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New Terrorism

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Terrorism Revisited

Part of the book series: Contemporary South Asian Studies ((CSAS))

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Abstract

Most of the recent studies on terrorism assume contemporary terrorism to be something substantially different from what it used to be, although no consensus exists on how to designate it, when did it evolve into this new form or what is crucially different in it. Martha Crenshaw is the most important exception and criticises what she classifies as the “new terrorism school”. Most authors tend to see the intangibility of aims as the most typical characteristic of new terrorism. We take in consideration the two most important terrorist groups of our age—Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda—and show they have tangible objectives. Whereas it is unquestionable that the most brutal terrorism in our era is made in the name of religion—contrary to what Martha Crenshaw sustains—the importance of two of the exceptions (The Shining Path and the Tamil Tigers) invalidates the criteria. Most authors consider suicide terrorism to be a distinctive characteristic of “new terrorism”. While we acknowledge that the use of mass suicide terrorism was absent between the Second World War and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it appears that Walter Laqueur’s distinction between the “mastermind” and the “instrument” in the modern terrorist operation is more fruitful to understand what we are dealing with. Other arguments for “new terrorism” such as new type of organisation, globalisation or new techniques are also dismissed, whereas the sheer brutality of the phenomenon is seen as unquestionably “new” and distinct in a Western perspective, but not necessarily so in a global one. The enormous effort to define terrorism as a new type of crime is therefore dismissed as useless when not counterproductive. On the contrary, the analysis of the motivations of terrorism is crucial, and the normative blurring under a mantle of euphemisms is considered to be an error.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Martha Crenshaw gives several examples of contradictions of both author’s remarks in different parts of their texts when referring to a new sort of terrorism opposing an old sort of terrorism. Crenshaw’s case is made in a clear way and she proves that none of them provided a consistent proposal for defining a new sort of terrorism.

  2. 2.

    Speaking of “new terrorism” as a “school of thought” seems quite far-fetched.

  3. 3.

    For the remainder of this section, we will focus on those who characterise “new terrorism” as fanatically driven as opposed to have tangible objectives.

  4. 4.

    See, for instance, terror attacks in Bulgaria and Cyprus in 2013 and 2015: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192 and http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-cyprus-security-idUKKBN0OV2DN20150615

  5. 5.

    Wright (2006, pp. 172–175) provides perhaps the most detailed description of the strong cooperation deal passed between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.

  6. 6.

    For instance, see Hoffman (1998, p. 141) or Crenshaw (2007, p. 137). The issue is further developed in their book chapters on the Tamil Tigers.

  7. 7.

    See, for instance, According to Todd Huntley, “Balancing Self-Defense and Mission Accomplishment in International Intervention: Challenges in Drawing and Implementing Rules of Engagement”, Maryland Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, p. 106, footnote 150) a Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials On Iran, the IRGC, and Hezbollah's was titled.

    Increased Terrorist Activity Worldwide, U.S. Dep’t of State (May 31, 2013) and was previously available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210145.htm

  8. 8.

    For an in-depth analysis, see Crenshaw (2011, pp. 145–148) or Wright (2006, p. 239).

  9. 9.

    For instance, see Fayazmanesh (2008, p. 42) or Axworthy (2013, p. 277).

  10. 10.

    See here Wright (2006, pp. 249–250) for the successful negotiations of Al Qaeda with Pakistan to promote the jihad in Kashmir and for the unsuccessful negotiations with Iraq (op. cit., pp. 295–296). On the Al Qaeda-Iran negotiations to launch the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda, the best source is Brisard (2005).

  11. 11.

    For instance, see Roggio, B. (2010). “Taliban cooperation with Al Qaeda ‘is at the highest limits’”—Siraj Haqqani. The Long War Journal. [online] Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/taliban_cooperation.php [accessed 18 October 2016].

  12. 12.

    Vidino, L, 2006. The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan. The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, [online]. Fall 2006, pp. 1–12. Available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/2006/vidino_fall.pdf [accessed 18 October 2016].

  13. 13.

    For instance, see Byman (2007, pp. 128–131).

  14. 14.

    For instance, see Joscelyn, T. (2007, pp. 56–63).

  15. 15.

