Abstract
This chapter analyzes how the main ideas of Mencius’s political thought were interpreted, reconstructed, and appropriated by the three members of New Confucianism “xin rujia 新儒家” in the twentieth-century China, namely Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1904–1982), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). It presents the core textual analysis by the three thinkers in their interpretation of Mencius’s ideas, discusses these interpretations, and argues that Mencius was portrayed as pro-democracy and anti-monarchy in their writings. The chapter then concludes that the arguments that support the former image are doomed, and those that support the latter image are more convincing. Next, the chapter considers the set of Mencius-inspired arguments the thinkers hold in favour of democratic political participation. The thinkers attempted to conclude that democracy, which entails political subjectivity, is a more viable means to achieve the Confucian ends than a traditional monarchical system. The last part of this chapter argues that the thinkers’ arguments justify only a political account of individual subjectivity for democratic participation, which cannot explain why individuals as moral agents should take part in politics. A Mencian line of argument for an ethical account of political participation is therefore developed on the thinkers’ behalf.
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Notes
- 1.
As Yang Zuhan puts it, Yu Yingshi posited that Qian Mu “regarded Song-Ming Confucianism as a variation of Confucianism, which means that it is not authentic.” (Yang 1994: 152)
- 2.
Here I adopt Makeham’s English translation for “xinxing zhixue 心性之學”. As he puts it, this term refers to “theoretical discussions of the metaphysical and ontological import of the two concepts, mind and human nature” (Makeham 2003: 29).
- 3.
One reviewer raised an issue of whether such an interpretation is at odds with Mencius’s more pronounced endorsement of elitism, as seen in 4B19 and 3A4, and whether the New Confucians have taken notice of this. As will be demonstrated in the following discussion, the New Confucians argue that the Confucian political ideal has never realized in the past exactly because of the two main characteristics as embodied in the traditional moral-political approach, i.e., monarchical rule, and the ruler’s unilateral moral edification, while both of which presumed elitism of some form. I thank the reviewer for drawing my attention to this issue.
- 4.
Joseph Chan has extensively argued against the “ownership” conception of political authority in early Confucianism in one of the appendices of his recent book, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. He argues that the Confucian conception of political authority should instead be best understood as a “service”, which means that a ruler should not only deliver good governance for the ruled, but also tries to “win the hearts of the people” (Chan 2014a: 39), i.e., to establish an ethically treasured ruler-ruled relationship in which the ruler is committed to serve the people, and thereby earn the disposed submission of the ruled (Chan 2014a: 29–41).
- 5.
The discovery of bamboo-slip texts after the New Confucians presented their claims regarding democracy has suggested that centuries before Mencius’s time, abdication by the current ruler had once been believed to be an actual practice of transferring political power in high antiquity, and it had once been regarded as preferable to both hereditary rule and popular support of the ruled. Some scholars therefore argue that it was Mencius’s creative interpretation of the high antiquity that subjected all these models of transferring power under the intervention and determination of Heaven: no ruler identified by any of these models should be deemed legitimate without Heaven’s endorsement. Readers interested in the legends of abdication and how Warring States thinkers have interpreted them may consult, for example, Pines (2005) and Allan (2015). I thank one of the reviewers for drawing my attention to this issue.
- 6.
This part of discussion was addressed recently by Justin Tiwald and Anh Tuan Nuyen. By framing the question in terms of Socrates’ Euthyphro dilemma, Nuyen asked whether, in Mencius mind, the ruler is legitimate to rule because Heaven authorizes him, or that Heaven authorizes the ruler because he is qualified as legitimate to rule (Nuyen 2013:113–115). Tiwald seems to take the ‘Heaven-says-so’ view, in which Mencius “holds that political authorities cannot come into being except by appointment, and that at bottom the appointer of the ruling monarch is Heaven” (Tiwald 2008: 270). Nuyen, however, argues that the well-being of the people should be better understood as the “ratio cognoscendi”, i.e., Heaven’s will can only be read through the people, while Heaven as “ratio essendi” – meaning that without Heaven no political authority can be established (Nuyen 2013:113–126).
- 7.
I thank Yang Xiao for helping me clarify this point.
- 8.
Mou says that this saying is by “qianren 前人” (the ancients). But it does not seem to be a saying from any Confucian classics. It can be found in Lü Shi Chun Qiu (呂氏春秋 247 BC–239 BC). The sentence in full should be, “All-under-Heaven is not entitled to anyone but everyone under Heaven.”
- 9.
These two English terms are Mou’s own translations.
- 10.
Joseph Chan convincingly rejects the identification of this quote with an endorsement of popular sovereignty. He analyzed the “Honoring Impartiality” (Gui Gong 貴公) chapter of Lü Shi Chun Qiu in which this quote appears, and argues that the quote only puts forward that maintaining impartiality in governance is crucial, which, as it stands, has nothing to do with popular sovereignty” (Chan 2014a:227–229).
- 11.
Therefore, as Tiwald goes on to argue, the people do not have a right to rebellion.
- 12.
One of the reviewers critically asked whether the New Confucians, and/or I, have mistakenly interpreted Mencius’s understanding of the ruler-ruled relationship, which should otherwise include the socio-political class of men-of-service (shi 士) or “noble men” (junzi 君子), and in particular the important role this group of elite members was supposed to play as the mediators between the ruler and the people. In reply to this point, Mou, for example, identified the men-of-service with the category of the ministers (xiang 相), understood broadly (Mou 2003a: 61–62). Mou argues that given the ancient political system, however, the men-of-service or the ministers could at best only manage to maintain Zhidao (治道), which means how a good ruler should govern, but could never achieve Zhengdao (政道), which is concerned with political authority and its justification. This argument will be discussed shortly afterwards. I thank the reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.
