Abstract
Friedman, Richardson, and others have helpfully foregrounded the neglected presence of Kantian and neo-Kantian influences on the early Carnap. Here, however, I sound a cautionary note, highlighting a dimension along which early Carnap departs directly from Kant and neo-Kantianism, swinging much closer to Russell – namely, in his conception of logic’s subject-matter. For while Kant and neo-Kantians conceive of logic as a science concerned primarily with mental activity and its (ideal) contents (concepts, Fregean ‘Sinne’), Carnap (mostly) follows Russell in seeing logic as primarily concerned with the objectivities represented by such contents through such acts – i.e., with the objects, properties, states of affairs, facts (and so on) that together constitute the world’s most general or universal features. But then, because Carnap also follows Russell in placing logic at the very basis of his own constitution programme, I conclude that Russellian doctrines lie at the heart of Carnap’s Aufbau project, which means that we must also orient our understanding of early Carnap on central points by reference to decidedly non-Kantian threads.
For very useful discussion of an earlier draft of this paper (and much else), I would like to thank the audience at the Carnap conference organized by Christian Damböck at the LMU-Munich in July 2013, especially Michael Friedman and Tom Ryckman . As will become clear in what follows, my largest debt by far in my understanding of the early Carnap is owed to Michael’s wonderfully rich and thoughtful writings on this and related topics. I would also like to thank Erich Reck and André Carus for very helpful and engaging conversations during the writing of this paper, as well as an anonymous referee for the Yearbook for their comments.
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Notes
- 1.
In this proposal for the re-framing of our engagement with the Aufbau through a broadly Kantian perspective, Friedman- -> and Richardson- -> significantly develop and vastly extend earlier sketches in this direction made - -> in Haack (1977), Sauer (1985, - -> 1989), Moulines (1985), - ->and - ->Coffa (1991).
- 2.
- 3.
For a very lively and nuanced presentation of the multi-faceted intellectual context of Carnap- ->’s early work, see - -> (Carus 2008).
- 4.
To be sure, Natorp- -> argues for a very particular understanding of the acts of ‘synthesis’ and ‘judgment’, insofar as he associates the most ‘original’ versions of these acts not with a ‘combining’ of pre-given discrete parts but with a more holistic ‘determining’ the parts of a whole together with the ‘connection’ and ‘correlation’ between the parts all at once (cf. Natorp 1910: 21–39).
- 5.
This is part and parcel of Natorp- ->’s attempt to defend and further develop Kant- ->’s proposed expansion and reorientation of logic, from the traditional merely ‘formal’ logic of acts toward the transcendental logic of basic cognitive contents, yet to do so in a way that satisfies Kant’s demand for a single principle provided by an original activity of understanding (Natorp 1910: iv).
- 6.
- 7.
For a lengthier defense of the claim that all three realms belong within Frege- ->’s conception of ‘what is logical [das Logische]’, see - -> (Tolley 2011).
- 8.
Like Kant- ->, Frege- -> distinguishes the kinds of objects we can know on the basis of the division between the different ‘sources of cognition [Erkenntnisquellen]’ of these objects, with the ‘logical’ source providing apriori knowledge of what pertains to everything ‘thinkable’, independently of whether it is also sensible or imaginable (cf. Frege 1884: §14, §§26–27, and §105; and Frege 1969: 286f).
- 9.
All of this suggests that we should be cautious against grouping Frege- -> too close to Kant- -> or the neo-Kantians, even if – as Gottfried Gabriel- -> and Hans Sluga- -> have argued (cf. Gabriel 1986; Sluga 1980) – there are clearly ways in the Kantian problematic leaves deep marks on Frege’s own positions. For further comparison of Kant and Frege on different aspects of their philosophies of logic, see (MacFarlane 2002) - ->and - ->(Linnebo 2003).
- 10.
For more on the relation between logic and ontology in Husserl- ->, see - ->(Smith 2007).
- 11.
For more on the interaction between formality and universality in Russell- ->’s conception of logic, see - ->(Proops 2007: 12f).
- 12.
This is true as well of the use of ‘judgment’ by Russell- -> and Whitehead- -> in Principia.
- 13.
For evidence that Carnap- -> was at this time intimately familiar firsthand with Frege- ->’s distinctions and terminology, compare the transcripts of Frege’s lectures on logic that Carnap made while attending Frege’s lectures - -> - ->(cf. Reck and Awodey 2004).
- 14.
- 15.
This is so, even if in the Aufbau Carnap- -> nevertheless seems to run tautologicality and generality together (cf. Carnap 1928: §154).
- 16.
One might see this hinted at in the 1927 ‘Concepts’ essay, where Carnap- -> speaks of mathematical and logical (tautological) propositions as ‘so-called cognitions from formal concepts’ (Carnap 1927: 373; my ital.).
- 17.
This has already been usefully highlighted by Friedman- -> himself (cf. Friedman 2000: 70–80).
- 18.
Note that Carnap- -> claims that even in the case of ‘logical objects’, we still require a ‘construction [Aufbau<IndexTerm ID="ITerm340">]’ (Carnap 1928: §107).
- 19.
Especially notable are the conventionalist perspectives about the foundations of science found in Henri Poincaré- -> and Hugo Dingler- ->, whom Carnap- -> singles out in his ‘Autobiography’ as being especially responsible for the ‘conventionalist attitude’ he embraced concerning the foundations of physics in particular (cf. Carnap 1963: 14). Neither Poincaré nor Dingler, however, held that logic was conventional (cf. Carus- -> 2008: 119; - ->Friedman 1999: 83).
- 20.
In fact, though Kant- -> rejects the idea that we have any representations present in our minds ‘innately’, Kant accepts, by contrast, that the nature of the capacity for understanding is innate to our minds (cf. Kant 1790: 8:221f).
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Tolley, C. (2016). The Context of the Development of Carnap’s Views on Logic up to the Aufbau . In: Damböck, C. (eds) Influences on the Aufbau. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21876-2_10
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