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Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism

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Epistemic Pluralism

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

I discuss Carnap’s method of explication with special emphasis on its application to epistemology. I observe that explication has the advantage over conceptual analysis of not being vulnerable to the so-called paradox of analysis. Moreover, explicationist epistemology is intrinsically immune to the Gettier problem. I proceed to identify three senses in which the former is inherently pluralistic. For example, it allows for a plurality of legitimate and potentially interesting epistemological projects. Finally, I argue that while there are salient affinities with Alston’s theory of epistemic desiderata , beyond a far-reaching commitment to pluralism, there are also important differences. Above all, Carnap’s methodological outlook is reconstructive in ways in which Alston’s is not.

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Correspondence to Erik J. Olsson .

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Olsson, E.J. (2017). Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_2

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