Ethics, Emotions and Theology: A Humean Investigation

Abstract

This article pursues the theme, ‘Do emotions shape the world?’ through an investigation into the implications of the work of David Hume, the ethical theorist who went further than any other in the western philosophical tradition to center moral theory on the emotions. Hume’s sentiment-based account of ethics is traditionally viewed as a dissenting position to the more mainstream rationalist ethics exemplified by the works of Immanuel Kant. This study of the consequences of taking Hume’s emotion-centered theory as one’s starting place provides a particular context in which to give one answer to the following research question: ‘Is a worldview which emphasizes the importance of emotions likely to raise theological concerns to a higher position than they would be if one embraced a worldview which emphasizes the importance of reason?’ We find that the combination of Hume’s empiricist epistemology, according to which all ideas come from either sense perception or internal reflection, and his notion of the ‘natural objects’ of the passions, places an impediment between moral agents and some very central theological concerns and issues. I conclude with some suggestions about how theorists interested in combining an emotion-centered account of ethics with an epistemology that is more amenable to traditional theological issues might proceed.