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The Place of Sociality: Models of Intersubjectivity According to Kant

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Kant and Social Policies

Abstract

The chapter attempts to clarify first the particular status that social rights possess and have possessed in the light of their intellectual genealogy and their intrinsically problematic content (§ 1). Next, it examines how Kant related to this broader picture in the text that deals with the question of rights most directly, the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals (§ 2). Thus, the chapter explores the foundation of social rights as understood by Kant (and hinted at in the Metaphysics of Morals), turning instead to the work which is more conceptually connected to the former: the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (§ 3). It is here, within the discourse related to the fundaments of the moral and juridical community, that certain traces can be found of a “latent foundation” for the social sphere and social rights (§ 4).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As it is known, the topic is intensively investigated as point of intersection amongst philosophers, theorists of law and of politics. By referring to the present debate, let me recall at least the following studies: G. De Búrca, B. de Witte, L. Ogertschnig (eds), Social rights in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005; J. Jimenez, Social Policy and Social Change: Toward the Creation of Social and Economic Justice, Los Angeles, Sage, 2010 (2015 2); Th. Casadei, I diritti sociali. Un percorsofilosofico-giuridico, Firenze, Firenze University Press, 2012; H.A. García, K. Klare, L.A. Williams (eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice. Critical Inquiries, Abingdon, Routledge, 2015.

  2. 2.

    For what concerns the history and developments of such contraposition, the paradigmatic research developed by G. Oestreich (Geschichte der Menschenrechte und GrundfreiheitenimUmriß, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1968, 1978 2) remains one of the most relevant points of reference.

  3. 3.

    Th. Paine, On the First Principles of Government, in M. Foot, I. Kramnick (eds), Thomas Paine Reader, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987, p. 464.

  4. 4.

    T. Casadei, I diritti sociali, cit., p. 27–32. On this specific point see also: G. Razzano, Lo “Statuto” costituzionale dei diritti sociali, in E. Cavasino—G. Scala, G. Verde (a cura di), I diritti sociali dal riconoscimento alla garanzia, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica 2013; E. Catelani, Profili costituzionali della limitazione dei diritti sociali garantiti dallo stato e dalle regioni di fronte alla crisi economica, in E. Catelani, M. Tarchi (a cura di), I diritti sociali nella pluralità degli ordinamenti, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica 2015, pp. 17–56.

  5. 5.

    MdS, 6: 305–306 [The Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by M. Gregor, Introduction by R.J. Sullivan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 201217, p. 85]. References to Kant’s works embedded in the text are formed by the standard abbreviations of the German titles, followed by the volume number in Academy edition (theAkademieAusgabe) of Kant’s writings in which the work is included, and by the page number in that volume.

  6. 6.

    MdS, 6: 306 [85].

  7. 7.

    MdS, 6: 242 [33–34].

  8. 8.

    B. Ludwig, Einleitung, in I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, Meiner, Hamburg, 19982 (1986), spec. pp. xiii-xxvi.

  9. 9.

    A. Pinzani, Der systematische Stellenwert der pseudo-ulpianischen Regeln in Kants Rechtslehre, “Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung”, 59, 1 (2005), pp. 71–94.

  10. 10.

    For what concerns the Kant’s use of the expression “Tun und Lassen”: implicit referring to Christian Wolff, Vernüfftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderungihrer Glückseligkeit [1720]—now in Ch. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von J. École, J.E. Hoffmann, M. Thomann, H.V. Arndt, Olms, Hildesheim-New York, 1976, Vol. IV, I.

  11. 11.

    See the following letters by Kant: to Johann Heinrich Lambert (31 December 1765; Ak. X, 56); to Johann GottfriedHerder (9 May 1768; Briefe, Ak. X, 74); again to Lambert (2 September 1770; Ak. X 97); to Marcus Herz (7 June 1771; Ak. X, 123 and another one datable around end 1773 (Ak, X 145); to Moses Mendelssohn (16 August 1783; Ak. X, 346–347); to Heinrich Jung-Stilling (datable after 1 March 1789; Ak. XXIII 495).

  12. 12.

    On this point see first L.W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago—London, 1960, spec. pp. 5–18; B. Ludwig, Einleitung, in I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, Meiner, Hamburg, 19982 (1986), spec. pp. xiii–xxvi.

  13. 13.

    See also Kant’s courses on Moral Philosophy: Mrongovius II, 29: 611–619; Powalski, 27: 131–133, passim. Furthermore: Feyerabend, 27: 1326.

  14. 14.

    VE, 40; Collins, 27: 271–272.

  15. 15.

