Abstract
This paper supports the idea that the proportionality test works as an analytical framework in adjudicating social rights. In particular, suitability and alternative means tests should gain relevance and stop being the neglected steps of the proportionality test. Suitability and alternative means tests are reinforced by considering several aspects, such as quantitative, qualitative and probabilistic. In this vein, it serves to rebut the position which sustains that proportionality as a safeguard against the state not doing enough is pure balancing. Suitability and alternative means tests state what has been done and what is possible to be done to promote the social rights in question. In sum, the work shows that this basic structure of proportionality can be used as an analytical tool to reconstruct decisions about social rights adjudication. Therefore, there is no reason for the Courts not to make more systematic use of the three-part test of proportionality, at least seen from the analytical level.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
More recently, some authors and judges added the test of the legitimacy of the aim as an autonomous step, which was previously considered a preliminary question of the suitability test.
- 2.
The focus of this chapter is on the adjudication on the rights that can be limited. Some of the rights contained in the American Convention of Human Rights or in the Latin American Constitutions or in the European Convention of Human Rights are protected absolutely. When the interference in such absolute rights has been established, there is no possibility of justification of it. Balancing is excluded. Therefore, the case law and the literature on absolute social rights will not be discussed here.
- 3.
- 4.
The narrative of ‘travel’ includes some surprises: ‘it is perhaps surprising that proportionality analysis, in the standard three step variation that has been utilized by so many contemporary courts, should be so absent from the adjudication of economic and social rights.’ Young (2017, p. 14).
- 5.
All the rights, whatever the name would be civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights, imposed positive and negative obligations on the state. Therefore, all the rights are negative and positive rights. The negative side of the rights imposes an obligation on the state to refrain (negative obligation), and the positive one an obligation to ensure or protect (positive obligations). Frequently, the positive function of rights is discussed regarding social rights. Nevertheless, the positive function is not limited to social rights. Perhaps the best example is, that one of the most quoted papers about social rights and proportionality, Alexy (2009). He used case law of the positive dimension of the right to life, not a case regarding the positive dimension of a social right. About proportionality by adjudicating positive rights see, among others, Mayer (2005), Vasileios (2004, pp. 74–87), Reinhard (2005, pp. 262–280), Johannes (1994, pp. 130–141), Hain (1996, pp.~75–84), Cremer (2008, p. 107), Borowski (2007) and Clérico (2009, pp. 151–164).
- 6.
Tushnet (2008) (pointing out that the study of the migration of constitutional ideas must be done with a great caution and suggesting that “The true object of study should be the way in which those constitutional ideas that do migrate are transformed as they cross the border, or, alternatively, the way in which ideas that seem to have migrated have deeper indigenous roots than one might think, deeper even than the prevalence of citations to nondomestic sources would indicate”).
- 7.
See Malcolm (2011).
- 8.
This is not surprising, as the empirical studies show, most Constitutions of Latin America includes justiciable economic and social rights. See, Jung et al. (2014, p. 1043).
- 9.
- 10.
Some scholars converge in the point that the more intensive the interference in a social right the more difficult to justify it. When the interference seems to leave the right with little content, then the reason to justify the interference grows in geometrical progression. This is what I called the progressive interpretation of the law of balancing, Clérico (2001, p. 168).
- 11.
Perhaps the most notorious is the one between the formal/structural approach of Alexy and the material approach to balancing of Moller (2012).
- 12.
Contiades and Fotiadou (2012, p. 660) and Gardbaum (2016), claiming that the German and South African constitutional courts and the ECtHR, ‘largely eschew proportionality analysis in their adjudication of positive and horizontal rights cases’. Young (2017) (integrating the “principle of proportionality” similar to the law of balancing, not the analysis of proportionality with the three standard subtests, in the reconstruction of the reasonableness test for social rights adjudication used by the South African Court). Not clear whether Young’s reconstruction applies for the reasonableness test by the UN Committee of ESCR, since it contains some sorts of alternative means test, that is the analysis of proportionality, and not only the principle of proportionality as defined by Young. The test supposed that the means are suitable; otherwise, it can never test if the State chooses one of the suitable measures. Hence, the adjudication of social rights includes more than one stage of proportionality.
- 13.