    The Bolshevik political violence was far more brutal than the violence of its “terrorist” predecessors. If we just remember one of the most symbolic examples—the failed attempt to the life of Grand Duke Alexandrovich in 1905 where terrorists cancelled the attempt in order not to endanger the Grand Duke’s children (Hoffman, 1998, p. 6)—we can see the difference regarding the Bolsheviks whom under the instructions of Lenin assassinated the entire royal family, including women and children. However, this second act is not technically an act of terrorism, contrarily to the first. This example should be sufficient for us to understand how erroneous it is our use of “terrorism” as the absolute evil. Otherwise, as Laqueur (2003, p. 13) reminds us, the terrorist assassination in 1922 of the German Foreign Minister (who happened to be Jewish) was an act precursor of the Nazi takeover.

  16. 16.

    Hoffman (1998, p. 85) considers that:

    … only two of the sixty-four groups active in 1980 could be classified as predominantly religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed Shi’a organizations al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution.

    This view ignores most of the lengthy and documented jihadi terror history prior to this date. It neglects all the terrorist activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood splinter groups or Shia-Iranian-affiliated groups, which were very important already before 1980. Once again, this betrays a Western-biased point of view. However, as an indicator, it points into the pertinent direction.

  17. 17.

    From 2014 onwards the Peruvian press has been pointing to a close association between Hezbollah and the Sendero Luminoso. See, for instance, https://nacionyanawara.lamula.pe/2016/10/19/hizbola-islamista-o-sendero-luminoso/yanawara/. As it happened in the past with Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers, it is therefore likely that the Iranian authorities are aiming at using this and other domestic terrorist groups for their own expansionist agenda.

  18. 18.

    See our following chapter on the Tamil Tigers.

  19. 19.

    Acosta and Childs (2013) was published after this review. Merari (2010) was also published after the review, but his writings on the issue in Reich (1990, pp. 192–207) were not taken in consideration either.

  20. 20.

    Several religious cults such as the one of Jim Jones engaged in mass suicide operations, but we cannot call them terrorist or even consider them mainly in the realm of political violence.

  21. 21.

    The issue is far more complex and has been discussed at length in the literature.

  22. 22.

    Merari (1990) makes a clear explanation of the issue.

  23. 23.

    Anecdotal evidence from Iran, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria confirms a complex picture for the individual, group and family motivations of the suicidal act.

  24. 24.

    Crenshaw (2011) dismisses the idea of WMD as a new sort of terrorism. See, namely, pp. 8 and 51.

  25. 25.

    According to the United Nations Office at the Geneva Library, https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11579/, “The French government had proposed, following the assassination by Croatian and Macedonian separatists of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934, that the League adopt a convention on terrorism. The text of the convention was drafted at the Conference for the Repression of Terrorism, which took place at the League of Nations headquarters in Geneva on November 1–16, 1937”. Crenshaw (2011, p. 21), using an indirect source, assumes however this convention to have been linked with anarchist terrorism.

  26. 26.

    Hoffman (1998, pp. 23–24) refers to the arguments put forward by the “Third World” delegates during the discussions in the United Nations on terrorism following the Olympic Games terrorist attacks in Munich in 1972. According to Crenshaw (2011, pp. 21–22), the same is true regarding academic studies where the studies addressing “internal warfare” or “internal war” were more popular than terrorism.

  27. 27.

    However member states were unable to reach a consensus (see Part 1, Chapter “The Conceptual Discussion on Terrorism”). For a more in-depth review, see: http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/1623/kofi_annans_legacy_on_counterterrorism.html

  28. 28.

    Diaz-Paniagua, Carlos Fernando (2008), Negotiating Terrorism: The Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-terrorism Treaties, 1997–2005, Volume 1, UMI: New York.

  29. 29.

    See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html

  30. 30.

    This is the most recent definition we have seen and can be consulted here under point 7a: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/topics_pdf/20160905_160905-mc-concept-ct.pdf

  31. 31.

    OIC, Convention of The Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999, URL: http://www.oic-oci.org/english/convenion/terrorism_convention.htm

  32. 32.

    Common Position 2001/931/CFSP http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0093:0096:EN:PDF and European Commission, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Official Journal of the European Union, L 164/3, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=%20CELEX:32002F0475&from=EN. The framework agreement was amended in 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32008F0919. An official synopsis is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33168

  33. 33.

    Quoted from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33168

  34. 34.

    Actually, when religious supremacist crimes are far outstripping the importance of the racial supremacist crimes, it is quite weird this has not been done yet.

  35. 35.

    See case details at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=67611&doclang=en

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Casaca, P. (2017). New Terrorism. In: Casaca, P., Wolf, S. (eds) Terrorism Revisited. Contemporary South Asian Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55690-1_2

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