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The Democratic Foundations of the EMU: The European Parliament and the National Parliaments Between Cooperation and Rivalry

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Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis

Abstract

According to Article 10 TEU, the functioning of the Union and of the EMU shall be founded on representative democracy. The democratic principle is all the more necessary since economic governance is characterised by its institutional complexity. It calls for a more empowerment of the European Parliament in the EMU. In the European multilevel democratic system, the national Parliaments shall be involved in the economic governance. However, the involvement of the European Parliament and national Parliaments remains limited. Furthermore, the financial and sovereign debt crises triggered substantial reforms of the EMU that have diminished the role of the Parliaments in the European and national decision-making processes. In contrast, due the so-called “monetary” and “economic” dialogues, there is a promotion of Parliaments in accountability process of the EMU. Finally, an important issue arises with the mutation of parliamentary role: the competition between European Parliament and national Parliaments requires an inter-parliamentary cooperation. Provide legitimacy for the EMU has thus brought changes to the parliamentary role in a multilevel constitutional system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Lammert (2009).

  2. 2.

    See Fabbrini et al. (2015).

  3. 3.

    Article 10, para. 2, TEU.

  4. 4.

    See for example GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—2 BvE 2/08.

  5. 5.

    ECJ 29 October 1980, Case 139/79, Maizena GmbH v. Council of the European Communities, para. 34.

  6. 6.

    ECoHR 18 February 1999, No. 24833/94, Matthews v. the United Kingdom.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., para. 49.

  8. 8.

    See ECJ 29 October 1980, Maizena GmbH v. Council of the European Communities, para. 22.

  9. 9.

    ECJ 10 July 2003, Case C-1/00, Commission v. ECB.

  10. 10.

    Article 12 of the Statute.

  11. 11.

    Protocol No. 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

  12. 12.

    Convergence Report, Report required by Article 109, j, TEC.

  13. 13.

    Elefteriadis (2014), p. 27.

  14. 14.

    In a book highlighting the major role of central banks in the resolution of the financial crisis, the author—a journalist fine connoisseur of central banking—has significantly devoted a chapter on the “President of Europe”: for him, during the crisis, the real President of the EU was not the President of the European Council, nor the President of the European Commission, but the President of the ECB! See Irwin (2013).

  15. 15.

    See the special issue of German Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014.

  16. 16.

    Article 141-1 of Monetary and Financial Code (code monétaire et financier).

  17. 17.

    Article 5 TFEU: “The Member States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union. To this end, the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for these policies. Specific provisions shall apply to those Member States whose currency is the euro”.

  18. 18.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJEC L 209, 2 August 1997, pp. 1 et seqq., consolidated.

  19. 19.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJEC L 209, 2 August 1997, pp. 6 et seqq., consolidated.

  20. 20.

    Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances; Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. OJEU L 306, 23 November 2011.

  21. 21.

    Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, pp. 1 et seqq. Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, pp. 11 et seqq.

  22. 22.

    Article 126, para. 11, TFEU.

  23. 23.

    Article 121, para. 5, TFEU.

  24. 24.

    ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Governement of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General.

  25. 25.

    See report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality, 19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011, COM/2012/373. Report from the Commission, Annual report 2013 on subsidiarity and proportionality, COM/2014/506.

  26. 26.

    See Closa Montero and Maatsch (2014) and Piedrafita (2014).

  27. 27.

    See Berner (2013).

  28. 28.

    GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—2 BvE 2/08, para. 175.

  29. 29.

    GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—2 BvE 2/08. See also GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 18 March 2014—2 BvR 1390/12.

  30. 30.

    GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 12 September 2012—2 BvR 1390/12, para. 208.

  31. 31.

    GFCC, Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016—2 BvR 2728/13.

  32. 32.

    ECJ, 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler.

  33. 33.

    Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015 on Greece, 13 July 2015, Statements and remarks, 579/15.

  34. 34.

    European Commission, Report on Greece’s compliance with the draft MoU commitments and the commitments in the Euro Summit statement of 12 July 2015, 14 August 2015.

  35. 35.

    See Martucci (2016).

  36. 36.

    Curtin (2015).

  37. 37.

    Bovens (2007), p. 450, cited by Curtin (2015).

  38. 38.

    See for a typical illustration of critics Kiiver (2005).

  39. 39.

    On the topic, see Fasone (2014).

  40. 40.

