Keywords

6.1 The Creation and Diffusion of a Policy Instrument: Macro-Regional Strategies

In the last years we have witnessed a multiplication of efforts to remap the EU’s political space through the creation of policy instruments with variable geometries and at different geographical scales. Macro-regional strategies are the most recent of these attempts.

Since the launch of the first macro-region around the Baltic sea in 2009, many other transnational areas have expressed an interest in establishing macro-regions. The discourse on macro-region has been expanding from the Baltic to the Danube area, the Adriatic-Ionian Sea and the Alpine macro-regions. New potential macro-regions are discussed for the Atlantic Arc trans-national space, the North Sea-Channel area and in the Mediterranean basin (see Fig. 1.4 in Chap. 1).

The macro-region concept was first introduced based on the initiative of the Baltic countries. The national governments and an informal group of members of European Parliament from the Baltic States (the Europe Baltic Intergroup) have undertaken constant efforts through the years to introduce a new transnational strategy for this region to both the European Council and the EU Commission. The Swedish government took great part in promoting the macro-region and in political lobbying. The strategy was officially recognized by the European Council in October 2009 during the Swedish Presidency. Additional decisive factors were the explicit political will of the national governments of the area and the ability to build consensus at diverse levels.

The concept and strategy of the macro-region is illustrated in the Communication from the Commission concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea region (European Commission 2009a) and in the following Council Conclusion (European Council 2009); it appeared in a paper drafted by the European Commission (European Commission 2009b) and was reiterated in the guidelines for future Social Cohesion Policy (Samecki 2009) . The proposals for the new regulations on Structural Funds, territorial cooperation and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for the programming period 2014–2020 mention the opportunity of sustaining the strategy (European Commission 2011a, b). The “Elements for a Common Strategic Framework 2014–2020” (European Commission 2012) indicates the support to macro-regional strategies among the priorities for cooperation. In sum, in a few years the idea to constitute a new transnational policy instrument has captured the attention of experts and policy-makers all over the EU and even beyond its borders (Dubois et al. 2009; Duhr 2011; Bialasiewicz et al. 2013) .

It is the purpose of this chapter to understand the reasons beyond such a rapid diffusion, to see if the strategy possesses some added-value with respect to existing policies or if this is yet another example of a supposedly new and, consequently, fascinating policy instrument with few prospects for achieving concrete results.

A macro-region has been defined as:

An area including territory from a number of different countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges (…) geographic, cultural, economic or other (European Commission 2009b, p. 1 and 7).

The definition reveals the functional dimension of macro-regions which are identified in relation to common cross-border challenges and opportunities that require a collective action as, for example, environmental problems where the action of a single actor yields no efficient result thus requiring a combined involvement of various actors. The adoption of a functional approach gives rise to possible variable geometries in the definition of macro-regional strategies , meaning that different geographical scales and areas can be identified in accordance with each single scope.

Nevertheless, the macro-regional area must clearly always encompass an inferior number of States in comparison to the whole of the EU and, following the example of the Baltic area, the strategy can also include non-EU countries because of functional linkages among territories. This last characteristic is very important, not only in light of the purpose of this book, but because it is one of the most salient features that distinguishes macro-regional strategies with respect to existing instruments.

The macro-regional strategy has indeed a very soft (and weak) degree of institutionalisation, because is based on 3 “nos”: 1) no new legislation—macro-regional strategies require no new ad hoc legislation; 2) no new funding—macro-regional strategies require no ad hoc funding by the EU; and 3) no new institutions—macro-regional strategies are not established and supported by ad hoc institutions. Consequently, the EU macro-regional strategy is a kind of soft political institution which aims at fostering dialogue and enhancing coordination by involving governments at diverse levels and at a trans-national scale. The strategy should be based on:

A ‘three yeses rule’: more complementary funding, more institutional coordination and more new projects (Alfonsi 2011, p. 2) .

In this sense, the added-value of macro-regional strategies is the integrated approach: a collective action that strives towards a common objective, integrating various actors, policies, programmes and funding (European Commission 2009b). The objective is to reduce economic and social divergences between the diverse territories and to construct competitive and sustainable macro-regions.

The macro-regional strategy would, thus, seem to constitute a pragmatic approach to the need for finding new modalities of rendering public policy more efficient in a cross-border area which goes beyond single nation States but without having to rely on the action of the whole EU and of each of its member States. In practice, the instrument aims to better coordinate existing institutions and resources and to implement visible and concrete ‘flagship’ projects. Moreover, it is also an innovative geopolitical experiment.

6.2 The Geopolitical Implications

The macro-regional strategy is on the one hand, as mentioned in the previous section, driven by a functional approach and by the need to respond to specific transnational issues. On the other hand, the initiative is based on the identification of proper geographical ‘regions’ and is supposed to link together areas according to a “mutual interdependence” and “spatially coherence” criteria: i.e. specific transnational interdependencies, material and immaterial flows, hard and soft linkages which qualify the geographical scale and the contents of a macro-region.

In the Baltic macro-region the most evident need that the strategy is supposed to address is the transnational management of the maritime environment and of the catchment area. The Baltic Sea is represented as a common good that must be protected by all the people and respective governments that are directly involved in its management but it is also a common good for all the EU, neighbourhood countries and more distant countries because of its diverse interconnections that have an influence on the area. The Baltic Sea is considered a transnational resource that should be conserved and managed at the proper scale and a concern for all of Europe. The same applies to the Danube River, the Adriatic-Ionian Sea and the Alpine area: ‘natural’ regions which require multi-level governance . Such a geographic and functional principle allows, at the same time, for the reshaping of power relationships inside and outside the EU according to natural, social and economic connections which require a transcendence of national and sub-national borders in order to cope with common issues.

“Another feature of macro-regions is the inherent experimentalism in the policy, no doubt a result of its relative novelty” (Mirwaldt et al. 2010, p. 12) . The novelty of macro-regions lies not only in the experimentation of a new transnational and multi-level governance model, but also in the fact that macro-regions may include non-EU countries, both pre-accession and neighbourhood countries. Macro-regional governance is “located between the nation State and the supranational community” (Schymik and Krumrey 2009) . It is situated in a vast, transnational area somewhere between the EU supranational level and member States and includes the participation of regions, local authorities and social and economic stakeholders. As such, macro-regional strategies represent a new political instrument for diverse actors at different levels. Each institutional level should take part in a positive-sum game: the sub-national and national levels are both supposed to be protagonists and in the pursuit of goals linked to regional development that crosses frontiers, dealing with common problems and contributing to strengthening integration in Europe even beyond the EU external frontiers.

