Skip to main content

Doing Moral Philosophy Through Personhood

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Handbook of African Philosophy

Part of the book series: Handbooks in Philosophy ((HP))

  • 242 Accesses

Abstract

The chapter provides the reader with one way to approach and understand African moral philosophy. It pivots African moral philosophy on the concepts of personhood. It identifies these concepts of personhood in the salient axiological concept of Ubuntu, which is typically explained in terms of the saying “a person is a person through other persons.” In relation to the first two instances of the concepts of personhood in the saying, it identifies three crucial themes of African moral philosophy. First, it identifies foundational issues relating the source and the nature of moral value as secular and construes morality to be derived from human nature. In relation to foundations, it further clarifies that African ethics is a dignity-based ethics. Second, it identifies and elucidates the final good to revolve around the pursuit and acquisition of virtue or excellence. Finally, it considers the robustness of African moral philosophy by considering how it can account for right action, the debate on partiality and impartiality and the status and place of animals in African moral philosophy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 299.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 299.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and dependence in black Africa-origins and contemporary forms. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 503–524.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Behrens, K. (2013). Two ‘normative’ conceptions of personhood. Quest, 25, 103–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottingham, J. (1986). Partiality, favouritism and morality. The Philosophical Quarterly, 144, 357–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darwall, S. (1977). Two kinds of respect. Ethics, 88, 36–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Donnelly, J. (2015). Normative versus taxonomic humanity: Varieties of human dignity in the Western tradition. Journal of Human Rights, 14, 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dzobo, K. (1992). Values in a changing society: Man, ancestors and god. In K. Gyekye & K. Wiredu (Eds.), Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies (Vol. 1, pp. 223–242). Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eze, O. (2005). Ubuntu: A communitarian response to liberal individualism. Masters Dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gbadegesin, S. (1991). African philosophy: Traditional Yoruba philosophy and contemporary African realities. Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • George, R., & Lee, P. (2008). The nature and basis of human dignity. In the President’s Council on Bioethics Human dignity and bioethics essays commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics. President’s Council on Bioethics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and community in African thought. In Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies (Vol. 1, pp. 101–122). Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gyekye, K. (1995). An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Temple University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gyekye, K. (2010). African ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2019, from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics

  • Hughes, G. (2011). The concept of dignity in the universal declaration of human rights. Journal of Religious Ethics, 39, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ikuenobe, P. (2006). The idea of personhood in Chinua Achebe’s things fall apart. Philosophia Africana, 9, 117–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ikuenobe, P. (2017). The communal basis for moral dignity: An African perspective. Philosophical Papers, 45, 437–469.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Janz, B. (2009). Philosophy in African place. Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaworska, A., & Tannenbaum, J. (2018). The grounds of moral status. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/grounds-moral-status/

  • Jollimore, T. (2014). Impartiality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/impartiality/

  • Loschke, J. (2014). Partiality, agent-relative reasons, and the individuals view. Social Theory and Practice, 40, 673–692.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loschke, J. (2018). Relationships as indirect intensifiers: Solving the puzzle of partiality. European Journal of Philosophy, 26, 390–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lougheed, K. (2022). Molefe on the value of community for personhood. South African Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.2020514.

  • Lutz, D. (2009). African Ubuntu philosophy and global management. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 313–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masolo, D. (2004). Western and African communitarianism. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 483–498). Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masolo, D. (2010). Self and community in a changing world. Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mbembe, A. (2001). On the postcolony. University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mbiti, J. (1969). African religions and philosophies. New York: Doubleday and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (2006). Deontology. In D. Copp (Ed.), Oxford handbook of ethical theory (pp. 425–458). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and community in African traditional thought. In R. A. Wright (Ed.), African philosophy: An introduction (pp. 171–181). University Press of America.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menkiti, I. (2004). On the normative conception of a person. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), Companion to African philosophy (pp. 324–331). Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African moral theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15, 321–341.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Metz, T. (2010). Human dignity, capital punishment and an African moral theory: Toward a new philosophy of human rights. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Metz, T. (2012). An African theory of moral status: A relational alternative to individualism and holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 14, 387–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metz, T. (2021). A relational moral theory: African ethics in and beyond the continent. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Michael, L. (2014). Defining dignity and its place in human rights. The New Bioethics, 20, 12–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, S. (2017). Reconsidering dignity relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare, 2, 108–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Molefe, M. (2017). Individualism in African moral cultures. Cultura, 14, 49–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Molefe, M. (2019). An African philosophy of personhood, morality and politics. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Molefe, M. (2020). African personhood and applied ethics. NISC [Pty]Ltd.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Molefe, M. (2021). Partiality and impartiality in African philosophy. New York: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). Invention of Africa. Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Munyaka, M., & Motlhabi, M. (2009). Ubuntu and its socio-moral significance. In F. M. Murove (Ed.), African ethics: An anthology of comparative and applied ethics (pp. 324–331). University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human development approach. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Oyowe, A. (2014). Fiction, culture and the concept of a person. Research in African Literatures, 45, 42–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oyowe, O. A. (2021). Menkiti’s moral man. New York: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oyowe, A., & Yurkivska, O. (2014). Can a communitarian concept of African personhood be both relational and gender-neutral? South African Journal of Philosophy, 33(1), 85–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ramose, M. (1999). African philosophy through Ubuntu. Mond Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramose, M., Bewaji, J., & van Binsbergen, W. (2003). The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose debate on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 22, 378–415.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its history and meaning. Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An ethic for a new South Africa. Cluster Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sulmasy, D. (2009). Dignity and bioethics: History, theory, and selected applications. In The President’s council on bioethics, human dignity and bioethics: Essays commissioned by the President’s council (pp. 469–501). Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral foundations of an African culture. In K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye (Eds) Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1. Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 192–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiredu, K. (2004). Introduction: African philosophy in our time. In Companion to African philosophy (pp. 1–27). Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiredu, K. (2009). An oral philosophy of personhood: Comments on philosophy and orality. Research in African Literatures, 40, 8–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, S. (1992). Moral Saints. Journal of Philosophy, 79(8), 419–439.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Motsamai Molefe .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Molefe, M. (2023). Doing Moral Philosophy Through Personhood. In: Imafidon, E., Tshivhase, M., Freter, B. (eds) Handbook of African Philosophy. Handbooks in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25149-8_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics