Abstract
The present chapter analyses the normative response of Portugal to the coronavirus crisis. As in other European Member States, the reaction to the pandemic was developed through a combination of enactment of the constitutional state of emergency with the statutory administrative emergency regime. Under both frameworks, there has been a strengthening of the executive at the expense of a parliamentary retreat. This chapter covers both responses to the pandemic and their shortcomings, mainly regarding the lack of democratic legitimation of the fight against the pandemic in face of a parliamentary circumvention and abdication.
The research leading to this chapter has been funded by the German Research Foundation/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in the framework of the Emmy-Noether-Project on “Transnational Solidarity Conflicts”.
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Notes
- 1.
Frankenberg (2019), p. 15.
- 2.
For a typology of emergency powers, see Ferejohn and Pasquino (2014).
- 3.
Novais (2021).
- 4.
Articles 164 and 165 of the Constitution. Unless otherwise specified, quotation of normative provisions refers to the constitutional text.
- 5.
The distinction between abstract and concrete review will be explained subsequently.
- 6.
Different normative possibilities have been identified in other States such as measures adopted by the executive under urgent or exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. This hypothesis lacks constitutional basis in Portugal. On this, see Diaz Crego and Kotanidis (2020).
- 7.
On the administrative state of necessity, see Gomes (2020b).
- 8.
Law 27/2006, of 3 July 2006, last amended by Law 80/2015, of 3 August 2015.
- 9.
Gomes (2020a), p. 69.
- 10.
Law 95/2019, of 4 September 2019.
- 11.
It is controversial that there is legal basis for confinement and general and compulsory quarantines of non-sick persons, as well as compulsory hospitalisation of patients outside the framework of a constitutional state of emergency. See Novais (2020).
- 12.
Law 81/2009, of 21 August 2009.
- 13.
Schmitt (2005), p. 5.
- 14.
Vermeule and Posner (2011).
- 15.
Influenced by the dramatic experience with the use of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. This provision warranted the President of the Reich vast emergency powers that availed the legal establishment of the national socialist regime. See Agamben (2005), pp. 14–15.
- 16.
Specifically, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark. See Diaz Crego and Kotanidis (2020).
- 17.
Ferejohn and Pasquino (2014), p. 215.
- 18.
Article 19(3) of the Portuguese Constitution.
- 19.
The Law on the State of Siege and State of Emergency – Law 44/86, of 30 September 1986 (last amended by Organic Law 1/2012, of 11 May) further details the circumstances in which the state of siege or the state of emergency applies. Cases of “military aggression” and “disruption of the constitutional order” fall under the state of siege whereas situations of “public calamity” are reserved for the state of emergency. That explains why, in the context of this chapter, we speak essentially of the constitutional state of emergency.
- 20.
Article 19(5).
- 21.
Articles 172(1) and 289 and Article 9(1) of the Referendum Organic Law – Law 15-A/98, of 3 April 1998 (last amended by Organic Law 4/2020, of 11 November 2020.
- 22.
Article 19(6).
- 23.
Article 138.
- 24.
Article 17 of the Law on the State of Siege and the State of Emergency.
- 25.
Botelho (2020), p. 68.
- 26.
Article 6 of the Law on the State of Siege and the State of Emergency.
- 27.
Article 19(7).
- 28.
Frankenberg (2014), p. 100.
- 29.
Decree-Law 10-A/2020, of 13 March 2020.
- 30.
- 31.
Botelho (2020), p. 71 ff.
- 32.
Kaiser (2020), p. 13. When the Eurocrisis first struck Portugal there was a discussion on the legal literature whether the situation of financial distress should be articulated under a state of financial exception. See Urbano (2013). The Portuguese Constitutional Court dismissed any controversies in this regard in Decision 353/2012, as it affirmed the following: “The Constitution certainly cannot remain unaware of the economic and financial reality, and in particular of a situation that can be considered to be of serious difficulty. But it has a specific normative autonomy that prevents economic or financial objectives from prevailing, without any limits, over parameters such as equality, which the Constitution defends and must enforce.”
