Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Metaphors, Dead and Alive

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind

  • 225 Accesses

Abstract

This paper examins how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. I will argue that Ockham’s conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley’s conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    On medieval views on the origin of language(s), see, e.g., Eco 1993; Ashworth 2013b.

  2. 2.

    Jennifer Ashworth has provided excellent surveys on this matter. See Ashworth 1991, 2007, 2013a. See also Purcell 1987 for the increasing use of transumptio for metaphor instead of metalepsis in the thirteenth century.

  3. 3.

    “[…] de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui: uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. […] Et similiter dicendum est de nomine ‘lucis’. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in senu visu: postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamucumque cognitionem.—Si ergo accipitur nomen ‘luminis’ secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur […] Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.”

  4. 4.

    For metaphora connected to translatio/translative, see Aquinas 1970, 202a: De veritate 7.2. For the pair metaphora–transumptio/transumptive see Dahan 2009, 261–262.

  5. 5.

    See Is 35:1 in Aquinas 1974, 153: Exp. Iasia 35: “letabitur deserta et inuia, et exultabit solitudo et florebit quasi lilium.” Aquinas comments (ibid., 153): “Primo (ed. add. ponit) hominum iocunditatem, quam comparat prato florenti, quod etiam ridens dicitur, quod quidem habet pulcritudinem in flore.” Also Aquinas 1892, 132: ST I-II.88.1 seems to allude to the Isaiah passage.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Reginaldo of Piperno’s reportatio of Aquinas’ Super I Cor. 11.2 (Aquinas 2019, n. 87584): “Dicendum quod in omni figurata locutione, commune est quod sensus non est ille quem primo aspectu verba praetendunt, sed ille quod ille qui loquitur significare intendit, sicut si dicam: pratum ridet, non est sensus huius locutionis quod illud pratum rideat, sed illud quod ego significare intendo, scilicet quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret sicut homo cum ridet. Hoc etiam modo se habet in locutionibus ironicis: cum enim non intendo hoc quod verba praetendunt significare, sed contrarium, ille est verus sensus quem ego intendo, et ideo nihil falsitatis est ibi.”

  7. 7.

    Of course, Aquinas uses the distinction between first and second imposition but in a different sense and in line with the common medieval distinction between first and second intentions. A second imposition is the case when words are imposed for words (Aquinas 1929, 624: Super Sent. I.26.1.1ad3).

  8. 8.

    “Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinaretur uni conceptui et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad aliquid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem imponitur illi alteri, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine ‘homo’. Primo enim imponebatur ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu ‘animal rationale’, postea autem utentes, videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quandoque hoc nomine ‘homo’ pro tali imagine, ita quod nisi hoc nomen ‘homo’ fuisset primo impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponeret hoc nomen ‘homo’ ad significandum vel standum pro tali imagine” (trans. Spade 1995, 34, slightly modified).

  9. 9.

    “[…] potest aliquis imponere hoc nomen ‘a’ ad significandum quodcumque animal quod occurret sibi cras. Hoc facto, distincte significat illud animal, et significabit apud omnes volentes uti voce sicut imposita est, quantumcumque illud imponens non distincte intelligat, nec forte distincte intelliget quando sibi occurret.” Ockham 1979b, 47: Ord. 22.

  10. 10.

    I am following Schierbaum 2014, 82–87 here, but with one qualification. According to her, subordination should in no sense be thought of as a mental activity. If it were, the only way to subordinate a word to a concept would be by imposition, but this does not seem to be entirely Ockham’s view; see below.

  11. 11.

    It is open to discussion what exactly Ockham means by a change of the concept’s natural signification. See Schierbaum’s discussion in Schierbaum 2014, 87–92. Ockham himself gives the example that a concept (and thus the subordinated word) loses its signification when all of its individual significates cease to exist; see Ockham 1978a, 347: In De int., prooem. 2.

  12. 12.

    The example of a dead man goes back to Aristotle and inspired the popular sophism of the dead man alive; see Ebbesen 1979. Ockham mentions the dead man as an example of metaphorical speech but without referring to imposition; see Ockham 1974, 758: SL 3-4.3.

