Abstract
Ted Honderich has made a very significant contribution to the debate about free will and determinism, in particular in his important book, A Theory of Determinism (Honderich, A Theory of Determinism, Oxford University Press, 1988). I share his general perspective on this issue, which, like mine, is in the Spinozist camp (Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, Princeton University Press, 1677/1985), and I also agree with many of its specific features. His account of the aspects of our practice of holding moral responsibility that would have to be given up and which can be retained is nuanced and powerful. This is the part of the project that I have addressed in past works (Pereboom, Living without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford University Press, 2014). Here, I will recount and expand on what I said there.
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Notes
- 1.
This proposal emerged from a discussion with Austin Duggan.
- 2.
Carl Ginet makes a similar suggestion (in correspondence).
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Pereboom, D. (2018). Honderich on Freedom, Determinism, and Meaning in Life. In: Caruso, G. (eds) Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66754-6_8
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