Nevertheless, see Beth (2017) (pointing out that “There are certain methodological challenges of undertaking comparative research into constitutional social and economic rights. Language has proved the major barrier and since some of the important jurisprudences are only available in Spanish, I have not been able to research all the relevant Latin American decisions and had to rely on secondary sources. There is, therefore; a bias in this chapter towards the decisions of the courts that are available in English”).
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Contiades and Fotiadou (2012, p. 660). Bilchitz (2014b, p.~710) (sustaining that ‘proportionality cannot conceptually provide content to rights and, rather, requires… supplementation by a doctrine of content.’). Contiades and Fotiadou (2014, pp. 740–746) (arguing “that proportionality emerges as a powerful and unique tool for substantiating the content of social rights and for maintaining social rights protection. … Nonetheless, merely to rely on the doctrinal basis of the fixed-core content distances theory from practice to such an extent that it explains why the author concludes with the hope that, in the end, those to blame for the crisis will pay. In the meantime, ensuring that rights infringements undergo judicial scrutiny through proportionality can help keep social rights alive throughout the crisis.”).
- 18.
Jung et al. (2014, p. 1043).
- 19.
For instance, it is the case of children, women, poor people, indigenous communities, migrants, people with disabilities, displaced people. See Aldao et al. (2017) and Bilchitz (2013) (referring to this constitutionalism characterised by addressing matters of distributive justice facing the challenges of poverty and structural inequalities in these jurisdictions).
- 20.
They arise out of the critical reviewing of material that is apparently disorganised: case law and doctrine, using argumentative and analytical tools provided by the theory of law. The proper function of the proportionality test presupposes the existence of a critical scholarship. Both the former and the latter help to address the objection of the ad hoc balancing. Clérico (2001, pp.~178–198) and De Laurentiis (2016).
- 21.
This objection sustains that social rights adjudication implicates policy questions and that courts are not properly equipped to address them. It attacks the judicial legitimacy by adjudicating social rights: judges are not elected and they are not easily accountable. Fowkes (2017, p. 109) (pointing out “that it is increasingly recognized that this argument is over-stated and that there is much that courts can legitimately do in these areas. That is especially true when other branches of government are not acting, and when the relevant comparison is therefore often between less than ideal judicial action, and no action at all an argument long used to defend expansive judicial action in India, for example”).
- 22.
This position is developed in the research line of Alexy R’s Theory of Constitutional. Scholars from the same school working on the collision between formal principles and the delimitation of the intensity of control of the judicial review, see Sieckmann (1988, pp. 39–60), Sieckmann (1997, pp. 101–107), Sieckmann (2016) and Raabe (1994, pp. 83–100). Raabe (1998), Alfonso Da Silva (2003) and Klatt and Schmidt (2012, pp. 69–74). Recently, Klatt (2015, pp. 354–382) (sustaining that the particular intensity of review depends on the circumstances of the case at hand as evaluated by using a number of factors like the quality of the decision, the empirical and normative reliability of the premises, the democratic legitimacy, the material principles that are affected and the specific function of the authority).
- 23.
O’Cinneide (2014, pp. 299–314) (arguing that diversity will trump uniformity regarding the methods of social rights adjudication and that will be misguided. I insist that this diversity let be better explained, if one distinguishes between the analytical, the doctrinal and the institutional perspective).
- 24.
- 25.
Clérico (200, pp. 151–164): In dealing with Alexy’s model, I propose that the negative action of the state has a definitive opposite, that is the requirement of a positive action, but the content of this positive action may be alternative. It is necessary to perform one of the actions, but not all at the same time. It is necessary that one of them be done. However, this does not exclude the possibility that under certain circumstances a particular remedy must be established. This is the case if a means is the only one capable of promoting the fundamental right in question. In these cases, the unconstitutional negative action of the state has not only a definitive opposite but also a definite content (necessary means), in the other cases a definitive opposite with alternative contents. The legislator has a (so-called structural) margin within which it can choose among the means to fulfill the requirement (sufficient means). It follows that the degree of fulfillment (degree of protection, degree of achievement) is not discretional; the legislator can only choose among the sufficient means. In these cases, the unconstitutional negative action of the state has a definitive opposite (something should be done), with an alternative and sufficient content (sufficient means). Compare, Kleiber (2014, p. 107) and Oliveira (2013) [cited 2018-05-10].
- 26.
