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1 Introduction

This chapter starts from the assumption that the predominant theoretical perspectives used so far to study the power of the European Union (EU) are not sufficient to grasp the full extent to which the EU’s external power constitutes a complex and multi-faceted process that encompasses structural dimensions. In particular, it assumes that the literature on the EU’s external power lacks analyses that account for both the relational and the structural level on which (the EU’s) power is exerted, and the interplay between the two levels (Bossuyt 2010, 2013). By fixating on narrow, micro-level factors, the extant literature risks overlooking less obvious aspects of the EU’s power, including structural aspects, and thus underestimating the EU’s external leverage.

Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to offer a structurally integrative approach, and hence an analytical framework, which can be used to address this gap in the literature. However, rather than being bluntly rejected, the predominant theoretical perspectives are in fact incorporated in the proposed explanatory model, which seeks to combine elements from the prevailing, agent-focussed approaches with insights from structural perspectives, notably from new realist International Political Economy (IPE)Footnote 1 and EU external governance perspectives. In developing a holistic, structurally integrative framework of analysis, this chapter thus works eclectically with arguments drawn, on the one hand, from neorealism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, and on the other, from the EU external governance literature and new realist IPE.

Following this introductory section, the chapter first gives an explanation of the chosen terminology behind the concept of ‘transnational power over’, indicating how the term responds to the need to address the specific theoretical concerns identified above. In particular, it shows how the concept reflects the structural dimensions of power, which may be transnational in nature and exist both in an agent-focused and a purely structural form. The next section focuses on the aspect of ‘transnational’ and indicates which tools will be used to trace and assess transnational mechanisms of EU impact. The chapter then goes on to identify TNPO as consisting of three structures, which are the main parameters of the concept: a material structure (TNPO1), an institutional structure (TNPO2) and an ideational structure (TNPO3). In identifying the three parameters, the chapter develops their respective analytical value and demonstrates how these conceptual devices each draw on specific aspects of the theoretical approaches mentioned above. This section ends by considering the types of overlap that may occur between the three TNPO structures. The chapter concludes by providing an operational definition of the TNPO concept, alongside an overview of the main points presented in the chapter.

2 Introducing TNPO

2.1 TNPO: The Term Behind the Concept

The denomination of ‘transnational power over’ in essence consists of a synthesis of two distinct attributes: ‘transnational’ and ‘power over’. ‘Power over’ captures the basic understanding of power as a relational exercise, which has led many to equate the term with ‘relational power’, typically defined as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do something he would not otherwise do. This can also be described as ‘direct agent-based power’, in that this type of power is exercised by an agent directly over another agent. However, as outlined above, agent-based power can also be exercised indirectly over another agent, in that power may be exercised over the structures within which other agents operate and which determine their possibilities and choices. In short, ‘power over’ does not only stand for direct agent-based power (exercised over agents), but may also capture indirect agent-based power (exercised over structures), denoted above as ‘agent-based structural power’. In fact, this reading of ‘power over’ comes close to Lukes’s (2005) use of the term, which is central to his three-dimensional model of power. Indeed, by distinguishing a third face of power, Lukes sought to demonstrate that A’s power over B not only derives from easily observable processes of decision-making (first face) and agenda-setting (second face), but may also operate at a deeper, less visible level, in that A may exercise power over B by “influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes 2005, p. 27). In sum, it is this structural reading of ‘power over’, i.e. agent-based power exercised directly over structures and indirectly over agents, that is reflected in the chapter’s concept of ‘transnational power over’.

‘Transnational’, in turn, as another distinct attribute of power, reflects the extent to which power is no longer exercised solely at the state-to-state or intergovernmental level, but increasingly involves non-state players, such as civil society organizations and corporate actors, as well as international—and even supranational—organizations. Moreover, the term ‘transnational’ has also been conceptualized to indicate how power can be exercised without the active or intentional intervention of an agent (see Section “Understanding and Operationalizing the ‘Transnational’ Dimension of TNPO”). Thus, apart from being an attribute of agent-based power, ‘transnational’ can also be an attribute of purely structural power.

To summarize, in representing a synthesis of two intrinsic features of power in contemporary international relations, the term ‘transnational power over’Footnote 2 (1) encapsulates power that is exercised over structures as well as in direct relations, and (2) goes beyond a narrow focus on the state level to also consider the role of non-state actors. As such, the concept of TNPO closely follows two key principles of Strange’s new realist ontology (1996, 1997, 1999). That is, Strange’s new realist ontology centers, inter alia, on the suggestion that the state is no longer the only significant actor, as well as on the need to account for structural power, along with the identification of structures (in casu security, finance, production, knowledge) through which power is exercised.

