Abstract
Scientific realism is often analyzed in the context of natural sciences theory. How does it behave in cognitive science theories? Some philosophers of science have proposed a pragmatic approach to the concept of scientific theory where models form an essential part of its construction. They play a role of mediation. Three distinct classes of models play such a role in cognitive science: (a) formal models, (b) physical models, and (c) conceptual models. Each of these classes challenges the realist thesis in specific ways.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
“If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of the language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. (Whether in this case reference to designata is made or not makes no difference for this classification.) If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata and analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax. The whole science of language, consisting of the three parts mentioned, is called semiotic” (Carnap 1937, 3–5, 16).
- 3.
Davis and many others have proven that computational machines that are parallel exist. And computational dynamicity will depend on the nature of the equation itself.
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There are significant formal problems with this position, for not all causal explanations allow predictions. For instance, a chaotic explanation is not necessarily predictive and all predictive explanations are not necessarily causal. Correlation is predictive, but not necessarily causal.
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This could be reformulated in set-theoretical terms and constitute a formal Tarskian model.
- 6.
The devil’s details for the realist and objectivist thesis applied to the physical models hide under the hood of the words phenomenon and features of the phenomenon.
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Meunier, JG. (2017). Theories and Models: Realism and Objectivity in Cognitive Science. In: Agazzi, E. (eds) Varieties of Scientific Realism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51608-0_18
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