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Amending the Unamendable: The Case of Article 20 of the German Basic Law

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An Unamendable Constitution?

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 68))

Abstract

The power which has the right to approve a constitutional norm is called pouvoir constituant. The original pouvoir constituant which drafts a new constitution is hierarchically higher than the derived one which has only the right to amend an existing constitution in the framework allowed by the original one. In other words, parliaments who want to amend the constitutions are limited by the unamendable provisions. In 1968, Parliament of Germany added the 4th paragraph (which provides German citizens the right to resist any person seeking to abolish the constitutional order) to Article 20 which had been rendered unamendable by the Article 79 of the Basic Law of Germany during the drafting process in 1949. Consequently, although this newly added paragraph is present in an unamendable article, any derived pouvoir constituant can amend, change or annul it because it is not approved by an original pouvoir constituant.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One of the most obvious examples of this kind of undemocratic limitations is the Article 3 of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey concerning the capital, national anthem, flag and unity of the state and the nation. The political will which has established the article as an unamendable provision belongs to the junta which lead the coup d’état of September 12, 1980.

  2. 2.

    For some examples see among others: Barthelemy and Duez (1993), p. 231; Özbudun (2013), pp. 180–181; Paine (1984), p. 41.

  3. 3.

    Beaud (1994), pp. 314–315.

  4. 4.

    Turpin (1992), p. 81.

  5. 5.

    Klein (1996), pp. 7–8.

  6. 6.

    Ece Göztepe, ‘Anayasa Yargısı ve Demokrasi’ (2012) Toplum ve Bilim 123, 48. I agree in general with Göztepe. I would argue that the transition was not from popular sovereignty itself but from the idea. Because, in Rousseau’s system of popular sovereignty which is a modern version of direct democracy from the Greek city-state of Athens, the public has the right to be directly part of the government. But this system never was put into effect because right after the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie “stole” the Revolution from the populace and established a representative system based on Sieyès’ ideas. Indeed, the abstract concepts of “nation” and “national representation” are created by Sieyès with the aim of supporting the monarchy against Rousseau’s dangerous thoughts on giving sovereignty to the people. They actually pour out meaning from democracy and give the right to govern not to the general population but to a certain elite group of the society.

  7. 7.

    Case no. 2003-469 (23 March 2003), §3, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/2003/2003-469-dc/decision-n-2003-469-dc-du-26-mars-2003.857.html. Accessed 28 July 2016.

  8. 8.

    du Loû (2003), p. 731.

  9. 9.

    Schmitt (2008), p. 244.

  10. 10.

    de Malberg (1920), pp. 509–510.

  11. 11.

    Lavroff (1995), pp. 99–100, cited by: Gözler (1997), p. 189.

  12. 12.

    de Malberg (1931), p. 109.

  13. 13.

    Klein (1996), p. 33.

  14. 14.

    Roznai (2015), p. 5.

  15. 15.

    For Schmitt, the provisions which are not essential in a constitution.

  16. 16.

    Schmitt (2008), p. 236.

  17. 17.

    Beaud (1993), p 15.

  18. 18.

    Beaud (1994), p. 315.

  19. 19.

    Dérosier (2008), pp. 785–795.

  20. 20.

    Murswiek (2008), p. 3, cited by: Sağlam (2010), p. 575.

  21. 21.

    Burdeau (1950), p. 209, cited by: Beaud (1993), p. 16.

  22. 22.

    Turpin (1992), p. 81.

  23. 23.

    Kubalı (1971), p. 96.

  24. 24.

    Robert (2003), p. 362.

  25. 25.

    Gözler (1997), p. 27.

  26. 26.

    Duguit (2005), pp. 383–385.

  27. 27.

    Beaud (1993), p. 14.

  28. 28.

    Schmitt (2008), pp. 211–212.

  29. 29.

    It should be remembered that Schmitt ignored the existence of such a concept as derived pouvoir constituant. For him, there was only one constituent power which is what we call the original pouvoir constituant.

  30. 30.

    Teziç (2012), p. 156.

  31. 31.

    Kubalı (1971), pp. 98–99.

  32. 32.

    de Malberg (1922), pp. 496–497.

  33. 33.

    Kubalı (1971), p. 99.

  34. 34.

    Teziç (2012), p. 158.

  35. 35.

    Klein (1996), p. 18.

  36. 36.

    Beaud (1994), pp. 383–384.

  37. 37.

    Case no. 62-20 DC, 6 November 1962.

  38. 38.

    Renoux and de Villiers (1994), p. 624.

  39. 39.

    As it’s mentioned before, Schmitt does not accept the existence of such a concept like “derived” pouvoir constituant. Therefore, from his point of view, there is only one pouvoir constituant and this is the power who writes the constitution for the first time. For Schmitt, what we call as derived pouvoir constituant is just a limited power to amend the constitution and it has no right to “constitute”. Schmitt (2008), pp. 211–212.

  40. 40.

    It would be better to understand this “end of time” as “the collapse of the country” which is created by the relevant constitution.

  41. 41.

    Schmitt (2008), p. 229.

  42. 42.

    Klein (1996), p. 205.

  43. 43.

    Beaud (1994), p. 455.

  44. 44.

    Sieyes (1999), pp. 492–493.

  45. 45.

    Sieyes (1989), pp. 1004–1018.

  46. 46.

    de Malberg (1931), p. 110.

  47. 47.

    Beaud (1993), p. 37.

  48. 48.

    Beaud (1993), p. 14.

  49. 49.

    Duverger (1948), p. 195.

  50. 50.

    Gözler (1997), p. 92.

  51. 51.

    Esmein (1909), pp. 980–981.

  52. 52.

    Kubalı (1971), p. 101.

  53. 53.

    Beaud (1993), p. 16.

  54. 54.

    Özbudun (2013), p. 175.

  55. 55.

    Onar (1993), p. 18.

  56. 56.

    Gallagher (2012), p. 2. For an adverse view see: Hailbronner (2014), pp. 628–634.

  57. 57.

    For the “Germany Treaty” see http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/10/1/b1885d93-c91a-4fa7-80bd-e1d3b3171b87/publishable_en.pdf.

  58. 58.

    Khan and Zöckler (1992), p. 168.

  59. 59.

    Federal Republic of Germany became a full member of the United Nations Organization in 1973, just 5 years after from this amendment.

  60. 60.

    Roznai (2015), p. 8.

  61. 61.

    Grimm (2010), p. 34.

  62. 62.

    For an adverse view, see: Gárdos-Orosz (2015), p. 1.

  63. 63.

    Michel and Cofone (2015), p. 6.

  64. 64.

    Roznai (2015), p. 9.

  65. 65.

    In 1884, there were three constitutional laws which were in effect all together.

  66. 66.

    Duguit (1994), pp. 370–371.

  67. 67.

    Beaud (1994), pp. 382–383.

  68. 68.

    Article 95.

  69. 69.

    Article 89/5: “The republican form of the government shall not be subject to any amendment”.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Law Faculty, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Serkan Köybaşı

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  1. School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

    Richard Albert

  2. Law School, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, Turkey

    Bertil Emrah Oder

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Köybaşı, S. (2018). Amending the Unamendable: The Case of Article 20 of the German Basic Law. In: Albert, R., Oder, B. (eds) An Unamendable Constitution?. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 68. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_10

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