2.2 Understanding and Operationalizing the ‘Transnational’ Dimension of TNPO

The TNPO concept only holds on the assumption that power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, has a substantial transnational dimension. This assumption is necessary in order to encapsulate the emergent complexity of global life, and in particular to account for the fact that globalization and interdependence have significantly blurred the divide both between private and public and between the distinct levels of governance (local, regional, national, supranational, interregional, international, etc.). Crucially, this divide is blurred to the point where transnational forces interact with or exist alongside traditional intergovernmental relationships. Strange was among the first scholars to observe that international power became increasingly diffused while global functions were provided as the result of the growing ‘transnationalization’ of non-territorially linked networks, which she conceived of as an interplay of deliberate and non-intentional effects of decisions and non-decisions made by governments and other actors (Strange 1987, 1988). This implies that structural power is increasingly located in or emerges from transnational economic and financial groups, networks and markets, as well as flows of capital, technology, ideas and information (see e.g. Castells 2000; Strange 1988).

Based on the above line of thinking, the chapter’s use of the word ‘transnational’ follows the classical definition of ‘transnational relations’, understood as cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least one actor or interaction partner is nongovernmental (Keohane and Nye 1971, p. xii; Risse-Kappen 1995, p. 3). Above all, this comprehensive understanding of ‘transnational’ allows us to focus the analysis on the EU as a governmental actor, while tracing and assessing the agency of nongovernmental actors and networks, which either interacts with or exists alongside the EU’s agency. In this regard, the chapter distinguishes three broad sources of transnational relations that may contribute to the EU’s influence over a third country: (1) EU cooperation projects centred on engagement with local non-state actors, including NGOs and business associations (cf. ‘domestic empowerment’; see more below). It should be noted that these EU aid projects may also involve or rely on cooperation with European societal actors (e.g. NGOs, business associations, education institutions) that are active in the countries in question, (2) direct engagement of European societal actors with state and/or non-state actors in a partner country, for instance through trade or investment or through the provision of democratic assistance (e.g. by NGOs), (3) unintentional and/or passive sources of EU impact (cf. the notion of ‘purely structural power’, see Holden 2009; Bossuyt 2013) deriving from the EU’s ‘presence’ or from third countries’ interdependence with the EU’s system of regional governance and the single market (see more below). Taken together, these three different sources of transnational relations and cooperation frameworks may constitute significant transnational forces and networks, which need to be taken into account when examining the EU’s influence over third countries and regions.Footnote 3

In terms of the analytical tools used to trace and assess the transnational dimension of the EU’s TNPO, it is possible to draw on insights from the extant literature on Europeanization dynamics beyond the EU’s border. Particularly useful is Schimmelfennig’s (2007) attempt to conceptually map pathways of Europeanization beyond Europe. Through his mapping exercise, Schimmelfennig (2007) seeks to propose ways of theorizing Europeanization mechanisms in countries without any realistic membership perspective. Crucially, in reviewing the prevalent concepts and perspectives, he concludes that these all emphasize that Europeanization may operate through intergovernmental and transnational channels alike. That is, they all suggest that pathways of Europeanization may differ depending on whether they work through intergovernmental interactions or through transnational processes via societal actors in the target state. Presenting a four-by-four table of the different mechanisms of EU impact, Schimmelfennig (2007) adds two other dimensions according to which Europeanization may vary: EU-driven versus domestically-driven pathways, and processes following a logic of consequences versus those following a logic of appropriateness. Based on these two distinctions, Schimmelfennig (2007) retrieves several notions capturing transnational mechanisms of EU impact. Many of these concepts appear useful to analyze the transnational dimension of the EU’s TNPO, most notably domestic empowerment, competition, societal lesson-drawing, transnational socialization, transnational social learning and societal imitation. In what follows, we will see that these notions, as a significant part of the approach, can be used to capture the nuances of the transnational dimension of TNPO.

In considering each of these governmental and transnational means by which the EU is able to have an impact, it is important to examine closer the dimensions that Schimmelfennig (2007) uses for mapping the different mechanisms of Europeanization. As mentioned, on the one hand, the suggested mechanisms of EU impact can differ depending on whether they are EU-driven or domestically driven. Processes of Europeanization that are driven by the EU are based on the provision of EU incentives to third country actors. By contrast, processes of Europeanization that are domestically driven capture instances of rule adoption or policy adaptation that occur without inducement from the EU. In this case, domestic actors—independently from EU action—become favourable to convergence or compliance with EU norms and rules, for instance, because they believe compliance or convergence will improve their domestic situation (see e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, pp. 8–9). On the other hand, Europeanization mechanisms can vary depending on which logic of action the rule transfer or norm diffusion follows, i.e. the strategic logic of consequences, or the cultural logic of appropriateness.

This distinction is particularly prevalent in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s (2005) analysis of Europeanization dynamics in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which suggests three alternative models of EU impact in these countries. In a typical rationalist tradition, their first model, i.e. the external incentives model, assumes that Europeanization operates according to a logic of consequences, in that rule adoption or policy adaptation is based on the extent to which EU threats and rewards alter the strategic cost-benefit calculations of third country actors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, pp. 10–11).

Conversely, the second model draws on a sociological approach, assuming that Europeanization may be induced by ‘social learning’. Following a logic of appropriateness, Europeanization is driven here by the identification of the target states with the EU and the extent to which the latter manages to persuade them of the legitimacy of the EU rules and norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, pp. 18–20).

In turn, the third model, i.e. lesson-drawing, may follow either logic of action. Considered as the ‘ideal type’ of voluntary rule transfer (in contrast to more coercive forms, such as conditionality), ‘lesson-drawing’ occurs in reaction to domestic dissatisfaction with current policies in the target country, which induces policy-makers or societal actors to learn from the experiences in the EU. Europeanization is based then on their perception that the EU rules are appropriate solutions to their domestic problems (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, pp. 20–21).

Since the three models described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) may also operate through transnational channels, i.e. through EU engagement with local societal actors, Schimmelfennig’s (2007) mapping exercise includes three notions that represent the transnational equivalent of the respective mechanisms: domestic empowerment, societal lesson-drawing and transnational social learning. ‘Domestic empowerment’ is a EU-driven mechanism in the sense that it is the EU that provides incentives to local societal actors. Whereas intergovernmental bargaining produces a ‘top-down’ process of regulatory adaptation, the empowerment of domestic civil society actors aims to achieve change from the ‘bottom-up’. Schimmelfennig explains in an earlier article that by providing transnational incentives the EU seeks to use rewards to mobilize societal groups and corporate actors in a target state in order to apply pressure on their government to change its policy (Schimmelfennig 2005, p. 832).

In turn, ‘transnational social learning’, or ‘transnational socialization’, covers an EU-driven process whereby societal actors are persuaded into favouring EU norms or rule. The attempt at persuasion will be successful, if the civil society actors consider those norms or rules legitimate and if they identify themselves with the EU to the point where they take these norms or rules for granted. In sum, while domestic empowerment covers, for instance, the EU’s provision of financial and technical assistance to societal actors in the target countries (cf. incentives or reinforcement by reward), ‘transnational social learning’ refers to EU-sponsored mechanisms of dialogue held with societal actors in the target countries, which may start, for instance, with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy and human rights in the discourse of the societal actors.

Finally, the mechanism of ‘societal lesson-drawing’ is domestically driven in that local societal actors are drawn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo. They favour certain EU rules or norms because they perceive them as solutions to their domestic problems either based on rationalist calculations or based on the appropriateness of the EU solutions.

Interestingly, in an update of his conceptual mapping of Europeanization beyond Europe, Schimmelfennig (2009) places the mechanism of ‘lesson-drawing’ only under the logic of appropriateness, whilst inserting another—albeit similar—concept under the logic of consequences, i.e. ‘externalization’. Introduced to the literature by Lavenex and Uçarer (2004), the notion of ‘governance by externalization’ represents a structural mode of EU external governance. As Schimmelfennig (2009) explains, the notion captures the extent to which the EU’s impact derives from its ‘presence’ rather than from its direct actions (cf. Allen and Smith 1990; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). As Schimmelfennig (2009, p. 9) puts it:

In this view, […] the EU’s impact on third countries is a result of its capacity as an important system of regional governance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or unanticipated) effect on internal regulations and policies.

‘Governance by externalization’ most visibly derives from the EU’s internal market and policies, encapsulating respectively the market mode of governance, described by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) and the competition mode of governance,Footnote 4 presented by Bauer et al. (2007). As highlighted in Bossuyt (2010, 2013), these types of governance may not only affect governments, induced to adapt their existing rules and policies to those of the EU, but also local societal actors, in which case Schimmelfennig (2009) uses the label of ‘transnational externalization’. For instance, if foreign companies want to enter the EU’s market, they may have no choice but to adopt EU rules or standards (e.g. on product standards). Lavenex and Uçarer (2004) differentiate between ‘negative externalities’ and ‘unilateral policy emulation’. Following a rationalist logic of action, the former process occurs when third countries adapt to EU rules because ignoring or violating them would entail net costs (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004, p. 21). Conversely, in the latter case, regulatory adaptation occurs because third country governments or societal actors perceive an EU rule as superior and adopt it in order to deal more efficiently with domestic issues. A related notion is ‘imitation’. This involves a high degree of adaptation, with ‘inspiration’ being at the other end of the adaptation scale. As pointed out by Lavenex and Uçarer, “in between are different forms of emulation or combination, which involve the selective adoption of specific elements of the EU policies” (2004, p. 422).

To summarize, the toolbox (see Table 1) that has so far been established in order to capture the transnational dimension of TNPO centres on two distinctions: EU-driven versus domestically driven mechanisms, and rationalist versus constructivist logics of action. Moreover, most of the transnational mechanisms have an intergovernmental equivalent (see Table 1). However, a third distinction can be added, notably ‘agent-based’ versus ‘purely structural’ mechanisms of TNPO. As Holden (2009, pp. 12–13) explains, structural power is either ‘purely structural’ or ‘agent-based’. Capital, for instance, possesses structural power that is purely structural, as capital automatically constitutes power, independent of intentional agency. In this case, a structure thus implicitly empowers certain actors—whilst possibly disempowering others—without the involvement of conscious agency. Conversely, agent-based structural power, as the term suggests, involves agency in the sense that the origin of the produced power effect is located at the agent-level. In this case, an actor intentionally shapes or affects the structures within which others operate.

Table 1 Toolbox for analyzing intergovernmental and transnational mechanisms of EU TNPO
Full size table

In the context of the TNPO toolbox, the notions ‘externalization’ and ‘transnational externalization’ clearly constitute purely structural sources of impact. Such mechanisms as ‘negative externality’ and ‘competition’ encapsulate how the EU may wield power over third country governments or companies independently of intentional or conscious EU agency. Overall, purely structural pathways of EU impact capture instances of EU influence resulting from its presence and third countries’ interdependence with (or dependence on) the EU’s internal market and its system of regional governance. It should be noted, however, that the single market can serve as a tool of agent-based structural power. Indeed, in some cases the EU purposively uses access to its internal market as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions in other domains (see e.g. Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006). In addition, the EU’s ‘presence’—described by Bretherton and Vogler as a consequence of its being (2006, pp. 27, 33)—may constitute a form of attraction or magnetism. This is ‘purely structural’, in that the EU’s impact arises from the appeal of its rules or norms (cf. unilateral emulation, imitation, lesson-drawing) or, more generally, from the attraction of its model as a regionally (economically and politically) integrated group of liberal democracies (Schimmelfennig 2007; see also Haughton 2007; Leonard 2005).

By contrast, the mechanisms of ‘domestic empowerment’, ‘transnational socialization’ and ‘transnational social learning’—as well as their respective intergovernmental equivalents—are indicative of agent-based structural power (see Table 1). All three represent sources of impact that are based on EU-initiated engagement with third country non-state actors. In other words, the EU’s power in these cases is a result of intentional EU agency towards local societal actors (or towards domestic elites in case of the intergovernmental equivalents). The agency relies either on the provision of material incentives—i.e. domestic empowerment—or on persuasion through dialogue—i.e. transnational socialization and transnational social learning.

2.3 The Three TNPO Structures

2.3.1 TNPO1: Material Structure

The first structure over which it is possible to exert influence is the material structure, labelled here ‘TNPO1’. ‘Material’ refers here to materialism in the physical understanding of the term, as captured in the common (neo)realist notion of ‘material capabilities’. Whilst rejecting (neo)realism’s obsessive preoccupation with the state, this chapter shares neorealism’s beliefs to the extent that it assumes (1) the EU’s policies towards third countries/regions to be shaped by self-interest considerationsFootnote 5; (2) the EU to be vying for greater influence over third countries/regions, given that the policy objectives derived from those self-regarding calculations involve enhancing EU power over the respective third country/region; and as a result, (3) the EU to be engaged in ‘competition’ for influence in the respective third country/region. Hence the inclusion of the neo-realist notion of ‘competition’ in the TNPO toolbox (see Table 1). ‘Security competition’, or ‘geostrategic competition’, and the ensuing mechanism of ‘balancing of power’, is an agent-based form of structural power, which clearly draws on a rationalist logic of action, with the third country weighing off the advantages and disadvantages of forming an ‘alliance’—i.c. any form of cooperation—with the EU in the latter’s attempt to balance the influence of another—i.e. more dominant—actor.

