Abstract
Kevin O’Regan argues that seeing is a way of exploring the world, and that this approach helps us understand consciousness. O’Regan is interested in applying his ideas to the modeling of consciousness in robots. Hubert Dreyfus has raised a range of objections to traditional approaches to artificial intelligence, based on his reading of Heidegger. In light of this, I explore here ways in which O’Regan’s approach meets these Heideggerian considerations, and ways in which his account is more Heideggerian than that of Dreyfus. Despite these successes, O’Regan leaves out any role for emotion. This is an area where a Heideggerian perspective may offer useful insights into what more is needed for the sense of self O’Regan includes in his account in order for a robot to feel.
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Paine, R. (2014). Heideggerian Credentials? O’Regan’s Sensorimotor Approach to Perception and Robots That Feel. In: Bishop, J., Martin, A. (eds) Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05107-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05107-9_3
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