Abstract
This article provides information on how financiers of public limited companies in the past ensured that they achieved a return on and a return of their investment. I am investigating this with examples from the USA, Great Britain and Germany. First, I examine when and to what extent public limited companies were formed and whether and to what extent ownership and control were separate. Moreover, control and incentive mechanisms, e.g. monitoring by supervisory board or incentive pay to managers, are investigated.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Acheson GG, Campbell G, Turner JD, Vanteeva N (2015) Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain. Econ Hist Rev 68(3):911–936
Adams RB, Hermalin BE, Weisbach MS (2010) The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and a survey. J Econ Lit 48(1):58–107
Bayer C, Burhop C (2009) Corporate governance and incentive contracts: historical evidence from a legal reform. Explor Econ Hist 46(4):464–481
Braggion F, Moore L (2011) Dividend policies in an unregulated market: the London stock exchange, 1895–1905. Rev Financ Stud 24(9):2935–2973
Braggion F, Moore L (2013) The economic benefits of political connections in late Victorian Britain. J Econ Hist 73(1):142–176
Burhop C (2009) No need for governance? The impact of corporate governance on valuation, performance, and survival of German banks during the 1870s. Bus Hist 51(4):569–601
Burhop C, Lübbers T (2009) Cartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in German coal mining, 1881–1913. J Econ Hist 69(2):500–527
Calomiris CW, Carlson M (2016) Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: national banks in the 1890s. J Financ Econ 119:512–532
Campbell G, Turner JD (2011) Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain. Econ Hist Rev 64(2):571–597
Campbell G, Turner JD (2015) Managerial failure in mid-Victorian Britain? Corporate expansion during a promotion boom. Bus Hist 57(8):1248–1276
Cheffins BR, Bank S (2009) Is Berle and means really a myth? Bus Hist Rev 83(3):443–474
Cheffins BR, Bank SA, Wells H (2013a) Questioning law and finance. US stock market development, 1930–70. Bus Hist 55(4):601–619
Cheffins BR, Koustas DK, Chambers D (2013b) Ownership dispersion and the London stock Exchange’s ‘two-thirds-rule’: an empirical test. Bus Hist 55(4):670–693
Crafts N (2012) British relative economic decline revisited: the role of competition. Explor Econ Hist 49(1):17–29
Deloof M, Vermoesen V (2016) The value of corporate boards during the great depression in Belgium. Explor Econ Hist 62:108–123
Deloof M, Roggemann A, van Overfeld W (2010) Bank affiliations and corporate dividend policy in pre-World War I Belgium. Bus Hist 52(4):590–616
Dew-Becker I (2009) How much sunlight does it take to disinfect a boardroom? A short history of executive compensation regulation in America. CESifo Econ Stud 55(3–4):434–457
Edmans A, Gabaix X (2016) Executive compensation: a modern primer. J Econ Lit 54(4):1232–1287
Faccio M, Lang LHP (2002) The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. J Financ Econ 65:365–395
Fear J, Kobrak C (2010) Banks on board: German and American corporate governance, 1870–1914. Bus Hist Rev 84(4):703–736
Foreman-Peck J, Hannah L (2012) Extreme divorce: the managerial revolution in UK companies before 1914. Econ Hist Rev 65(4):1217–1238
Foreman-Peck J, Hannah L (2015) The diffusion and impact of the corporation in 1910. Econ Hist Rev 68(3):962–984
Franks J, Mayer C, Wagner HF (2006) The origins of the German corporation – finance, ownership, and control. Rev Financ 10(3):537–585
Franks J, Mayer C, Rossi S (2009) Ownership: evolution and regulation. Rev Financ Stud 22(10):4009–4056
Freeman M, Pearson R, Taylor J (2013) Law, politics, and the governance of English and Scottish joint-stock companies, 1600–1850. Bus Hist 55(4):636–652
Frydman C, Hilt E (2017) Investment banks as corporate monitors in the early twentieth century United States. Am Econ Rev 107(7):1938–1970
Frydman C, Molloy R (2012) Pay cuts for the boss: executive compensation in the 1940s. J Econ Hist 72(1):225–251
Frydman C, Saks RE (2010) Executive compensation: a new view from a long-term perspective, 1936–2005. Rev Financ Stud 23(5):2099–2138
Grossman RS, Imai M (2016) Taking the lord’s name in vain: the impact of connected directors on 19th century British banks. Explor Econ Hist 59(1):75–93
Guenther J (2017) Capital market effects around dividend announcements: an analysis of the Berlin stock exchange in 1895. Account Hist Rev 27(3):249–278
Guinnane T, Harris R, Lamoreaux NR, Rosenthal J-L (2007) Putting the corporation in its place. Enterp Soc 8(3):687–729
Guinnane TW, Harris R, Lamoreaux NR (2017) Contractual freedom and corporate governance in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bus Hist Rev 91(2):227–277
Hannah L (2007) The divorce of ownership from control from 1900: re-calibrating imagined global historical trends. Bus Hist 49(4):404–438
Hannah L (2014) Corporations in the U.S. and Europe 1790–1860. Bus Hist 56(6):865–899
Hannah L (2015) A global corporate census: publicly traded and close companies in 1910. Econ Hist Rev 68(2):548–573
Hannah L, Foreman-Peck J (2014) Ownership dispersion and listing rules in companies large and small: a reply. Bus Hist 56(3):509–516
Herrigel G (2007a) Guest editor’s introduction: a new wave in the history of corporate governance. Enterp Soc 8(3):475–488
Herrigel G (2007b) Corporate governance. In: Jones G, Zeitlin J (eds) The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 470–497
Hilt E (2008) When did ownership separate from control? Corporate governance in the early nineteenth century. J Econ Hist 68(3):645–685
Holderness CG, Kroszner RS, Sheehan DP (1999) Were the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock ownership since the great depression. J Financ 54(2):435–469
Jensen MC, Murphy KJ (1990) Performance pay and top management incentives. J Polit Econ 98(2):225–264
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1998) Law and finance. J Polit Econ 106(6):1113–1155
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (1999) Corporate ownership around the world. J Financ 54(2):471–517
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny RW (2000) Agency problems and dividend policy around the world. J Financ 55(1):1–33
Lehn KM, Patro S, Zhao M (2009) Determinants of the size and composition of U.S. corporate boards: 1935–2000. Financ Manag 38(4):747–780
Morck RK (2007) A history of corporate governance around the world. Family business groups to professional managers. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Musacchio A, Turner JD (2013) Does the law and finance hypothesis pass the test of history? Bus Hist 55(4):524–542
Pagano M, Volpin PF (2005) The political economy of corporate governance. Am Econ Rev 95(4):1005–1030
Pagano M, Volpin PF (2006) Shareholder protection, stock market development, and politics. J Eur Econ Assoc 4(2/3):315–341
Rajan RG, Zingales L (2003) The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century. J Financ Econ 69:5–50
Ramirez CD (1995) Did J.P. Morgan’s men add liquidity? Corporate investment, cash flow, and financial structure at the turn of the twentieth century. J Financ 50(2):661–678
Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) A survey of corporate governance. J Financ 52(2):737–783
Simon MC (1998) The rise and fall of bank control in the United States: 1890–1939. Am Econ Rev 88(5):1077–1093
Spamann H (2010) The “antidirector rights index” revisited. Rev Financ Stud 23(2):467–486
Sylla R, Wright R (2013) Corporation formation in the antebellum United States in comparative context. Bus Hist 55(4):653–669
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
About this entry
Cite this entry
Burhop, C. (2019). Corporate Governance. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_32-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_32-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences