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The Institutional Underpinnings of Policymaking in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe

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Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

Chinese authorities identified the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 in January 2020, yet already by early March, there were over 4000 cases in Europe (Spiteri et al., First cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the WHO European Region, 24 January to 21 February 2020. Euro surveillance 25(9): 2000178, 2020), and governments were seeing the disease as a serious threat. The novelty of the disease, along with the array of possible manifestations—with symptoms ranging from nothing at all to severe pneumonia and death—meant that scientific understanding and advice regarding best practices were sometimes ambiguous and often changing as the caseload increased and data and understanding improved. Under such circumstances, it is to be expected that policy responses should differ across countries, as policymakers struggle to evaluate advice in the face of difficult tradeoffs. In hindsight, however, approaching two years since Europe saw its first recognized case, the early and perhaps understandable differences in governmental responses to the pandemic look surprisingly persistent even as the available advice from national and international health authorities has converged and stabilized. This consistency in the range as well as relative efficacy of responses over time suggests systematic underpinnings to policymaking in times of crisis just as for policymaking under more usual circumstances. To gain insight into the drivers of policymaking in the face of the COVID-19 threat, we examine the breadth and severity of initial governmental measures to contain the disease from January through April 2020 in Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Spain. Initial analysis suggests that many of the usual suspects in institutional analysis—system type, electoral rules, and state territorial structure—provide little leverage on either government policy response or health outcomes. We focus here on coalition dynamics and, in particular, the interdependencies between ministries (and ministers’ parties; Alexiadou, Ideologues, partisans, and loyalists. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) in pandemic policymaking.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.

  2. 2.

    Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.

  3. 3.

    This part of our argument depends on the maintained hypothesis that politicians (and ministers in particular) believe some nontrivial number of voters is able to connect policies to ministries and their ministers.

  4. 4.

    Whatever coalition policy looks like in terms of bills passed—whether policies are the product of some overall interparty compromise, as the mass of coalition scholarship assumes (e.g., Tsebelis and Money 1997), or are parsed out to parties in line with the cabinet portfolios they control (e.g., Alexiadou and Hoepfner 2019; Heller 2001; Laver and Shepsle 1996)—actual bills are elaborated and policies implemented in whichever ministries have jurisdiction.

  5. 5.

    It is, of course, possible that two-party coalitions will form parties that will not seek to attract the same sets of uncommitted voters. Grand coalitions might be an example of this, at least inasmuch as the parties in question compete for voters more with other parties closer to their own positions than with each other. Or, for instance, the case of Giuseppe Conte’s second government, a coalition of the populist Movimento 5 Stelle and the antipopulist Partito Democratico, which apparently disagreed not only on questions of policy but on fundamental questions of the proper conduct of politics. As Horowitz (2019) reported, “the joining of two parties that have called each other every name in the book, including Mafiosi and kidnappers, internet trolls and hatemongers, was remarkable.” We expect, given that they start from a position of political and almost existential conflict, that such coalitions should be able to achieve little.

  6. 6.

    Parliamentary groups in Italy often are unrelated to electoral parties. Free and Equal won fourteen list seats in the 2018 Camera dei Diputati election as an electoral coalition, but had disbanded as an electoral contender by the 2019 European Parliament elections. We assume that its minister, Roberto Speranza, thus was essentially an independent insofar as electoral politics were concerned. And it is difficult as of this writing to gauge Italia Viva’s current electoral interests, as it has yet to contest elections.

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Correspondence to William B. Heller .

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Heller, W.B., Muftuoglu, E., Rosenberg, D. (2023). The Institutional Underpinnings of Policymaking in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe. In: Shvetsova, O. (eds) Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30844-4_2

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