- 33.
There was a strong controversy among scholars on whether the suspension of the right or freedom to travel would provide sufficient legal basis for the compulsory confinement. The difficulty lies in the apparent fact that the Portuguese constitutional text, on the regulation of the right to freedom (Article 27), does not allow for the compulsory internment of carriers of a contagious disease or the confinement of non-sick people. See Novais (2020), de Brito (2020), Alexandrino (2020), Ramião (2020).
- 34.
The suspension of the freedom of worship was criticised due to its connection to the freedom of religion, a right that cannot be suspended according to Article 19(6). See Gouveia (2020b), p. 100.
- 35.
The suspension of the right of resistance was subject to criticism since it is considered an implicit limit to the constitutional exception as a last resort means of defense against unconstitutional suspensions of rights. See Canotilho and Moreira (2007), p. 422, Gouveia (2020a), p. 293, Gouveia (2020b), pp. 100–101, Ramião (2020), pp. 14–15, Sánchez (2021b), p. 772. Perhaps acknowledging the criticism, in the subsequent renewals of the original declaration, the right of resistance was no longer formally suspended but regulated to prevent any act exclusively directed against lawful orders issued by public authorities in the execution of the state of emergency.
- 36.
For a strong critique, see Terrinha (2019), p. 195 ff.
- 37.
Article 162(b).
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
Kaiser (2020), pp. 247–248.
- 41.
See Böckenförde (2017), pp. 120–121.
- 42.
Frankenberg (2014), p. 189 ff.
- 43.
Following Article 28 of the Law on the State of Siege and State of Emergency.
- 44.
See the poignant analysis by Sánchez (2021b).
- 45.
This deliberation is not public.
- 46.
Violante and Lanceiro (2020).
- 47.
Article 191(1).
- 48.
Articles 156(d) and 177(2).
- 49.
Article 180(2)(d).
- 50.
Article 180(2)(j).
- 51.
The most significant exception concerns the mandatory use of masks in public spaces which was required by parliamentary law. See Law 62-A/2020, of 27 October 2020, subsequently renewed by Law 75-D/2020, of 31 December 2020, Law 13-A/2021, of 5 April 2021, and Law 36-A/2021, of 14 June 2021. More recently, see Law 88/2021, 15 December 2021. Mandatory use of mask indoor is required by undelegated governmental legislation. See Article 13-B of Decree Law 10-A/2020, of 13 March 2020, last amended by Decree Law 6-A/2022, of 7 January 2022.
- 52.
In Portugal, the Government enjoys three types of legislative competence: (i) reserved or exclusive (includes matters relating to its own organisation and functioning—Article 198(2)); (ii) concurrent (includes matters not reserved to the Assembly of the Republic—Article 198(1)(a)); (iii) authorised or derived (includes matters in the relative reserve of the Assembly of the Republic, subject to its authorization or delegation—Article 198(1)(b) of the Constitution); (iv) complementary or developmental (decree-laws developing the principles or general bases of the regimes of the Republic—Article 198(1)(c) of the Constitution). (iv) complementary or developmental (decree-laws developing the principles or general bases of the legal systems contained in laws that are limited to them—Article 198(1)(c) of the Portuguese Constitution).
- 53.
Although the Parliament remains the primary legislator considering the constitutional division of powers, empirically the Government authors most of the legislation. Furthermore, the most significant legislative reforms have been introduced by governmental decrees (decree-laws). See Otero (2010), p. 232. For a critical account, see Alexandrino (2018), pp. 210–215.
- 54.
Alexandrino (2018), p. 215.
- 55.
Article 278(1).
- 56.
Article 136(4) a contrario.
- 57.
If a court disapplies a provision entailed in a resolution of the Council of Minister such decision is not subject to mandatory appeal to the Constitutional Court by the Public Prosecutor. See Article 72(3) of the Act on the Constitutional Court (Law 28/82, of 15 November 1982). It is also not reviewable by the Constitutional Court under ex ante or a priori proceedings. See Article 278(1).
