Keywords

In recent years, there has been an explosion of publicity in the United States into the issue of military sexual trauma. In researching this topic, a student might be tempted to focus on recent events as a means of understanding and conceptualizing it. Unfortunately, human history in many ways is one that has been recorded in blood, as it is replete with horrifying examples of violence. For instance, one of the first stories in the Bible is Cain slaying his brother Abel in a jealous rage (Genesis 4:8 New International Version). Archeologists studying excavation sites in what is now Germany found evidence that about 5,000 years ago, Mesolithic hunter-gatherers slaughtered a village of men, women, and children, carefully placing their skulls as trophies in a cave as a sort of homage to their crime (Kiernan, 2007). Thus, any study of man’s cruel and brutal treatment of each other must extend further back.

Perhaps the only historical theme as old as violence is the relationship between sex and violence. As Hicks (1994) notes, this seeming marriage of Mars, the Roman god of war, and Venus, the goddess of love and sex, is a theme consistent throughout history. Similarly, in the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud linked the twin human instincts of Eros and Thanatos, or the innate life and death instincts residing in every person (Bourke, 2007). Historical examples include the founding myth of the Roman Empire, which included the forced capture and rape of Sabine women. The Greek epic poem The Iliad details the Trojan War, started after Helen, the beautiful wife of the King of Sparta, was kidnapped as a result of the sexual desire of Paris, the prince of Troy (Homer, & Knox, 1998).

More recent examples include the mass rape and brutalization of Belgian women by invading German soldiers in World War I (Brownmiller, 1975). Approximately 30 years later, German women experienced a similar nightmare, as an estimated 100,000 to 1 million German women were raped over the course of a few weeks in 1945 by Soviet forces entering Berlin (Grossmann, 1995). In 1968, US servicemen massacred hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese inhabitants of the small village of My Lai, raping and sexually brutalizing dozens of women and children in the process (Neill, 2000). Conflict-related sexual violence has occurred in approximately 51 countries in the past 20 years, a “global scourge” that has occurred in both developed and developing nations (Bastick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007, p. 7). Although sexual violence is most commonly perpetrated by men against women, women have also participated in the violence, as demonstrated by the Abu Ghraib scandal. At this prison in Iraq, American soldiers, including women, sexually humiliated Iraqi detainees, some even taking photographs as trophies (Leatherman, 2011). In April 2014, Islamist extremist group Boko Haram kidnapped 250 Nigerian girls from their school. The group, whose name means “Western education is sin,” claimed it would sell the girls as slaves, in accordance with the group’s interpretation of Islamic teachings (Duthiers, Sesay, & Carter, 2014).

These examples demonstrate the long and horrifying relationship between military conflict and sexual violence. Although sexual violence has clearly been evident in military conflicts and institutions for a long time, the historical record rarely includes the voices of victims. Scholars argue this lack of study is attributable to several factors: The first is that it is often the victors who do both the raping and the recording of history, and thus there is little incentive to admit any transgressions (Brownmiller, 1975). A second reason is misogyny, as historians and policymakers often pay little attention to that which is not valued, namely, the health and safety of women (Hynes, 2004; Kristof & WuDunn, 2009). A third factor for this silence is cultural and social discomfort with sex and sexual violence. For instance, many victims refuse to come forward after conflicts out of a desire to avoid the shame and stigma associated with sexual victimization (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Leatherman, 2011). Additionally, for non-victims, comprehending the cruelty that humans are capable of inflicting on each other in the form of sexual violence is uncomfortable. This inability to comprehend such terror leads to silence and a resistance in the study of sexual violence and war. Unfortunately, refusing to understand an issue does not solve it, but rather prevents accountability for perpetrators and increases the shame and isolation of victims (Leatherman, 2011).

This chapter will explore some of theories scholars suggest in answering why sexual violence happens so often within military conflict. This chapter will explore conflicts where sexual violence did not occur, perhaps illustrating that this issue is not a fixed one, but rather one that might be preventable for future generations.