    This last expression is by Otfried Höffe. See: O. Höffe, Kant’s Principle of JusticeasCategorical Imperative of Law, in Y. Yovel (ed.), Kant’s practica lPhilosophy reconsidered, Kluwer Academic Publishers, London, 1989, pp. 149–167; Id.,KategorischeRechtsprinzipien. Ein Kontrapunkt der Moderne, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1994, spec. pp. 11–29 e 126–149; Id., Kategorische Rechtsimperativ. “Einleitung in die Rechtslehre”, in O. Höffe (Hrsg.), Immanuel Kant. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1999, pp. 41–62.

  16. 16.

    On this topic see: S. Goyard-Fabre, La philosophie du droit de Kant, Vrin, Paris, 1996, spec. pp. 17–60; Id., Philosophie critique et raison juridique, PUF, Paris, 2004, spec. pp. 64–70 e 120–149.

  17. 17.

    See MdS, VI, 318, 336–337, 371.

  18. 18.

    H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Hutchinson, London, 19655 (1947). Amongst the most recent studies: C. Horn—D. Schönecker (Hrsg.), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 2006; J. Timmermann, Immanuel Kant, Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der Sitten, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2004 (ed. ingl.: Kant’s “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”. A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).

  19. 19.

    On this point: A. Pirni, Kant filosofodellacomunità, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2006, spec. pp. 28–36.

  20. 20.

    See also Ch. Schnoor, Kants kategorischer Imperativ als Kriterium der Richtigkeit des Handelns, Mohr, Tübingen, 1989, spec. pp. 47–48.

  21. 21.

    A. Pirni, Il “regnodeifini” in Kant. Morale, religione e politica in collegamento sistematico, Genova, ilMelangolo 2000.

  22. 22.

    Other scholars could agree with the thesis of the Kingdom of Ends’ double sphere of application. I’m referring here to: D. Pasini, Dirittosocietà e stato in Kant, Giuffrè, Milano, 1957, spec. pp. 49–56; D. Pasini, Das Reich der Zwecke und der politisch-rechtliche Kantianische Gedanke, in Funke G. (Hrsg.), Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1974a, pp. 675–691; Id., Il ‘mondo dei fini’ ed il pensiero giuridico-politico kantiano, in A. Rigobello (a cura di), Ricerche sul ‘regno dei fini’ kantiano, Bulzoni, Roma, 1974b (ma 1975), pp. 87130; G. Fassò, Storia della filosofia del diritto, il Mulino, Bologna, 1968, spec. pp. 387–410; P. Quattrocchi, Comunità religiosa e società civile nel pensiero di Kant, Le Monnier, Firenze, 1975, spec. pp. 146–157; Id., L’ideale della comunità umana come determinazione costitutiva del regno dei fini, in A. Rigobello (a cura di), Ricerche sul ‘regno dei fini’ kantiano, cit., pp. 191–213; Ch. Taylor, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, in Id., Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Philosophical Papers, Vol. II), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 318–337.

  23. 23.

    Idee, 8: 22.

  24. 24.

    Anfang, 8: 110.

  25. 25.

    “Right, therefore, comprehends the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one Person can be harmonised in reality with the voluntary actions of every other Person, according to a universal Law of Freedom” (MdS, 6: 45). See also Gemeinspruch, 8: 289–290.

  26. 26.

    Cfr: Feyerabend, Tit. I (De norma action umliberalium et in genere), 27: 1334 and 1335.

  27. 27.

    GMS, 4: 433.

  28. 28.

    GMS, 4: 435.

  29. 29.

    About this specific point, first see: H.J. Paton. 1946. The Categorical imperative, cit., spec. pp. 207–222, 266–278; G. Prauss, Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann 1983; H.E. Allison, Kant’s Preparatory Argument in Grundlegung III, in O. Höffe (Hrsg.), Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein Kooperativer Kommentar, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, pp. 314–324; F. Chiereghin, Il problema della libertà in Kant, Trento, Verifiche 1991, spec. pp. 76–101.

  30. 30.

    On this specific point see: A. Rigobello, “Il ‘Regnodeifini’ come Ideale Regolativo e come Struttura Trascendentale”, in G. Funke (Hrsg.), Aktendes 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, cit., pp. 597–604, spec. pp. 599–600.

  31. 31.

    On this point see G. Cunico, Moralische Teleologie und höchstes Gut bei Kant, “Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie”, 1998 (XXX), pp. 111–124. See also B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harward University Press 1985, spec. p. 231.

  32. 32.

    R. Esposito, Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità, Torino, Einaudi 1998, pp. 86–87.

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Pirni, A. (2016). The Place of Sociality: Models of Intersubjectivity According to Kant. In: Faggion, A., Pinzani, A., Sanchez Madrid, N. (eds) Kant and Social Policies . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42658-7_4

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