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The Impact of War in Ukraine on the Political and Ideological Agenda of European Post-communist State Conservative Populists: The Case of EKRE

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Producing Cultural Change in Political Communities

Abstract

Right-wing populists in Estonia—as well as in other European post-communist states—defy easy categorization or placement on left/right axes. Their values combine democratic and non-democratic elements. These populists emphasize majoritarianism and direct democracy at the expense of minority rights, while according to little value to the rule of law. Similarly, Estonian populists give little heed to liberal values, but instead emphasize so-called traditional values. But it is in foreign policy that the contradictions of these populist parties emerge most saliently, as their Euroscepticism and social conservatism aligns them with Russian state messaging and pro-Russian far-right populist parties, while the Soviet legacy imposes constraints on them given lingering fears of Russia on the part of their electorates. Vladimir Putin’s February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine provides for analytical leverage on the core ideology of Soviet legacy right-wing populism. Through the study of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE), in comparison to Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) and Hungary’s Fidesz parties, this chapter analyzes the ideological core of contemporary Soviet legacy populism.

Published with support of project O-006 “Strategic communication in the context of the war in Ukraine: lessons learned for Estonia”, Estonian Military Academy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    PiS—Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—Law and Justice.

  2. 2.

    Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance.

  3. 3.

    The aim of Russian strategic narratives as understood here is to disable their potential adversaries. To these ends, the Kremlin very often targets various populist movements and groups in Europe from left to right, seeking to align populists of the right and left against the center. Interestingly, Russia claims to protect and promote worship against liberalism and tries to promote the notion that Russia is protecting conservative and family values (Mölder & Sazonov, 2020b). Russia’s influence operations disseminated strategic narratives for promoting narratives of ‘Pax Russica’ among the Russophone community in Estonia for years, trying to influence the whole of Estonian society and the Estonian state, to split it, but also to shape the political environment. Kremlin’s strategic narratives are opportunistically targeted at potential target audiences, among them populist movements, radical (but also non-radical) political figures and forces, several international target groups, alternative or anti-establishment groups, anti-US, anti-NATO movements, anti-EU, anti-vaxxers etc. (Mölder & Sazonov, 2020a).

  4. 4.

    For years, Russia has tried to exploit populist forces on both the right and the left (Kuzio 2018), attracting some with its Soviet-era nostalgia and coherence (the Left) or as a proponent and defender of so-called conservative values. One of the biggest political forces in Europe to which, in addition to the extreme left, the Kremlin has contributed are the right-wing conservative forces. Shelby Butt and Daniel Byman (2020) highlight that one of Moscow’s most pernicious efforts is its support for white-supremacist and other far-right groups, encouraging them with propaganda, and making them stronger and more dangerous.

  5. 5.

    The Serbian Progressive Party was founded in 2008. In this treatment, we consider Serbia as an apt comparison with the core cases in post-communist Europe, given the Yugoslav legacy. Comparative case studies of Estonia and other former Yugoslavian states have previously yielded analytical leverage, e.g., Petsinis (2016, 2020).

  6. 6.

    Catholics in 2021 numbered only 8,690 out of 1.3 million Estonians, according to the Estonian census, and data on politically conservative Catholics is sparse. https://andmed.stat.ee/en/stat/rahvaloendus__rel2021__rahvastiku-demograafilised-ja-etno-kultuurilised-naitajad__usk/RL21451.

  7. 7.

    Staff, Harri Tiido: Poola marukatoliiklike ühenduste sidemetest lähiriikidega, Err, April 8, 2021, retrieved May 29, 2023, from https://www.err.ee/1608170194/harri-tiido-poola-marukatoliiklike-uhenduste-sidemetest-lahiriikidega. See as well, Dauksza et al., The Golden Lion Roars from Crakow, VSquare, December 30, 2020, retrieved May 29, 2023, from https://vsquare.org/the-golden-lion-roars-from-cracow/.

  8. 8.

    This surprising phenomenon allegedly owes much to French managerial support as well as ten million euros in funding routed from Poland, according to investigative journalism coming from the ranks of the staff of Eesti Päevaleht: Kund, 2020.

  9. 9.

    While EKRE’s base in rural areas is linked to the state of Estonian agriculture, and with that seasonal farm labour, the party has consistently expressed hostility towards Ukrainian agricultural workers.

  10. 10.

    Rocca al Mare is an iconic beachfront in the Estonian capital Tallinn.

  11. 11.

    In spite of the potential gains of EU structural adjustment funds and Common Agricultural Policy subsidies for EKRE's base of voters in smaller towns and rural areas.

  12. 12.

    In an interview with “Otse Eloga”, the spokesman of the KAPO, Jürgen Klemm, confirmed that the Defence Police have not identified any Russian links between Varro Vooglaiu and the Foundation for the Protection of Family and Tradition, which he heads (Vaher, 2022).

  13. 13.

    Jürgenson joined the EKRE in November 2021. Before that, he has been a member of the Centre Party for two decades.

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Correspondence to Vladimir Sazonov .

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Ploom, I., Sazonov, V., Foster, N. (2023). The Impact of War in Ukraine on the Political and Ideological Agenda of European Post-communist State Conservative Populists: The Case of EKRE. In: Mölder, H., Voinea, C.F., Sazonov, V. (eds) Producing Cultural Change in Political Communities. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43440-2_11

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