1 What Is Sexual Violence?

Traditionally, rape has been legally defined as the unwanted penetration of a woman’s vagina by a penis or other items (Bourke, 2007). Unfortunately, rape is not the only form of sexual violence that occurs. For instance, forced marriage, sterilization, sexual humiliation, branding, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, and trafficking are all forms of violence commonly used in conflicts (Leatherman, 2011). Men, women, and children can all be victims of sexual violence. Additionally, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities may face increased risk for violence as they are often subjected to legal, cultural, and religious discrimination (Bastick et al., 2007; Leatherman, 2011). Thus, sexual violence can take many forms and be perpetrated against a variety of groups. In 2005, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance proposed a general definition for sexual violence that included

… any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic a person’s sexuality, using coercion, threats of harm or physical force, by any person regardless of relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to home and work. (Bastick et al., 2007, p. 19)

When examining sexual violence within the context of armed conflict, the question becomes “when does sexual violence become a weapon of war?” Or how does sexual violence in war differ from acts during peacetime with civilian actors and when is that difference clear (Kelly, 2010)? Generally, scholars assert that this transition occurs when sexual violence is used as a part of strategic campaign that also has military aims or objectives. This determination is made by examining the individual acts of violence, such as rape by soldiers, but also the broader macro political and cultural framework in which such act (or acts) occurs (Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Skjelsbaek, 2001).

Sexual violence therefore becomes a weapon of war when the individual attacks on men, women, and children are also part of a strategy employed to obtain specific political or military objectives. Farwell (2004) argues that sexual violence during war is often used as “an instrument of terror” (p. 393) intended to control, coerce, or destroy certain populations.

Brutality and slavery are also characteristics of sexual violence in war. For instance, approximately 90 % of rapes during violent conflicts are gang rapes (Hagen & Yohani, 2010). This behavior, labeled by Mukwege and Nangini (2009) as “rape with extreme violence” (p. 1), often features genital dismemberment, such as the cutting of breasts or penises, or the insertion of objects such as glass or heated plastic (Leatherman, 2011; Thomas & Tiessen, 2010). In addition, military conflicts often provide soldiers the opportunity to enslave women and children for sexual purposes. For instance, a 2004 Amnesty International report found that women in Sudan often had their legs broken so that they could be raped repeatedly by soldiers and not be able to escape (Hagen & Yohani, 2010). These characteristics allow soldiers to demonstrate their “limitless power” over the subject population, as well as their devotion to their units or leaders (Hagen & Yohani, 2010, p. 17; Neill, 2000).

Finally, sexual violence becomes a weapon of war when it has characteristics of ethnic cleansing or when a group is targeted based on their shared race, ethnicity, religion, or culture (Engle, 2005; Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Milillo, 2006). Examples of this included forced pregnancy and the mass rape of women of a certain tribe or religious group (Skjelsbaek, 2001). In these cases, sexual violence is not just a crime against an individual victim, but a part of broader political or military objective to subjugate or eradicate an “inferior” group (Farwell, 2004; Neill, 2000).

2 Theories on Sexual Violence

The biological theory of sexual violence sees men as innately sexually aggressive, with war providing the opportunity for this drive to be expressed (Gottschall, 2004; Snyder, Gabbard, May, & Zulcic, 2006). Those relying on this theory cite the structure of male anatomy (e.g., forced sexual intercourse is possible with a penis) and the long history of males fighting over access to female reproductive assets (Brownmiller, 1975; Neill, 2000). Thus, according to this theory, humans fight and rape because it is in their genes to do so. Similar to Freud’s understanding of drives, this approach sees rape as an “inevitable, genetically predetermined reflex” (Gottschall, 2004, p. 133).

Evolutionary psychologists suggest that male predation and rape against women occurs as a result of finite evolution and adaptation for species survival. McKibbin, Shackelford, Goetz, and Starratt (2008) identify five subtypes of rapist adaptations that have to do with conditional mating strategies. The five include: (1) disadvantaged men who resort to rape, (2) “specialized” rapists who are sexually aroused by violent sex, (3) men who rape opportunistically, (4) high-mating-effort men who are dominant and often psychopathic, and (5) partner rapists motivated by assessments of increased sperm competition (p. 89). Further, the reproductive benefits of rape may also be an adaptive, evolutionary strategy where men can procreate their genes when a population of consenting partners is unavailable (Shackelford & Weekes-Shackelford, 2012) (see rape resulting in pregnancy in Chap. 5 of this text for further discussion of implications on the rape victim).