Alexy (2007, p. 108) (defining it as a structural margin of appreciation by means setting).
- 27.
Young (2017).
- 28.
At the same time, the analysis of positive rights shows that Alexy develops a theory of the margin of appreciation within different types of margin (in end-setting, in means-selecting and in balancing), and the scope of it. Truly, his theory applied in the context of structural inequality cannot give rise to a theory of a wide margin of discretion for the legislative in all the cases and contexts. Arango (2006, pp. 153–172) and Clérico (2007).
- 29.
O’Cinneide (2014).
- 30.
At the same time, the discussion about the theory of weak courts-strong courts by adjudicating social rights travels to Latin America’s scholarship very well.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
Schlink (2012, p. 730).
- 34.
Huang and Law (2015).
- 35.
- 36.
In the easy cases, the accumulative way serves as a rational postulate to exhaust the consideration of all relevant arguments.
- 37.
The side of proportionality apparently explains the phenomenon of the explosion and still travels to the world.
- 38.
- 39.
Constitutional Court of Guatemala, File 2643-2008, August 16, 2010; Parra (2016, p. 157).
- 40.
Ibid.
- 41.
Ibid; compare, Añón Roig (2016, p. 57) (sustaining that the core of the right serves as an absolute limit).
- 42.
Courtis (2009, p. 379).
- 43.
Añón Roig (2016, p. 57).
- 44.
Constitutional Court of Colombia, T-025/04, January 22, 2004.
- 45.
Constitutional Court of Colombia, T-760/08, July 31, 2008.
- 46.
Parra (2016, p. 157).
- 47.
Clérico (2017).
- 48.
Schlink (2012, p. 727).
- 49.
At the same time, it is not the favoured jurisdiction that academic commentators discuss social rights review use to select. In this domain the “usually suspected”—at least in readily researchable English-language works, seems to be India, Colombia and South Africa, see O’Cinneide (2014, p.~316); Hirschl (2013, pp. 8–9) (noting that comparative scholarship must avoid restricting its focus to a few favoured national case studies).
- 50.
This forced them to return to living in the streets again. In the view of this, she submitted an injunction for the legal protection against the local government.
- 51.
The Government alleges that it has an inelastic budget for this purpose.
- 52.
Q. C. vs. GCABA (Supreme Court of Argentina, 24 April 2012).
- 53.
Decrees 690/06, 960/08 and 167/11.
- 54.
Para 1 from the majority’s vote.
- 55.
Ibid, para 12 from Petracchi’s concurring opinion.
- 56.
Ibid, para 11 from Petracchi’s concurring opinion.
- 57.
Ibid, para 7 from Petracchi’s concurring opinion and the majority’s vote.
- 58.
The subsidy amounts to a monthly payment ranging from 700 to 1200 Argentinean Pesos.
- 59.
Ibid.
- 60.
Ibid.
- 61.
With regard to each of the quantitative, qualitative and probabilistic perspective, there is a minimum threshold of sufficiency which any means must meet and above which any increase contributes to a proportional rise of the degree of suitability.
- 62.
This unconstitutional omission turns out to be even more serious if it is considered that the rights at play and the portion of the population left without help are precisely ‘those which the National Constitution specially prioritizes’. Ibid, para 15 from Petracchi’s vote in accordance with Art. No. 75, Sections 23 and 22 from the Constitution of Argentina.
- 63.
O’Cinneide (2014, p. 307) (pointed out different proposals that show the development of the ‘technology’ of judicial review to deal with the argument of resources allocation).
- 64.
Both positions are unattractive. It is not a question of ‘either or’, but rather understanding the different values of the alternative means test depending on the scenario that it is applied.
- 65.
As posed above, the flexible and contextual approach of judicial review seems to be plausible as the abstract and general ones, like the weak or strong courts in the abstract. The flexible and contextual approaches sustain that the correct intensity of control must be determined in each concrete case, depending on the factual and normative circumstances and oriented by the rules that do not depend on the case, see Klatt (2015) and other scholars referred in note 22 of this work.
- 66.
Ibid.
- 67.
Ibid, paras 14, 15 from the majority’s vote.
- 68.
Ibid.
- 69.
Ibid.
- 70.
In the clear cases, the suitability and necessity tests avoid balancing, since because of these tests, it can be determined that the limitation of one right can be lesser without harming the promotion of the other.
