Abstract
In his Scientific Representation. Paradoxes of Perspective (2008), Bas van Fraassen offers a pragmatic account of scientific representation and representation tout court. In this paper I examine the three conditions for a user to succeed in representing a target in some context: identification of the target of the representational action, representing the target as such and correctly representing it in some respects. I argue that success on these three counts relies on the supposed truth of some predicative assertions, and thus that truth is more fundamental than representation. I do this in the framework of a version of the so-called “structural” account of representation according to which the establishment of a homomorphism by the user between a structure abstracted from the intended target and some relevant structure of the representing artefact is a necessary (although certainly not sufficient) condition of success for representing the target in some respects. Finally, on the basis of a correspondence view (not theory) of truth, I show that it is possible to address what van Fraassen calls “the loss of reality objection”.
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Notes
- 1.
See Chakravartty (2010, p. 206). Intentionality is essential to the success of all kinds of representation, not only scientific representation.
- 2.
We use bold font to refer to structures, e.g. A, and italic to denote the domains, e.g. A.
- 3.
If some of the elements belonging to the domains do not stand in any relation, we have what Da Costa and French call a “partial structure” (2003, p. 19).
- 4.
Dunn and Hardegree give the definition for similar structures, namely structures of the same type, that is, whose families of degrees of their respective relations are the same (p. 10). Our philosophical discussion will implicitly be restricted to representations which involve structures of the same type. For example, two structures which contain only one-place relations (properties) and two-place relations are similar.
- 5.
A structure can be a faithful homomorphic image of another structure, without being accurate or exact. We come back to this important point below.
- 6.
On this I disagree with Bartels (2006, p. 12) who claims that “causal relations” between two things, such as between an object and a photograph of it, can play a role in determining the direction, and thus the asymmetry, of a representation. The asymmetry is determined by the intention of the user only.
- 7.
Again, a user could use the so-called caricature of Mrs. Thatcher to represent Bismarck say, by means of another referential action.
- 8.
Meyer (1995, p. 616, Fig. 709). The map is part of the collection of the Linden-Museum in Stuttgart. I wish to thank Anthony Meyer and Dr. Ingrid Heermann, curator of the Oceanic art section of the Linden-Museum for their kind authorization to reproduce this photograph. [I here revisit an example discussed in Ghins (2011)].
- 9.
- 10.
On this I disagree with Bartels (2006, p. 14).
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Otávio Bueno, Marco Giunti, Dimitris Kilakos, Diego Marconi, Stathis Psillos and Alberto Voltolini for their useful comments at oral presentations of some parts of this paper, and Peter Verdee for his suggestions on the more technical parts.
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Ghins, M. (2016). Bas van Fraassen on Success and Adequacy in Representing and Modelling. In: Magnani, L., Casadio, C. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_2
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