  13. 13.

    “Ex hoc enim quod est aliqua similitudo inter duas res, vox quae imponitur uni transfertur ad aliud, ut quia sicut pes animalis substat animali, sic lignum substat ponti, et hoc nomen ‘pes’ imponitur ad significandum pedem animalis, transumitur tamen hoc nomen ‘pes’ ad significandum lignum substans ponti. Sed hoc non est ex impositione, quia imponitur totaliter ad placitum; modo quod ‘pes’ significet tale lignum vel pro tali accipiatur, ad hoc intellectus quodammodo ratione ducitur, et ideo non est impositio sed transumptio” (trans. Ashworth 2013c, 146, slightly modified).

  14. 14.

    Like Ockham, Burley claims that our words directly signify things, not our concepts of things. However, they disagree about whether the things directly signified by words are particular objects or their common natures. Ockham holds the former, Burley the latter. Burley on signification, see Cesalli 2013, 93–99. For a comparison of their views on signification see Dutilh-Novaes 2013, 74–79.

  15. 15.

    From an exegetical point of view, one finds both aspects in Boethius, that is, the user’s reason and will; however, Boethius does not mention imposition, see Boethius 1891, 166: In Cat. 1. The larger background, of course, is the dispute between linguistic naturalism and conventionalism, which we already encounter in Plato’s Cratylus.

  16. 16.

    “Vel dicendum (et melius) quod propria significatio dicitur dictionis quam recipit usus communiter. Unde quod modo per aliquam dictionem significatur transsumptive, cum usus inoleverit, significabitur proprie, et tunc erit dictio equivoca quoad primum modum. Et ideo […] contingit sic significationem que non est modo propria, sed transsumptiva, fieri postea propriam per frequentem usum” (trans. Copenhaver et al., slightly modified).

  17. 17.

    “Vix etiam est aliquod vocabulum, quin in libris auctorum aliquando sumatur proprie et secundum suam primam significationem, et aliquando improprie et metaphorice et secundum significationem impropriam.”

  18. 18.

    Recall that Ockham relates Aristotle’s second mode of equivocation with Boethius’ deliberate equivocals. See also ibid., 22–23: In SE 2.2.8. For improper supposition, see Ockham 1974, 236–237: SL 1.77.

  19. 19.

    “Istis modis et multis aliis possunt dictiones a proripa significatione tranferri ad impropriam, cuiusmodi translationis grammatici diversas docent species. Inter quas continentur istae: metaphora, synecdoche, metonymia, antonomasia, emphasis, catachresis, metalempsis, anthropopathos, onomatopoeia, phantasia, paralange et multae aliae […]. Et nota quod aequivocum tale, iuxta istum secundum modum, vacatur a Boethio aequivocum a consilio.”

  20. 20.

    “[…] scriptores veteres, quia tam profunditate scientae quam splendore eloquentiae praepollebant, necesse fuit eos propter ornatum eloquii per diversa vocabula et varias dictionem orationum formas suam intentionem exprimere […].”

  21. 21.

    “Videtur autem alius esse modus aequiuocationis quem Aristoteles omnino non recipit. Nam sicut dicitur pes hominis, ita quoque dicitur pes nauis, et pes montis, quae huiusmodi omnia secundum translationem dicuntur. Neque enim omnis translatio ab aequiuocatione seiungitur sed ea tantum cum ad res habentes positum uocabulum, ab alia iam nominata re nomen ornatus causa transfertur, ut quia iam dicitur quidam auriga, dicitur etiam gubernator, si quis ornatus gratia cum qui gubernator est dicat aurigam, non erit auriga nomen aequiuocum, licet diuersa, id est, moderatorem currus nauisque significet. Sed quoties res quidem uocabulo eget, ab alia uero re quae uocabulum sumit, tunc ista translatio aequiuocationis retinet proprietatem, ut ex homine uiuo ad picturam nomen hominis dictum est.”

  22. 22.

