Abstract
Kelsenian legal science is a distinctive theoretical project for the comprehension of positive law. It distinguishes itself from the broader, nineteenth century German tradition of legal science through a process of critical interpretation and reworking. The process, initiated with Kelsen’s habilitation of 1911, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (Kelsen 2008), represents a reconsideration of the fundamental elements of this tradition which preserves the methodological requirement for a theory of law to be a science. The adoption of this interpretative position entails that the Kelsenian project assumes both the continued pertinence of a notion of legal science and the historical legitimacy of the tradition of legal science in relation to preceding conceptions of a theory of law. The tradition of legal science is held, in the 1911 habilitation, to denote the origin from which further work on a theory of law is to develop.
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Notes
- 1.
We use the term ‘Kelsenian Legal Science’ to refer to the distinctive theoretical framework through which Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) articulated his conceptualization positive law. The subsequent modifications and alterations of this original framework are held to represent Kelsen’s reflection upon the continued pertinence of the project of a legal science of positive law.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
For Jouanjan, the point of transition between the two forms of legal theory is represented by the work of Carl Friedrich Gerber (1823–1891). See Jouanjan 1997.
- 5.
In particular, Laband’s three-volume, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reichs (1876–1882).
- 6.
See G Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 2nd edition, 1905.
- 7.
- 8.
Kelsen’s critical engagement with a sociology of law, commences with the 1912 review of Kantorowicz’s Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie (Kelsen 1992), proceeds to the extended exchange (1915–1917) with Eugen Ehrlich (Kelsen and Ehrlich 2003), and, finally, to the work of Weber (Kelsen 1922, 1929a, b). For a broader discussion of Kelsen and Weber, see the contributions in Bryan et al. (2015a and 2015b). The engagement with natural law begins in the 1920s (Kelsen 1973a, 2006a). There is a further phase of engagement in the late 1940s to the 1960s (Kelsen 1949, 1956, 1959a, b, c, 1960b, 1973b).
- 9.
“Laws of nature say: ‘If A is, then B must be’” (Kelsen 2002, 24).
- 10.
In this further determination of its conceptual framework, the Reine Rechtlehre also reemphasizes its critique of a sociology of law (Kelsen 2002, 13–14) and natural law (Ibid. 25; 35–36; 37–53).
- 11.
The question of the periodization of Kelsen’s work is the subject of extended discussion in the exchange between Heidemann and Paulson (Paulson 1998; Heideman 1999; and Paulson 1999). See also Hartney (1991, xx–liii), who discusses the conceptual evolution of Kelsen’s work from the Reine Rechtslehre (1934) to the General Theory of Norms (1979).
- 12.
For a reconsideration of the American reception of the Kelsenian project, see Telman 2016.
- 13.
Kelsen retired from his Professorial position at the University of California in 1952, but retained a position as an emeritus Professor.
- 14.
This critique is continued in the posthumously published Die Illusion der Gerechtigkeit: Ein kritische Untersuchung der Sozialphilosophie Platons (Kelsen 1985).
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
The recourse to this philosophical tradition becomes increasingly explicit after the work of Hart.
- 18.
See Kähler, (Chap. 2) in this volume.
- 19.
This is the initial stage for Kähler’s critical analysis in Chap. 2 of this volume.
- 20.
Tensions within various social fact theses and their relationship with Kelsenian legal science are analysed by Kähler in Chap. 2 of this volume.
- 21.
The nature of law and the relationship between ‘science’ and the ‘science of law as pure theory’ are examined by Quiviger in Chap. 3 of this volume.
- 22.
- 23.
This is Quiviger’s interpretative position in Chap. 3 of this volume.
- 24.
As emphasized by Quiviger in Chap. 3 of this volume.
- 25.
- 26.
This is the basis for the analysis presented by Peterson in Chap. 4 of this volume.
- 27.
Kelsen, whilst appropriating the Wolffian notion of civitas maxima (Kelsen 1920, 1926), never engages in a more extensive discussion of Wolff. There is no further reference to Wolff in later work and the later discussion of the natural law tradition, from the late 1940s onwards, concentrates on the earlier work of Pufendorf (see, for example, Kelsen 1949).
- 28.
See the analysis presented by Peterson in Chap. 4 of this volume.
- 29.
A segment of Kelsen’s essay is contained in his General Theory of Norms (Kelsen 1991, 252ff).
- 30.
- 31.
As emphasized by Carrozza in Chap. 5 of this volume.
- 32.
See Carrozza’s discussion in Chap. 5 of this volume.
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
As emphasized by Giordano in Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 36.
See the analysis presented by Giordano in Chap. 6 of this volume.
- 37.
- 38.
Viola conducts such an examination in Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 39.
As emphasized by Viola in Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 40.
See the analysis presented by Viola in Chap. 7 of this volume.
- 41.
See Viola’s discussion in Chap. 7 of the volume.
- 42.
This is the position from which Lifante’s analysis commences in Chap. 8 of this volume.
- 43.
As emphasized by Lifante in Chap. 8 this volume.
- 44.
See the analysis presented by Lifante in Chap. 8 of this volume.
- 45.
This is the focus of Apalategui’s analysis in Chap. 9 of this volume.
- 46.
As emphasized by Apalategui in Chap. 9 of this volume.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
See the analysis presented by Champeil-Desplats in Chap. 10 of this volume.
- 50.
As emphasized by Chwaszcza in Chap. 11 of this volume.
- 51.
- 52.
See the analysis presented by Chwaszcza in Chap. 11 of this volume.
- 53.
- 54.
This is the position of Champeil-Desplats in Chap. 10 of this volume (the phrase is that of Champeil-Desplats).
- 55.
See the analysis presented by Chwaszcza in Chap. 11 of this volume.
- 56.
This the position from which Tedesco’s analysis commences in Chap. 12 of this volume.
- 57.
See the analysis presented by Tedesco in Chap. 12 of this volume.
- 58.
See the evaluation presented by Tedesco in Chap. 12 of this volume.
- 59.
- 60.
This is the position from which McGarry commences his analysis in Chap. 13 of this volume.
- 61.
As emphasized by McGarry in Chap. 13 of this volume.
- 62.
This is the underlying orientation of Sieckmann’s contribution (Chap. 14) in this volume.
- 63.
See Sieckmann, (Chap. 14) in this volume.
- 64.
This is the position from which Chiassoni commences his analysis in Chap. 15 of this volume.
- 65.
See Chiassoni, (Chap. 15) in this volume.
- 66.
See the analysis presented by Chiassoni in Chap. 15 of this volume.
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Langford, P., Bryan, I., McGarry, J. (2017). Introduction: Kelsen, Legal Science and Positive Law. In: Langford, P., Bryan, I., McGarry, J. (eds) Kelsenian Legal Science and the Nature of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51817-6_1
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