Abstract
In this paper we discuss a follow-up step of the empirical turn that we refer to as an “axiological turn” in the philosophy of technology. For a clear understanding of this follow-up step it is of crucial importance to distinguish between values at the level of the object of study, that is, values in technology and engineering practice, and values at the meta-level, that is, values in the philosophy of technology. We argue that a study of the role of values in technology and engineering practice may be conducted in line with our original call for an empirical turn. This is what we refer to as a descriptive axiological turn; it focusses on an empirically informed philosophical analysis of all kinds of values and norms in technology and engineering practice. Our call for a descriptive axiological turn is in essence nothing more than an amendment on the call for an empirical turn. By contrast a normative axiological turn in the philosophy of technology goes beyond the empirical turn; it not only describes and analyses but also evaluates the norms and values in technology and engineering practice. In other words, a normative axiological turn involves taking a normative stance at the (meta-)level of the philosophical analysis itself. Two forms of normative axiological turns are discussed, a reflective and a substantive one, as well as some of the problems and challenges that an implementation of a normative axiological turn will have to face. Finally, we also discuss how recent developments in the philosophy of technology that call for an active role of philosophers of technology in technology development fit into this distinction between a descriptive and normative axiological turn and under what conditions a normative axiological turn may be made.
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Notes
- 1.
For instance, a new journal dedicated to the philosophy of technology (Philosophy and Technology, edited by Floridi) and a new book series (Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, edited by Vermaas) have been set up.
- 2.
In their contributions to this book, Pitt and Nordmann argue for a much more central place of philosophy of technology in mainstream philosophy.
- 3.
One of the promising developments is the fPET, the Forum on Philosophy, Engineering and Technology; its mission is “to foster scholarship and reflection, by scholars and practitioners from diverse fields, including engineers, philosophers, and social scientists, on the topics of engineers, engineering, and technology.” See http://web.ecs.baylor.edu/faculty/newberry/fpet-2014.html.
- 4.
We will not enter here in a discussion whether empirical adequacy is a value, a norm or both. If empirical adequacy is taken to be a norm, then truth may be taken to be its corresponding value.
- 5.
Quine makes a philosophical claim about the analytic-synthetic distinction and this claim itself is, just as other philosophical claims, constrained by empirical adequacy (by experience) only at the “edges” of the fabric of our beliefs.
- 6.
This paragraph is based on (Kroes and van de Poel 2015).
- 7.
Our call for a descriptive axiological turn may be seen as a call to put off the self-imposed narrow blinkers of the empirical turn with its strict focus on technical values.
- 8.
Our plea for a descriptive axiological turn is, as we remarked before, not motivated by an assessment that the empirical turn with its focus on non-moral aspects has been accomplished.
- 9.
Williams himself does not use the notion of a thin ethical concept.
- 10.
Many more items can be added to this list. For instance, most of the “ilities” that play a key role in software engineering, and outside that field, appear to be thick concepts; see, for instance, http://codesqueeze.com/the-7-software-ilities-you-need-to-know/.
- 11.
- 12.
See, for instance, the code of conduct of the NSPE: http://www.nspe.org/resources/ethics/code-ethics, and of the ASME: https://community.asme.org/colorado_section/w/wiki/8080.code-of-ethics.aspx.
- 13.
Here we touch upon the ethics of philosophy as a profession; see (Hansson 2015).
- 14.
He made the same plea in his presidential address to the 2015 SPT meeting in Shenyang (China).
- 15.
Brey distinguishes between two different empirical turns; this distinction, however, is not relevant for the following, so we will ignore it here.
- 16.
See also his contribution to this volume.
- 17.
See also Briggle’s call for a policy turn in the philosophy of technology in this volume.
- 18.
Note that our notion of an external good differs from MacIntyre’s notion; according to MacIntyre (1984, p. 188) external goods are “contingently attached” to practices and can be achieved in alternative ways. This is not the case for external goods that are realized by putting an understanding of technology to practical use in bringing about better technology.
- 19.
MacIntyre (1984, pp. 188–189) writes that internal goods “can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods.” Thus the standards of excellence for judging the realization of internal goods appear to be closely related to the nature of those internal goods.
- 20.
Houkes’ analysis of the interaction of basic and applied research on Perovskite solar cells may be interpreted as a nice example of the subtle interplay between internal and external goods in the development of physics and engineering; see Houkes’ contribution to this volume.
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Kroes, P., Meijers, A.W.M. (2016). Toward an Axiological Turn in the Philosophy of Technology. In: Franssen, M., Vermaas, P., Kroes, P., Meijers, A. (eds) Philosophy of Technology after the Empirical Turn. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33717-3_2
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