Thus, diverse visions and interests interact in the construction of macro-regions which may have relevant effects inside the EU and upon EU policies affecting member States, regions and cities belonging to the same ‘region’, pre-accession countries and neighbouring countries. In this sense, according to the new regionalism and para-diplomacy perspective, macro-regions could be considered a new channel, a new window of opportunity for the geopolitical positioning of diverse actors within and beyond the borders of the EU.

The strategy is not only a technocratic instrument with important political consequences but also an initiative with social implications. It should favour the building of a common sense of identity and belonging, the sharing of common values and visions between people of diverse nationalities. As mentioned in the case of the Danube area:

Projects initiated and developed within the framework of the European Danube Macro-regional Strategy could only be successful if people’s minds are undergoing meaningful changes and individuals of the region start to develop the so-called ‘Danube consciousness’, a set of identity elements which describe their attachment to the river itself and also their solidarity towards the people living in the environs of the Danube (Lütgenau 2010) .

Macro-regional strategies are meant to be founded based on a top-down governance and through big infrastructural strategic projects and plans, but they are also meant to be able to cope with more subtle and soft questions that concern social and cultural cohesion. A macro-regional strategy should take into consideration hard as well as soft borders, material as well as imagined borders. It needs a multilevel governance structure because places, local populations and local issues matter in the construction of transnational spaces. A macro-regional strategy should be based on democratic, networked governance capable of negotiating different interests and perceptions through a multilevel approach.

This social and cultural region-building process sustained by common institutional and political instruments must transcend the strong distinction between the EU internal and external space. This requires strong and difficult coordination with EU external policies especially with regard to the enlargement and neighbourhood policies and their instruments, respectively the IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession assistance) and ENI (European Neighbourhood Instrument).

From this perspective, the Danube macro-regional strategy is particularly interesting insofar as it includes eight EU member States, four accession countries and two neighbourhood countries (Ukraine and Moldova). As stated by the European Parliament:

The Danube region is an important crossover covered by the EU’s Cohesion Policy programmes, programmes for countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and potential candidate countries, and therefore represents an area where enhanced synergies between different EU policies can be developed: cohesion, transport, tourism, agriculture, fisheries, economic and social development, energy, environment, enlargement (European Parliament 2011).

The same goes for the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) that includes four member States and four pre-accession countries: the macro-regional strategy is connected to the EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans.

The macro-regional strategy is a geopolitical instrument that sustains the Europeanisation of non-EU countries. It should contribute to extending the instruments of internal EU cohesion policy to non-EU countries, ensuring the convergence of regional development policies implemented in various regions and with other sectoral policies and instruments having a potential leverage effect in the macro-region, such as the EU maritime integrated strategy, environment and employment policies, etc. These sectoral policies implement European directives and regulations, they diffuse criteria, standards and benchmarks shared at the supranational EU level provoking changes at national and local levels. In this, a top-down process of policy convergence is promoted. At the same time, an upward process should be put in place. The actors of macro-regional strategy can influence the drafting of new regulations through the many different channels of negotiation of supranational strategies: member States in the Council of the EU; citizens’ representatives in the European Parliament; local authorities in the Committee of the Regions; trade unions and employers associations in the Economic and Social and Committee.

Finally, macro-regional strategies establish new spaces and networks that are supposed to transcend the logic of concentric circles of integration (see Chap. 1), in order to support the idea of a European space re-shaping along the lines of an “Olympic rings” geography (Browning and Joenniemi 2008) . The logic of “Olympic rings”, according to Browning and Joenniemi, is different from the Wesphalian model anchored on national States’ role, and also different from the imperial or Eurocentric one that envisions a series of concentric circles around a European core with differentiated integration perspectives; instead it is reminiscent of a neo-Medieval polity which has been described in Chap. 1, one that is more cosmopolitan and based on a transnational logic and a network governance with various centres and multiple regionalisations.

In vast areas which share common histories, common goods and challenges, these (new) regionalisation processes could be nested within the European integration process. This regionalisation could facilitate the construction of a polycentric Europe more attentive to local social and economic dynamics; could support European diversity against the homologation and standardization of a unique model of development dictated by other EU policies; could offer an alternative to Eurocentrism by involving the EU ‘peripheries’ on an equal base, and could stretch beyond the imaginary of an impenetrable “fortress Europe” . The aim, in this regard, is to reconsider European integration from the perspective of external territories:

It is logical, in the context of such a vision, that those ‘outside’ are also drawn into and provided with access to the inner European circle. In this understanding, outsiders are needed as true partners—that is, actors to be provided with regulating and constituting power, rather than conceptualized as the objects of the actions of those on the inside. This is so as their active contributions are needed if the construction of a more de-centred and less security-geared Europe is to become reality (Browning and Joenniemi 2003, p. 475–476).

Beside these ambitious objectives, the factual implementation of macro-regional strategies implies several challenges which will be described in the next sections.

6.3 The Challenges

Many authors have expressed doubts over the innovative aspect and geopolitical implications of the macro-regional strategy. The added-value of these strategies as well as their capacity to re-shape the EU geo-policy have been put into question. In this respect macro-regions are confronted with four different challenges that can be defined as governance, efficiency, community and external challenges.

The first challenge is governance. Integration between different instruments ­requires coordination between different institutions and regulations (European, national, regional, etc.) which represents, indeed, a governance challenge (Bengtsson 2009) . It is a complex governance that faces difficulties insofar as it implies the interaction among various institutional levels and actors, and possible tensions among the various powers (Dubois et al. 2009, p. 39) . According to these analysts, however, standing relations among these actors (central and sub-national governments, social and economic actors) could help to overcome conflicts with regard to tenure and command over the macro-regional strategy.

Furthermore, some have raised questions about whether the governance of macro-regional cooperation is really as “bottom-up” as it is presented (Mirwaldt et al. 2010; Stocchiero 2010; CPMR 2009) . The action plans annexed to the macro-regional strategies are approved by the European Council and are elaborated by the member States with the assistance of the European Commission’s DG Regio, in consultation with sub-national authorities and local stakeholders. The macro-regions, as articulated by the European Commission, assigns a prominent role to the central governments of the member States.

However, when it comes to the implementation stage the central role played by member States is less evident. In the Baltic and the Danube macro-regional areas some regional authorities have assumed the coordination role in establishing priority areas and are leaders of flagship projects. Thus, as noticed by Perkmann in the case of the Euroregions, similar to the case of macro-regions, the role regional authorities could play depends in part on the “policy entrepreneurialism” of those actors, where “policy entrepreneurs” are defined as “actors that position themselves as protagonists within specific policy areas by taking advantages of the windows of opportunity opened up by conjunctures within their policy environment” (Perkmann 2005) . A structure-agency problem appears: does the macro-regional strategy offer a structure of opportunity for real multi-level governance? How much does it depend on the policy entrepreneurialism of individual actors?

Second, the efficiency challenge (Bengtsson 2009) is linked to a weak focus of macro-regional strategies which, despite their functional orientation, are based on a wide range of priorities and initiatives. Without a proper focus there is a loss of expected added-value of the strategy, a risk of failure to implement criteria apt at concentrating on strategic projects and, above all, a failure to observe the inter-dependency linking the various projects.

The efficiency challenge also relates to the fact that no additional funds are allocated to macro-regional strategies implying that resources for project implementation should originate from existing funds such as EU funds and contributions from international financial institutions (European Commission 2009b). In this respect, it is worth stressing that evidence on the implementation of EU programmes, with particular regards to territorial cooperation initiatives, shows that the coordination as well as complementarity and coherence with other programmes and funding instruments (European as well as national and regional) is a major concern when evaluating the efficacy of the programmes. The fact that EU programmes respond to different regulatory frameworks represents additional constraints for implementing and coordinating activities between diverse funds.

Other authors have highlighted the strong similarity between the macro-regional approach and the transnational strand of the EU’s territorial cooperation. Macro-regional strategies and transnational cooperation programmes overlap geographically and are in pursuit of the same objectives. Similarities between ‘flagship projects’ proposed by the macro-regional strategies and ‘strategic projects’ implemented in the framework of the EU transnational cooperation programmes have also been stressed. Further tensions exist regarding the relations between the macro-regions and other forms of trans-boundary cooperation, such as the Euro-regions and the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).

The efficiency challenge raises the following questions: does the macro-regional strategy fulfil its promise to be an effective tool for delivering concrete benefits and added-value? What are the main coordination problems? What are the linkages between the macro-regional strategy and territorial cooperation?

Third, the creation of macro-regions has been generating tensions inside the EU: if, on the one hand, the strategy responds to the spatial diversity of the EU, on the other hand, it can also feed the divergent dynamics among different areas, favouring a multi-speed Europe. As indicated by Bengtsson (2009, p. 7) , this issue may be defined as a “community challenge”: the macro-region is a form of regionalisation inside the EU (intra-regionalization) that benefits those territories that are involved first-hand. Yet, it also requires the solidarity of all member States of the EU. As a result and as shall be highlighted hereafter, the Commission must notify the European Council with regard to the possibility of establishing a macro-region, showing that added-value exists for the entire EU.

Some voices have been more visible and recognized in their opposition to the creation of macro-regional strategies based on the argument that they can reward more certain areas than others. According to this point of view, the diverse macro-regional areas should be distributed equally, cover all of the EU and be more properly nested in the European space. On the other hand, their creation depends upon the autonomous political will of the diverse local stakeholders and on the maturity of their cooperation networks. What conditions should be met in order to cope with the community challenge? Does territorial cooperation have a role to play in laying the foundation for the setting up of macro-regional strategies?

Fourth, the community challenge is linked to the external dimension of the macro-regional strategies, and with what I define as the “external challenge”. As already indicated, the macro-regions are based on geographic functionalities that span over the EU borders. The efficacy of the EU macro-regional strategy in coping with transnational issues depends on the possibility to involve external territories. If theoretically the need to create macro-regional strategies with external countries is evident, politically it is not easy to realize. What political conditions do constraint the construction of macro-regional strategies with external countries? How much can macro-regions be extended outward? What role the borders of the EU play in the macro-regional strategies? Could they support a new Europe of Olympic rings?

6.3.1 The Governance Challenge

As already mentioned, the added-value of the macro-regional strategy is in its integrated approach, namely the multi-level and trans-national governance which strives for an effective coordination of EU, national and regional instruments, plus the financing of flagship projects. The macro-regional strategy is innovative in technical terms because it builds a new form of governance which aims at achieving more efficacy in addressing common challenges and opportunities. At the same time, it is also innovative in a political sense as the new scale of governance “located between the nation State and the supranational community” (Schymik and Krumrey 2009, p. 3) , can potentially contribute to an ongoing reshaping and rescaling of the European polity.

The macro-region is supposed to constitute a new multi-level and multi-actor subjectivity. However, this supposed added-value represents a governance challenge because it has yet to be accomplished: considering the different degrees of decentralisation and de-concentration of EU member States and non-EU countries, the real multi-level collaboration between the central, regional and local authorities of diverse countries and the participation of different levels of government which is needed, this poses as great challenge.

Moreover, within a trans-national approach governments should be ready to change and harmonize their domestic policies according to EU directives and regulations and in line with partner countries in order to achieve common objectives. In addition, according to the EU solidarity and common benefits principles, governments should be willing to co-finance projects implemented in other nations when there are important impacts on their own countries at stake. The basic issue is the political willingness of governments, functioning at diverse levels and in different territories, to relinquish some of their sovereignty and to converge resources in the implementation of flagship projects in a common space.

