Abstract
Biometrics covers a variety of technologies used for the identification and authentication of individuals based on their behavioral and biological characteristics. A number of new biometric technologies have been developed, taking advantage of our improved understanding of the human body and advanced sensing techniques. They are increasingly being automated to eliminate the need for human verification. As computational power and techniques improve and the resolution of camera images increases, it seems clear that many benefits could be derived through the application of a wider range of biometric techniques for security and surveillance purposes in Europe. Facial recognition technology (FRT) makes it possible to compare digital facial images to determine whether they are of the same person. However, there are many difficulties in using such evidence to secure convictions in criminal cases. Some are related to the technical shortcomings of facial biometric systems, which impact their utility as an undisputed identification system and as reliable evidence; others pertain to legal challenges in terms of data privacy and dignity rights. While FRT is coveted as a mechanism to address the perceived need for increased security, there are concerns that the absence of sufficiently stringent regulations endangers fundamental rights to human dignity and privacy. In fact, its use presents a unique host of legal and ethical concerns. The lack of both transparency and lawfulness in the acquisition, processing and use of personal data can lead to physical, tangible and intangible damages, such as identity theft, discrimination or identity fraud, with serious personal, economic or social consequences. Evidence obtained by unlawful means can also be subject to challenge when adduced in court. This paper looks at the technical and legal challenges of automated FRT, focusing on its use for law enforcement and forensic purposes in criminal matters. The combination of both technical and legal approaches is necessary to recognize and identify the main potential risks arising from the use of FRT, in order to prevent possible errors or misuses due both to technological misassumptions and threats to fundamental rights, particularly—but not only—the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. On the one hand, a good part of the controversies and contingencies surrounding the credibility and reliability of automated FRT is intimately related to their technical shortcomings. On the other hand, data protection, database custody, transparency, accountability and trust are relevant legal issues that might raise problems when using FRT. The aim of this paper is to improve the usefulness of automated FRT in criminal investigations and as forensic evidence within the criminal procedure.
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Notes
- 1.
FRT in relation to criminal investigations has been implemented in 11 EU member states and in two international police cooperation organizations, Europol and Interpol. Currently, 7 member states expect to implement it until 2022 (TELEFI, 2021, p. 22). FRT is much more frequent in the USA. Already in 2012 the FBI launched the Interstate Photo System Facial Recognition Pilot project in three states, a system fully deployed as of June 2014, now integrated in the Next Generation Identification System, which provides the US criminal justice community with the world’s largest electronic repository of biometric and criminal history information. For other applications at state and local level, see New York City Bar Association (2020).
- 2.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/89.
- 3.
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L119/89.
- 4.
This section concentrates on system vulnerabilities which are part of the biometric processing itself. Since biometric systems are implemented on server computers, they are vulnerable to all cryptographic, virus and other attacks which plague any computer system. For example, biometric data may be stored locally on hardware within the organization, or externally at an unknown location within the cloud (Tomova, 2009), both vulnerable to hacking. The training dataset may be subject to intentional manipulations, such as data poisoning attacks (Papernot et al., 2018) and backdoor injections (Chen et al., 2017). Vulnerabilities of data storage concern modifying the storage (adding, modifying or removing templates or raw data), copying data for secondary uses (identity theft or directly inputting the information at another stage of the system to achieve authentication) and modifying the identity to which the biometric is assigned. We are aware of these issues, but do not intend to cover them in this paper.
- 5.
For example, in S & Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581, the European Court on Human Rights found the retention by the British police of DNA samples of individuals who had been arrested but had later been acquitted, or who had had the charges against them dropped, to be a violation of their right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR (Sampson 2018). Furthermore, in some EU member states the indefinite retention of biometric samples, including DNA evidence and fingerprints of data subjects, has been successfully challenged, except for in exceptional circumstances. See, for the (pre-Brexit) UK, R (on the application of GC & C) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21. Also in the UK the High Court of Justice (England and Wales) was called upon to determine whether the current legal regime in that country was ‘adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-arbitrary use of automated facial recognition in a free and civilized society’. In R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of the South Wales Police [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin), the judgment was that the use of FRT was not ‘in accordance with law’ and implied a breach of Article 8 (1) and (2) ECHR and of data protection law, and it failed to comply with the public sector equality duty.
- 6.
The Constitutional Court in France stated that the keeping of a database with biometric identity information allowing identification interferes with the fundamental right to respect of privacy. Cons. const. (France) no. 2012–652, 22 March 2012 (Loi protection de l’identité), Article 6.
- 7.
ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 2008, Articles 84 and 86.
- 8.
ECtHR, M.K. v. France, no.19522/09, 18 April 2013, Articles 44–46 (‘ECtHR, M.K. 2013’).
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Faraldo Cabana, P. (2023). Technical and Legal Challenges of the Use of Automated Facial Recognition Technologies for Law Enforcement and Forensic Purposes. In: Završnik, A., Simončič, K. (eds) Artificial Intelligence, Social Harms and Human Rights. Critical Criminological Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19149-7_2
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