Introduction

Abstract

Contemporary theories of time largely bifurcate neatly into A-series theories and B-series theories. The former take events to move through time, from future, to present to past. The latter deny that events move in this way, taking being future, present and past not to capture fundamental features of time and taking the relations of before, after and simultaneous with to do so instead. This chapter presents the distinction between A- and B-theories and uses it as a background for presenting the articles on time by Mary Whiton Calkins, Ellen Bliss Talbot and Grace Neal Dolson. We will see that Calkins develops a view of time that recognises the reality of time in a way that is compatible with her absolute idealism but that fits neither A-series nor B-series views. We will see Dolson critically discussing Henri Bergson’s view of time, which rejects both A-series and B-series views. Finally, we will see Talbot offering an A-series view that is a novel alternative to familiar options such as the presentist view, according to which only the present exists, and to the growing block view, according to which the present is the edge of the growing block of time.