and ethics considerations?” (DOJ, 2021: 13).
- 4.
Based on our interviews, within the compliance industry there is e. g. the rumor that the influential instruction on “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Program” was actually leaked by an employee of the DOJ, who is now working in the private compliance sector. The legend goes that the DOJ left it online not to draw attention to this fact. True or not, this rumor exemplifies the importance of actors which have an inside view of central bodies of prosecution and by extension to the importance of prosecution itself for the development and focus of compliance within the organizational field.
- 5.
From the online self-description: “Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) is a 501(c)(6) member-based association for regulatory compliance professionals. SCCE was established in 2004 and is headquartered in Minneapolis, MN. We provide training, certification, networking, and other resources to more than 6,700 + members. Our members include compliance officers and staff from a wide range of industries. The need for guidance in meeting regulatory requirements extends to a wide range of sectors, including: academics; aerospace; banking; construction; entertainment; government; financial services; food and manufacturing; insurance; and oil, gas, and chemicals. […] We offer training, certification, and publications committed to improving the quality and acknowledgment of the compliance industry. SCCE helps members protect their companies [acc. SS] and advance their careers through services including education, updates on regulatory requirements and enforcement, and access to a rich professional network. SCCE currently has more than 5,800 members. Plus over 3,000 compliance professionals hold the Corporate Compliance & Ethics Professional (CCEP)® certification and over 700 hold the Corporate Compliance & Ethics Professional-International (CCEP-I)®. Each member of SCCE has direct access to our CEO, Roy Snell.” (SCCE, 2018). Despite the danger of over interpreting the online self-description of this organization. The proclaimed goals do not entail to prevent deviance but rather to protect companies with accordance to the regulatory environment.
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Pohlmann, M., Starystach, S. (2023). Compliance, Integrity, and Prevention in the Corporate Sector: The Collective Mindsets of Compliance Officers in the USA. In: Pohlmann, M., et al. Organizational Crime. Organization, Management and Crime - Organisation, Management und Kriminalität. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-38960-4_13
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