Keywords

Introduction

The advent of the Arab Spring in the Middle East created dramatic changes to the face of the region. The results of these revolutionary movements yielded great pain towards regression. The region is arguably in one of the most turbulent times in its modern history. It is fitting that experts in this field express we are living in the era of the Post-Arab Spring. Although there is an increase in the usage of the internet and an expansion of connectivity to Cyber-Democracy platforms, authoritarian regimes, media players, foreign powers, and private individuals continue to repress the flourishing of these platforms to discourage progress.

Many shared a genuine hope for change in the Middle East, but this sentiment has now dissipated. At the onset of the Arab Spring experts saw with great anticipation the pinnacle of a 15-year process that showcased the revolutionary dimension of Cyber-Democracy in the Middle East. What sparked the call to action for the Arab Spring was the self-immolation of a Tunisian vegetable vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010. Bouazizi’s story immediately became publicized throughout the region through social media and more importantly on television. As images and live video became viral showing crowds taking to the streets in Tunisia to protest and topple the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime in January 2011, Arab public opinion, or The Arab Street, began to believe that change was possible.

As events unfolded, change appeared to sweep in some of the most solid authoritative Arab regimes. The Arab Street had enough of socioeconomic disparity, lack of participation in government, and nepotism in the political and economic sphere. As a result, Hosni Mubarak fell in Egypt, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was assassinated in the streets, and a civil war began in Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria. Unfortunately for the states mentioned, all have become volatile. Since 2011, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was toppled by a military coup in July 2013 leaving a similar autocratic government in place with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as president. In Libya, civil war persists and the country continues to exist as a failed state. Syria continues to see horrific strife in an ongoing civil war which has left tremendous collateral damage, a massive refugee crisis, and an open playing field for competing regional and international powers. The impact of the Arab Spring was so severe on Syria that it opened the door for the merger of two militant extremist Islamic groups: the al-Nusra front in Syria with the neighboring Iraqi militant group, The Islamic State of Iraq. These two groups formed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria or commonly known as ISIS. Combined, ISIS committed itself to fighting the Assad Regime and spreading its influence across the region. ISIS has taken its fight beyond the borders of its “caliphate.” In November 2015 the group launched a coordinated terrorist attack in Paris and bombings in Beirut.

The Arab Street continues to observe events unfolding in the Post-Arab Spring leaving them to question the sustainability of democracy in the region. Recent public opinion polling, notably by the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller and Northwestern University in Qatar, is showing The Arab Street to be considerably unsure about the future prospects of the stability and reliability of democracy in their respective contexts. Although these surveys show that there is healthy growth in internet usage and social media platforms, the prospects of facilitating increased Cyber-Democracy is still in question. They also show the same issues that promoted the Arab Spring are once again at the forefront. The difference today is that the opponents of democratic change are better positioned to stunt the growth of the possibility for revolution.

This analysis aims to answer the question: Is Cyber-Democracy showing progress or regression in the context of the Post-Arab Spring? As it stands, the reality of the situation in the Middle East is that the development of Cyber-Democracy still continues to grow, but the results of the Arab Spring overwhelming led to regression. In order to present this conclusion, the intention here is to uncover the reasons for regression; analyze two case studies, Egypt and Tunisia; showcase the dynamics of The Arab Street as discovered in recent polls; and to finally discuss the concept of illiberalism in the context of an Arab Democracy. To conclude, this chapter will look at future challenges and potential prospects for Cyber-Democracy in the Middle East .

Regression Post-Arab Spring

State Reactions After the Arab Spring

The outcome of the Post-Arab Spring created a different reality for Cyber-Democracy platforms. Its effects offer a double-edged sword for an uptrend of democracy in the region. On the one hand, the accessibility of these platforms is available, but governments in the region are mobilizing to counterrevolutionary trends. Moroccan physician and blogger, Hisham al-Miraat, explains to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) that:

The Arab Spring has had two consequences…It showed that you can change things in your country, but it was also a wake-up call to those governments – it was a paradigm shift in the online world. Before, those governments thought the Internet could not undermine the structures they had spent centuries building. But the Internet is ubiquitous; you can’t just shut it down. (Radsch 2015)

Al-Miraat’s conclusions are justified because many governments in the region made internet accessibility a top priority through internal technology development programs when the internet first emerged. Unfortunately, the consequences of the revolutions enabled governments in the region to move against Cyber-Democracy platforms (Xavier and Campbell 2014, pp. 155–156).

In Egypt, the Mubarak government made information and communications technology (ICT) a strategic priority since 1999 (Freedom House 2015, p. 270). From 1993 to 2008, internet control was relaxed, but as online campaigns exposed government repression, the state police during 2008–2011 conducted surveillance, censorship, and cyberattacks against opposition groups – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom House 2014, p. 260). Even after the Arab Spring, restrictions and surveillance continues to be a major factor in hindering free speech in Egypt. Although a new constitution guarantying freedom of speech was passed in a referendum in 2014, concerns are still present over vague provisions allowing the government to censor free speech in certain cases. In addition, telecommunications services have repeatedly been suspended in the Sinai Peninsula where military operations take place (Freedom House 2014, p. 259). In August 2015, an antiterrorism law was enacted and has created fears that provisions within the law can be used against online activists and critics of the government. A cybercrime law is also in the works of being ratified by the president which criminalizes a broad spectrum of potential online offenses. Lastly, journalists and online activists continue to face imprisonment or are serving sentences for allegedly opposing the state (Freedom House 2015, p. 268).

Tunisia’s story is different from Egypt in relation to the internet’s introduction to the Post-Arab Spring. The internet was publically launched in Tunisia in 1996 and broadband was made available in 2003. The internet landscape during the Ben Ali era was extensively restricted despite having built a relatively advanced infrastructure and a developed telecommunications market. The restriction efforts of the regime developed Tunisia’s online reputation as being an “internet enemy.” Despite its reputation, Tunisia made great strides in creating a freer internet. Few cases of online restrictions have been documented in Tunisia following the revolution, although the judiciary continues to impede in this area. In 2012 Tunisia joined a coalition of governments focused on advancing internet freedom and hosted the third Freedom Online Conference in 2013. Finally, with the passing of the new constitution in 2014, protection of free speech is guaranteed and prior censorship is banned, but there are still several laws from the Ben Ali era that continue to test the validity of the freedoms offered in the constitution (Freedom House 2014, p. 783).

Throughout the region, several governments have enacted legislation limiting the ability for independent journalist or freedom activists to utilize the internet. Many states have enacted cybercrime laws to counter the use of the internet through the justification of protecting the state against terrorism. As a result, according to the CPJ, over 30 online journalists were arrested in the Arab Middle East in 2014 under vague provisions of cybercrime and antiterrorism laws. In the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the cybercrime law was updated to “make it illegal to defame the government or injure its representation” (Radsch 2015). Monitoring and surveillance measures have been established in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Under these laws, news websites and blogs must register with the state. Similar laws are in place in other Gulf Arab countries like Kuwait and Qatar. In Kuwait, a law has been proposed to allow authorities to block or shut down the internet without reason. Qatar passed a cybercrime law in September 2014 which grants the government authority to impose fines and prison sentences for publishing content that violate social values (Radsch 2015).

It is evident that states in the region are aware of the effectiveness of Cyber-Democracy platforms. There are more examples proving that governments in the region are taking more provocative steps to thwart the threat of Cyber-Democracy platforms. In most cases in the region, governments have used the excuse of countering terror threats in order to have more control over the internet. Despite these challenges, later sections in this discussion will show that restrictions on the internet are not necessarily unpopular with The Arab Street. Even though these measures have been enacted, the use of the internet continues to be a very important force in the region.

