Abstract
Free, fair and orderly elections, and significant popular participation are the sine qua non of a robust democracy. And votes which are neither ‘bought’ nor coerced, are vital for legitimacy of the democratic process. At the first sight, Indian democracy appears to deviate from this norm. However, the country has had regular, generally free and fair elections, over past seven decades, conducted and closely supervised by the independent Election Commission of India. The chapter analyses this puzzling co-existence of illegal campaign financing and the resilience of electoral democracy.
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Notes
- 1.
See Inden (1986) for a comprehensive criticism of Indian ‘culture’ as an explanation of the country’s exceptionalism.
- 2.
See the Economist Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety which classifies India as a flawed democracy. The country dropped by ten points in the most recent Economist democracy index. “India’s overall score fell from 7.23 in 2018 to 6.9 in 2019,” the Economist Democracy Index reported. https://qz.com/india/1789129/india-drops-in-the-economist-democracy-ranking-over-kashmir-caa/.
- 3.
One common response to the apparent increase in the costs of politics, and to complaints about plutocratic party finance is to introduce or to boost public subsidies for political parties and/or candidates (Alexander, 2019; Scarrow, 2007, p. 203). While it appears to be fair and above board, state funding of elections has its critics. The Election Commission of India, an independent regulatory agency that is responsible for the conduct of elections, is opposed to it on the ground that the Commission does not have access to campaign and party financing in the first place and suspects, public subsidy will be heaped on the top of cash whose provenance is not clear, and possibly illegal.
- 4.
For comparative purposes, it has been pointed out that the combined 2015-16 United States presidential and congressional elections involved $11.1 billion (U.S. Federal Election Commission 4/19/2013).
- 5.
- 6.
Neeta Lal, “India’s Criminal Politicians: Why are so many people facing criminal charges still elected to India’s legislative bodies?” the Diplomat, December 19, 2018.
- 7.
Neeta Lal, ibid.
- 8.
“In a recent report, rights group Association of Democratic Reforms pointed out how nearly half of the 542 Lok Sabha lawmakers elected last year have declared criminal cases against them, as shown in their mandatory affidavits. It noted a sharp increase—within the decade since 2009—in elected parliamentarians with cases against them for serious criminal acts, including murder and rape. In their latest report on the Delhi assembly polls held on February 8, it found that 37 of the 70 legislators are facing serious criminal cases.” Pallab Bhattacharya, “Tainted politicians, elections and judiciary” South Asia Journal, February 17, 2020. http://southasiajournal.net/india-tainted-politicians-elections-and-judiciary/ Downloaded on July 9, 2020.
- 9.
Other examples of electoral wrongdoing galore. A report in the Press Trust of India (May 26, 2019) says that 43% of newly elected Lok Sabha MPs in 2019 faces criminal charges. Nearly half of the newly-elected Lok Sabha members have criminal charges against them, a 26 per cent increase as compared to 2014, according to the Association of Democratic Reforms. In the new Lok Sabha, nearly 29 per cent of the cases are related to rape, murder, and attempt to murder or crime against women. Pragya Singh Thakur, the newly-elected BJP MP from Bhopal, faces terror charges in connection with the 2008 Malegaon blasts. Dean Kuriakose from the Congress, who won from the Idukki constituency in Kerala, has 204 criminal cases against him, including culpable homicide, house trespass, robbery, criminal intimidation.
- 10.
Illegal campaign finance can have a negative consequence for democracy. One can see this in the case of Brazil. Personal communication, Elizangela Valarini. Heidelberg, 14.7.2020.
- 11.
Voting is confidential and is perceived by voters to be confidential. There is no guarantee how a particular voter will vote, regardless of the incentives he has been given. Bjorkman says: “as one social worker so aptly put it, ‘you can’t buy a vote’” (Bjorkman, 2014, p. 630, emphasis in original).
- 12.
In the Mumbai election that Bjorkman (2014) studied, we find winability of the candidate and his chances of delivering benefits after the election were the main concern for voters. Where his cash came from was a secondary consideration.
- 13.
These are referred to as ‘goondas’ or ‘mastaans’ in vernacular language. These mercenaries of electoral politics follow the cash-trail, and go to which ever party offers the best deal. This has been the case in West Bengal. When the Congress party yielded the ruling position to the communist party, the goondas moved on to the new ruling elites. When the TMC replaced the CPM, the same characters effortlessly moved on to new regime.
- 14.
Personal communication, K.C. Suri, 23 July, 2020. See his chapter on the Chevalla Lok Sabha constituency in this volume.
- 15.
Voting in very large, general constituencies, sometime with over a million voters, is different from voting in legislatures where votes can be monitored and lobbyists can thus seek to influence voting in return for material considerations. See Mario Jorge’s contribution to vote buying in Brazilian legislatures.