    “Sed vox fit nota rei […] ex transumptione autem ut quando vox imponitur rei primo in ratione signi et sub propria ratione, deinde, propter similitudinem rei illius cui primo imponebatur vel propter proportionem vel relationem quam habet ad aliquam aliam rem transumitur ista vox ad aliquid aliud repraesentandum, ut patet: ‘ridere’ enim proprie attribuitur et ex impositione significat risum hominis, propter quandam similitudinem huius actus ad florere transumitur haec vox ‘ridere’ ad repraesentandum vel significandum florere.”

  23. 23.

    “[…] quando sermonem exornamus […] non novam impositionem vocis facimus […] Quod itaque in ‘auriga’ vel in ‘ridere’ quandoque aliud intelligimus ex adiunctis sibi, quam habeat eorum propria impositio, non est hoc aequivocationis multiplicitati deputandum.”

  24. 24.

    However, Abelard also saw that metaphorical expressions can also make their way into ordinary usage and thus get a “quasi-imposition” (Rosier-Catach 1991, 164). See also Martin 2011.

Bibliography

  • Abelard, Peter. 1921. Die Logica ‘Ingredientibus’. Glossen zu den Kategorien, ed. Bernhard Geyer. Aschendorff: Münster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas, Thomas. 1884. Commentaria in octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. In Opera omnia, vol. 2, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1888. Pars prima Summae theologiae, q. 1–49. In Opera omnia, vol. 4, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1889. Pars prima Summae theologiae, q. 50–119. In Opera omnia, vol. 5, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1892. Prima secundae Summae theologiae, q. 71–114. In Opera omnia, vol. 7, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1897. Secunda secundae Summae theologiae, q. 57–122. In Opera omnia, vol. 9, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1903. Tertia pars Summae theologiae, q. 1–59. In Opera omnia, vol. 11, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1929. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. Commentum in primum librum, ed. Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1970. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 1–7. In Opera omnia, vol. 22 1/2, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1974. Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram. In Opera omnia, vol. 28, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1976. De fallaciis. In Opera omnia, vol. 43, ed. Commissio Leonina, 383–418. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1989. Expositio libri Peryermenias. Editio altera retractata. In Opera omnia, vol. 1/1, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Commissio Leonina.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2019. Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura, cap. XI–XIII.9. Reportatio Reginaldi de Piperno. In Corpus Thomisticum, ed. Enrique Alarcón. corpusthomisticum.org/c1r.html.