The preparation and implementation of a Plan of Action that derives from a strategic paper drafted by national governments and the European Commission through a “bottom up” consultative approach and through the involvement of local actors (European Commission 2009b, p. 8), is the primary component of the governance mechanism for macro-regions. In practice, the Commission exerts a “soft power” in the role of “overall coordinator”, “external facilitator”, and “impartial honest broker” (European Commission 2009b, p. 4 and 6), while the strategy is supposed to be drafted and implemented “from within” (p. 5), meaning by the national and sub-national governments and different stakeholders. The European Commission should elaborate the strategy with the National Contact Points under the Prime Ministries or the Foreign Affairs Ministries of the countries in the macro-region in coordination with sector ministries and in consultation with diverse stakeholders. Central administrations or “exceptionally regions or inter-governmental bodies” act as the Coordinators for Priority Areas and identify the flagship projects and indicate the relative responsibilities and roles. The Lead Partners of the flagship projects, meaning various agencies or institutions, implement the actions.

The strategy, however, is an EU strategy; therefore, the responsibility and accountability remains at the EU level. To this avail, the Commission convenes a High Level Group from all member States that periodically reports to the European Council (European Commission 2009b, p. 3), and “should be consulted about amendments of the Strategy and the Action Plan” (European Council 2009).

This architecture is backed by a consultative process with “involvement of stakeholders concerned from all levels in the region, for example through an annual forum with the aim to help the Commission in its tasks” (European Council 2009).

The Baltic case made it undeniably clear that a lengthy phase of harnessing consensus and legitimacy was necessary: stakeholder conferences were organized to discuss working papers concerning various problems; round tables were held to treat different topics and possible strategy actions. The Commission opened a consultative phase that gathered 110 written recommendations from bodies across the area (Joenniemi 2009, p. 3) . In the Danube case the consultation process was shorter and was less participative, in the Adriatic-Ionian case it was even more so. In the latter case, the consultation process only lasted six months and gathered very few written relevant proposals.

The pending issue is prominently of a political nature: is a macro-regional strategy truly “bottom up” or does it constitute a means of policy inter-governmentalism? It is rather obvious that central governments were the main actors in the creation of macro-regions. Consequentially, stakeholder associations such as the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) and the Assembly of European Regions (AER) questioned the effective role of sub-national governments in macro-regional strategy:

Looking at how the Strategy will be implemented, here again the role of sub-regional authorities is a secondary one (CPMR 2009, p. 4).

The Assembly of European Regions writes:

In spite of the proclaimed territorial approach, the initiative seems to remain top-down and member-state-driven (...) with limited democratic legitimacy (...) If the role of regions in these macro-regions is merely consultative, there will be no improvement in the design and implementation of Cohesion Policy (AER 2009, p. 14)

Furthermore, Schymik and Krumrey (2009, p. 10) indicate a basic contradiction among the stakeholders:

On the one hand, many are advocating a bottom up approach (...) On the other hand there are also voices calling for a strong leadership or top down leadership (...) [and for a] more effective implementation of the action plan.

Thus, a just balance between the legitimization and the efficacy of the macro-region should be identified, reverberating the general search for a balance between legislative and government powers in all democratic processes.

Central governments are the central nodes of the macro-regional governance system. They have a general oversight power through the High Level Group mentioned above. They are to be coordinated by the European Commission in their trans-national relationships but European coordination is only a soft power acting as an “external facilitator” and “impartial honest broker” (European Commission 2009b), and it is not mandatory. Furthermore, central governments are not passive players in lobbying for the identification of priorities and if they have to co-finance flagship projects from their own resources, they have a decisive say in the decision making process. Central governments, moreover, play a major role in national decentralisation and de-concentration processes: they supervise and coordinate regional and territorial policies and above all they have many more capacities than local authorities and Regions in foreign affairs which are essential functions in framing transnational policies. Thus, the relative political power is more in the hands of central governments than in those of the European Commission, local authorities and other stakeholders: the macro-regional strategy lies in the political will of the central governments.

This inter-governmentalism contrasts with the idea that the macro-regional strategy should be a transnational and multi-level political construction:

Guided by the EU’s principles of subsidiarity and partnership, the consultation of key stakeholders may help to turn intergovernmental cooperation between States into a bottom-up process of multi-level politics that grounds EUSDR within the region. Thus linking intergovernmental activities with various bottom-up activities may bring Europe closer to the citizens, facilitate territorial cooperation, and thus helps to build a macro-region (De Frantz 2011, p. 17) .

Translating this will into reality is not an easy process. It takes a long time to be realized and in the case of the Baltic area where political conditions are the most favourable, the European Commission admits that “the Strategy is a dynamic innovative process that needs time” (European Commission 2009a). Although the Commission’s assessment considers the enhanced cooperation achieved in the Baltic macro-region in a positive light, there are issues:

Needing to be further addressed, including better alignment of funding and a reinforced organisational structure. (...) The strategy needs to be more embedded in political and administrative structures. Its set-up is still vulnerable to organisational changes, or changes in political priorities. Long-term sustainability requires institutional stability, with allocation of sufficient human resources (at regional, national and European level). To achieve goals, it is important that priority area coordinators, but also their equivalents in the other participatiàòng member States, are fully involved. Line Ministries need therefore to take a more active role, and to allocate adequate staff and support. (European Commission 2011c, p. 7 and 8)

The difficulty in clarifying, constructing and implementing the macro-regional governance pushed the Commission to put forward a specific Communication on the issue (European Commission 2014). The aim is to offer suggestions to improve the process in terms of the political leadership, ownership as well as coordination and implementation. Yet the recommendations appear insufficient: they put more pressure on member States at the central level (“Ministers hosting the National Contact Points should be the ultimate decision makers”, p. 5), weakening the multilevel approach and supporting a traditional inter-governmental scheme. Furthermore, they are vague on the engagement of non-EU countries (which is essential in the case of Danube macro-region and EUSAIR) and on the use of existing funds. A coalition of member States participating in the macro-region must be forged. They must plan and implement internal and external activities to create the conditions for the setting up of the macro-region: internal activities to create a national system made up of different ministries in charge of sector policies, of regional and local authorities and of social and economic stakeholders interested and committed to the implementation of the macro-regional strategy; and external activities to negotiate the identification of priorities and flagship projects with the corresponding national systems. External activities also concern relationships with member States that are not part of the macro-region but who should be included in the strategy (e.g., in the case of the development of trans-European corridors).

