Abstract
As in many other transitional settings, reconciliation has been a political mantra throughout Burundi’s complex transition from civil war to peace. A central merit of reconciliation-as-a-mantra is that it has facilitated allowed a unifying and pacifying discourse among political and military elites as well as other opinion leaders. Despite fundamental disagreements about almost all aspects of reconciliation—its definition, its timing, its mechanisms—all of Burundi’s political and societal elites embraced it as common public good. It sometimes seemed as if, by insisting and repeating that Burundians need it and want it, reconciliation might become a self-fulfilling prophecy for Burundi. Not surprisingly, the notion of reconciliation in Burundi therefore has, over the past twenty years, added a very normative dimension to public political discourse. Although very vague—an important feature that enables the common use of its normative dimension—reconciliation generally refers to how society and relations between individuals and groups should ideally be, despite all the divisions in Burundi’s recent past that frequently turned violent.
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Notes
- 1.
A 2008 census registered around 8 million inhabitants. The census did not register ethnic affiliation. Contrary to the situation that prevailed in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide, Burundian identity cards do not mention ethnic affiliation. However, that does not prevent people from identifying themselves (and their fellow citizens) as Hutu (around 85%), Tutsi (around 14%), Twa (around 1%) or Ganwa (a small number of descendants of the first king of Burundi). Although these societal groups cannot easily be distinguished on the basis of the ‘classical’ objective indicators (territory, culture, language, religion), the self-identification by Burundian citizens definitely includes ethnic affiliation (see also UN CERD 1997: 3).
- 2.
It is worth noting that, already in August 1997, FRODEBU published a report under the strategically clever title “Burundi, a system of apartheid in disguise” (“Burundi, un apartheid qui ne dit pas son nom”).
- 3.
The skepticism (see i.a. International Crisis Group 2000; Chrétien 2000) was based on a number of elements, including the impression that is was largely externally imposed upon Burundi (in particular by Nelson Mandela), the important reservations expressed by a number of (Tutsi) signatories to the agreement, important issues that remained unresolved and, most importantly, the absence of the predominantly Hutu armed rebel movements among the signatories of the APRA.
- 4.
I am grateful to Alex de Waal for bringing this point to my attention.
- 5.
I am grateful to Liz Mc Clintock for bringing this point to my attention.
- 6.
ONUB = United Nations Operation in Burundi (May 2004–December 2006); BINUB = United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (January 2007–December 2010); BNUB = United Nations Office in Burundi (January 2011–December 2014).
- 7.
“La paix et le développement durables ont pour socle la vérité, la réconciliation et le pardon mutuel entre Burundais” (our translation).
- 8.
This position has, to my knowledge, never been publicly declared in those terms. However, several informants confirm that transitional justice has been discussed at the most senior levels within the military and that there is a shared resistance against truth and accountability for past human rights abuses.
- 9.
During a mission in October 2011, upon asking a question on the party’s position to two senior CNDD-FDD officials whether the party wished those responsible for the killing of president Ndadaye to be brought to justice, I received an (understandably but also tellingly) evasive reply.
- 10.
Past tense, because it is very unclear whether, as a result of serious internal divisions and intimidation campaigns, FNL still represents an important part of the Burundian (mainly Hutu) electorate.
- 11.
Information obtained from an interview with a senior UN official involved in the mediation between the government and Rwasa.
- 12.
In addition, Rwasa also has reason to fear international judicial action for the alleged responsibility of his rebel movement in the massacre of the passengers—including one British national—of the minibus Titanic Express in December 2000 (Wilson 2006).
- 13.
This point is mainly developed on the basis of years of monitoring of transitional justice in Burundi and regular interviews with national and international, governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, none of whom I can mention here in person.
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Vandeginste, S. (2017). Negotiating and Sharing Power: Burundi’s Bumpy Road to Reconciliation Without Truth. In: Rosoux, V., Anstey, M. (eds) Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62674-1_11
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