    Article 126, para. 5, of the Rules of Procedure.

  41. 41.

    Opening statement at Deutscher Bundestag, Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Discussion on ECB policies with Members of Parliament, Berlin, 24 October 2012.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Mario Draghi: Interview with Bild, Interview with Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, conducted by Kai Diekmann, Nikolaus Blome, Daniel Biskup on 25 April 2016 and published on 28 April 2016.

  44. 44.

    Kritik an Niedrigzinspolitik: Draghi will Einladung des Bundestags annehmen, brk/dpa/Reuters/AFP, 28 April 2016.

  45. 45.

    Chapter III: Reporting to the President of the Republic-Parliamentary Oversight Article L. 143-1.

  46. 46.

    See for example Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu de réunion n. 65, Commission des finances, de l’économie générale et du plan, 17/02/2015, Audition de M. Christian Noyer, gouverneur de la Banque de France, sur la politique monétaire européenne et le soutien financier à la Grèce; Compte rendu de réunion n. 0005 - Commission des affaires européennes, 24/07/2012, Audition, conjointe avec la Commission des finances, de M. Christian Noyer, Gouverneur de la Banque de France, et de M. Ramon Fernandez, Directeur général du Trésor, sur la mise en œuvre de l’accord du 29 juin 2012 relatif au pacte de croissance et à l’union bancaire.

  47. 47.

    See for example Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu de réunion n. 79, Commission des Finances, de l’économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire, 13/05/2015, Échange de vues informel, conjoint avec la commission des Finances, de l’économie générale et du contrôle budgétaire, avec M. Benoît Coeuré, membre du directoire de la Banque centrale européenne.

  48. 48.

    Article 2, ab, 1, of Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011; Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.

  49. 49.

    Broad guidelines of economic policy guidance to Member States issued by the Commission at the beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance; any conclusions drawn by the European Council on orientations for economic policies in the context of the European Semester; the results of multilateral surveillance carried out under this Regulation; any conclusions drawn by the European Council on the orientations for and results of multilateral surveillance; any review of the conduct of multilateral surveillance at the end of the European Semester; Council recommendations addressed to Member States in accordance with Article 121, para. 4, TFEU in the event of significant deviation and the report made by the Council to the European Council as defined in Article 6, para. 2, and Article 10, para. 2, of this Regulation.

  50. 50.

    The specification of the content of the draft budgetary plan as set out in a harmonised framework established in accordance with Article 6, para. 5; the results of the discussion of the Eurogroup on the Commission opinions adopted in accordance with Article 7, para. 1, to the extent that they have been made public; the overall assessment of the budgetary situation and prospects in the Euro area as a whole made by the Commission in accordance with Article 7, para. 4; Council acts referred to in Article 9, para. 4 and in Article 12, para. 3.

  51. 51.

    The Eurosummit didn’t exist, when the Six Pack was adopted.

  52. 52.

    BCE, 23 July 2015 L/MD/15/442, Letter from the MEPs representing Ireland and one MEP representing Northern Ireland.

  53. 53.

    “Constâncio diz em carta porque não vem à Assembleia da República”, 4 May 2016, Observador.pt. See Coelho and Fromage (2016).

  54. 54.

    Article 10 of Protocol No. 1.

  55. 55.

    Kreilinger (2015). See also Cooper (2014).

  56. 56.

    See Kreilinger (2015).

  57. 57.

    European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Report with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, 24 October 2012, PE 494.867v04-00 A7-0339/2012 (2012/2151(INI)).

  58. 58.

    Communication from the Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union Launching a European Debate, 30 November 2012, COM(2012) 777.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    European Council, Conclusions, 13–14 December 2012, point 14.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    See Kreilinger (2015).

  65. 65.

    Slovakia 2016, The Netherlands 2016, Luxembourg 2015, Latvia 2015, Italy 2014, Greece 2014.

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  1. Department of Public Law, University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), Paris, France

    Francesco Martucci

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  1. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Luigi Daniele

  2. Department of Public Law, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Pierluigi Simone

  3. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Rome, Italy

    Roberto Cisotta

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Martucci, F. (2017). The Democratic Foundations of the EMU: The European Parliament and the National Parliaments Between Cooperation and Rivalry. In: Daniele, L., Simone, P., Cisotta, R. (eds) Democracy in the EMU in the Aftermath of the Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53895-2_2

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