Regions and local authorities can participate by putting forward proposals for the elaboration of the strategy and for flagship projects. They may have many years of experience in territorial cooperation, help in identifying problems and opportunities and also have relevant competencies delegated by the central governments (especially in countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK). However, even in those cases regional and local authorities have fewer capacities than central governments in promoting trans-national coordination, or in identifying and implementing flagship projects. They do not have strong networks (at least in the Mediterranean area), they have generally not consolidated partnerships and they have different political positions and perceptions.

The governance model for the macro-regional strategy is indeed an opportunity for some stakeholders to be more pro-active than others, as is the case for some German States who have played a coordinating role in specific priority areas in the Baltic and in the Danube strategies (CPMR 2010). The Italian Marche Region has also been very committed to sustaining the launch of the EUSAIR by hosting and supporting the secretariat of the Adriatic-Ionian initiative, coordinating the network of the Italian Regions involved and supporting the Forum of the Adriatic-Ionian cities and towns as well as the network of Universities UNIADRION (Virtual University of the Adriatic-Ionian Basin). They have also been important in playing a ‘whispering’ role with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the political opportunities offered by the EU macro-regional strategies while building political consensus with local authorities of the area and at the European level through the Committee of the Regions.

The problem is that such a role for regions and local authorities should not be taken for granted. Democratic governance mechanisms, moreover, are also lacking at the local level at the expense of, for example, effective involvement of other local actors and civil society. In this, territorial cooperation initiatives could play a supporting role for building the political and institutional conditions for a proper multi-level and democratic governance of the macro-regional strategies.

6.3.2 The Efficiency Challenge

If the added-value of the macro-regional strategy consists in the integrated approach, than the basic issue at hand is whether the integrated approach is really integrated or not: if the Action Plan of the strategy is task specific or more generalistic. In discussing the Baltic case, Bengtsson (2009) highlights how the Action Plan shows a weak strategic focus. Due to a lack of proper focus there is a loss of expected added-value, a failure in implementing criteria apt at concentrating on significant projects, and, above all, a failure in observing the inter-dependency linking the various priorities. From this point of view, the macro-regional strategy risks failing to introduce any innovation and differences in comparison to other programmes such as for example, the transnational cooperation component of the EU Cohesion Policy.

In this sense the three “nos” presented in the previous sections could be interpreted as strong constraints to the development of the macro-regional strategies. Without new institutions or strong governance and without ad-hoc resources, the macro-regional strategy risks failure.

On the other hand, the condition on “no new funding” could constitute also an innovative factor given that all actors are spurred towards better coordination and synergy of the various financial resources available at different levels. In this case the issue at hand regards the feasibility of such coordination. Coordination should be implemented among different resources at national and regional/local scales, as well as in regards to all policies and programmes of the EU. For instance, the Report of the European Commission on the implementation of the strategy in the Baltic macro-region (European Commission 2011c) indicates how different structural funds have jointly supported the flagship projects, complemented by national, regional and local funds. The efficiency challenge is clearly linked to the problem with governance. Coordination tensions exist between institutions and instruments within the bigger framework of existing tensions and power struggles discussed in the previous section (Dubois et al. 2009) . For example, the Baltic case shows tension between the macro-regional strategy, mainly supported by the DG Regional Policy of the European Commission, and the integrated maritime policy (CPMR 2009).

There are additional constraints due to tensions between the European Commission and central and sub-national governments in terms of prioritizing between the macro-regional strategy and other institutional structures and financial programmes such as Euroregions, the European Group for Territorial Cooperation and the operative programmes of territorial cooperation. The Cohesion Policy forms the backbone of the macro-regional framework because its objective is to sustain territorial cohesion in vast areas, similar to those covered by the transnational component of EU territorial cooperation. However, differences exist in terms of multilevel coordination: the strategy for the macro-region merges the Community level with central, regional and local authority levels while territorial cooperation is more focused on regional and local actors. The macro-regional strategies should mobilise resources from different instruments and funds while territorial cooperation has its own operative programmes and resources. The macro-regions should also integrate the flagship projects in European, national and regional policies, overcoming the weakness of the territorial cooperation that is the scarce integration and mainstreaming of its fragmented projects in national and regional policies.

In this sense, the macro-regional strategy emerged from dissatisfaction with the inter-governmental, trans-national and cross-border cooperation in the Baltic area, such as:

The small size of the areas concerned (NUTS3), which are too small for large-scale projects (…) the trans-national programmes are also handicapped by a system of governance that is often ill-adapted to strategic decision-making and by a low degree of involvement of member States in the delivery of projects. As results the number of “structuring” projects is considerably reduced. (…) each programme is also hampered by the excessive red tape involved (CPMR 2010, p. 2–3),

Territorial cooperation fatigue is palpable here, besides a more general dissatisfaction with the Cohesion Policy overall. The Barca Report, for example, says that:

The state of the empirical evidence on the performance of Cohesion Policy is very unsatisfactory (…) the most evident weaknesses (...) are: a deficit in strategic planning (...) a lack of focus on priorities and a failure to distinguish between the pursuit of efficiency and social inclusion objectives; a failure of the contractual agreement to focus on results (...); a remarkable lack of political and policy debate on results in terms of well-being of people, at both local and EU level, most of the attention being focussed on financial absorption and irregularities (Barca 2009, p. xv–xvi) .

Cooperation fatigue couples with enlargement fatigue: indeed, another motivation for the launch of the macro-regional strategy was the EU’s widening and stressful expansion to 28 member States. The enlargement has increased the need to spur more social and territorial cohesion. The political objective is to create a more united Europe, increasing social and economic convergence. With Europe enlarged to 28 States, the geographical, social and economical dimensions are wider and scattered; a risk of relative fragmentation versus concentration exists; tighter relationships are needed. A claim for a greater commitment towards a deepening of EU political integration before any further enlargement perspective is demanded.

Despite these limitations, the macro-regional strategy represents a tentative attempt at promoting social cohesion with more efficacy than traditional territorial cooperation in EU trans-national spaces. Diverse stakeholders are pushing to achieve concrete results through the implementation of flagship projects with strong impacts. The macro-regional strategy, according to those stakeholders, should not be a simple sum of projects as has happened so far with territorial cooperation. It should be founded, as already mentioned, on a concept of functionality that allows the identification of specific needs, priorities of action and flagship projects. The approach should be task-specific rather than general-purpose.