Assuming that structural power is based on the possession of material resources, regime theorist Oran Young argues that “[in] a general way, it makes sense to view the link between structural power and bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries among the participants or stakeholders in processes of institutional bargaining” (1991, p. 289). This point is central to TNPO1 in that it assumes that the EU’s material capabilities, such as the size and strength of its market, result in asymmetric relationships and third countries’ dependence. However, it is important to note that material power is not limited to the ‘capability’ of an agent, but that it can also occur due to asymmetric flows of goods, finance, etc. This is highlighted, inter alia, in Susan Strange’s work and in neo-Gramscian analyses (see e.g. Cox 1981, 1987), which conceptualize structural power in terms of flows of goods, finance and the resultant gravitational pull of core economic entities.

In moving on to identify TNPO1 in more detail, let us start by considering the EU’s foremost material resource, the single market. The sheer size and strength of the EU’s internal market leads to a gravitational attraction and inherently asymmetric trading relationships, in particular with neighbouring and/or weak trade partners, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). The possibility to include or exclude third countries to the single market is already a powerful tool, let alone the possibility of framing the terms of reference within which this possible market access is to take place. Although the EU officially maintains the language of ‘partnership’ and ‘equal footing’, in practice, its preponderant market power enables it to force its pre-agreed positions upon interested trade partners (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, pp. 78–79).

On the one hand, the internal market provides the EU with agent-based structural power. This is captured in Meunier and Nicolaïdis’s (2006) study of the EU’s common trade policy. As they observe, the EU is not only a trade power, or ‘power in trade’, but also a ‘power through trade’. That is, while the EU remains a major power in trade based on the strength of its internal market as well as the collective character of European trade policy and the efficiency of its institutions in negotiating lucrative commercial deals, the EU has been increasingly “using access to its huge market as a bargaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic policies of its trading partners, from labour standards to human rights, and more generally to shape new patterns of global governance” (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006, p. 907). Tying market access to domestic changes often involves the use of conditionality (see more below).

On the other hand, the power that derives from the internal market can be purely structural. Useful tools to capture this dimension of the EU’s market power are the above-mentioned mechanisms of externalization (negative externality and unilateral policy emulation), transnational externalization, and the market and competition modes of governance (see Section “Understanding and Operationalizing the ‘Transnational’ Dimension of TNPO”). These purely structural pathways of EU impact help to understand how EU internal rules—even without conscious EU agency—spill over to third countries. For instance, as already highlighted above, if firms want to export to the EU, the exported products need to be in accordance with the EU’s rules or standards, such as environmental and safety standards. The REACH regulation on chemicals and their safe use, for example, affects all the companies that wish to export chemicals to the EU.

Beyond the single market, and inherently related to this, the EU draws power from its dominant position as an economic giant. An important contributor to the EU’s economic weight is of course the euro, which—despite the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the EU—has become a reserve currency in many parts of the world. As Holden notes, “[a] strong currency is in itself a form of structural power” (2009, p. 188). Other material ‘resources’ and ‘capabilities’ that fall within the sphere of TNPO1 are—in no particular order—the provision of development and financial aid (e.g. loans and technical assistance), technological competence, and military and security-related capabilities. Obviously, the military and security-related capabilities barely stand comparison with the EU’s economic and commercial strength, especially since the EU’s security and defence policy remains rather limited in scope. By contrast, the EU’s development policy is highly elaborate, and is intentionally used by the EU to increase its influence worldwide, and in particular its structural power (Holden 2009). Moreover, just like access to the EU’s market, development aid and financial assistance are offered as an incentive, set on the condition that third country governments follow the EU’s demands for political and economic reforms. Central to the rationalist logic underpinning the ‘external incentives model’ (see above), this modus operandi is captured by the intergovernmental mechanism of conditionality.

A final point that needs to be made in the context of the EU’s provision of aid regards its civil society assistance. A substantial part of the EU’s aid goes to civil society actors, such as NGOs and business associations. This modus operandi can be captured by the transnational mechanism of domestic empowerment. According to a rationalist instrumental logic, civil society assistance may help to change the domestic opportunity structure in favour of societal actors with independent incentives to adopt EU rules and helps to strengthen their bargaining power towards the government or towards societal or political opponents (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, p. 664).

2.3.2 TNPO2: Institutional Structure

The second structure over which an actor can exert influence is the institutional structure, labelled here ‘TNPO2’. This notion draws on a varying range of institutional approaches, which converge on the proposition that ‘institutions matter’. TNPO2 is further divided into two subcomponents: a micro-level and a macro-level.

