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An Eroding Nuclear Taboo? Neue Waffensysteme, Strategien und normative Herausforderungen

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Am Rande des Kollapses

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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den Evolutionsprozessen, denen verschiedene Ausprägungen nuklearer Zurückhaltung in einem sich wandelnden technologischen, strategischen und normativen Umfeld ausgesetzt sind. Ich unterscheide drei Formen nuklearer Zurückhaltung – Tabu, kategorische Zurückhaltung und beschränkte Zurückhaltung – und bette diese in einen materiellen und intersubjektiven Kontext ein. Während empirische Evidenz darauf hindeutet, dass die stärkste Ausprägung nuklearer Zurückhaltung – das Tabu – in den meisten Nichtnuklearwaffenstaaten reproduziert oder sogar noch verstärkt wird, gibt es bei den Nuklearwaffenstaaten Hinweise dafür, dass kategorische und auch beschränkte Zurückhaltung unter Druck geraten.

Abstract

This study deals with the evolution of different interpretations of nuclear restraint in the midst of a changing technological, strategic and normative environment. I differentiate between three degrees of nuclear restraint, i. e. taboo, categorical restraint and contingent restraint, and embed these in their material and intersubjective context. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that the overwhelming number of non-nuclear weapons states reproduces and even further strengthens the strongest form of nuclear restraint, i. e. the taboo. When it comes to nuclear weapons states, however, there are worrying indications that categorical and even contingent forms of restraint are weakening.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Diese Ergebnisse konzentrieren sich stark auf den nuklearen Ersteinsatz und nicht den atomaren Erstschlag. Ich folge diesem Fokus. Eine noch detailliertere Betrachtungsweise zu Ausprägungen nuklearer Zurückhaltung könnte weitere analytische Kategorien, unter anderem auch solche, die sich spezifisch mit dem Erstschlag befassen, entwickeln.

  2. 2.

    Diese Meinung ist mit der damaligen – und auch jetzigen – Nukleardoktrin der USA kompatibel.

  3. 3.

    Umgekehrt gibt es auch französische Einflüsse in Brodies Denken. Anfang der 1960er Jahre verbrachte er, finanziert von der Carnegie Corporation, ein Jahr in Frankreich. Raymond Aron arbeitete mit Brodie am Hudson Institut. Abschreckung war für diese Denker das Mittel, Krieg im Atomzeitalter unmöglich zu machen. Sie argumentierten stark dagegen, dass nukleare Kriege zu gewinnen seien.

  4. 4.

    Für eine detaillierte und kritische Auseinandersetzung mit NUTS, siehe Amadae (2016, S. 79 − 84).

  5. 5.

    Siehe auch De Certeau (1984) und seine Arbeiten zu rhetorischen Praktiken.

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    Markus Kornprobst

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    Hakan Akbulut

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Kornprobst, M. (2021). An Eroding Nuclear Taboo? Neue Waffensysteme, Strategien und normative Herausforderungen. In: Akbulut, H. (eds) Am Rande des Kollapses. Edition ZfAS. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32855-9_5

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