Abstract
Classical economic models proceed from strong rationality assumptions which are known to be inaccurate (as no human is perfectly rational), but which are thought to reasonably approximate aggregate human behaviour. However, there is now a wealth of experimental evidence that shows that human agents frequently deviate from these models’ predictions in a predictable, systematic way. Using this data, there is now an opportunity to model and predict human economic behaviour more accurately than ever before. More accurate predictions will enable the design of more effective multiagent mechanisms and policies, allowing for more efficient coordination of effort and allocation of resources.
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Keywords
- Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Equilibrium Strategy
- Iterative Model
- Quantal Response Equilibrium
- Cognitive Hierarchy
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Wright, J.R. (2015). Behavioural Game Theory: Predictive Models and Mechanisms. In: Barbosa, D., Milios, E. (eds) Advances in Artificial Intelligence. Canadian AI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9091. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18356-5_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18356-5_35
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