What Went Wrong with Cyber-Democracy After the Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring showcased the revolutionary dimension of Cyber-Democracy in a manner appearing to encourage democratization in a region heavily entrenched in autocracy. Cyber-Democracy platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and media helped encourage a captive audience to believe that change was possible. The role Cyber-Democracy played during this time cannot be underestimated, but deeper analysis into the Arab Spring shows economic grievances created the basis for these revolutionary movements. As a result, media outlets like Al-Jazeera were at the forefront in broadcasting these events to the Arab Street. As public displays of protest were broadcasted region-wide, the Arab Street figured that if the self-immolation of a vegetable vendor could change the face of a nation in Tunisia then onlookers in other countries like Egypt could do the same (Xavier and Campbell 2014, pp. 157–161).

Arab media expert Marc Lynch implies media played a significant role in creating the trend toward regression for democratic transition in the Middle East (see Xavier and Campbell 2014, pp. 167–168). Lynch claims media organizations who proved to be catalyst for the revolutions in the region rapidly degenerated into serving the agendas of state authorities or political factions to counter democratic change. Consequently, the media “played a destructive role during the attempted transitions for three major reasons: political capture, the marketing of fear, and polarization” (Lynch 2015, p. 91). This claim is reinforced with Al-Jazeera specifically, seeing the station began supporting the interests of its state patron, Qatar. The Egyptian government also followed suit with this interpretation claiming that Al-Jazeera broadcasted with bias in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian Interior Ministry raided the station’s offices in Cairo in December 2013 and arrested several journalists on charges of spreading “rumors and false news” (El Deeb 2013). Although several activists were released in September 2015 including two key Al-Jazeera journalists, several are still incarcerated (Al-Jazeera 2015). Furthermore, as Lynch points out, “Al Jazeera came to be identified with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda, while other stations peddled wild, sensational stories that fed anti-Islamist anger and suspicion” (Lynch 2015, p. 93).

Broadcast media or television is still an important factor in the evolution of Cyber-Democracy in the Middle East. In relation to online activism in the region, if it were not for the launch of Qatari-based Al-Jazeera in 1996, Cyber-Democracy platforms may have developed at a slower pace (Xavier and Campbell 2014, pp. 151–153). The importance of Al-Jazeera is critical, for it offered its audience a narrative of the region’s current events without state-run bias. Prior to its inception, media in the region was primarily offered through the prism of the state’s agenda (Salvatore 2013, pp. 6–7).

As it relates to state media, Lynch explains that this sector continues to resist reform and serves the interest of the state or elite patrons. For broadcast media, new television stations emerging on the media scene tailor their content according to the political interests of their patrons. Limited reform emerged in Morocco and Jordan, but these reforms yielded the marketing of constitutional reforms while adding to fears of horrific unrest. In Libya and Yemen, both failed states, local media also portrayed the bias of political factions which created further “polarization, fear, and insecurity” (Lynch 2015, p. 96). The national media sphere effectively spiraled backwards to their prerevolutionary positions, detracting democratic evolution. As Lynch concludes, the state media maintained the traditional “rules of the game” leaving broadcast media and print media “in the hands of elites who had benefited from the old order and so feared change” (Lynch 2015, pp. 93–94).

Social media, a Cyber-Democracy platform, is another factor contributing to the regression of the revolutionary ambitions of the Arab Spring. Regression in this area continues to fester polarization and even isolation of political groups. Sadly, social media also served to enhance fear of democratization. Lynch adds that although social media is important, he makes the distinction that social media worked in tandem with broadcast media, thereby “forming a singular media ecology: Broadcast-media content circulated frequently via social media” (Lynch 2015, p. 92). Despite the Western focus on social media platforms during the Arab Spring, television still serves as the primary source of information for the Arab Street. Lynch states social media can create the call for activism, but it may not lead to democratization. It has helped isolate individuals into “informational clusters” where one’s ideology or political leaning is reinforced. Although these clusters are challenged by opposing clusters from time to time, they also create a false sense of unity in one’s respective political-ideological camp. In the context of the “social media Arab Street,” the extremist camp has benefited from this (Lynch 2015, p. 97). Finally, Lynch concludes that these realities “amplified extreme voices, gave wing to baleful rumors, and kept the center from holding” (Lynch 2015, p. 96).

The dichotomy of the Post-Arab Spring presented in this section is heavily focused on the dimension of Cyber-Democracy. Several other factors also contributed to the regression of the Arab Spring whether it be international responses, direct intervention by regional players, or involvement of Western powers. As Lynch’s argument relates to Cyber-Democracy, regression stems from platforms initially used during the Arab Spring and subsequently reversing the tide for change by conflicting agendas of elites and nonelite individuals. This calls to mind the dual nature of Cyber-Democracy impacting many who were more inclined to use these platforms for democratization. As polling data will show in the following section, the idea of nurturing Cyber-Democracy with the use of media or web-based platforms is struggling to capture the hearts and minds of the Arab Street (see Table 1).

Table 1 Internet and Facebook usage/penetration in the Middle East, Egypt, and Tunisia
Full size table

Surveys of the Arab Street

Understanding the perception of the Arab Street on Cyber-Democracy has produced unique findings on where the region is headed in the areas of the usage of platforms and how they are shaping opinions on the effectiveness towards democratization. This section will highlight two studies: (1) “Media Use in the Middle East: An Eight-Nation Survey by Northwestern University in Qatar (2013)” and (2) the “7th Annual Arab Youth Survey 2015” by ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller. Northwestern’s study focuses on data collected on media use (internet, television, and face-to-face interaction) in three geographic sectors of the Arab world: The Levant, North Africa, and the Gulf States. Within these sectors, the study focused on the following nations: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The study conducted 10,000 interviews, 90% face-to-face, in most of these countries. The ASDA’A Burson-Masteller Arab Youth Survey 2015 presents insight into “the concerns and aspirations of Arab youth, their views on the economy and the impact of the Arab Spring, their media consumption habits, and attitudes towards traditional values and the people who influence them” (p. 4). The survey conducted 3500 face-to-face interviews with Arab men and women ages 18–24 from January 20 to February 12, 2015, in 16 Arab countries. The countries surveyed were: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Media Use in the Middle East

Media use and perception in the Middle East is an area of study offering interesting results. The 2013 study conducted by Northwestern University in Qatar supported this conclusion by noting survey data offered paradoxes on media perception in the Middle East. On the one hand, media use continues to grow in the region, but attitudes on this subject are conflicting. Generally speaking, there is optimism in most countries on media credibility and quality, but in countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, media credibility shows less favor (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 8). The study maintains that the most important platform for media is television with Al-Jazeera being the top source for news in the region. An overwhelming majority of adults (98%) in the Middle East watch television (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 15). The survey highlights the importance of interpersonal interactions when it comes to obtaining information in the Middle East, and it is a point in this discussion that deserves proper attention. To briefly summarize, the survey states:

While commentators in the west decry the intrusion of the internet on interpersonal communication and the death of conversation, this is assuredly not the case in the Arab world, where interpersonal communication continues to play a powerful role–even in online communication (social communication online is the most popular activity reported by those in the survey). (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 95)

The internet is the second most used media platform in the Middle East. The internet is used roughly 3 h a day in the home and is heavily used in the Gulf Arab States. Online usage has developed a generation gap where “82% of people under the age of 25 use the internet, compared to only 37% of those over 45” (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 11). In total, over 66% of all adults use the internet. By comparison: 91% of adults use the internet in the UAE, 86% in Qatar, 82% in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; whereas, 22% of Egyptians and 46% of Jordanians use the internet (Dennis et al. 2013 p. 17). Roughly 75% of online users in the Middle East use wireless devices (smartphones and laptops) to access the internet (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 11). Social networking is widespread with online users in the region. Facebook is the most popular social media platform, although other platforms are gaining ground. New strides have been made in closing the language gap with online usage, and Arabic has surpassed English on most online media platforms in the region (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 8). Adults on the internet in the Middle East use a variety of different online media sources for new consumption, namely within the Arab language sphere and Western media outlets. In the countries surveyed over 55% use Arab websites for regional news while 35% use Western sources. For news concerning Europe and America, 34% of adults use Arab websites and 29% use Western websites (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 36).