  • Aristotle. 1961. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta. Translatio Boethii, Editio Composite, Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, Lemmata e Simplicii commentario decerpta, Pseudo-Augustini Paraphrasis Themistiana. In Aristoteles Latinus, vol. I, 1–5, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1968. De arte poetica. Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka. In Aristoteles Latinus, vol. XXXIII, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. Bruxelles: Desclée De Brouwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1975. De sophisticis elenchis. Translatio Boethii, Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeke. In Aristoteles Latinus, vol. VI, 1–3, ed. Bernard G. Dod. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ashworth, Jennifer E. 1980. Can I speak more clearly than I understand? A problem of religious language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham. Historia linguistica 7: 29–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1991. Equivocation and analogy in fourteenth-century logic. Ockham, Burley and Buridan. In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta, 23–43. Amsterdam: Grüner.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2007. Metaphor and the logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan. Vivarium 45: 311–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013a. Analogy and metaphor from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and Walter Burley. In Later mediaeval metaphysics. Ontology, language, and logic, ed. Charles Boylard and Rondo Keele, 223–248 and 291–299. New York: Fordham University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013b. Aquinas, Scotus and others on naming, knowing, and the origin of language. In Logic and language in the middle ages: A volume in honour of Sten Ebbesen, ed. Jakob L. Fink, Heine Hansen, and Ana Mariá Mora-Márquez, 257–272. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2013c. Being and analogy. In A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 135–165. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bacon, Roger. 1988. Compendium studii theologiae, ed. Thomas S. Maloney. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boethius. 1891. In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor. In Migne Patrologia Latina, vol. 64, 159–294. Paris: Garnier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burley, Walter. 1967. Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis. Venice, 1497. Repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2003a. Expositio vetus super librum Praedicamentorum, ed. Mischa von Perger. Franciscan Studies 61: 55–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2003b. Super tractatum fallaciarum, ed. Sten Ebbesen. Cahiers de l’institut du moyen-âge grec et latin 74: 197–207.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2005. Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos 4-12, ed. Sten Ebbesen. Cahiers de l’institut du moyen-âge grec et latin 76: 239–281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cesalli, Laurent. 2013. Meaning and truth. In A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 87–133. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahan, Gilbert. 2009. Saint Thomas d’Aquin et la métaphore. Rhétorique et herméneutique. Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale 18(2008): 85–118. Repr. Dahan, Gilbert. Lire la bible au Moyen Âge: essais d’herméneutique médiévale, Geneva: Droz, 249–282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, Donald. 1978. What metaphors mean. Critical Inquiry 5 (1): 31–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina. 2013. The Ockham-Burley dispute. In A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 49–84. Leiden: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebbesen, Sten. 1979. The dead man is alive. Synthese 40: 43–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eco, Umberto. 1993. La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea. Rome: Laterza.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, Herbert Paul. 1969. Utterer’s meaning and intentions. The Philosophical Review 68: 147–177.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, Christopher G. 2011. “What an ugly child”. Abaelard on translation, figurative language, and logic. Vivarium 49: 26–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ockham, William. 1967. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, prol., d. 1. In Opera theologica, vol. 1., ed. Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown, St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1970. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, d. 2–3. In Opera theologica, vol. 2, ed. Stephen Brown and Gedeon Gál. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1974. Summa logicae. In Opera philosophica, vol. 1, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál, and Stephen Brown. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1978a. Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis. In Opera philosophica, vol. 2, ed. Angelo Gambatese and Stephen Brown, 345–504. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1978b. Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis. In Opera philosophica, vol. 2, ed. Gedeon Gál, 135–339. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979a. Expositio super libros elenchorum. In Opera philosophica, vol. 3, ed. Francesco del Punta. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979b. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, d. 19–48. In Opera theologica, vol. 4, ed. Gerald Etzkorn and Francis E. Kelley. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1980. Quodlibeta septem. In Opera theologica, vol. 9, ed. Joseph C. Wey. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1984. Quaestiones variae. In Opera theologica, vol. 8, ed. Gerald Etzkorn, Francis E. Kelley, and Joseph C. Wey. St. Bonaventure, N.Y: The Franciscan Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Panaccio, Claude. 2015. Ockham’s externalism. In Intentionality, cognition, and mental representation in medieval philosophy, ed. Gyula Klima, 166–185. New York: Fordham University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Peter of Spain. 2014. Summulae logicales. Summaries of logic. Text, translation, introduction, and notes, ed. Brian P. Copenhaver, Calvin Normore, and Terence Parsons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Purcell, William. 1987. Transsumptio. A rhetorical doctrine of the thirteenth century. Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 5: 369–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosier-Catach, Irène. 1991. La notion de translatio, le principe de compositionalité et l’analyse de la prédication accidentelle chez Abélard. In Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIe siècle, ed. Joël Biard, 125–164. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1997. Prata rident. In Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet, ed. Alain de Libera, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, and Alain Galonnier, 155–176. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schierbaum, Sonja. 2010. Knowing lions and understanding ‘lion’: Two jobs for concepts in Ockham? Vivarium 48: 327–348.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. Ockham’s assumption of mental speech. Thinking in a world of particulars. Leiden: Brill.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Spade, Paul Vincent. 1995. William of Ockham. From his Summa of logic, part I, pvspade.com/Logic/docs/ockham.pdf.

  • de Wyk, Thomas. 1997. Fallaciae, ed. Sten Ebbesen, “Texts on equivocation. Part II. Ca. 1250–1310”. Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-âge Grec et Latin 67: 139–143.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany

    Martin Klein

Authors
  1. Martin Klein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Martin Klein .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Mount St. Mary#x2019;s University, Emmitsburg, MD, USA

    Joshua P. Hochschild

  2. University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA

    Turner C. Nevitt

  3. Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, USA

    Adam Wood

  4. Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

    Gábor Borbély

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Klein, M. (2023). Metaphors, Dead and Alive. In: Hochschild, J.P., Nevitt, T.C., Wood, A., Borbély, G. (eds) Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 242. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation