Abstract
Raimo Tuomela has a good deal to say about the we-mode and the I-mode in relation to joint actions and related phenomena. Moreover, he also invoked the notion of a pro-group I-mode. However, it is not always entirely clear what the basis of these distinctions is and whether, ultimately, the distinction between the we-mode and the pro-group I-mode can be satisfactorily made out. If not then, since pro-group I-mode is a species of I-mode, the fundamental distinction between we-mode and I-mode is called into question. In this paper, firstly, I explore these distinctions and Raimo Tuomela’s understanding of them. Secondly, I contrast Tuomela’s conception with my own strict individualist I-mode account and argue inter alia that since the notion of we-mode (at least as articulated by Tuomela) cannot satisfactorily be distinguished from a pro-group I-mode then to this extent and contra Tuomela we should prefer an account of collective intentions and related we-mode phenomena, including so-called we-reasons, purely in terms of I-mode and, therefore, in strict individualist terms.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Tuomela provided a number of closely related accounts. I take his account in (Tuomela 2013) to be definitive for my purposes here.
- 3.
Many of the points made in this section are drawn from my review (Miller 2014) of Raimo Tuomela’s book, Social Ontology.
- 4.
As such, they are perhaps instances of what Tuomela refers to as joint intentions. To the extent that his joint intentions refer to such attitudes then they are individualist in character and to be distinguished from we-intentions. I note this in the context of Tuomela’s claim, “The reviewer incorrectly and confusingly speaks of we-intentions and joint intentions in my sense as a group’s intentions” (Tuomela 2014) in his comments on my review (Miller 2014).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
The following definition is drawn from various previous publications of mine. See previous note.
- 9.
Some groups, such as economic classes, might be defined in part in terms of a common interest which they pursue somewhat unconsciously. Such groups may have unconscious collective ends.
- 10.
See (Elster 1989).
- 11.
At a presentation she gave at Delft University of Technology in June 2010 at which I was present.
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Miller, S. (2023). Joint Actions: We-Mode and I-Mode. In: Garcia-Godinez, M., Mellin, R. (eds) Tuomela on Sociality. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_4
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