While the biological approach looks primarily at human genes, most other theories consider the sociocultural contexts of sexual violence. One of the first theories to do this was feminism, which has within it several different schools of thought (Gottschall, 2004; Skjelsbaek, 2001). The first is essentialism, which derives from radical feminism (Leatherman, 2011). This approach views sexual violence during wartime as a natural expression of the patriarchal hierarchy that has historically existed between men and women. As masculinity has traditionally been viewed as powerful and femininity associated with passivity, behavior during war is simply a natural extension of this relationship. Thus, sexual violence is just men acting out their natural role of male aggressor, seeking to dominate and exploit what they view as their possession, namely, the bodies of women (Brownmiller, 1975; Skjelsbaek, 2001). Thus, for essentialist theorists, when men rape during times of conflict, it is simply “boys being boys,” or as Leatherman (2011) states, “It is what men do to women when they can…” (p. 14).

Structural theory also relies on feminist theory but seeks to also incorporate ethnic, religious, political, and racial contexts as well (Leatherman, 2011). This approach criticizes the essentialist approach for being reductionist and deterministic, meaning it views all women, regardless of class, age, race, or religion, as victims and all men as perpetrators (Leatherman, 2011; Skjelsbaek, 2001). Scholars using this approach argue that not all women have the same risks in war. In many conflicts, certain groups are targeted more than others. For instance, in El Salvador, women who were supporters of guerilla groups fighting government forces were often targeted for sexual attacks, meaning their political and sexual identities increased their risk for sexual violence (Bastick et al., 2007; Skjelsbaek, 2001; Wood, 2006). Under this theory, women are targeted in war when they represent “female embodiments of other socio-cultural identities” or when their gender intersects with their political, religious, ethnic, and racial identities (Skjelsbaek, 2001, p. 223). Thus, this theory explains sexual violence in conflict as not solely attributable to patriarchy and misogyny. Rather, it examines when men belong to groups with power (e.g., political, ethnic, religious) and how this affects women and girls of the same, or other, groups (Leatherman, 2011). One benefit of this theory is that it views female identity, and not male aggression, as the primary aspect worth studying, thereby raising awareness of the trauma suffered by women and girls in armed conflict (Leatherman, 2011; Skjelsbaek, 2001).

A related theory is social constructionism, which rejects the notion that gender is fixed or should be solely understood through patriarchy. Rather, it views gender, and gender roles, as constructed or artificially created within a society or culture. Generally skeptical about broad categories or narrow dichotomies (e.g., male vs. female, victim vs. aggressor), this approach instead examines how acts are “shaped and constrained by the system of power relations, and how behavior either reproduces or reinforces that system” (Leatherman, 2011, p. 17; Skjelsbaek, 2001). Thus, under this theory, gender is something a person “does,” as opposed to something that person “is” (Gerecke, 2010). As a result, sexual violence during wartime would be viewed through the lens of the norms, rules, and beliefs about social behavior that prevail in such transaction (Leatherman, 2011). For instance, social constructivist theorists would point to situations where males are victims of sexual violence or where females act as perpetrators. Neither of these could be easily explained by the theories listed above (Leatherman, 2011; Skjelsbaek, 2001). This theory would argue that to act masculine is often associated with exerting power over someone weaker, who is often seen as feminized. Thus, in the case of a sexual assault against a female of another group, the perpetrator seeks to “masculinize” (or gain power) his identity as a male and member of his group and “feminize” (or make weak) the identities of the female victim. This approach would also explain situations where males are victims and women are aggressors, as the actors in such situations would be similarly “feminized” (or victimized) or seeking to express power (masculinized) through their actions (Skjelsbaek, 2001). This theory rejects the notion that gender is static or fixed. Rather, it argues a much broader context of systems, beliefs, and norms must be examined to explain how gender is expressed within a situation (Gerecke, 2010; Leatherman, 2011; Skjelsbaek, 2001).

Related to the social constructivist theory are cultural theories of understanding sexual violence. These attribute acts of violence that occur within conflicts or military institutions to aspects of military culture. As an institution, the military is hierarchal and dominated by males and often socializes its members to be “masculine” (aggressive) and devalues what is “feminine,” or weak. In addition, it is also a system that views violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflict (Farwell, 2004; Meger, 2010; Trenholm, Olsson, & Ahlberg, 2011). Thus, under culture theory, sexual violence in war and within military institutions is a natural “product of the hyper-masculine climate of abuse and antipathy towards women” (Meger, 2010, p. 122). Similarly, other scholars argue that war, with its ability to destroy social order and norms, makes sexual violence seem less taboo and therefore rational and permissible (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Chang, 1997). For instance, when soldiers are trained to kill or accept being killed in action, would the ethics of sexually assaulting a woman remain clearly wrong for that soldier? As one Japanese soldier explained “If my life was not important, an enemy’s life became inevitably less important…” (Chang, 1997, p. 58).

Another theory that attempts to explain sexual violence in wartime is the strategic rape theory. It relies on the pragmatic view that rape can be, and often is, used as an extremely effective weapon of war. Like a bomb, sexual violence against civilians or other soldiers can serve a military or political objective (Gottschall, 2004). For instance, it can terrorize civilian populations as a way to decrease resistance. It can also be used to emasculate enemy fighters, thereby demoralizing them (Farwell, 2004). In addition, military leaders often use the promise of access to women as an enticement to soldiers, hoping to motivate them, build group cohesion, and control libidinal energy (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Hynes, 2004; Morris, 1996; Rosen, Knudson, & Fancher, 2003).

Finally, rape can be used as way to destabilize the social and family structure of the enemy. As Diken and Bagge Laustsen (2005) argue, “if one aims to destroy an ethnic group, women are good targets in the family structure….Raped women should therefore stand as a metaphor for a defeated community” (p. 115–116). Raped women are often seen as “spoiled” and are rejected by their communities (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Leatherman, 2011). Thus, the raped woman is not only assaulted, but her community, family, and culture are also attacked and weakened (Farwell, 2004; Gottschall, 2004). Thus, this theory argues that sexual violence not only physically harms individual enemies but also has the insidious ability to fray the fabric of their communities. This is why it so often planned, encouraged, and employed in conflicts around the globe (Gottschall, 2004; Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010). An example of this strategic targeting was seen in the conflict in Rwanda, where allegations surfaced that Hutu militia leaders specifically ordered HIV-positive members to rape Tutsi women as a way to infect them and spread disease in the community (Thomas & Tiessen, 2010). This theory is therefore primarily concerned with examining the ultimate goals of the actions in a macro context, examining how military and political groups commonly utilize sexual violence against specific groups for certain purposes.

Borrowing from a wide variety of disciplines, the theories above provide a foundation for explaining why sexual violence occurs in wartime. Each theory has its strengths and weaknesses and should be employed with caution so as not to exclude, marginalize, or minimize any individual’s or entity’s role. Below are descriptions of recent examples of sexual violence that has occurred during military conflicts. Which theory do you think best explains these events?

3 Recent Examples of Sexual Violence in War

3.1 The Rape of Nanking and the Comfort Women

In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, then part of the Republic of China. As part of the invasion, the city of Nanking was occupied (Chang, 1997). The city fell on December 13, 1937, beginning weeks of terror for the Chinese civilians trapped in the city. Called “The Rape of Nanking,” this period saw unspeakable cruelty and violence unleashed on the population by Japan’s military, with approximately 260,000 civilians killed and 20,000–80,000 Chinese women and girls raped (Aydelott, 1993; Chang, 1997; Hicks, 1994). European missionaries within the city attempted to warn the world of the atrocities taking place within Nanking, sending out messages describing the decapitation contests held by soldiers, disembowelment of raped women, and use of torture such as castration, live burial, and hanging (Chang, 1997).

Some historians attribute the brutality exhibited during this period to Japanese military training, which was notoriously strict, hierarchical, and violent. According to Chang (1997),

The Japanese solider was not just hardened for battle in China; he was hardened for the task of killing Chinese combatants and noncombatants alike. Indeed, various games and exercises were set up by the Japanese military to numb its men to the human instinct against killing people who are not attacking. (p. 55)

Recruits were often beaten with spiked boots or belts and made to fight other recruits, a strategy meant to secure instant obedience and acceptance of authority (Hicks, 1994). Other experts argue that Japanese cultural norms encouraged the behavior, in particular rape. These include the belief that raping a virgin made a soldier more powerful in battle (Chang, 1997).