- 71.
Stone Sweet and Mathews (2008, p. 39), among many others.
- 72.
A standard argument, about the proportionality in the narrow sense by adjudicating negative or positive rights, is that it reduces to a mere ad hoc balancing. It is increasingly recognised that this objection is over-stated and that the argumentation in balancing is subjected to rules. The judgments on the intensity of the restrictions or the weight of the rights are guided by rules. These are the rules of balancing (‘consideration mandates’, ‘rules of weight’). Certainly, these guiding rules do not determine totally the material result of the conflict. Nevertheless, they constrain in advance the justification. Therefore, they introduce predictability; reduce the indeterminacy of balancing and the leeway of judicial discretion. Clérico (2001, pp. 151 and 178), Pou Giménez (2014, pp. 585–616), Ronconi (2012) and De Fazio (2014).
- 73.
- 74.
Paragraph 12 from the majority’s vote in “Q. C.”
- 75.
Paragraph 8 from the majority’s vote with quotations from International Human Rights Conventions, especially the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
- 76.
The local state tried to justify the insufficiency with the budget argument. This was not serious. It did not furnish with any reliable and concrete information about the alleged budget restrictions. It is not enough to ‘make abstract and theoretical assumptions’ such as ‘economic resources are scarce by nature and the Government must attend to several activities and needs of the population.’ The local state has not justified that ‘at least, the resources the local Government has, have been used and executed at their full possible extent, and that the budget’s organisation and distribution has taken into account the priority assigned by the Constitution to the satisfaction of the fundamental rights.’ Ibid, para 18 from Petracchi’s concurring opinion.
- 77.
Clérico (2001, pp. 168, 236 and 345).
- 78.
‘The forces of the counter-arguments (must grow) in a more than proportional way’, Alexy (1986, p. 271)—highlighted by L.C.
- 79.
There is a proportional relationship between the unsuitability of the means from a quantitative, qualitative and probabilistic perspective and its sufficiency for the satisfaction of the social right in question. The more interference in the right, leaving it without almost any possible satisfaction, the stronger will be its capacity to resist, the more serious the justification is demanded.
- 80.
Compare Landau (2014), pointed out that a minimum core approach, which prioritises the basic needs of the poorest members of society, may be the most effective way for courts to protect the vulnerable during times of crisis without causing an overwhelming political backlash or freezing the status quo in the face of a genuine crisis. At the same time, sustaining that such an approach need not require a court to formulate a minimum entitlement to social rights with exacting and impossible precision, and should be seen as complementary to other approaches like proportionality analysis.
- 81.
This rule implies: (a) A presumption against the proportionality of the omission or the insufficient action; (b) the shift of the burden of argumentation to those who argue the proportionality of the omission or the insufficient action, generally, the State; (c) an aggravated demand for justification, the disproportion of the omission or the insufficient action can only is reverted if the party that has the burden of the argument can claim and justify more than important reasons; (d) an epistemic rule according to which if there are still doubts when the argument has ended, the state’s omission or insufficient action are left as disproportional. Clérico (2009, pp. 151–164).
- 82.
Jackson and Green (2011, p. 605), sustaining ‘even if proportionality as an approach might sometimes support creation of a rule’. To the contrary, I claim that if one takes the postulate of coherence in law seriously, the creation of a rule after balancing is an inescapable step.
- 83.
Alexy (1986, pp. 79 and 83). Clérico (2001) (about a net of rules resulted from balancing; Klatt (2015, p. 374) (complex canon of precedents). The Constitutional Court of Colombia calls them ‘subreglas jurisprudenciales’ (sub-rules of case law), and expressly asserts that they are ‘ascribed rules’ which are the product of a correct balancing performed by the Court. The Court held that a case can be solved by an ascribe rule, see García Jaramillo (2014, p. 381).
- 84.
Arango (2004).
- 85.
- 86.