The emphasis on sources for news and current events are spread across different platforms. Television is still the top source for news where 83% of adults access it. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon are the most reliant on television for news and current events. Interpersonal sources, namely family and friends, are second where 72% of adults rely on this source for information. Over 65% of adults see the internet as an important source for news which surpasses newspapers at 53% and radio at 47%. In Qatar, 70% of adults use internet sources for news and find it more important than television (58%). This is a striking trend seeing that Al-Jazeera, a Qatari news broadcaster, is the most important source for news in the region. Age demographics show that television is prominent with all age groups, but print media and radio show a divergence. The older generation is more likely to use these platforms for information while the younger generation (74% under the age of 25) gravitates towards digital media for information (Dennis et al. 2013, pp. 24–25). News consumption is utilized both at the local and international levels. Although local news is the most sought after by 73% of adults, regional (53%) and international (43%) are equally important and are also followed. The Gulf States tend to follow regional and international news respectively; Egyptians and Tunisians are far more interested in national news over regional or international news (Dennis et al. 2013, p. 34).

Understanding the effectiveness of online political development is lagging with people surveyed in the Middle East. Generally speaking, the internet is viewed as an effective tool for political development, yet in the Middle East, this sentiment is being tested. On cosmetic subjects such as technology, life issues, and consumer goods, the public views that the internet is very effective in influencing opinions. On the political front, 49% of adults find that the internet will enable them to have more say in their government. Within that sample, 48% believe that the internet will provide them with more political influence on their government. Despite this, most people believe that the internet does provide for better understanding of politics. Polling in Saudi Arabia displays more optimistic opinions on the effectiveness of the internet on politics. Over 71% of Saudis believe that the internet provides for a better understanding of politics. In addition, 63% of Saudis feel that the internet will give the public more influence on politics (Dennis et al. 2013, pp. 59–60).

Opinions on regulation of the internet offers paradoxes highlighted in the study. As it relates to the freedom of expression on the internet, 61% of adults in the Middle East believe that it is acceptable to voice their opinions online even if they are unpopular. In contrast to this opinion, 50% of adults in the Middle East believe that there should be more regulation over the internet, yet 51% feel that there is not enough awareness of present regulation on the internet today. The study presents that support for increased regulation on the internet is strong in Saudi Arabia (62%), Lebanon (64%), Qatar (57%), and Tunisia (52%). Confidence in expressing opinions about politics on the internet is low where 47% of adults in the region believe it is safe to express their opinions on the internet. Age disparities also emerge in the survey. Most young people in the Middle East are trusting of the internet than older adults. Half of adults under 25 believe it is safe to voice their opinions online while 41% of adults 45 and older agree. This example also transmits to political advocacy, 48% of young adults are likely to advocate for online political freedom whereas 41% of adults 45 and older are willing to do the same. Finally, 55% of adults under the age of 25 and 45% of adults 45 and older favor increased online regulation in their country (Dennis et al. 2013, pp. 55–56).

The Legacy of the Arab Spring on Arab Youth

The Arab Spring left a tremendous impact on the youth of the Middle East. Presenting the findings of the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey offers insight into how the youth of the Middle East see the course of Arab Spring unfolding. The sentiment surrounding democratization in the Middle East is summarized with uncertainty from the youth. Overall, the breakdown of the findings concludes that democracy in the region is still facing challenges. The youth in the Middle East are cautiously optimistic about future prospects in their respective countries. The UAE continues to be the favored model for emulation for the fourth year in a row. Lastly, on the media front, although digital media is making ground, youth in the Middle East prefer to seek information on current events from television (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, pp. 6–7).

When asked if the Middle East is better off after the Arab Spring, youth in the Middle East responded with uncertainty almost rejecting the notion that democracy could work in the region. Confidence in the outcome of the Arab Spring has been declining since 2012. Polling showed that in 2012, 72% of youth agreed that the Arab World was better off after the Arab Spring. These numbers start to decline in 2013 to 70%, in 2014 to 54%, and again in 2015 to 38%. In regards to being better off in 5 years after the uprisings, 41% felt they would be in 2015, 51% in 2014, 74% in 2013, and 71% in 2012. In response to the statement “democracy will never work in the region,” 39% agreed with the statement while 36% disagreed and 25% were not sure. When looking at countries individually negative opinions on democracy working in the region were shared by a majority in Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Tunisia (46%). On the other hand, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, UAE, and Palestine were optimistic about democracy working in the region (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, p. 8).

The youth is very concerned about the threat of ISIS, and most are not confident that their governments can deal with the group. Over 73% of Arab youth are concerned with the group’s growing influence where 37% believe that it is the region’s greatest obstacle. Although collectively 47% believe that their governments cannot deal with the group, confidence is strong in places like Algeria (83%) and to a lesser degree in the Gulf Arab states where 60% of respondents believe their governments can deal with ISIS. Unlike the Gulf States, Lebanon is the leading country in the region that believes (77%) its government cannot deal with the ISIS threat (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, p. 10).

Despite security, economic and political concerns, youth in the region are cautiously optimistic about the future. Looking at the three subregions in the Middle East, 83% of Gulf Arab youth, 57% of North Africans, and 29% in the Levant believe that their country is headed in the right direction. In terms of general optimism, 67% in the region believe the future will be better while 26% believe the past was better. Approximately 70% of Gulf and North African respondents believe the future will be better while 57% feel the same way in the Levant (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, p. 14).

The United Arab Emirates is the favored place to live among Arab youth. Known as an economic marvel, the UAE leaves a great impact on the Arab youth. Its appeal surpasses western countries like the United States, Germany, and Canada. When presented a list of 20 countries, over 20% want to live in the UAE, 13% in the United States, and 10% in Germany and Canada. On the point of emulation, 22% want to see their country become like the UAE, 15% like the United States, and Germany 11%. The study concludes that the popularity of the UAE is largely due to expected continued economic growth and the perception that the Emirates encourages an environment for young Arabs to achieve one’s full potential (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, p. 18).

Media use by Arab youth is consistent with most surveys of the region. Digital media continues to grow at a fast rate, but television is still a key source for media consumption. According to the survey “television remains the most popular source of news (60%), 40% of young Arabs get their news from online sources and 25% from social media” (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller 2015, p. 26). Social media makes strides as a growing platform for information, 91% of respondents visit a social media platform at least once a week. The largest consumer of social media in the Middle East is the Gulf.

The presentation of these surveys reveals the important dynamics of where the Arab Street stands after the Arab Spring. It is clear that the use of Cyber-Democracy platforms is playing a very critical role in accessing information. Social media and the internet are quickly rivaling television, but the power of news broadcasting still champions the media sphere. The surveys show that there are paradoxes in relating Cyber-Democracy platforms to the general favorability of democratization. Several issues may be contributing to this issue. First, the broadcasting of instability in countries where the Arab Spring took place is certainly on the mind of the Arab Street. As indicated, the optimism surrounding the Arab Spring in the initial years following it continues to slide consistently. Second, the Arab Street is also skeptical on the effectiveness of the internet on the political sphere citing that the internet is most reliable in matters of cosmetic subjects. This is revealed in the striking support for increased regulation on the internet as a whole. At the same time, it can also imply that the internet is more effective than the Arab Street is willing to admit. Noting Lynch’s conclusions, the “like-minded” knowledge clusters could be a potential reason for this. Third, it can be implied from the data that the Arab Street is seeking a stable political system over dealing with the challenges of developing democracy in their own countries. This is inferred from the consistent favorability of the young Arab Street wanting to emulate the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is ruled by a monarch, but given its economic success and offering the perception that it enables an individual to achieve his full potential, offers a very compelling argument that the Arab youth searches for these elements in their own societies. Despite these challenges, the use of Cyber-Democracy platforms can still be a vehicle for democratization in the future.