As the rest of the world heard of the atrocities occurring at Nanking, the Japanese government was criticized for the harm caused to civilians. This criticism led Japanese military and political leaders to create a new strategy, or the organization of military brothels as a method of containing and controlling sexual violence (Chang, 1997; Hicks, 1994; Wolfe, 2014). This strategy called for the creation of complex web of brothels that would be staffed by “comfort women.” Unfortunately, this plan called for the kidnap, purchase, and forced prostitution of between 80,000 and 200,000 women in Southeast Asia (Chang, 1997; Hicks, 1994). By forcing these young women to sexually service Japanese soldiers, the Japanese government hoped to reduce the embarrassing rape of local women (which might decrease the local population’s willingness to support the Japanese), limit the spread of sexually transmitted disease, and provide soldiers with the “reward” of access to sex (Chang, 1997; Copelon, 2000).

These “comfort women” were often kidnapped or enticed with false promises of receiving jobs such as housework (Hicks, 1994; Wolfe, 2014). Often forced to live in camps close to the battlefield, many women were forced to sexually service as many as 20–30 men per day (Barstow, 2000). These women were primarily Korean; however, many originated from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma, ethnicities traditionally viewed by Japanese as culturally inferior (Copelon, 2000; Wolfe, 2014). Women lived with the threat of beatings, contracting sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy, and death from military engagement (Hicks, 1994; Lee, 2003). After the war ended, many comfort women were killed in military action or abandoned and left to make their way home. Unfortunately, many of these women found themselves as permanent exiles in their communities, labeled “dirty” and publicly humiliated for the sexual crimes committed against them. Facing incredible social and cultural stigma, many women elected to never speak about their experience (Barstow, 2000; Hicks, 1994; Wolfe, 2014).

Until recently, very little was known about the comfort women. After World War II ended, Japanese military leadership was never charged for their crimes against these women (Wolfe, 2014). It was not until the 1980s, when South Korean women’s groups began to demand accountability from the Japanese government, was any substantial coverage provided to this issue (Lee, 2003; Wolfe, 2014). The attention largely began after the discovery by Japanese historians of official documents showing the full support by the Japanese government during World War II of the creation and maintenance of the comfort women brothel system (Copelon, 2000; Wolfe, 2014). This discovery prompted lawsuits from several surviving comfort women, demanding reparations for their suffering and an official acknowledgment of what occurred (Lee, 2003; Wolfe, 2014). To date, such efforts have been unsuccessful, and the Japanese government has been strongly criticized by human rights and women’s rights groups for their continued refusal to accept legal responsibility for the crimes committed against the comfort women. In particular, groups cite the lengths the Japanese government has gone to suppress information about official government involvement with the comfort women, such as excluding all mention of them from memorials, museums, and school textbooks (Chang, 1997; Lee, 2003; Wolfe, 2014).

Unfortunately, the few comfort women who survived now face the double insult of lengthy legal battles and a historical record that denies their suffering and excludes their stories. Some women’s groups blame this silence on the historic tendency to downplay and excuse sexual crimes against women, especially women of color (Wolfe, 2014). Korean feminist Chung Hyun Kyung (2000) asserts that

Neither the Korean nor the Japanese government wanted to talk about what happened to Korean women during World War II. For Korean men it was too shameful for their egos to accept what happened to Korean women, and there were more important things they needed to talk about in relation to Japan. And for Japanese men it was too guilt provoking to confront what really happened. They preferred to deny the whole thing because they did not want uncomfortable guilty feelings, nor did they want to give material reparation. (p. 17)

3.2 Ethnic Cleansing: Rapes in Bosnia

After World War I, the nation of Yugoslavia was stitched together out of the land that had roots in the Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires (Stiglmayer, 1994). This new country contained several distinct ethnic and racial groups, including Serbians (who had Slavic heritages), Croatians and Slovakians (who were the preferred group under Austrian and Hungarian rule), and Bosnians (many of whom were Muslim as a result of the region’s proximity to Turkey and the Ottoman Empire) (Stiglmayer, 1994; Woodward, 1995). These groups had different languages, histories, and religions, and many groups had long-standing tensions as a result of these differences. In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia, and Muslim and Croatian majorities living in Bosnia voted to do the same. These groups felt that Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbians and felt starting their own countries was the best solution (Aydelott, 1993). Secession by these nations prompted a regional civil war for territory. This conflict was particularly intense within Bosnia, where Bosnian Serb forces attempted to rid Bosnia of Muslims (Aydelott, 1993).