TNPO2micro encompasses different forms of institutionalized cooperation and engagement. The micro-institutional power that the EU wields through TNPO2micro assumes that the denser the institutional relationship between the EU and a third country is the larger the EU’s TNPO over the country will be. TNPO2micro includes both formal contractual (including treaty-based) formats of institutionalization established as part of the EU’s relations with third countries, and less formal and less integrated (including ad hoc) formats of institutionalization, often held at the bureaucratic or technocratic level rather than at the high political level. As such, TNPO2micro covers practically all existing types of EU institutionalized cooperation with third countries, ranging from formal political dialogue as established through bilateral and bi-regional agreements (e.g. inter-regional dialogue with the Southern African Development Community), over human rights dialogues and civil society dialogues, to meetings between bureaucrats or technocrats (e.g. seminars, info sessions, training sessions, twinning). Moreover, TNPO2micro also includes the physical presence of the EU in partner countries. This concerns both the long-term presence and activities of Commission delegations (EU delegations from 2010 onwards), EU Special Representatives and embassies of EU member states in the partner countries, and the occasional presence of such EU actors as the (former) troika of foreign ministers and EU Commissioners (e.g. through formal visits).

TNPO2macro, the second subcomponent of TNPO2, is located at the macro-level of international relations, rather than at the more case-specific institutional micro-level of bilateral or bi-regional contractual (or other) relations. In particular, it concerns the power that an actor (i.c. the EU) may have over another actor based on the former’s dominant position within an international regime or international institution. To some extent, this point chimes with historical institutionalist propositions, which emphasize the asymmetries of power that arise from the way in which institutions work (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 938). In addition, it echoes Krasner’s regime theoretical understanding of structural power as the power to shape the rules of institutions and regimes. In Krasner’s view, international regimes and normative structures can, after a certain amount of time (i.e. following a ‘time-lag’) become independent sources of influence, and can thus be used as instruments to exercise power over other states (1982, p. 499). The EU actively promotes multilateralism and does so, primarily, in an attempt to protect itself from globalization; however, in doing so, the EU acts as an agent of the very process of globalization (see e.g. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, pp. 17–18). Because of its formidable trade power and substantial economic strength, the EU contributes to globalization particularly through its trade policy and its support for a global free market economy and neo-liberal international order, including through the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Moreover, as exemplified by its WTO agenda, the EU’s attempts at shaping and managing globalization are based on its own regulatory models (see e.g. De Bièvre 2006; Meunier 2007; Young and Peterson 2006). As Holden writes, “the WTO is more than a series of, inevitably ‘crisis-ridden’, negotiations, and is an accumulated body of law, which the EU has had a major role in shaping” (2009, p. 188). However, the EU also has a significant say in other areas of global governance. As Keukeleire and MacNaughtan point out, the EU “has played a pivotal role in the development, adoption and implementation of important new multilateral legal instruments, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and various disarmament regimes and initiatives” (2008, p. 302).

2.3.3 TNPO3: The Ideational Structure

The third and final structure over which an actor can exert influence is the ideational structure, labelled here ‘TNPO3’. It encompasses such intangible factors as beliefs, values, norms, identity and legitimacy. In other words, TNPO3 is ideational in the sense that it takes ideas, normative interpretations and mental constructs seriously and regards them as causally important in their own right. It is useful to start the discussion by referring to Krastev and Leonard’s claim that the new world order is determined not just by the balance of ‘hard power’, i.e. the ability to use economic or military power to coerce or bribe countries to support you, but by the balance of what Nye has famously termed ‘soft power’ (Krastev and Leonard 2007; also see Leonard 2005). Originally defined in very broad terms as ‘non-command power’, Nye’s concept of soft power encapsulates the ability of a state to get what it wants through attraction, rather than through coercion and payment, arising from the appeal of its culture, political ideals and policies (Nye 1990, 2004).

Although initially designed for the U.S., the notion of soft power can also be used to capture the magnetic pull of the EU. From a Lukesian point of view, attraction or magnetism can be seen as a form of ‘passive power’. In the case of the EU, for instance, part of its transformative power, understood here as the power to enable domestic change within third countries, rests on the passive leverage that it draws from its attractive single market and its success as a regionally—economically and politically—integrated group of liberal democracies (Haughton 2007; Leonard 2005; Therborn 2001; Vachudova 2001). Related to this is the attraction stemming from the so-called ‘European dream’ and the ‘European way of living’, which reflect the high level of prosperity and quality of life associated with the EU, including high living standards and efficient social welfare systems (see e.g. Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Also the fact that the EU is characterized by a legacy of peaceful relations and successful reconciliation appeals to external partners.