Clérico (2001, pp. 178–198). Clérico (2015). The focus is on the systematisation of results of prior proportionality tests regarding each right to solve (using a network of rules resulted of prior balancing) similar cases without balancing (standardisation process). Additionally, it is a matter of systematising the discussions on the weight of rights in constitutional practices. The outcomes are the dogmatic rules of balancing (mandates of consideration, rules of weights) that must be at the heart of the balancing process and take the features of the concerned rights seriously. The net is useful although the case cannot be strictly solved by applying a precedent. In these cases, the criteria and principles developed in the case-law cannot be transferred per se to solve the present case, but must guide it in assessing the interference and weight of rights in conflict in the case. The interference in the access to the right to housing of people living in situation of vulnerability is to be assessed as very high although the future case can differ from the one ruled by the Court in Q.C.
- 87.
Thus far, it has been suggested that the adjudication of rights by means of balancing is a matter of immaturity of the case-law also applied by social rights. This thesis is partly right with respect to the rules that arise out of balancing results and solve conflicts without balancing, see Schauer (2005, p. 68), sustaining that when a larger number of cases are solved, they will obtain a greater number of rules. This will bring them closer to a system of rights adjudication structured by rules, such as the American system.
- 88.
Aldao et al. (2017, p. 83).
- 89.
A renewed discussion about proportionality can be expected in Latin America since the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of ESCR has come into force. Art. 8 (4) of the ESCR Protocol states, that ‘when examining communications …, the Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party …. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.’ In another work, I sustained that the reasonableness review for social rights has similarities to the test of proportionality from the analytical point of view. Nevertheless, the reasonableness test and the proportionality test can differ in one important respect at the level of the intensity of judicial review. In one approach to reasonableness, the Court reviews whether the legislative or executive have considered the social right at stake and applied the criteria that they determine to promote the social right. The main aim is the evaluation of the justification of policies. In contrast, in Latin America the trend of some courts – with lots of variations –is additionally to ‘protect the normative strength of robust provisions on social rights’ through material tests like the prohibition of regression or of insufficiency. It is not only a matter of ‘reviewing the proceedings through which policies are regulated’. The context in Latin America continues to revolve around poverty, social, economic and, political and cultural inequality. It is to be hoped that further discussions about the reasonableness and proportionality tests in Latin America take this context seriously.
- 90.
Huang and Law (2015).
- 91.
As Gerards also proposes for the ECtHR in general not specifically by positive rights. Gerards (2013, pp.~466–490).
References
Abramovich V, Courtis C (2002) Los Derechos Sociales como Derechos Exigibles. Trotta, Madrid
Aldao M, Clérico L, Ronconi L (2017) A multidimensional approach to equality in the inter-American context. Redistribution, recognition, and participatory parity. In: von Bogdandy A et al (eds) Constitutionalism in Latin America. OUP, Oxford
Alexy R (1986) Theorie der Grundrechte. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Alexy R (2007) Zur Struktur der Grundrechte auf Schutz. In: Sieckmann J (ed) Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Alexy R (2009) On constitutional rights to protection. Legisprudence 3(1)
Alexy R (2010) The construction of constitutional rights. Law Ethics Hum Rights 4(21)
Añón Roig MJ (2016) Hay límites a la regresividad de derechos sociales. Revista Derechos y Libertades, Madrid
Arango R (2001) Der Begriff der sozialen Grundrechte. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Arango R (2004) El valor de la coherencia y el precedente constitucional. In: Zuluaga R (ed) Interpretar y argumentar. Nuevas perspectivas para el derecho. Universidad Javeriana, Bogota
Arango R (2006) La prohibición de retroceso en Colombia. In: Courtis C (ed) Ni un paso atrás. Buenos Aires
Arango R (2011) El concepto del goce efectivo de los derechos. Temis, Bogotá
Bernal Pulido C (2013) The migration of proportionality across Europe. NZ J Public Int Law 11(3)
Beth G (2017) Constitutional approaches to gender and social and economic rights. In: Irving H (ed) Constitutions and gender handbook. Edward Elgar, Northampton
Bilchitz D (2013) Constitutionalism, the global south, and economic justice. In: Bonilla D (ed) Constitutionalism of the global south. The activist tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bilchitz D (2014a) Socio-economic rights, economic crisis, and legal doctrine. Int J Constitutional Law
Bilchitz D (2014b) Necessity and proportionality. Towards a balanced approach? In: Lazarus L et al (eds) Reasoning rights. Hart, Oxford
Borowski M (2007) Grundrechte als Prinzipien., 2. Auflage, Baden-Baden
Chacón Lemus MS (2013) La Ponderación de principios en la justicia constitucional guatemalteca. Opus Magna Constitucional, Corte de Constitucionalidad
Clérico L (2001) Die Struktur der Verhältnismässigkeit. Nomos, Baden-Baden, p 168
Clérico L (2007) El examen de proporcionalidad. entre exceso de acción y la insuficiencia por omisión o defecto. In: Carbonell M (ed) El principio de proporcionalidad en el Estado constitucional. Bogotá
Clérico L (2009) Das Untermaßverbot und die Alternativitätsthese. In: Clérico L, Sieckmann J (eds) Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation. Studien zur Rechtstheorie Robert Alexys. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Clérico L (2012) Sobre Casos y Ponderación. Los Modelos de Alexy y Moreso, ¿Más Similitudes que Diferencias? Isonomía, México
Clérico L (2015) Examen de proporcionalidad y objeción de indeterminación, Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho, vol 31. Nueva Época
Clérico L (2017) Proportionality and balancing. In: Mendes CH, Gargarella R (eds) Oxford handbook of constitutional law in Latin America. OUP, Oxford (forthcoming)
Contiades X, Fotiadou A (2012) Social rights in the age of proportionality. Global economic crisis and constitutional litigation. Int J Constitutional Law
Contiades X, Fotiadou A (2014) A reply to David Bilchitz. Int J Constitutional Law 12(3)
Cordón Aguilar JC (2013) La noción del “contenido esencial” y el principio de proporcionalidad. In: Derechos humanos. el anhelo por garantizar el respeto a la dignidad de la persona (ed) Cara Parens de la Universidad Rafael Landívar
Courtis C (ed) (2006) Ni un paso atrás. La prohibición de regresividad en materia de derechos sociales. del Puerto, Buenos Aires
Courtis C (2009) Standards to make ESC rights justiciable: a summary exploration. Eur Law Rev2
Cremer W (2008) Die Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung bei der grundrechtlichen Schutzpflicht. DÖV
Da Silva AV (2003) Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume. Nomos, Baden-Baden
De Laurentiis L (2016) A Proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional: Origem. Modelos e Reconstrução Dogmática, Sao Paulo
Falcón JP (2013) El Examen de Proporcionalidad por acción insuficiente. aDA Ciudad, Buenos Aires
Fazio FD (2014) Sistemas Normativos y conflictos constitucionales. ¿es posible aplicar derechos fundamentales sin ponderar? Isonomia: ITAM, N° 40, Abril 2014, México D. F.
Fazio FD (2017) Teoría jurídica de los derechos sociales. Buenos Aires
Florian FJL (2013) La eficacia de los derechos sociales entre particulares. Pensamiento Constitucional
Fowkes J (2017) Transformative constitutionalism in the global south. In: von Bogdandy A et al (eds) Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America. OUP, Oxford
García Jaramillo L (2014) Subreglas jurisprudenciales de contención a las mayorías parlamentarias. In: García Jaramillo L (ed) Nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación/tensión entre la democracia y el constitucionalismo. Grijley
Gardbaum S (2016) Positive and horizontal rights. Proportionality’s next frontier or a bridge too far? In: Jackson V, Tushnet M (eds) Proportionality. New frontiers, new challenges. CUP, Cambridge
Gerards J (2013) How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights. Int J Constitutional Law 11(2)
Hain K (1996) Untermaßverbot in der Kontroverse, ZG
Hirschl R (2013) From comparative constitutional law to comparative constitutional studies. Int J Constitutional Law 11(1)
Huang C, Law D (2015) Proportionality review of administrative action in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China. In: Bignami F, Zaring D (eds) Research handbook in comparative law and regulation. Edward Elgar, Northampton
Jackson V, Green J (2011) Constitutional interpretation in comparative perspective. Comparing judges or courts? In: Guinsburg T, Dixon R (eds) Comparative constitutional law. Edward Elgar, Northampton
Johannes D (1994) Das Untermaßverbot, Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung
Jung C et al (2014) Economic and social rights in national constitutions. Am J Comp Law 610:1043
Klatt M (2015) Positive rights: who decides? Judicial review in balance. Int J Constitutional Law 13(2)
Klatt M, Schmidt J (2012) Epistemic discretion in constitutional law. Int J Constitutional Law 10