As the conflict raged, stories of official “rape camps” began to trickle out to human rights agencies and feminist groups (MacKinnon, 1994). These tales described organized campaigns by Bosnian Serbs to use the rape of Bosnian Muslim women as a way to exterminate non-Serbs and create a “Greater Serbia” (Stiglmayer, 1994; Neill, 2000). Human rights organizations estimate that between 20,000 and 50,000 women and girls were raped during the conflict (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005). While some women were assaulted at home or in the streets, many took place within rape camps set up by Serbian soldiers. At the camp at Doboj, approximately 2,000 Bosnian Muslim women were detained and raped repeatedly between May and June 1992 (Sharlach, 2000). As this was a civil war fought between groups who formerly lived together, many women reported knowing the men who raped them, recognizing them as former coworkers or neighbors (Neill, 2000).

The use of rape camps by Bosnian Serbs was part of an official military and political strategy to remove unwanted populations, namely, Muslims, from Bosnia (Salzman, 2000). This would be accomplished by two means. First, it created fear and demonstrated Serbian power over the population as a way to encourage Muslims to flee and never return (Salzman, 2000). This was a successful tactic, as out of a population of 4.3 million, more than 2 million Bosnians became refugees who fled the area, creating the greatest mass movement of children since World War II (Woodward, 1995). Second, a cultural attack against Muslims was done. Traditionally, Bosnian Muslims valued virginity and purity, and men were mandated to protect the dignity and honor of the community’s women (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Salzman, 2000). A raped woman was often viewed as defiled and faced expulsion from her community (Salzman, 2000; Sharlach, 2000). Thus, this was a method to attack the fabric of Muslim families and communities by Serbian forces (Aydelott, 1993; Sharlach, 2000).

This cultural attack was also seen in the rape camps with forced pregnancies. In many camps, a woman was raped until a gynecologist confirmed she was pregnant and would not be released until it was too late to abort (Neill, 2000). Traditionally, Yugoslavian cultures understood nationality to be patrilineal, or based on the father’s culture and ethnicity (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Neill, 2000; Salzman, 2000). Thus, forced pregnancy was a way for Serbs to “ethnically cleanse” Bosnian Muslim women, creating Serbian babies who would “kill Muslims when they grew up” (Salzman, 2000, p. 73). Many of these women faced the agonizing choice of bearing the child or attempting an abortion, a taboo in the Muslim community (Neill, 2000). Feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon (1994) labeled these attacks as “genocidal rape” (p. 11), as they were intentionally part of political and military plan. Specifically, she argued they represented

…rape under orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide. (MacKinnon, 1994, pp. 11–12)

After the conflict, evidence indicated that these rape camps were planned, organized, and encouraged by Serbian military and political leaders (Salzman, 2000). Another reason suggested for why this strategy was implemented was that the rapes, particularly gang rapes, created a “brotherhood of guilt” that created and cemented bonds between Serbian soldiers and destroyed bonds of friendship that might have existed with their former Bosnian Muslim neighbors (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005; Snyder et al., 2006). Some Serbian soldiers later claimed they were threatened with death if they refused to participate in the assaults (Diken & Bagge Laustsen, 2005). Thus, the purpose of these rapes and the devastating consequences they caused show how effective rape can be as a weapon, as it “destroys life, it creates unwanted life, it causes catastrophe for communities, [and] strains cultures and religious beliefs…” (Neill, 2000, p .49).

3.3 Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), located on the western coast of Africa, has experienced devastating and prolonged conflict since 1996. Over this period, extreme violence, mass movements of refugees, and sexual violence have devastated the region (Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010; Steiner et al., 2009). The conflict began after violence spilled over from neighboring Rwanda. Home to a multitude of ethnic groups and cultures, as well as tremendous supplies of natural resources such as natural gas and minerals, the DRC became the center of a “world war” in Africa, as eight neighboring nations and a host of rebel groups scrambled to gain political and economic control of this region (Leatherman, 2011, p. 121). Since the start of the conflict, human rights organizations estimate over five million people have died, and several hundred thousand women and girls were raped (Bastick et al., 2007; Steiner et al., 2009).