Moreover, the EU seems to have a rather benevolent and non-threatening image compared to other international powers, including the U.S., and is increasingly accepted around the globe as a source of authority on several public policy issues (see e.g. Holden 2009, p. 184). As Holden explains, “[s]ignificant here is that many do not perceive it as an actor in the sense that major states are viewed, thus its own webs of control have tended to elicit less paranoia and resistance than these other actors” (2009, pp. 188–9). As mentioned previously, the EU’s magnetic pull stems from its presence, rather than from its intentional agency, which constitutes a purely structural form of structural power. Similarly, (non)governmental actors in third countries may be drawn to the EU’s rules or norms independently of intentional EU agency, as is encapsulated by such mechanisms as unilateral emulation, (societal) imitation, (societal) lesson-drawing (see Table 1). At the same time, however, norms and values are also spread through conscious efforts by the EU, thereby testifying to agent-based structural power. This duality is captured in Ian Manners’s (2002) concept of normative power, which illustriously represents the ideational underpinnings of the EU’s soft power. Indeed, Manners’s framework of normative power depicts the EU as a changer of norms in international relations based on combination of its very existence and conscious agency, notably by projecting its internally shared principles and norms onto its external partners (Manners 2002, p. 252).

When it comes to pinpointing the norms and principles propagated by the EU, Manners (2002, p. 240) identifies four ‘core’ norms, which form a central part of the EU’s vast body of laws and policies, namely peace, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms, as set out in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and incorporated in the EU’s various external policies and strategies. In addition, Manners designates four ‘minor’ norms, i.e. social progress, combating discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. Departing from the proposition that Europeanization consists of “the external projection of internal solutions”, Schimmelfennig (2007), in turn, not only considers the EU’s export of its constitutional norms, but also of its model of regionalism as well as its “multilaterally managed regulatory framework for liberal markets”, or “neoliberal economic model” seen in a more critical perspective. It is worth noting that the EU’s attempt to disseminate its regionalist model can be observed in the EU’s tendency to design its policies and strategies for regional groupings of countries rather than for individual states (Schimmelfennig 2007).

2.4 Overlap Between the Three TNPO Structures

While TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3 are the material, institutional and ideational structures in their purest, or ideal, forms, in practical terms, they are often found to interact with each other. This is particularly true for TNPO2micro, which is present in two different overlaps, notably in TNPO2micro-3 and TNPO1-2micro-3. Before moving on to identify the overlap between the TNPO structures, it should be noted that the delineations of overlap presented below are tentative rather than definitive, and that the instances of overlap suggested here are indicative rather than exhaustive.

2.4.1 TNPO1-2: Overlap Between TNPO1(material) and TNPO2(institutional)

By and large, overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO2micro encompasses the extent to which EU aid constitutes a direct intervention in third countries’ domestic structures and to which the assistance ensures contact between the two Parties, thereby establishing relationships between the EU and the third country that become institutionalized in one way or other (see e.g. Holden 2009, p. 183). In practice, however, such direct EU intervention hardly ever occurs without deliberate attempts by the EU to push through domestic reforms that are inspired by or draw on the EU model. In short, TNPO1-2micro thus appears to be inherently linked to TNPO3.

In contrast, overlap between TNPO1 and TNPO2macro is more easily observable and does not necessarily interact with TNPO3. Nevertheless, compared to the other types of TNPO overlap, TNPO1-2macro is only a minor case of overlap. It is most likely to occur in the security domain. A case in point is when the EU relies upon a regional security organization such as NATO in order to gain more (geo)strategic influence over a third country.

2.4.2 TNPO1-3: Overlap Between TNPO1(material) and TNPO3(ideational)

One way in which the EU attempts to diffuse ideas, principles and norms is by coupling them with or channelling them through the provision of such material incentives as market access and financial assistance. By the same token, the EU draws on its formidable trade power to promote non-trade issues, including such principles and norms as sustainable development and respect for social rights. These two examples point to the interaction of ideational and material factors that may occur between TNPO1 and TNPO3. The overlap between both structures largely constitutes agent-based structural power, as the overlap derives mostly from conscious EU agency. Yet, in some cases, the overlap clearly testifies to structural power that is purely structural in nature. A case in point is when producers and/or legislators in a third country experience the necessity to adopt EU product standards as a result of competitive pressures (cf. the notion of ‘competition’, see Section “Understanding and Operationalizing the ‘Transnational’ Dimension of TNPO” and Table 1).