Nonetheless, the task presents a serious challenge as there is no common standard for identifying flagship projects. The same problem is observed in the different experiences of territorial cooperation programmes which are striving to define what a strategic project is. Projects launched within the Baltic macro-region do not seem very different from projects financed by transnational cooperation programmes in other geographic areas.

This debate raises another question about the link that should be forged between the macro-regional strategy and territorial cooperation: what is the difference between the strategic projects of territorial cooperation and flagship projects of the macro-regional strategy? What complementarities and coordination could be established?

Traditionally, territorial cooperation had the objective of creating a fabric of relationships and exchange of practices between regions across political borders. Recently a significant effort has been dedicated to strategic projects in order to increase the impact of territorial cooperation on cohesion but the instrument offers insufficient resources to support the realization of “hard” interventions such as infrastructural, technological or environmental investments. Furthermore, the multi-level partnership of territorial cooperation is weak: strategic projects are captured by regions and local authorities and the involvement of central governments and international organizations is rare.

On the other hand, territorial cooperation is tasked with supporting increasing linkages between territories, especially with new members States but also candidate, pre-candidate, and neighbouring countries, facilitating the development of the institutional framework of the macro-region and the identification of strategic projects (CPMR 2010). Moreover, according to the CPMR General Secretariat:

In a context of widespread disenchantment with Europe, the continued promotion of this kind of ‘ground level’ cooperation across the whole continent is essential (…). Growing globalisation now offers territorial actors opportunities that extend far beyond Europe’s borders. The special relations that already existed with neighbouring EU territories are being strengthened, while an increasing number of cooperation initiatives between European territories and those of other continents are emerging (CPMR 2010, p. 3).

Perhaps a division of tasks could be defined in the future: the macro-regional strategy should focus on ‘hard’ projects while territorial cooperation should focus on ‘soft’ projects such as institution building and harmonization of rules and policies. Another option could be to merge territorial trans-national cooperation with the macro-regional framework, thus avoiding the confusion between strategic and flagship projects. Territorial cooperation has an important role in setting the basis for a bottom-up approach and this is necessary to support the legitimisation of strategic and flagship projects that should be negotiated among diverse stakeholders.

In the case of the Baltic area, the Commission discussed around 750 proposals. This intense effort aimed at fostering actor involvement is proof of the Commission’s endeavour towards drafting a “broad, complex and not sufficiently focused” action plan, creating “another label for the already established cooperation” (Schymick and Krumrey 2009, p. 3). The majority of stakeholders, and particularly central governments, local authorities, social and economical organisations, have taken part in the process. Different views on the priorities have been aggregated:

For instance, the main priority for Sweden is accepting environmental challenges connected with the Baltic Sea Region, whereas Estonia’s principal priority is territorial integration (understood as establishing more functional connections between the East and West parts of the Baltic Sea Region and improvement of industrial infrastructure) (Wojcik 2008) .

The Baltic macro-regional strategy indeed includes an ample range of priorities and projects. The inclusion of a wide range of initiatives is aimed at building consensus among a variety of stakeholders is, however, inconsistent with the task-specific approach that should represent the added-value of the macro-regional strategy.

Notwithstanding the application of the general-purpose approach in the consultation process, the time has come to focus and decide which flagship projects should be implemented. The decision to implement a specific flagship project rather than others is a political decision. Who decides what is strategic? In the macro-regional governance framework discussed above, the pivotal role of central governments seems evident. In this sense other stakeholders, such as regions and local authorities, are demanding stronger roles.

Flagship projects, moreover, should also be debated in the representative bodies (i.e. parliaments and regional councils) and with civil society organisations. The fact that flagship projects decided at top level without informing territorial stakeholders might clash with local and trans-local constituencies should not be overlooked. The local dimension has political importance in a multi-level and trans-national perspective which points to the need for building a trans-national democratic process, such as indicated in the previous discussion on the governance challenge.

This is all evidence of how the macro-regional strategy is an inherently political construction:

In which commonalities are not a precondition for how the region functions in practice (…). It is possible to create strong cross-border cooperation among regions in countries that do not necessarily share a common history or culture. On the contrary, ‘a history of alienation’ between regions can actually provide the starting point for cooperation. In this sense, the importance of history and culture should not be underestimated, but should be understood as ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘fixed’. The argument is that it is the common challenges that create the basis and willingness for cooperation. (Baad Berkkan et al. 2009, p. 29)

Such political construction depends primarily upon the political will of national, and sub-national, governments in setting up a concrete integration and coordination of instruments and funds, supported by the European Commission, and relinquishing some of their sovereignty. However, the functioning of the strategy cannot rest only on the political willingness of governments and stakeholders as it requires the proper incentives for supplementary funding, and/or obligations to earmark part of their national and regional budgets to those projects.

This kind of orientation has been assumed in various EU policies for both the 2014–2020– internal Cohesion Policy (Strategic Community Framework) as well as in environment areas for integrated maritime and transport (TEN-T), research and competitiveness policies and new external regulations for IPA and ENI that give preference towards flagship projects. However these are important but very weak orientations, that do not resolve the criticisms of macro-regional strategies discussed so far.

6.3.3 The Community and External Challenges

The macro-regions, as already mentioned, are defined as a function of shared cross-border challenges and opportunities. This implies potential variable geometries in the delimitation of the proper areas and scales. To this avail, the issue concerning the delimitation of the macro-region takes centre stage: which territories and regions comprise a macro-region? Who is in and who is out? According to the concept of functional regionalization , the scale is determined by the type of problem at hand and the nature of opportunities sought: specific trans-national interdependencies, material and immaterial flows and hard and soft linkages qualify the geographical space of the macro-regions irrespective of national and EU boundaries.

In the cases of the Baltic, Danube, Adriatic-Ionian and Alpine macro-regions, these areas are supposed to correspond to ‘natural’ regions or common goods: the sea basin, the river basin or the mountainous region. This is coherent with the common challenge that some of those macro-regions aim to address: in the Baltic as well as in the Adriatic, for example, one relevant pending issue concerns the eutrophication of the sea as a consequence of pollutant discharges from surrounding regions. Handling this problem means demarcating the macro-region to include catchment areas in these territories.

The functional approach is interwoven with political considerations, with the positions of national and sub-national governments in the EU framework and with respect to neighbourhood countries as well as continental and regional powers like Russia and Turkey. According to the functional principle, ‘natural’ macro-regions have no administrative and politically defined boundaries; yet this is not the case with macro-regional strategies: even if they are delineated based on functionalities, political conditions continue to be relevant in the delimitation of the area.

The setting up of the EU strategy for the Baltic macro-region, as already mentioned, has induced many other areas to follow this example and propose or to launch similar initiatives. Though where then should macro-regions be created? How can they be geographically distributed in order to not generate a multi-speed Europe? How much can they be extended outward? What role do the boundaries of the EU play in macro-regional strategies? Do macro-regional strategies serve a Europe of Olympic Rings, i.e. a polycentric and unbounded space, as opposed to the Eurocentric character of other EU external policies?

At the time of writing, the European Commission was supporting the implementation of the strategy in the Baltic and Danube areas. The Adriatic-Ionian strategy was approved in 2014 and the Alpine strategy is planned in 2015. Western Balkan countries, candidates and potential candidates for accession in the EU participate in the Danube and Adriatic-Ionian macro-regions. Other regions and local authorities are proposing the elaboration of strategies for macro-regions in the North Sea and along the so-called Atlantic Arc. The Mediterranean basin represents another space where diverse stakeholders feel the necessity to improve trans-national governance through the establishment of a single macro-region or several strategies covering different areas: from the Adriatic-Ionian to Western Mediterranean.

The Danube macro-regional strategy is particularly interesting because it comprises eight EU member States, four accession countries and two neighbouring countries (Ukraine and Moldova). The strategy is linked to the EU enlargement process towards the Western Balkans. The candidate and pre-candidate countries are strongly interested in the initiative as yet another step towards full accession into the EU:

The Republic of Serbia has great significance in the future realisation of the aims contained in the Joint Overall Strategy for the Danube Region. (…) Through its participation in the development process and subsequent implementation of the Strategy, the Republic of Serbia confirms its strategic commitment for its effective membership in the European Union (Republic of Serbia 2010, p. 3).

EU member States have more prudent positions. The German policy paper underlines that:

Participation of non-EU countries is crucial if the desired objectives are to be achieved (…). Such participation must not blur the strategy’s focus, shifting it to the EU’s external relations rather than the Danube region (German Government 2009, p. 3).

The macro-regional strategy presents, in such a case, another parallel mechanism for reinforcing the accession process. The same arguments of the Danube Region apply in the EUSAIR: it is a vast area constituted by four EU member States and four accession countries (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia). The Adriatic-Ionian area is a political priority for the Italian government for which the accession of the Western Balkan countries in the EU is a major geopolitical interest, matched by Greece, Croatia and Slovenia governments. The macro-region is considered instrumental to the fact that the Adriatic-Ionic will be an internal EU sea in the future. In the Baltic and the Danube areas, Germany similarly shows a strong interest in sustaining the two macro-regions, given its strong commitment towards enhancing territorial cohesion in Eastern Europe (Braun and László Kovács 2011) . Special attention is given to involving Russia via cross-border collaboration.

Other member countries such as France and Spain have so far not officially expressed their opinions regarding macro-regions. In the case of Spain, some Northern regions are lobbying the government for an Atlantic macro-region. The French and Spanish governments are considering different opportunities but they do not express much enthusiasm in creating a Mediterranean macro-region due to the possible overlapping or misunderstanding with other existing initiatives, e.g. the Union for the Mediterranean. They are cautious in this respect:

Macro-regions, being a partial grouping of territories, could break the communitarian principle of shared implementation, according to the co-operation principle (…), the real regional dimension in the EU is the community. (…) Cohesion and territorial solidarity are the basis of the regional policy and not inter-regional competitiveness. (…) The ‘resulting legitimacy’ should be accompanied by the ‘democratic legitimacy’ in a framework of solidarity … (Moya Pérez 2010. Translation by the author) .

As indicated by this last quote and as already mentioned, macro-regions pose a “community challenge”. The unbalanced creation of the macro-regions could indeed stimulate a multi-speed Europe and weaken the solidarity principle. Consequently, a comprehensive EU plan on macro-regions is requested by some stakeholders, for example the CPMR:

The debate on the potential geographical areas to be covered by such strategies could be organised by each of the 13 existing transnational areas (CPMR 2010, p. 5).

On the other hand, the same regions belonging to CPMR and the Assembly of the European Regions should themselves question which criteria should guide the creation of macro-regional strategies because a competitive race to put forward macro-region initiatives is taking place with potential conflicting effects on different areas. Should macro-regions be more equally distributed through a ‘global’ approach in order to reduce the competitive race and safeguard the solidarity principle?

Indeed, if the pragmatic and prudent approach suggested by the European Commission were to be adopted, the creation of macro-regions should be procedurally experimental, a process of test cases and of trial and error. If the strategy works it can be spread to other trans-national areas, but only in the case it is needed.

The need to avoid creating territorial disparities and preferences also explains the principle of the “three nos” mentioned in the introduction, especially the fact that macro-regions will not have specific resources and institutions. In principle the opportunity of creating a macro-region is open to all the European Union territories depending on their political trans-national conditions. The EU, on the other hand, does not want to create a new institutional machine which risks perpetuating itself without a concrete reason. If the macro-region strategy does not succeed, it may disappear without losing any institutional and financial resources: it is possible that in the next few years the strategy will disappear completely or it will be applied in some areas only. Despite the fact that Europe may be running at different speeds, the emergence and potential success of macro-regions depends on real political processes taking place and not on whether or not resources and opportunities are equally or unequally distributed.

