Abstract
Aldo Antonelli offers a novel view on abstraction principles in order to solve a traditional tension between different requirements: that the claims of science be taken at face value, even when involving putative reference to mathematical entities; and that referents of mathematical terms are identified and their possible relations to other objects specified. In his view, abstraction principles provide representatives for equivalence classes of second-order entities that are available provided the first- and second-order domains are in the equilibrium dictated by the abstraction principles, and whose choice is otherwise unconstrained. Abstract entities are the referents of abstraction terms: such referents are to an extent indeterminate, but we can still quantify over them, predicate identity or non-identity, etc. Our knowledge of them is limited, but still substantial: we know whatever has to be true no matter how the representatives are chosen, i.e., what is true in all models of the corresponding abstraction principles. This view is backed up by an “austere” conception of universals, according to which these are first-order objects, i.e., ways of collecting first-order objects. Antonelli thus claims that second-order logic does not import any novel ontological commitment beyond ontology of first-order, naturalistically acceptable, objects. Moreover, in the case of arithmetic, even if Hume’s Principle is construed as described above, Frege’s Theorem goes through unaffected, since there is nothing in its proof that depends on an account of the “true nature” of numbers. A viable construal of logicism is then given by the combination of semantic nominalism and a naturalistic conception of abstraction. [Editors note]
I am grateful to Tyrus Fisher and Elaine Landry for valuable comments and criticism.
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Antonelli, G.A. (2016). Semantic Nominalism: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Universals. In: Boccuni, F., Sereni, A. (eds) Objectivity, Realism, and Proof . Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 318. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31644-4_2
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