Of particular note for the sexual violence in the DRC was the brutality of the attacks. The use of gang rape was particularly widespread, with an average of 4.5 assailants per victim (Meger, 2010). The use of torture, branding, and mutilation were also employed, with instruments such as bayonets, guns, or sticks often used to penetrate a victim’s vagina (Leatherman, 2011). Stories also circulated of women being shot in the vagina after being raped, thereby “literally blowing her genitals apart” (Meger, 2010, p. 126). Men and boys were also targeted, with reports that thousands were raped or sexually brutalized through acts such as beating genitalia with rifles (Bastick et al., 2007). The consequences of this violence have been devastating. Many victims become HIV positive as a result of their attacks or are perceived to be infected by others and are thereby shunned by their spouses and communities (Trenholm et al., 2011). The conflict destroyed infrastructure and public health resources, meaning many victims lack access to any medical care (Hynes, 2004; Steiner et al., 2009). This lack of proper medical care means they lack access to care that would prevent unwanted pregnancy or treat sexually transmitted disease or commonly seen trauma-related injuries such as fistulas, or a rupture between a woman’s vagina and rectum or bladder (Leatherman, 2011; Steiner et al., 2009).

The violence has not been constrained to one faction or group; rather, multiple groups have employed sexual violence against civilian populations (Leatherman, 2011). Researchers conducting interviews with soldiers in the region found that many claimed they raped women as a way of feeling masculine of fulfilling the ideals of the “sexually potent fighter” (Baaz & Stern, 2009, p. 505). Many asserted that their rapes were acts of lust that resulted from frustrated sexual desire. Other soldiers ascribed their behavior to their cultural belief that raping a virgin provided magical powers and invincibility (Bastick et al., 2007). Other scholars noted that the DRC had a long history of subordinating women in political, legal, and cultural spheres. For instance, DRC law requires a married woman to obtain her husband’s permission to sell property or open a bank account and if a single woman is raped, the victim is often forced by her family to marry her assailant (Leatherman, 2011; Meger, 2010). Thus, during times of conflict, sexual violence is a natural extension of the usual maltreatment of women but also serves as a grave insult to the masculine identities of enemy soldiers for their inability to protect “their” women (Meger, 2010, p. 130).

Finally, many scholars argue that the use of sexual violence in DRC has been a “systematic means of terrorizing the civilian populations” as a way to promote mass movements and destabilize the region (Meger, 2010, p. 126). In particular, the warring factions have competed for access to the vast mineral resources located in the eastern part of the DRC. These areas have seen the most intense violence and destruction. For instance, in the region of North Kivu, over 80 % of all structures, such as schools, homes, and churches, were destroyed (Leatherman, 2011). In South Kivu, the sexual violence was particularly pronounced and brutal, with over 100,000 women estimated to have been raped (Bastick et al., 2007; Steiner et al., 2009). Thus, it seems political and military forces, who often receive aid and support from multinational corporations in Europe and North America, realized that creating instability in a resource-rich environment could provide access to such resources, thereby enriching and empowering themselves (Leatherman, 2011). One particularly method used by these groups to accomplish this has been sexual violence, which, as Meger (2010) notes, “is an effective tool of both symbolic and physical subjugation and social disorder” (p. 131). Thus, it seems sexual violence is also employed as part of an economic agenda to secure access to desired resources in the DRC.

4 When Does Sexual Violence Not Happen?

In reviewing this chapter, there may be the temptation to assume that sexual violence is endemic in all conflicts or that there is no hope for ever ending this cruelty and suffering. However, as noted by structural and social constructionist theorists above, not all soldiers participate in sexual violence and not all civilians become victims. Additionally, not all conflicts contain sexual violence. For instance, regional conflicts between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Israel/Palestine have featured continuous and severe violence. However, incidents of sexual violence have been low in both conflicts (Wood, 2006, 2009). In reviewing conflicts, it seems the internal discipline of the military unit, the ability of the military leadership to exhibit effective leadership, the level of idealism within the group, and the need of the group for civilian support and/or international support and aid all seem to play a part in whether a military group discourages or utilizes sexual violence (Wood, 2006, 2009). This not only provides hope that sexual violence is not a natural or necessary part of war but also provides grounds for holding those who engage in it fully responsible for their actions (Wood, 2009).