The political answer to the community challenge should not be to stop the macro-regions that are working but to understand how to better create the conditions for those areas with a weak trans-national orientation to catch up. In the Baltic many institutions and networks have created fertile ground for the setting up of the macro-regional strategy. In other areas the conditions are less favourable. Yet even in the case of the Baltic, involving all the relevant actors to ensure broader participation in the strategy, as suggested by the European Commission (2011c), may not be sufficient. In the Mediterranean area the prerequisite conditions for cooperation are even weaker (Alfonsi 2011) . Furthermore Mediterranean countries have to face what we have defined as the “external challenge” of macro-regions: the coordination among member and non member States is more complex than in the exclusively internal macro-regions; furthermore the effective involvement of different governance levels it is difficult to achieve in contexts with limited decentralization levels and models. Other EU programmes, especially territorial cooperation initiatives, can play an important role in setting up a proper multi-level governance of the macro-regional strategy, similarly to what has been already mentioned in the case of the efficiency challenge.

6.4 Conclusions

Macro-regional strategies constitute a new geopolitical space where territories and institutions are supposed to cooperate in order to respond to common transnational challenges and opportunities that requires collective action, and according to an integrated and issue-oriented approach that links actors, policies and funding. The macro-regional strategy is a new soft political institution for transnational territorial cohesion. Besides the Baltic, the Danube, the Adriatic-Ionian and the Alpine macro-regions, other areas have expressed an interest in developing this instrument—the Atlantic arc, the North-Sea Channel, the Black Sea region—while others are asking the EU to elaborate a comprehensive view or map of equally distributed future macro-regions which would cover the entire territory of all of Europe.

Macro-regional strategies have the potential to better respond to the needs of peripheral and border territories, overcome the boundaries that divide nations and regions, inside and outside the EU, establish new networks and enhance common opportunities. However, in order to respond to these very high and positive expectations, the macro-regions are confronted with four main challenges.

First, the “efficiency challenge” is due to a weak focus of macro-regional strategies and to constraints in implementing an effective coordination between different stakeholders and funds which respond to different regulative frameworks and interests. Other tensions concern the similarity between the macro-regional approach and the transnational strand of the territorial cooperation programme, and between the macro-regions and other forms of trans-boundary cooperation, such as the Euroregions and the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The Baltic experience highlights that a better subdivision of tasks between these overlapping instruments is needed, and that the added-value of macro-regions is mostly in the support of so-called flagship projects.

The weak institutionalisation of macro-regions implies that no ad-hoc funding is available and that other sources should be pooled and coordinated. Considering the three “no” conditions of the macro-regional strategy, incentives for the implementation of collective actions should be offered to stimulate political convergence with more alignment of funding from the different European programmes, and from other international and national funding sources.

Integration between different instruments also requires coordination between different institutions (European, national, regional, etc.), that indeed represents a “governance challenge”. The real problem is the complex governance of the macro-regional strategies, the difficulties implied in their coordination and, more fundamentally, in the variable political wills and institutional capacities of central and local governments and of the diverse countries.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of multi-level governance, the prominent role played by central governments in the macro-regional strategies is evident. The bottom up process is limited to the first phase of consensus building. For real multi-level governance to take place the strategy should be more open and capable of offering more opportunities for participation. At the same time, diverse stakeholders should act more pro-actively if they want to exploit these opportunities. Territorial cooperation has a role to play in building the political, institutional and social conditions for proper multi-level governance of the macro-regional strategies to take place, contributing to the forging of political will, institutional capacities and social networks. More communication and ownership should be stimulated at the local level. More democratic decision-making processes should be put in place for the selection of flagship projects. The European Commission could implement a more general and direct initiative to increase awareness and ownership.

If the creation of macro-regions responds to the spatial diversity of the EU, at the same time it can feed the divergent dynamics among the different areas, favouring a multi-speed Europe, which poses a “community challenge”. This is the reason why some member States, regions and local authorities have asked the European Commission to define a comprehensive plan on macro-regional strategies for the whole of Europe. However, the European Commission’s approach is prudent because the strategy still has to prove its functionality and because political conditions are not equally distributed in the diverse areas. Consequently, the construction of macro-regions is proceeding at different speeds. In areas lagging behind in the process, more efforts and investments from the European Commission could stimulate and support networking, political convergence, and conflict management among the stakeholders.

All of these challenges become even more difficult to address when macro-regions include non-EU countries, and especially neighbouring countries. This last issue could be defined as the “external challenge” of macro-regions. Neighbouring countries sharing common problems with members States should definitely be involved for any strategy to be effective in a transnational space. Yet, in these cases the complexity of the coordination problem is even more evident. The possible application of EU macro-regional strategies depends firstly on the political will of member States and secondly on the political interest of third-party countries to take part in the process. Furthermore the possibility of involving third-party countries in a proper multi-level governance of macro-regions is constrained by their low degree of internal de-concentration or decentralization, their different approaches to territorial cohesion in their national policies and by the lack of capacity of local authorities and stakeholders.

The proper involvement of non-EU countries is constrained, moreover, by the vision that the EU has on its external space. In this regard, the macro-regional perspective is relatively easier for countries who have already become candidates for accession. Balkan countries are participating in the building of the Danube and the Adriatic-Ionic macro-regional strategies . They have a direct and strong interest in the macro-regional process because it sustains their accession to the EU. Conversely, neighbouring countries are milder towards the macro-regional strategy because the incentive is negligible and very difficult to achieve.

These difficulties are evident in the Mediterranean. Southern Mediterranean countries are trapped by the inefficiency of previous experiments, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, in conflicts and in different political transition processes that make a macro-regional perspective unrealistic in the short term. A hypothetical Mediterranean macro-regional strategy could be articulated in coordination with the Union for the Mediterranean and the ENP, but both programmes are in a critical phase of restructuring to face the new and evolving Mediterranean geopolitical scenario.

All these dynamics manifest how the macro-regional strategies, despite their functional role, represent political processes and constructions, instrumental to the geopolitical positioning of diverse actors. The macro-regional strategy, in this respect, could nurture different geopolitical perspectives which are hardly coherent, and be unable to realize the polycentric political space which has been represented with the metaphor of the “Olympic rings”. In order to be part of a new cosmopolitan discourse more open to re-discussing Eurocentric models and norms, neighbouring countries and territories should participate more decisively in the construction of macro-regional strategies, while the EU should increase efforts for creating networks and stimulating a democratic debate on common policies.