Abstract
This chapter argues against the myth promoted by the Indonesian military that the genocide of 1965 was spontaneous. Drawing on army records from Aceh, Melvin lays out how plans for the army seizure of state power evolved in the lead up to 1965 in the context of the Dwikora military operation to oppose the formation of Malaysia (Ganyang Malaysia). Melvin argues that the army used these chains of command to seize state power and attack its political enemy through a self-described “Annihilation Operation” that it launched on 1 October 1965.
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Melvin, J. (2018). The Road to Genocide: Indonesian Military Planning to Seize State Power Prior to 1 October 1965. In: McGregor, K., Melvin, J., Pohlman, A. (eds) The Indonesian Genocide of 1965. Palgrave Studies in the History of Genocide. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71455-4_3
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