- 16.
“Effective rule-use demands both that compliance is produced and that compliance is linked to desired results.” (Baldwin 1995, p. 142. Emphasis added).
- 17.
The issue is extensively analysed under the concept of ‘useful illegality’. See Niklas Luhmann (). For further analysis of this issue, see (2005, 2008) and Mitra, Pohlmann and Hauck (2019).
- 18.
One can argue, hypothetically, that the higher the credibility of sanctions against non-compliance, the higher would be the expectation of governance. However, force alone cannot be a long-term solution. No state can have as many compliance officers as people, and even if it did, who will police the police? Beyond the bureaucratic control over individuals, therefore, there comes yet another parameter of rule which originates in the community in which one lives. In a social context, where individuals face each other daily and can expect to do so over the foreseeable future, their proximity to one another and knowledge of each other might induce them to what Axelrod (1984) calls ‘tit for tat’. People learn to reciprocate like with like. Since there is a tomorrow, the actor sees the incentive in investing in good will and social capital. Thus, following Axelrod, knowledge, proximity, reciprocity and recursiveness of the context where one is embedded can lead egoists to cooperate. People, who instinctively resort to self-help, can learn to understand and abide by social norms. Compliance, in this case, emerges from a combination of regulation and self-regulation. Trust, shared norms and social networks that result from such institutional arrangements enhance governance.
- 19.
Julio Ribeiro, “The creation of Vikas Dubey, who flourished all these years because of political and police patronage” Indian Express, July 11, 2020. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/vikas-dubey-kanpur-encounter-up-police-6499829/downloaded on July 12.
- 20.
Anuja, Gireesh Chandra Prasad, “Electoral bonds boon or bane for India’s political funding system?” in Livemint, 4 Dec 2019 https://www.livemint.com/politics/policy/electoral-bonds-boon-or-bane-for-india-s-political-funding-system-11575424422379.html. Downloaded on July 14, 2020.
- 21.
Election Commission of India’s Model Code of Conduct. file:///C:/Users/js3/AppData/Local/Temp/Election_Commission_of_India's_Model_Code_of_Conduct.pdf. Downloaded on July 14, 2020. The main points of the code of conduct are: 1. The government may not lay any new ground for projects or public initiatives once the Model Code of Conduct comes into force.2. Government bodies are not to participate in any recruitment process during the electoral process.3. The contesting candidates and their campaigners must respect the home life of their rivals and should not disturb them by holding road shows or demonstrations in front of their houses.4. The election campaign rallies and road shows must not hinder the road traffic.5. Candidates are asked to refrain from distributing liquor to voters. 6. The election code in force hinders the government or ruling party leaders from launching new welfare programs like construction of roads, provision of drinking water facilities etc. or any ribbon-cutting ceremonies.7. The code instructs that public spaces like meeting grounds, helipads, government guesthouses and bungalows should be equally shared among the contesting candidates.8. Candidates should not display their election symbols near and around the poll booths on the polling day. 9. There will be poll observers to whom any complaints can be reported or submitted.10. The ruling party should not use its seat of power for the campaign purposes.11. The ruling party ministers should not make any ad hoc appointment of officials, which may influence the voters to vote in favour of the party in power.12. Before using loud speakers during their poll campaigning, candidates and political parties must obtain permission or license from the local authorities. The candidates should inform the local police for conducting election rallies to enable the police authorities to make required security arrangements.
- 22.
A host of anthropological studies from India bear this out. (Mitra, 1979; Bjorkman, 2014). Auyero (2000a, b) shows how election cash acts as a ‘gift’ and rather than a one-off purchase of a vote, shades off into the moral economy of the poor. It is this socio-transactional aspect of campaign-cash that has embedded electoral democracy in many transitional societies. Michelutti (2007, p. 641) argues, “In recent years there has been a dramatic rise in support for popular politics and political figures who represent themselves as leaders of the under-privileged and as promoters of pro-poor social policies in countries like Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Indonesia.”.
- 23.
Picherit (2020, p. 93) quotes a faction leader to show that there is no direct linkage between distribution of money and vote: “I give money, but people are free to vote, which control do I have? They smile, they talk softly and once they leave the house, they will go to the other candidate. They are like bastards, but this is the game”.
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Mitra, S., Pohlmann, M. (2021). Making Elections Work: Campaign Cash, Marketisation of Votes and Social Negotiation in India. In: Valarini, E., Pohlmann, M., Mitra, S. (eds) Political Corruption and Organizational Crime. Organization, Management and Crime - Organisation, Management und Kriminalität. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34374-3_2
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