Egypt and Tunisia

Egypt and Tunisia provide a good example of comparison as it relates to the revolutionary movements that took place in their respective contexts. Comparing Egypt and Tunisia offers insight into two separate paths of political development. Overall Tunisia is heralded as a bumpy success story while Egypt is viewed as a democratic failure despite maintaining limited stability. Politically, both countries saw the rise of Islamist parties emerge to power after their revolutions – the Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Both parties were founded by the same political ideology, but the divergence on the orthodoxy of that ideology became apparent in developing their party programs in their respective political systems. Interestingly, Tunisia’s Ennahda became suspicious of the Muslim Brotherhood as they carefully watched events unfold in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, maintained its ideological platform to its detriment and was overthrown by a military coup in 2013.

The catalyst for change in both countries was fueled by similar reasons, consequently protests in Tunisia subsequently influenced protests in Egypt. Motivations for change in both countries were driven primarily by economic grievances rather than political ideals. The two countries diverge in respect to the demographics of the protestors. In Egypt, the protestors were mainly from the middle class whereas in Tunisia the protestors were a broad-class coalition. Protestors with middle-class occupations accounted for 55% in Egypt and 30% in Tunisia. Demonstrators representing workers, students, and the unemployed accounted for 19% in Egypt, yet in Tunisia they accounted for 57%. Age demographics were also different; in Egypt they were primarily middle-aged while in Tunisia they were significantly younger. Lastly, civil society associations such as the Muslim Brotherhood played a greater role in Egypt than they did in Tunisia (Beissinger et al. 2015).

Political Progression in Tunisia

The political progression in Tunisia was effected by regional developments which in turn guided internal dynamics for a more inclusive political system. In essence, since the revolution in 2011, Tunisia can be considered a fragile, yet genuine Arab democracy (Marks 2015, p. 1). To expand on this claim one must understand the internal dynamics Tunisia faced in its postrevolutionary context. Although Ennahda emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood’s school of Islamism, it never held real power in the Tunisian political sphere before the revolution. The party was banned in the country forcing many of its members to flee aboard. This is a stark contrast from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood seeing that it had played a role in the Egyptian political and social sphere for many years prior to the revolution. Ennahda, on the other hand, reentered Tunisian politics as a result of the revolution. From the onset, Ennahda was looked at through the prism of the Muslim Brotherhood, and there was fear the movement would popularize jihadism and promote an Egyptian-style Islamist state (Marks 2015, p. 2).

Monica Marks from the University of Oxford correctly maintains that regional developments such as the rise of ISIS, the Egyptian Military Coup of 2013, and local challenges effected Ennahda’s behavior. Marks concludes “the primary effect of these developments forced Ennahda into a defensive posture, narrowing its range of political maneuver” (Marks 2015, p. 1). Having rejoined the political scene and winning a plurality in the 2011 elections, Ennahda was aware of the suspicion it faced from the opposition. In reaction to this, the Islamists created a cross-coalition government with secular parties. In conducting interviews with Ennahda members (Nahdawis), she was amazed to discover a majority of Nahdawis did not view the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as the political model they wanted to follow. In contrast, the Nahdawis were more interested in emulating the Turkish Islamist party AK Parti or even the German Christian Democrats. Finally, the idea of creating a theocratic regime like Iran or Saudi Arabia was also viewed as a nonoption.

This sentiment was shared by the Ennahda president, Rached Ghannouchi. In her interview with Ghannouchi, Marks points out that he was careful to avoid mentioning the Muslim Brotherhood, but instead he validated the Turkish model stating the “AK Parti will gradually make Turkey a more Muslim country…Through education, building the economy, and diversifying the media. That’s our model – not law. Make people love Islam, don’t coerce them” (Marks 2015, p. 3). Effectively, as Marks says, the Nahdawis began to view themselves as more enlightened than their Muslim Brotherhood contemporaries. Criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood was prevalent with Nahdawis to the degree of frustration. They felt that events unfolding in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood at the helm was impeding on the success of Ennahda in Tunisia. Moreover, Ghannouchi addressed Cairo in October 2013 and warned Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood of enacting a “democracy of the majority,” concluding that power must be balanced, and that diverse societies must accept diversity or face chaos (Marks 2015, p. 4).

Ennahda also faced another headwind with extremist Islamist factions within the political sphere. Youth in Tunisia were being influenced by Salafi jihadism, an aggressive and violent form of Islamism, through online content emerging from the Gulf States. Consequently, over 3,000 Tunisians were fighting in Syria for ISIS. The Salafist movement in the view of Ennahda was bewildering. Ennahda leadership viewed this segment as a misguided trend among the youth resulting from marginalization from the eras of Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba. Ennahda argued that weakening the Zaytouna, a historic center of religious learning, during the Ben Ali and Bourguiba eras created a vacuum for extremist Islamism to be propagated among the youth. Ennahda reacted to this trend by reviving the Zaytouna so that they could bring the Salafi youth into the fold of progressive discussion to thwart their views. This created a generation gap between the youth and their parents who were more inclined to follow the gradualist approach of Islamism rather than their Salafi-influenced children (Marks 2015, p. 5).

Support for Ennahda declined after the revolution as terrorism was intensified by Salafi jihadists. Attacks carried out during 2012 and 2013 led Ennahda to declare the largest Salafist Jihadi group, Ansar Al-Sharia, a terrorist organization. In addition to its declaration, Ennahda began revisiting Ben Ali era measures to crackdown on the group. These measures were heavily criticized as being too soft on the Salafists by the opposition leftist party Nidaa Tunis. As a result of the breakdown in the security situation and Ennahda’s willingness to include the opposition, the Nidaa Tunis party – a party consisting of “leftists, business elites, and officials from the Bourguiba and Ben Ali Regimes” – won parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 2014 (Marks 2015, p. 7).

The victory of Nidaa Tunis was not solely centered on security issues. Ennahda’s approach to changing regional dynamics, namely ISIS in Syria and the coup in Egypt, directed the party towards inclusion of the opposition. The Egyptian coup was especially at the forefront during the drafting of the new Tunisian constitution in 2013. Initially, Ennahda attempted lustration against the opposition, but protests in the streets led to a retraction of support for this measure by the party leadership. Fortunately, the constitution was passed and power was temporarily handed to a technocratic caretaker government. This change in rhetoric by Ennahda did not come easily. Rached Ghannouchi is mainly credited for convincing members of his party to accept an abandonment of lustration and open the playing field for other parties. Ghannouchi feared that if his party was not willing to bend, the revolution could be reversed. He stressed that Tunisia was in a period of transitional politics (Marks 2015, pp. 9–10).

The Tunisian case offers an example of a transition in politics which is in line with the needs of its political context. It proves that internal dynamics while being influenced by external dynamics impacted the transition for democracy in Tunisia. The discussion presented on Tunisia offers a key conclusion; it is a model for progression. The leadership of the Ennahda party maintained a progressive approach during the transition, for had they taken the approach of their Muslim Brotherhood cousins in Egypt, progression may have been reversed. Tunisia’s democracy is still fragile. Several issues continue to dominate the political scene. Unemployment is still a factor, and security concerns following the terrorist attacks on the beach resort in Sousse and the Bardo National Museum in 2015 are still in play. Regional issues like the civil war in Syria and increasing terrorist activity of ISIS will also continue to impact extremist factions in Tunisia, yet it may conversely encourage the country to stay the course towards sustained democracy to avoid carnage domestically.