- 58.
Frankenberg (2014), pp. 203–204.
- 59.
See Article 6-A of Law 1-A/2020, of 19 March 2020.
- 60.
See OSCE (2020), p. 32.
- 61.
Judgment Case No 0122/20.1BALSB (10 September 2020) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 62.
Judgment Case No 088/20.8BALSB (31 October 2020) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 63.
Ordered by Resolution of the Council of Ministers 89-A/2020 on 26 October 2020.
- 64.
Judgment Case No 01958/20.9BELSB (31 October 2020) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 65.
Determined by Decree No 3-C/2021, of 22 January, 2021.
- 66.
Judgment Case No 012/21.0BALSB (5 February 2021) (Supreme Administrative Court); Judgment Case No 0136/20.1BALSB (18 February 2021) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 67.
Judgment Case No 088/20.8BALSB (31 October 2020) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 68.
Judgment Case No 086/21.4BALSB (27 June 2021) (Supreme Administrative Court). Judgment Case No 085/21.6BALSB (27 June 2021).
- 69.
Judgment Case No 0105/21.4BALSB (24 August 2021) (Supreme Administrative Court).
- 70.
Dyzenhaus (2006), p. 47.
- 71.
In Germany, a similar criticism is made in relation to the review of sanitary measures by administrative courts at least as to what concerns restrictions of gatherings. See Arzt (2022).
- 72.
On this, see Bargado (2020), p. 293 ff.
- 73.
Garoupa et al. (2019), p. 248.
- 74.
The case is still pending. The referral was submitted on 20 November 2020 and can be accessed at https://www.provedor-jus.pt/documentos/2020_11_20_Tribunal_Constitucional.pdf. (access 1 May 2022).
- 75.
Judgment 468/2022.
- 76.
Judgments 424/2020 and 687/2020.
- 77.
- 78.
Meaning that it does not produce erga omnes effect and is only binding in the dispute at stake. For an overview of the Portuguese system of constitutional review, see Cortês and Violante (2011).
- 79.
- 80.
Judgment 477/2022.
- 81.
Judgments 88/2022, 89/2022, 510/2022.
- 82.
Judgments 465/2022, 466/2022, 489/2022, 490/2022.
- 83.
See Order of the Third Chamber of the First Senate of 7 April 2020 – 1 BvR 755/20; see also Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 1 May 2020 – 1 BvR 996/20; Order of the Second Chamber of the First Senate of 3 June 2020 – 1 BvR 990/20.
- 84.
See Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 17 April 2020 – 1 BvQ 37/20; see also Order of the First Chamber of the First Senate of 15 April 2020 – 1 BvR 828/20.
- 85.
See Order of the Second Chamber of the First Senate of 29 April 2020 – 1 BvQ 44/20.
- 86.
Kaiser and Hensel (2020).
- 87.
Decision of the First Senate of 19 November 2021 – 1 BvR 781/21 et. al.
- 88.
Decision of the First Senate of 19 November 2021 – 1 BvR971/21, 1 BvR 1069/21.
- 89.
Order of the First Senate of 16 December 2021 – 1 BvR 1541/20.
- 90.
- 91.
Gonçalves (2020).
- 92.
Gonçalves (2020).
- 93.
Möllers (2013), p. 118.
- 94.
- 95.
Provedor de Justiça (2021), p. 42.
- 96.
Möllers (2013), p. 118.
- 97.
Möllers (2013), p. 117.
- 98.
Sánchez (2021b), p. 782.
- 99.
Diário da República, I Série, Parte C, n.° 131, 8 July 2021, pp. 24–25.
- 100.
The draft is available at https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=%3d%3dBQAAAB%2bLCAAAAAAABAAzNLKwNAQAqW9jdQUAAAA%3d (accessed 16 August 2022).
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Violante, T. (2022). The COVID-19 Pandemic and the State of Emergency: Lessons from Portugal. In: Chrysogonos, K., Tsiftsoglou, A. (eds) Democracy after Covid. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13901-7_2
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