Abstract
Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) agent, and that this embodiment must be affectively lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also an agent imbued with an explicit sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we outline the interoceptive foundation of basic agency and argue that there is a qualitative difference in the phenomenology of agency when it is instantiated in organisms which, due to their complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively grounded agency not only entails affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for subjectivity.
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Notes
- 1.
Stylistic note: we cite the most recent English edition of our sources whenever this is possible for ease of reference. However, in order to avoid giving a false impression of the original date of publication, we also always provide the year of publication of the first edition in square brackets.
- 2.
The attribution of subjecthood by others may in fact be an essential element in infants’ development of an explicit awareness of their own subjectivity (Reddy 2003), but on the view we are promoting here they were already agents on their own terms even before they were born. This is what allows much of the body schema to develop in utero rather than post-partum (Lymer 2011).
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Stapleton, M., Froese, T. (2016). The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity. In: García-Valdecasas, M., Murillo, J., Barrett, N. (eds) Biology and Subjectivity. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30502-8_8
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