Abstract
King’s chapter provides a systematic overview of the state of the philosophy of cognitive psychology in the first half of the fourteenth century, and so a framework for the subsequent chapters as well. In addition to outlining the broad consensus position, which he calls ‘the Neo-Aristotelian synthesis,’ King identifies ‘five specific trouble spots’ in which this consensus is threatened.
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Further Reading
Further Reading
There is a wealth of scholarship on medieval philosophy in all languages, but the following suggestions are confined to recent works in English that help guide the reader. There are good general discussions of many topics in medieval cognitive psychology in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http://plato.stanford.edu ) as well as in the revised edition of The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy (ed. Pasnau 2014) and in the Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (ed. Lagerlund 2011). The Cambridge Companion series has individual volumes on Augustine, Abelard, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham, each of which has some treatment of issues in the philosophy of mind. Details about more specialized works that cover material treated in this Introduction follow.
For “The Long Shadow of Augustine”: The standard study of Augustine’s views about cognitive psychology is O’Daly (1987), with particular attention paid to his theory of ‘active’ perception in Silva (2014). There is no systematic study of Augustine’s influence on the philosophy of mind in the later Middle Ages, but there are many specialized studies, such as Cross (2012), which deal with Augustine’s long shadow. For the twelfth century, King (2007b) and Panaccio (2010) deal with Abelard’s theory of Mental Language and more broadly with his account of thinking.
For “The Neo-Aristotelian Synthesis”: The initial formation of the neo-Aristotelian synthesis in cognitive psychology is partly covered in Bieniak (2010). Historical surveys are to be found in Tachau (1988) and Pasnau (1997a). There are several extended studies of the views of individual philosophers, most notably Henry of Ghent in Goehring (2006), John Duns Scotus in Cross (2015), and William of Ockham in Panaccio (2004), each of which may be consulted as regards the more particular problems the synthesis faced. The details of the neo-Aristotelian synthesis in cognitive psychology can be found in almost any of the general reference works listed above. Some dissenters from the mainstream are discussed in Pasnau (1997b) and Brower-Toland (2013) (Olivi) and in Adriaenssen (2014) (Olivi and Auriol).
For “The Ontology of Psychology”: Problems in the ontology of psychology are surveyed in King (2012). Pluta (2007) deals with particular questions about emergence and materialism; Klima (2009) takes up the issue of the immateriality of the human soul. Pasnau (2008) concentrates on the relation between mind and soul, while Pasnau (2012) is a more general treatment of the relation of psychology to hylomorphism.
For “Mental Architecture”: Mental architecture is the main focus of King (2008) and Perler (2013).
For “Transduction”: The problem of transduction, especially the contrast between abstractive and illuminationist accounts of cognition, is dealt with in King (1994) and Klima (2013b). Spruit (1994) surveys the history of the debates over the need for an intellective representation, a key feature in transduction. Klima (2011) takes up abstraction, while Pini (2015) looks at occurrent thought in Aquinas and Scotus. Henry of Ghent’s views about how causality is related to cognition is taken up in Pickavé (2015).
For “The Object of Thought”: Singular thought is the main focus of Normore (2007) and King (2015).
For “Intentionality”: King (2007a) gives an overview of how to think about representation and intentionality in the Middle Ages; Klima (2004a, b; 2013a; 2015a, b) gives top-down accounts of medieval theories of representation, while Tweedale (2007) offers a historical survey. Aquinas is dealt with in Panaccio (2001) and in Brower and Brower-Toland (2008); his account is contrasted with that of Durand of St.-Pourçain in Hartman (2013), and with Ockham and Buridan in Klima (2011). King (2004) and Pini (2008) analyze Scotus’s views of cognition and mental content. Ockham’s alternative account, and in particular the question of his externalism, is treated in Brower-Toland (2007a, b) and Panaccio (2015); King (2003) emphasizes instead Ockham’s shift to competencies.
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King, P. (2017). Later Medieval Philosophy of Cognitive Psychology. In: Klima, G. (eds) Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51763-6_1
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