Kleiber M (2014) Der grundrechtliche Schutz künftiger Generationen. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Koutnatzis SIG (2013) Verfassungsvergleichende Überlegungen zur Rezeption des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit in Übersee. In: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee. VRÜ
Kumm M (2004) Constitutional rights as principles: on the structure and domain of constitutional justice. Int J Constitutional Law (I•CON) 2
Landau D (2014) The promise of a minimum core approach. The Colombian model for judicial review of austerity measures. In: Nolan A (ed) Economic and social rights after the global financial crisis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Malcolm L (2011) Social rights jurisprudence, emerging trends in international and comparative law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Matricardi LF (2009) A Proibição de Insuficiência e o STF: O Controle de Proporcionalidade da Omissão Estatal, São Paulo
Mayer M (2005) Untermaß, Übermaß und Wesensgehaltsgarantie. Baden-Baden
Moller K (2012) The global model of constitutional rights. OUP, Oxford
Moreso J (2012) Ways of solving conflicts of constitutional rights. Ratio Juris: 25–31
O’Cinneide C (2014) The problematic of social rights – uniformity and diversity in the development of social rights review. In: McCrudden L, Bowles N (eds) Reasoning rights: comparative judicial engagement. Hart, Oxford
Oliveira FBB (2013) Controle da omissão estatal em direitos fundamentais. Conteúdo, estrutura e o problema da justiciabilidade dos deveres de proteção, São Paulo. Faculdade de Direito, University of São Paulo
Parra O (2016) The protection of social rights. In: Bergallo P et al (eds) The Latin American casebook. Courts, constitutions, and rights. Ashgate, London
Pou Giménez F (2014) Libertad de expresión y discurso homofóbico en México: ¿es correcta la teoría constitucional de la Suprema Corte? In: Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, No. 140
Raabe M (1994) Grundrechtsschutzundgesetzgeberischer Einschätzungsspielraum. In: Grabenwarter et al (eds) Allgemeinheit der Grundrechte und Vielfalt der Gesellschaft. pp 83–100
Raabe M (1998) Grundrechte und Erkenntnis. Der Einschätzungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Reinhard R (2005) Zur Konkretisierung des Untermaßverbotes. ZG
Ronconi L (2012) Derecho a la salud. un modelo para la determinación de los contenidos mínimos y periféricos. Salud colectiva 8(2)
Schauer F (2005) Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States. A case study in comparative constitutional architecture. In: Nolte G (ed) European and US constitutionalism. CUP, Cambridge
Schlink B (2012) Proportionality. In: Rosenfeld M, Sajó A (eds) The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law. OUP, Oxford, p 730
Sieckmann J (1988) Das System richterlicher Bindungen und Kontrollkompetenzen. In: Mellinghoff R et al (ed) Die Leistungsfähigkeit des Rechts. Heidelberg, pp 39–60
Sieckmann J (1997) Beurteilungsspielräume und richterliche Kontrollkompetenzen. In: DVBl
Sieckmann J (2016) Principios formales. In: Portocarrero Quispe A (ed) Ponderación y discrecionalidad. Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá
Stone Sweet A, Mathews J (2008) Proportionality, balancing and global constitutionalism. Columbia J Transnational Law 47
Tushnet M (2008) Why comparative constitutional law? In: Tushnet M (ed) Weak courts, strong rights: judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative constitutional law. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Vasileios T (2004) Das Untermaßverbot. Frankfurt am Main
Von Bogdandy A (2017) Ius Constitutionale Commune in América Latina. Observations on Transformative Constitutionalism. In: von Bogdandy A et al (eds) Constitutionalism in Latin America. OUP, Oxford
Young K (2017) Proportionality, reasonableness and social rights. In: Jackson V, Tushnet M (eds) Proportionality. New frontiers, new challenges. CUP, Cambridge
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the comments, critics and suggestions in different stages of the work made by Martín Aldao, Robert Alexy, Rodolfo Arango, David Duarte, Federico de Fazio, Peter Hull, Daniel Oliver Lalana, Sebastián Sciosciolli, Jan Sieckmann, Leticia Vita and Hyun Jung Lee. Errors are mine.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Clérico, L. (2018). Proportionality in Social Rights Adjudication: Making It Workable. In: Duarte, D., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Proportionality in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89647-2_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89647-2_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-89646-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-89647-2
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)