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The Principle of Proportionality, Rights Theory and the Double Effect Doctrine

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Bioethical Decision Making and Argumentation

Part of the book series: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine ((LIME,volume 70))

Abstract

This chapter aims to state which, if any, is the connection between the legal principle of reasonableness and the moral principle of double effect, taking into account that they share an analogous purpose and that the actions which they refer to are also similar in structure. While the former purports to grant rights the latter purports to grant human goods that, in both cases, are taken to be universal and absolute. Actions regulated through the double effect principle and the principle of reasonableness share a common structure; that is, actions with a direct end and a foreseen but not directly willed effect. The second purpose is to argue that while the double effect principle deals with its major problem (respecting the absolute nature of human goods) in a quite satisfactory way, some interpretations of the legal principle of reasonableness fail to guarantee the absolute nature of rights.

I thank Professor José A. Seoane, whose valuable suggestions and remarks have helped to make this work possible, and Professors Caridad Velarde, Alejandro Vigo, Mariano Crespo, Pilar Zambrano and David Thunder for their assistance. I also thank Professors Pedro Rivas and Juan B. Etcheverry, Aitor Rodríguez Salaverría, Ana Carolina Maluf, Ernst Thera, Luciano Laise and Marina Dandois for their support and cooperation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf., on this issue, Schwarze 1992, 680–702; Emiliou 1996, passim; Akehurst 1992, 38–39; Boyron 1992, 237–264; Barnes 1994, 495–499; Bermann 1978, 415–432; Braibant 1974, 297–306; Auby 1979, 227–238; Linares 2010, passim; Gavara de Cara 1994, 293–326; Gündisch 1983, 97–108; Alexy 2002a, 66–68; Willoughby 1929, passim; Georgiadou 1995, 532–541, Jiménez Campo 1983, 72.

  2. 2.

    The “translation” referred to by this author implies, according to his own words, specification of (a) the identity of the duty-holder(s) who must respect or give effect to A’s right; (b) the content of the duty, in terms of specific act-descriptions, including the times and other circumstances and conditions for the applicability of the duty; (c) the identity or class-description of A, the correlative claim-right-holder(s) (in a Hohfeldian sense of ‘claim-right’); (d) the conditions under which a claim-right-holder loses the claim-right, including the conditions (if any) under which the holder can waive the relevant duties; (e) the claim-rights, powers, and liberties of the claim-right-holder in the event of non-performance of duty; and, above all, (f) the liberties of the right-holder, including a specification of the limits of those liberties, i.e. a specification of the right-holder’s duties, especially of non-interference with the liberties of other holders of that right or of other recognized rights. Since (f) involves specifying the duties of right-holder A, it necessarily involves a specification of the claim- rights of B, and this specification in turn requires a complete specification of points (a) to (f) in respect, now, of B; which will require a similar specification in respect of B’s duties of non- interference with C…” (Finnis 2011, 246–247).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, Spain

    Juan Cianciardo

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  1. Juan Cianciardo
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Correspondence to Juan Cianciardo .

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  1. Universidad Internacional de La Rioja (UNIR), Logroño, Spain

    Pedro Serna

  2. Research Group Philosophy, Constitution and Rationality School of Law, Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña, Spain

    José-Antonio Seoane

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Cianciardo, J. (2016). The Principle of Proportionality, Rights Theory and the Double Effect Doctrine. In: Serna, P., Seoane, JA. (eds) Bioethical Decision Making and Argumentation. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 70. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43419-3_8

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