Political Regression in Egypt

The Egyptian case offers a basis for democratic regression in the political system. In comparison to its Ennahda cousins, the Muslim Brotherhood’s inability to moderate its ideology or make compromises led to its downfall. The fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011 yielded a 2-year rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt until it was overthrown in July 2013. The revolution in 2011 left Egypt in an uneasy power arrangement partnering military, security, and political institutions in a “power triangle” (Kandil 2014). This uneasy arrangement left the security apparatus falling behind the military while the political sphere was open to negotiation with the Brotherhood seeking to present itself as the best option for governing to the others. Despite appeasing both sides, the Brotherhood swiftly moved to seize control of the revolution and left little for the other ends of the triangle to participate in developing the state. Consequently, the opposition became solidified and moved against the Brotherhood to regain control (Kandil 2014).

In 2013, Reuters conducted interviews with politicians, youth activists, diplomats, and military officials in Egypt. The news agency uncovered that initially the Muslim Brotherhood was not interested in taking control of the government. It was viewed among Brotherhood members that Egypt was not ready for the Muslim Brotherhood to govern and that one political actor could not rule alone . After the Brotherhood allied with smaller Islamist parties, it gained control of the parliament, and the party quickly realized it still did not have the power to make legislative changes. This left some Brotherhood members frustrated and created the momentum to call for control of the presidency. The sentiment was encouraged by younger members. Despite objection from the Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, the young element headed to social media to promote the idea of seeking the presidential nomination. Opposition for the measure was still fierce for the reason of creating suspicion. After intense debate and several rounds of votes, a slim majority of members voted in favor of running a candidate for the presidency (Blair et al. 2013).

The debate over the candidacy was also an uphill battle. The Brotherhood sought two respected pro-Mubarak judges as candidates, but they declined. Khairat El-Shater, the deputy leader of the Brotherhood, was disqualified as a candidate due to his criminal record, and finally the choice was given to Muhammad Morsi. According to interviews by Reuters, Morsi was reluctant in accepting the position. Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafik, a former air force general and final loyal prime minister of Mubarak by a thin majority. Shafik was hated by liberals and leftists, and as a result, they supported Morsi. Their support for Morsi was reinforced by promises of participation in the new government and drafting the new constitution. Despite these promises, the development of the constitution created clashes with secular parties and civil society groups alike. Dissatisfaction on the points of the constitution were centered on “ambiguous wording on freedom of expression, and the absence of explicit guarantees of the rights of women, Christians and non-government organizations” (Blair et al. 2013). In addition, Morsi circumvented the judiciary by declaring the constitutional assembly was above judicial review along with the president. Seeing that the judiciary was filled by Mubarak appointees, Morsi feared that they would attempt to undo the Brotherhood’s political gains. The entire process to develop the constitution also shunned members of Morsi’s own party. Ignoring warnings from his own staff, many in the Brotherhood hierarchy concluded that Morsi was far too self-confident in his approach.

From December 2012 to the late spring of 2013 demonstrations in the streets voiced disapproval of the moves made by the Morsi government. In the meantime, the military maintained neutrality as it did during the first revolution. In the early days of the new presidency, Morsi removed top generals in the military to strengthen his influence over the organization. Consequently, the same general that Morsi appointed as commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, would become the new president of Egypt following the coup in the Summer of 2013. According to the Reuters report, members in the military claimed that Morsi made a critical miscalculation in appointing al-Sisi. The military was happy to see the old-guard retired and allowed it to happened, but they still looked at Morsi with great suspicion. In January 2013 the military warned that unrest in the country would lead to collapse and it maintained itself as the “‘solid and cohesive block’ on which the state rests” (Blair et al. 2013).

The economic situation in Egypt was also crumbling. The military had effectively left the economy in shambles during its interim rule following the revolution. Energy prices were rising, and the state’s efforts to subsidize costs in the domestic sphere were becoming limited. Moreover, regional financial support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was significantly reduced due to Brotherhood opposition to the Gulf Monarchies. Qatar and Turkey were still offering support to the Morsi government, but this was not enough. Loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were also considered, but this was rejected by the military during its interim rule. The military feared that taking a loan from the IMF would spark more protests. Finally, chances of getting a loan diminished after Morsi issued the constitutional decree. Time had run out for the Muslim Brotherhood. They began blaming pro-Mubarak elements in the country for inciting economic strife, but these accusations fell on deaf ears leading Egyptians to blame the Brotherhood government. As protests raged on, the military took decisive action in overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood.

Interestingly, there were attempts by factions in Egypt to avoid a disintegration of the government prior to the military coup. Reuters uncovered through its interviews that efforts were made in the final days of the Muslim Brotherhood regime to salvage the situation. In the month leading to the coup, two chief power brokers, Amr Moussa, a former Mubarak era foreign minister and secular nationalist politician, and Khairat El-Shater met at the home of liberal politician Ayman Nour to avoid collapse (Blair et al. 2013). According to Moussa, El-Shater claimed the “government’s problems were due to the ‘non-cooperation of the ‘deep state’ – the entrenched interests in the army, the security services, some of the judiciary and the bureaucracy” (Blair et al. 2013). Moussa concluded after his meeting with El-Shater that the Muslim Brotherhood was not willing to change and that they were “over-confident, incompetent in government and had poor intelligence on what was brewing in the streets and the barracks” (Blair et al. 2013). After the overthrow of Morsi, a court in Egypt in the summer of 2014 dissolved the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood from participating in parliamentary elections, only allowing Brotherhood candidates to run independently or form a new party. The government also designated the group as a terrorist organization after allegations that the group incited violence and had links to jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula. In addition, the new constitution does not allow political parties to be formed on a religious basis (BBC, August 9, 2014).

Identifying these case studies offers insight into the initial developments of Arab democracy in Egypt and Tunisia. The key difference that separates these two cases is the manner in which political elites reacted to the changing political environment. For the Tunisian Ennahda, accepting the risk of making compromises and allowing for competition among political parties aided in maintaining the goals of the revolution. Repression of plurality in the political sphere could not be accepted because it would reject the efforts of the revolution itself. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood believed its power was consolidated. With this in mind, the Brotherhood was not willing to accept that they mismanaged the political and economic situation in Egypt. As presented, the opposition was even willing to provide olive branches to the Brotherhood in order to hold the country together, but the Brotherhood would not accept this as option. The end result was a military coup. The military and opposition factions determined that the stability of Egypt was more critical than seeing the Muslim Brotherhood lead the country to total collapse. To conclude, both cases present value in serving as a model for future development of democratic systems in Arab countries.

Testing Liberalism in the Middle East

Liberalism and democracy are thought to go hand in hand in the West, but as the Arab world begins to experiment with democracy on its own, this concept is being tested. Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, conducted extensive research of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, and he has uncovered that Islamist movements are proving to be illiberal. Hamid presents that the disconnection with the West is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of where religion plays in Middle East. In emphasizing this point, Hamid quotes the former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh: “Today those who call themselves liberals or leftists, this is just a political name, but most of them understand and respect Islamic values. They support the sharia and are no longer against it” (Hamid: May 6, 2014a). Furthermore, Western democracy developed on the foundation of liberal ideals. In the context of Arab democracies, reverse democratization is unfolding where democracy is the foundation for Islamism.

What is a liberal democracy? The discussion of this topic could fill volumes, but to briefly touch upon the subject, liberal democracy is practiced primarily in the West. It is a representative political system which allows for free and fair elections, the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic freedoms and liberties such as speech, religion, assembly, and property. Following the Arab Spring, illiberal democracy emerged and “The developing world saw democratically elected leaders using popular mandates to infringe upon basic liberties” (Hamid: May 6, 2014a). Even though elections in places like Egypt and Tunisia were free and fair, the ruling parties attempted to directly impact the political system in way that would weaken opposition to its mandate. As explained in previous sections, the ruling parties attempted to manipulate the existing political system so that it would solidify its power for future cycles.

In the past, the general consensus on Islamist parties was that they would have to moderate their ideology once they would be at the helm of state affairs. Hamid concludes that the opposite is true; democratization does not have a moderating effect on Islamist parties and it does not downplay the importance of their ideology. Hamid references the first Egyptian and Tunisian constitutions as being innately contrary to the values found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Where Western and Arab liberals would undoubtedly agree that there are fundamental universal rights, Islamists reject this. From the Islamist perspective, “The will of the people, particularly when it coincides with the will of God, takes precedence over any presumed international human-rights norms” (Hamid: May 6, 2014a).

Islamists, however, cannot be held solely responsible for the promulgation of their ideological program. The illiberal consensus Hamid speaks of is shared by the mainstream. Islamists are not necessarily committed to introducing a new social order; instead, they are utilizing the state to promote and expand upon standards which the mainstream already holds. Hamid states: “Even those Islamists who have little interest in legislating morality see the state as a promoter of a certain set of religious and moral values” (Hamid: May 6, 2014a). In this regard, Hamid points out, initially the Muslim Brotherhood focused on the individual. The concept focused on the development of future generations to influence the political process through a gradual approach, but the advent of the Arab Spring left this model vastly underdeveloped yielding a sense of urgency to manage the political system from the onset. The development process was short, and it left the Muslim Brotherhood to focus on maintaining power.

Hamid stresses Islamists were interested in using democratic platforms to further their program while maintaining it through the democratic process. Islamist illiberalism was showcased particularly when it faced crises, and rather than moderate their positions, they chose to blame the opposition or call for elections to maintain their mandate. On this point, Hamid makes the comparison to European democratization and how parties like the Christian Democrats had to moderate their positions in order to succeed in elections. For Islamists, moderation is not needed because Islam itself is not a point of contention within the Arab political context. Hamid further expands on this by revealing that the political spectrum in the Egypt and Tunisia respectively shifted to the right. In quoting a senior Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood official, Hamid highlights that as freedom in the political sphere expands, the public consistently chooses Islam. Furthermore, Hamid concludes “Freedom and Islamization were not opposed but rather went hand in hand” (Hamid: May 6, 2015).

The rise of the Islamist militant group ISIS has called into question whether Islamist groups are heading towards this trend. Hamid notes that most Islamists do not fit into the jihadist camp. They are generally members of mainstream movements like the Muslim Brotherhood whose aim is to work within the system to promote Islamic values: “Islamists do not necessarily harken back to seventh century Arabia” (Hamid: October 1, 2015). Although Islamist may reject the tenets of Salafism, defined above, Islamism itself does not require Islamists to put forward its aims. Hamid cites Indonesia and Malaysia where elements of sharia law are more heavily represented than in the context of their Arab contemporaries. Sharia ordinances in the context of Malaysia and Indonesia have been implemented by secular parties themselves and are met with little resistance from the public. (Hamid: October 1, 2015). This continues to fit into the narrative that Islam is a relevant feature of societies where the majority of the population follow the faith.

Minimizing the role of Islam (of radical Islam) in the political sphere is a major challenge. Even in the case of the Turkish Republic, founded by secular leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, showcased the rise of the Islamist movement (headed by the AK Party) and proves that Islam is a force in politics. Hamid emphasizes correctly that “Muslims are not bound to Islam’s founding movement, but neither can they fully escape it. The Prophet Muhammad was a theologian, a head of state, a warrior, a preacher, and a merchant, all at once” (Hamid: October 31, 2014b). Furthermore, Hamid discusses the idea of reformation within the Islamic world and compares it to the Protestant Reformation witnessed in Europe. He argues that the Islamic world already had its reformation in late nineteenth century. The reformation yielded Islamic Modernism, the first movement which later would evolve into Islamism. Islamic Modernism attempted to allow Islam to be “safe for modernity” and was a response to “secularism, colonialism, the rise of Europe – but it was also, importantly, a response to the creeping authoritarianism of the late Ottoman era” (Hamid: October 31, 2014b). The movement recognized that the state and state power were a political reality. In the past as it related to matters of Islamic law or governance, the clerical class in Muslim societies maintained a prominent role, and Islamic modernists effectively changed the course of that dynamic for future generations.

As Islam plays a major role in societies in the Middle East, Hamid explains this is where ISIS draws its strength. For example, the idea of having established a “Caliphate” within its territory is a powerful tool in gaining support, even if the masses don’t agree with ISIS’ interpretation of what the Caliphate is. Seeing a Caliphate evolve resonates in a manner that offers the masses a return to the past or a return to order and greatness. Since the fall of the last true Caliphate in 1924, the Muslim world has had a difficult time creating a “Post-caliphate political model” (Hamid: October 31, 2014b). Noting the Brotherhood, the caliphate model would prove difficult; instead, they chose to operate within the confines of the political system. Another issue surrounding the implementation of the “Post-caliphate model” harkens back to Islamic Modernist period and its anticlerical bent. Islamism has effectively developed without the aid of clerics, and they are not entirely interested in seeing clerics elevated to lead the movement. Hamid cites the Muslim Brotherhood having an overwhelming majority of supporters and leaders who came from professional sectors in medicine, engineering, and law. In the case of Salafis, who aim to see a return to the era of the Prophet, the role of clerics is even more diminished. They claim that it is because of the clerical establishment’s role in expanding scholarship that Islam lost its purity and power. This yields what Hamid calls the “democratization of religion.” In short, groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have profited from the Salafist model. Salafism itself encourages the independent interpretation of the Quran and the life of the Prophet Muhammad without clerical guidance (Hamid: October 31, 2014b).

Testing liberalism in the context of Arab democracy presents many challenges. The conversation has to take into consideration the importance that Islam plays in the public sphere. Shadi Hamid’s conclusion on the matter puts forward that what democracy looks like the in the western world may not necessarily be evident in the Middle East. He is correct in displaying that the Arab Spring yielded illiberal democracy driven by Islamist parties. The core factor driving this conclusion is based on how The Arab Street views Islam as being a relevant force in politics. He also highlights the political vacuum left by the dissolution of Caliphate in 1924 as driving a segment of the public to lean towards Salafist ideas. Even though Islam continues to play a role in public life in the region, parties driving their platforms on it have also been faced with challenges, namely the examples of Egypt and Tunisia mentioned earlier. Although Islamists promote illiberalism, Hamid concludes that in order for “The Westphalian system to survive in the region, Islam, or even Islamism, may be needed to legitimate it. To drive even the more pragmatic, participatory variants of Islamism out of the state system would be doom weak, failing states and strong, brittle ones alike to a long, destructive cycle of civil conflict and political violence” (Hamid: October 31, 2014b).

Some Principal Ideas on Cyber-Democracy, Islam, and Democracy

We should expect that the further diffusion of knowledge (knowledge, research, education, and innovation) should have at least in principle the effect of supporting and further progressing processes of democratization. Knowledge society, knowledge economy, and knowledge democracy interplay (Carayannis and Campbell 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2015; Campbell and Carayannis 2013, 2016a, b). Knowledge and good quality knowledge, available for and accessible to more people and larger segments of society, also via platforms or networks that are internet-based, advance reasoning capabilities of citizens, eventually pushing forward developments that encourage democracy and democratization. Authoritarian regimes, therefore, are being confronted by the following dilemma: Without more knowledge and innovation, it appears not possible to advance economic performance. One the other hand, when more knowledge is being introduced to society, then it cannot be prevented that knowledge will have spill-over effects in the sense of nurturing demands for more democracy. In the long run, it does not appear to be realistic, to advance economy without also advancing democracy and democratization. However, in the short run, the relationship between knowledge and democracy can be complex, meaning that diffusion processes of internet-based knowledge are not necessarily and automatically linked to a fostering of processes of increased democratization (Carayannis and Campbell 2014).

What is the relationship between democracy and Islam in Muslim-majority countries and societies? This certainly represents a sensitive key question. Islam (in Muslim-majority countries) has an influence on society and democracy. However, we are convinced that it is absolutely misleading and in fact wrong to assert that Islam per se is not compatible with democracy or necessarily at conflict with democracy (for a further reading, see Campbell et al. 2012). What appears to be more important is to acknowledge a need for sensitive learning processes in Muslim majority countries, so that a prospective relationship between Islam and democracy can evolve, so that democracy there can progress to developing further to levels of a high-quality democracy. Democracy, as a concept and belief, is wider than a specific religious system (or a specific party-political approach). Within democracy, there must be sufficient space and tolerance, allowing for different religious beliefs (for example Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), but also for secularism and an explicitly nonreligious comprehension and construction of a vision of society. Pluralism and heterogeneity are essential for democracy and for driving quality of democracy. We should not forget that also Europe experienced complex processes of “separation of church and state” for several centuries, leading to the formation of modern democracy. Christian-Democratic parties in Europe represent an innovative example for a development of bringing Christianity into a good political balance with democracy. In the coming years, we should be prepared to expect that also in the Muslim-majority countries a greater diversity in interpretations of Islam will evolve. The global spreading of knowledge (also via the internet) should impose some additional effects.

Religion, religions, and religious systems can try to influence state and state structures directly. Alternatively, religions can influence values and value systems, which then influence political systems, because every political system, also every democracy, is value-based in a pluralistic sense. Such an “indirect effect” of religions on politics may be more preferable or an advantage, since then religions and nonreligions (for example, secular movements) have an impact on the value-base of politics and democracy (see Fig. 1, also for a comparison of scenario one and scenario two). Every democracy is also value-based. But no particular political party, and no single religion, should have here a position of monopoly.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Possible influences of religion on states, state structures, political systems, and value systems

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Conclusion

From the countries of the Arab Spring, so far, only Tunisia managed to follow successfully a path toward more democracy and democratization. By this, Tunisia represents a potential role model for a transformation from authoritarianism toward democracy for the whole region of the Arab countries. A vast majority of the other Arab countries suffered from a decline in levels of modest democracy attempts, when the years 2011–2012 and 2014–2015 are taken as reference points (see for the Democracy Ranking 2016 in more particular Campbell et al. 2017). Tunisia considerably increased in a positive direction its scoring on quality of democracy (see Table 2), while other Arab countries (for example, Egypt, Libya, and Syria) suffered from a further decline in levels of democracy and democratization (for possibilities and options of democracy measurement, see: Campbell et al. 2013, 2015). The latest “Arab Human Development Report 2016”, issued by the United Nations Development Program, also indicates several troublesome developments: the “report warns that the policies and practices of exclusion across various fields, the lack of sufficient protection of political freedoms and human rights, weak economic competitiveness and the failure to establish good governance – particularly through greater transparency and accountability – are threatening the future prospects of youth and drawing some into circumstances that hinder their development.” Therefore: “This report calls for placing young people at the heart of the development process, which includes providing young people with genuine opportunities to unleash their energy and shape their future” (United Nations Development Program 2017, p. 17).

Table 2 The development of quality of democracy in Core Countries of the Arab Spring (years 2011–2012 and 2014–2015 in comparison). Countries ranked according to scores, Norway serves as a reference country (reference democracy)
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In the course of this discussion we have uncovered a great deal of information surrounding the regression of Cyber-Democracy in the Middle East. The conclusion on the future for democracy in the Middle East is still a complicated matter. The region as it is currently trending appears to approach the subject with caution because it is witnessing the pains required to achieve a fruitful democratic transition. Even the data presented offers paradoxes in the vitality of Cyber-Democracy in the coming years. On the one hand, we see a region keeping pace with the digital revolution, yet on the other we see the participants of those revolutions asking for more restrictions on the same platforms used during the Arab Spring. Governmental and elite-driven repression of democratization are one thing, but what has been uncovered here is that even the individual level is responsible for self-inflicted regression. Self-censorship online seems to be taking hold as fewer people believe the internet can effectively develop change. One cannot rule out that the turmoil in conflict zones like Syria, Yemen, and Libya are also impacting public opinion on democratization. Although these conflicts weigh heavily on the Arab Street, it has also proven to be a successful deterrent in the case of Tunisia. The young democracy managed to maintain the course towards democratization because the fear of a Syria-like conflict within Tunisian borders convinced the public to stay the course towards democracy. Illiberalism in the context of an Arab Democracy is also a concern for Western onlookers who have a preconceived notion that democracy and liberalism go hand in hand. In the end, democratization in the Middle East will have to take its course according to its own nature. Even if the current situation offers a picture of regression in Cyber-Democracy or democratization in general, faith in the democratic process now brought to the forefront in the Middle East must yield effective results.

This leads us to developing a preliminary model for an Arab Democracy in the context of the Post-Arab Spring. There are positive models to draw upon and perhaps the Tunisian experience is presenting the most effective example. As far as the Middle East is concerned, two examples of Muslim-oriented democracies are present and continue to operate within the region. The first is Turkey and the second is Iran, but we must keep in mind that both states are not ethnically Arab nor do they enjoy ethnic or religious homogeneity. The Turkish model was established from the beginning as a secular state and featured a built-in countermeasure from the military to maintain the secular nature of the republic. The introduction of this system by Kemalists was revolutionary from the start and still had complications. Since the creation of the secular Turkish Republic, the Islamist current in the country was equally powerful. The country has reoriented itself towards its Islamic roots under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AK Parti. Although the democratic system is still in place in Turkey, the evolution of the state since the Islamists have taken power has produced a state that is still repressive in comparison to Western democracies. The problem in this case was the lack of gradual evolution towards liberal democracy. As a result, the importance of Islam in the political sphere could not be avoided, in less than 100 years the secular identity of Turkey is slowly being reversed. Therefore, the complete removal of Islam in the public sphere cannot be achieved; the inherent prominence of Islam is far too important. In this regard, Kemalists made a miscalculation even though they preemptively aimed to counteract it.

The Islamic Republic of Iran offers a case that Arab democracies should avoid. In the case of Arab countries, the prominent sect is Sunni Islam, where a highly sophisticated clerical hierarchy does not exist as it does in the Shia world. This offers a unique advantage to Arab democracies because it inherently dissolves the concept of theocracy. As previously mentioned, Islamists in Tunisia were very careful to avoid the theocratic systems of Iran and Saudi Arabia when they envisioned the state. If there is to be sustainable and effective governance in Arab democracies, the Iranian model will prove constraining and will lack any possibility of evolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a uniquely Iranian concept. A conflict of ideology presents itself as an obstacle for reform, and even with a young population in Iran, overcoming this issue has proved difficult. The ideological struggle is the Islamic Republic refuses to acknowledge Western concepts of liberal democracy and feels that its interpretation of democracy is superior to the west (Litvak 2011, p. 6). Finally, the repressive nature of the Islamic Republic presents more of the same style of regimes Arab countries have faced in the past – they are not interested in reliving them again.

This was apparent with the outcome of the Green Revolution in 2009. Contesting the reelection of the then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ruled out any possibility of changing the system in order to orient it towards a Western style democracy. The reality for Iran is that it has a system created through its own political development in the context of its history. We must call to mind, the 2009 opposition candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi was a member of the political establishment, and from his point of view, he was contesting an election he felt was rightfully his. The danger for Arab democracies following the Iranian model is the model forces reformers to operate within a system that does not lend itself to peaceful change. This is evident in light of the violence and turmoil witnessed during the protests. To conclude, the Iranian model proves too rigid to developing a transformation to the system itself (Xavier and Campbell 2014, pp. 163–166).

