Abstract
In this first chapter we will briefly introduce some key topics that, perhaps in different ways, are part and parcel of both “traditional” philosophies of science and feminist philosophies of science: the situatedness of knowledge, the notion of relationality, the idea of conceiving sciences as sets of communal practices, the underrepresentation and exclusion of women, the critique to the value-free ideal, the ethical, political, and social dimension of sciences.
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We want to thank our contributors for their competence, cooperativeness, and patience, as well as an anonymous reviewer for his/her comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Lucy Fleet for supporting and encouraging the project from the beginning and up to its completion.
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Amoretti, M.C., Vassallo, N. (2016). Some Key Topics in Feminist Philosophies of Science: An Introduction. In: Amoretti, M., Vassallo, N. (eds) Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 317. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26348-9_1
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