- 13.
Combining these three points, the straightforward approach reveals what Mou calls the “functional presentation” (yunyong biaoxian 運用表現) of ethical reasoning, which has long been prevalent in Chinese culture (Mou 1996:124; 2003b: 46). The “reason” that takes effect in the functional presentation is “practical reason” (shijian lixing 實踐理性), which refers to “the virtues of one’s moral character.” Functional presentation is the inspiration of such virtues (Mou 2003b: 46–47). In politics, functional presentation of moral reason is properly manifested in zhidao 治道 by the straightforward approach (Mou 2003b: 48–49).
- 14.
I am grateful to Yang Xiao for helping me clarify this point.
- 15.
This is an oversimplified understanding of the concept of political subjectivity; see Calcagno 2008 and Häkli and Kallio 2014 for further discussion. But the message is clear here: Collective and even unanimous actions in politics do not necessarily embody subjectivity (Calcagno 2008:1062). The crux of the concept, argue Häkli and Kallio, lies on the “relative autonomy” of the political subject, without which “political agency would always be seriously thwarted by the subject’s social constitution, and it would be very difficult to account for unpredictable political acts” (Häkli and Kallio 2014: 195).
- 16.
In justifying political participation on ethical grounds, there can be at least three lines of reasoning. First, taking part in politics is an indirect contribution to the promotion of ethical development, in that it creates an unoppressive environment in which people may take part in activities that are ethically valuable. In this sense, ethically significant activities for moral agents are their opportunities for political participation, rather than political participation per se. Second, taking part in politics is a direct contribution to ethical development, in that it directly and causally enhances people’s virtue. Although these two arguments are different, they do not contradict one another; political participation can make both direct and indirect contributions to the ethical development of the individual. Third, political participation is a necessary requirement of ethical development, that is, a moral agent ought to take part in politics for the purpose of moral cultivation. In the extreme sense, it means that taking part in politics is indispensable to all moral agents. Here, only the first line of reasoning is addressed.
- 17.
For instance, both Xunzi (3.9) and Doctrine of the Mean (26) say that the attainment of the virtue of sincerity (cheng 誠) is the most excellent thing by the superior man. Since the pursuit of sincerity is ceaseless, a moral agent should try his best to extend his pursuit of sincerity beyond himself and towards other people and other things. In any case, there seems to be no Confucian classic that suggests that moral self-cultivation should be limited to one’s private realm. Rather, this all suggests that the unlimited scope of a moral agent’s ethical development is textually supported in Confucian thought.
- 18.
Here, Tamara Zutlevics’ understanding of oppression is adopted, “all oppressed people unjustly lack the opportunity for resilient autonomy,” which refers to “reasonable projectivity of one’s substantive desires and values into the future” (Zutlevics 2002: 86–87). Oppressive behavior should not only obstruct the opportunity of the people in formulating and carrying out their future projects; such obstruction should also need to be a result of injustice. As will be seen shortly, it is such unjust lack of the opportunity to develop their future projects that spoils the ethical development of a moral agent.
- 19.
Tessman suggests the following as examples of troubles that victims of oppression may suffer, which are mainly about the deprivation of material as well as social goods, “…for instance, members of targeted groups may be subject to violence or abuse; refused recognition and respect as full persons; forced to survive with inadequate housing, food, health care, child care, transportation or other goods; denied access to education or to their own cultural tradition; exploited and alienated in dead-end jobs; unjustly imprisoned; exposed to environmental hazards; and so on” (Tessman 2005:4).
- 20.
This story is from Lienü Zhuan 列女傳. For further discussions, see the Pang-White Chapter in this volume.
- 21.
Tessman cites the case of rape to illustrate her point: “If a woman chooses a strategy of submitting to an attempted rape rather than taking what she perceives to be the risks of resisting it, she will typically be blamed for the rape. […] one can implicate the gender system that contributed to the woman’s vulnerability by affecting the formation of her character into someone who is afraid or unable to fight back, that is, into someone who is in this specific way morally damaged” (Tessman 2005:38).
- 22.
Justifiably, Tessman does not ignore the fact that there are people who, despite their given membership in privileged groups, are critical of their social positions. They may attempt to resist the social structures that bring the privileges, and may even attempt a change of their own characters. However, argues Tessman, their attempts have only little if any chance of success because such attempts largely depend on luck rather than on the will of the moral agent (Tessman 2005:55).
- 23.
Tessman maintains that this argument does not conflict with the claim that those who demonstrate “ordinary vices of domination” may still be able to flourish, albeit with much difficulty (Tessman 2005: 53–106).
- 24.
This ethical argument is a negative one, i.e., the lack of political subjectivity would put a moral agent in a very difficult situation in terms of their ethical development, and therefore, in the course of a person’s moral cultivation, his political agency is necessary, especially in the non-ideal scenarios of the Confucian perspective, in which political oppressive domination usually takes place, which make a desirable social-political environment for their ethical development to become almost impossible. However, this does not mean that having political subjectivity in any sense helps to improve a person’s ethical development. If one wants to make a positive argument, one might need to assume that taking part in politics directly and causally enables a moral agent to develop and strengthen his drive to ethical development, and is therefore desirable for moral cultivation. This requires more discussion, which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. For a detailed positive argument, see Lai 2014: 129–191.
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Lai, L. (2023). Mencius and the New Confucianism’s Pursuit of Democracy. In: Xiao, Y., Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_15
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