There are elections taking place in Iran among different contenders, and which are competitive. However, the permitted political spectrum is rather limited and restricted. Compared with a western-style democracy, this would be as if the only allowed elections would be primaries within the spectrum of a particular political party or political movement (or of “one” political party).

The illiberalism factor must be taken into account when envisioning an Arab democracy. The discussion here boils down to a set of values that are widely held by the mainstream. Even in the case of Western Europe, religion still played a significant role in developing democracy. As Hamid pointed out, Western democracies achieved liberalism prior to democratization, but in the case of the Middle East reverse democratization has taken effect. Looking back at Tunisia and Egypt, we can determine that even if Islamist parties initially take control of the government, their inability to manage the affairs of the state proved ineffective fairly early on. The key miscalculation of Islamists in both cases was meeting the public’s real demands: stability and prosperity (Xavier and Campbell 2014, p. 170). This miscalculation opened the door for greater competition among political parties in Tunisia because the Ennahda was at its core willing to step down from power in order to salvage the unity of the state rather than see it spiral into chaos. This is not a solidified victory for leftist or more liberal parties either; the voting public will hold their demands to any future ruling party. Consequently, it may yield potential Islamist victories in the future if leftist and secular parties fail to meet those demands as well.

Political development in Egypt is effectively dominated by the pro-Sisi coalition since the removal of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2015 further solidified the pro-Sisi coalition with the victory of the “For the Love of Egypt” gaining 20% of seats in the Parliament. Voter turnout in the Egyptian elections was significantly low with 29.83% of eligible voters participating in the second electoral round. In addition, the Salafist Nour Party was virtually decimated in the elections gaining only eight seats in parliament (Aman 2015). As it relates to the development of the Arab democracy model, Egypt’s political dynamics were driven primarily by the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many question if the military ever really lost control of the situation following the revolution. In a sense, the military preserved the revolution in hopes of achieving stability, but with the advent of the pro-Sisi coalition achieving victory, the president will continue to steer the course of Egypt’s political future.

Militant Islamism in the form of Salafist Jihadism presents a double-edged sword for democratic evolution in the region. As it was the case for Tunisia, Islamist parties recognized the threat on the fragile young democracy, but Ennahda appeared weak in confronting it thereby enabling the opposition to criticize their efforts and transition to victory in the polls. Conversely, it also encouraged Salafist groups within the country to take bold stands in presenting a viable option for the public to turn to, but it was a hard sell. The rhetoric of combating this threat is also being used in Egypt. As mentioned earlier, the threat of Salafist groups like ISIS are weighing heavily on the mind of the Arab Street. The public is aware of the destabilizing effect that such a group can have on the state, but just as it can encourage the preservation of the state it can also encourage the mainstream who feel they have a religious obligation to reinstate the caliphate in the region to support it by direct or indirect means. Emerging Arab democracies must be vigilant against the threat of ISIS or face potential destabilizing effects within their domestic sphere. If ISIS is to intensify attacks against these states as it has in Tunisia and in Egypt in the Sinai it will serve as further justification to maintain added repressive measures in order to maintain safety. Increased attacks from the group may also prove to solidify the resolve of the public to stay the course in democratization, but this effort must be maintained with great caution.

Radical antidemocratic political movements, which assert to be influenced by Islam, pose a serious problem. In theoretical terms, a “caliphate” represents a premodern (in that sense a predemocratic) political concept for the political organization of a state, which does not apply principles of separation of power between the different branches of government in a democratic tradition, but implies a combination and falling-together of political and religious leadership. Caliphates assert to stand in line of a direct legacy and continuation with the establishment and founding of Islam in the early seventh century. When the terror organization of ISIL, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (sometimes also being translated as IS or ISIS, “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”), issued the claim of having (re-)established a caliphate in 2014, in a certain sense a political reality reemerged with connotations now 1400 years old. While other terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda, operate more in formats of an underground organization, ISIL is driven by the desire of forming and building state (quasi-state) structures, expressed in the understanding of having set up a caliphate. From an ISIL perspective, only military defeat would drive complete ISIL back into the status of an underground organization.

According to Wieland Schneider (2015), what makes ISIL so distinct and specific are (1) the levels of publicly demonstrated atrocities, (2) the introduction of slavery, but (3) also the way how ISIL managed these approaches in their media propaganda, using social media and videos. ISIL could and does tailor its media messages, depending on and differentiating between media markets, addressing Arab countries or Western societies in various and particular ways (Bösch 2017). For this, Schneider also introduces the term of “Jihadism” as a form of a “bizarre pop culture” (Schneider 2015, p. 213). All of this feeds into the interest of ISIL to build the quasi-state structures of a caliphate, supported and defended by ISIL insurgent groups in the West, so to strike there directly terrorist attacks. Furthermore, ISIL attempts to diffuse into other Arab countries, most notably Libya. In that sense, ISIL may also be interpreted as a fluid spectrum, ranging from underground groups on the one side, over to state building attempts on the other. These state-building efforts of ISIL make ISIL distinct (and draw a line of difference against Al-Qaeda).

We conclude that the model for an emerging Arab democracy must be maintained with a gradualist approach and cannot lose sight of the value democracy offers. In order for democracy to take hold in the Middle East, democratically elected parties must convey to the public that they are making concentrated efforts to provide stability, economic development, the rule of law, and freedom for all people. The concerns of illiberalism being innately part of Islamic democracy is indeed evident, but the transition to liberal democracy will have to run its course and is still a possibility. The key to this development must be directed by the willingness of political elites, broadcast media, and the individual himself to want it to succeed. Tunisia is a good model for emulation because the core of its progression was based on the determination to see democracy succeed. We must note, even if Tunisia is the only genuine Arab democracy, it is still fragile and must be observed cautiously.

Cyber-Democracy platforms in the Middle East are still a relevant force in the political development of these young democracies, but they are still subject to manipulation and self-degradation. Restricting them may counteract any success that has already been achieved. Regression in this area is a reality, but it could be temporary at best. Militant movements are also hindering the development of political development in the region for reasons outlined extensively in this chapter; the final verdict here must be to see the downfall of such movements. Like any radical movement that has emerged in history, it must be dealt with directly or else it will only gain more strength and influence.

Further observation of the region is still necessary in assessing the impact of Cyber-Democracy in the Middle East. Here are several discussion points. The first, when will Tunisia become a liberal Western style democracy? Are Arab media outlets in need of reform? Is Egypt’s President, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, intent on transitioning Egypt into a liberal democracy or a semi-liberal democracy? How great is the ISIS impact on preserving further democratization in Egypt and Tunisia? Will the impact of a democratic Tunisia serve as a future model for democratization in the Arab world as a whole? These are several points worth noting and expanding upon in the years to come.

As the region has shifted into the era of the Post-Arab Spring, the prospects for the hope of the seeing the region transition into the “Era of Arab Democracy” is certainly in question. From the perspective of Western observers, few can say that they have witnessed a live democratic transition engulfing an entire region from such a different cultural reference point. We must not be quick to impose Western standards or preconceived notions of democracy upon the Middle East. It has to unfold naturally and gradually, for no western nation-state can say it has not endured great pains to develop its own democratic system.

We want to close our analysis with the vision that, in the long run, democracy and further democratization will finally arrive in the Arab countries on a broader and more durable basis. No other outcome shall be acceptable or shall be accepted. This also aligns with beliefs that democracy and democratic development associate with sustainable development (Campbell and Carayannis 2014; Campbell et al. 2015). Cyber-Democracy will have here its role, and has all the potentials and capabilities to contribute and co-contribute to such a desired outcome .

Cross-References