2.4.3 TNPO2-3: Overlap Between TNPO2(institutional) and TNPO3(ideational)

In constituting the interaction between institutional and ideational factors, TNPO2-3 encompasses the extent to which ‘institutions matter’ as the site for socialization through dialogue. The overlap can be observed at both the micro-institutional and macro-institutional level, although it occurs predominantly at the former level. In essence, TNPO2micro-3 encompasses modes of rule transfer and norm diffusion based on EU-initiated processes of communication and social learning. In contrast to the interaction between TNPO1 and TNPO3, overlap between TNPO2micro and TNPO3 thus largely follows a logic of appropriateness, capturing how third country actors internalize EU norms not because they calculate the consequences of the norm adaptation but because they feel that norm conformance is ‘the right thing to do’. As Manners (2009, p. 3) argues, normative power implies the use of persuasive action, which involves constructive engagement, the institutionalization of relations, and the encouragement of dialogue between the parties. The theoretical mechanism underlying processes of socialization suggests that, through constructive dialogue, the socializee (i.e. the third country) is persuaded by the legitimacy of the socializer’s (i.e. the EU) interpretations of the world and changes its identity and interests accordingly (Checkel 2005, p. 812; also see Warkotsch 2009, p. 252). As the outsider fully internalizes the projected norm, norm diffusion through persuasive action is assumed to be more sustainable than norm compliance resulting from strategic calculation, which might end when the incentive structures changes (Checkel 2005, p. 813; Warkotsch 2009, p. 252).

TNPO2micro-3, in the form of rule transfer and norm diffusion based on EU-initiated processes of communication and social learning, constitutes agent-based structural power, as those dialogue processes of socialization are driven consciously and deliberately by the EU. It is noteworthy that this makes it fully distinct from behavioural adaptation as a result of ‘lesson-drawing’ or ‘unilateral policy emulation’ (see Table 1). They do not occur in the overlap, but fall entirely under TNPO3 and reflect a purely structural type of structural power, as norm compliance is induced by domestic factors rather than by pro-active EU norm promotion

2.4.4 TNPO1-2-3: Overlap Between TNPO1(material), TNPO2(institutional) and TNPO3(ideational)

In the most basic—and most comprehensive—respect, TNPO1-2-3 encompasses the extent to which EU cooperation agreements with third countries both establish institutionalized relationships and offer options for the provision of technical and financial assistance, which in turn serve to diffuse norms and values and/or to export parts of the acquis into the legal orders of the partner countries (see e.g. Petrov 2008, p. 46). In the same context, it also captures how these EU agreements offer options for the formalized incorporation of conditionality, which also serve to diffuse norms and values and/or to export parts of the acquis into the legal orders of the partner countries. In addition, TNPO1-2-3 also encompasses the extent to which EU agreements and formalized arrangements allow for the promotion of norms and principles through transgovernmental cooperation at the sectoral, bureaucratic/technocratic level (cf. external governance).

3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter sought to offer a structurally integrative approach in order to address the lack of structurally integrative perspectives in the literature on the EU’s external power. Rather than bluntly rejecting the predominant theoretical perspectives, the chapter in fact suggested to incorporate some of the theories’ propositions in developing a model that combines elements from agent-focussed approaches with insights from structural perspectives, notably from new realist IPE and EU external governance perspectives. As such, the chapter worked eclectically with arguments drawn, on the one hand, from neorealism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, and on the other, from the EU external governance literature and new realist IPE.

Central to the chapter’s theoretical argument is the claim that an analysis of power needs to account for the distinction between the relational and the structural level on which power operates, as well as for the interplay between the two levels. To account for this, the chapter introduced a conceptual tool, which it labelled ‘transnational power over’ (TNPO). Rather than being a theory, TNPO provides a conceptual frame that serves to broaden and, arguably enhance, our understanding of the EU’s power over third countries. In particular, it seeks to assess the extent to which the EU’s power over another actor derives from its control over a constitutive mix of structures, which determine the range of options available to the other actor. This constitutive mix of structures comprises three structures, notably a material, an institutional and an ideational structure. The term ‘constitutive’ also reflects the considerable level of overlap occurring between the structures. In other words, TNPO serves to assess the extent to which the EU’s power over another actor derives from its control over a material, an institutional and an ideational structure and the interaction between the structures, which, ceteris paribus, determine the range of options available to the other actor.

Importantly, such a definition of TNPO can only work based on the assumption that (1) power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, can be transnational in nature; that (2) structures have an ‘enabling’ or ‘facilitating’ impact; and that (3) structures shape and determine the context within which actors operate and relate with each other. Accordingly, it is essential to consider that TNPO constitutes power wielded not directly over another ‘actor’, but directly over the underlying ‘structures’ that determine the range of options available to that other actor.

In order to trace and assess transnational and intergovernmental mechanisms of EU impact across the three TNPO structures and their respective overlap, the chapter constructed a toolbox, which centres on four analytical distinctions: (1) EU-driven versus domestically driven mechanisms, (2) mechanisms based on rationalist logics of action versus mechanisms following constructivist logics of action, and (3) agent-based versus purely structural mechanisms of TNPO, and (4) transnational and intergovernmental mechanisms of EU impact.