Abstract
Contemporary feminist scholarship has highlighted the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy for feminist theory and politics. Hegel’s reception in the fields of postcolonial studies, decolonial studies, and critical philosophy of race did not encounter a similar fortune. Most of the contributions from these fields, instead, have polemically engaged with Hegel’s works, with the purpose to elucidate the crucial role that his philosophy played in the conceptualization of racial hierarchies and colonial Eurocentrism that underlie the master narrative of Western modernity. After reconstructing Hegel’s discourse on race(s) across his anthropology, philosophy of history and philosophy of right, this chapter draws on contemporary feminist approaches to Hegel with the aim of examining to what extent such feminist readings may help outlining textual and conceptual strategies for addressing the Hegelian corpus so as to make his contribution valuable for contemporary critical philosophies of race and antiracist theories and practices.
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Notes
- 1.
Susan M. Easton, “Hegel and Feminism,” in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London/New York/Sidney: Croom Helm, 1987), 30–55; Patricia J. Mills, Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); Antoinette M. Stafford, “The Feminist Critique Of Hegel On Women And The Family,” Animus, no. 2 (1997): 64–92; Alison Stone, “Ethical Implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2002): 243–260; Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, ed., Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought. Beyond Antigone? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).
- 2.
Luce Irigaray, “The Eternal Irony of the Community,” in Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian. C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 214–226; Patricia J. Mills, Hegel’s Antigone, The Owl of Minerva, Vol. 17, no. 2 (1986): 131–152; Patricia J. Mills, Women, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Seyla Benhabib, “On Hegel, Women and Irony,” in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, ed. Molly Shanley and Carole Pateman (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), 129–146; Kelly Oliver, “Antigone’s Ghost: Undoing Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”, Hypatia 11, no.1 (1996): 67–90.
- 3.
Nancy Bauer, Kimberly Hutchings, Tuija Pulkkinen, Alison Stone, “Debating Hegel’s Legacy for Contemporary Feminist Politics”, in Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, ed., Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought. Beyond Antigone? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 236.
- 4.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011); M. A. R. Habib, Hegel and Empire: From Postcolonialism to Globalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
- 5.
See Rocío Zambrana, “Hegel, History, and Race,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, ed. Naomi Zack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 251–260.
- 6.
See note 3.
- 7.
Robert Bernasconi, “Hegel at the Court of Ashanti,” in Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett (New York: Routledge, 1998), 41–63; Robert Bernasconi, “With what must the philosophy of world history begin? On the racial basis of Hegel’s eurocentrism,” Nineteenth-Century Contexts 22 (2000): 171–201; Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 35–64; Allegra De Laurentiis, “Race in Hegel : Text and Context,” in Philosophie nach Kant: Neue Wege zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental—und Moralphilosophie, ed. Mario Egger (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014): 591–624; Michael H. Hoffheimer, “Hegel, race, genocide,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001): 35–62; Darrel Moellendorf, “Racism and rationality in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit,” History of Political Thought 13 (1992): 243–255; Joseph Mc Carney, Hegel on History (London/New York: Routledge, 2000); Joseph Mc Carney, “Hegel’s racism? A response to Bernasconi,” Radical Philosophy 119 (2003): 32–35; Jong Seok Na, “The Dark Side of Hegel’s Theory of Modernity: Race and the Other”, Esercizi Filosofici 14 (2019): 49–71; Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
- 8.
In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right Hegel does not refer to “race(s)” explicitly, however, as the chapter aims at showing, the “history of the Spirit” summarized at the end of the Grundlinien contributes to sustain the conceptual architecture of Hegel’s racial discourse. See in particular § 346 (HW 7: 505).
- 9.
In the Encyclopaedia’s “Anthropology”, Hegel primarily uses the word Rasse to refer to “race”. Geschlecht appears only occasionally as in relation to (Native) Americans that he describes as a “vanishing, feeble race” [ein verschwindendes schwaches Geschlecht] (HW 10: 63)—or in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History where Hegel refers to the Orientals as “ein einförmiges Geschlecht” (HW 12: 277). Menschengeschlecht usually stands for “mankind/human race”, as well as Menschengattung. Sometimes, however, Hegel refers to Menschengattungen (Z §395; HW 10: 70) and Menschenrassen (Z §393, Z §396; HW 10: 58, 76) as plurals, or to Menschengattung as singular (Z §393; HW 10: 57) presupposing nevertheless a plurality and a hierarchy of Menschengattungen as in Z §393 where he speaks of the superiority of one human species over the other: “die geistige Überlegenheit der eninen Menschengattung über die andere” (HW 10: 57). Sandra Bonetto provides a different interpretation of Hegel’s semantics of race: “In Hegelian usage Rasse/Geschlecht (race) may be regarded as cognate with Nation insofar as it denotes a group of individuals that are descendants of the same family, house, or tribe, united by common ancestry or blood relationship. […] Thus, while there is only one human species (Gattung or Menschengattung), there are natural differences between various populations within the species determined by geographical factors,” Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 39.
- 10.
See § 390 where Hegel writes “But the natural determinacy of soul is to be conceived as a totality, as a copy of the concept. The first stage here is therefore the entirely universal, qualitative determinations of soul. Here belong especially the racial differences, both physical and mental, of humanity and also the differences of national spirit [die Unterschiede der Nationalgeister]” (HW 10: 50; trans. modified, emph. added). Hegel seems to establish a correspondence between racial varieties, on the one hand, and people/nations on the other hand. This aspect also finds evidence in the following passage at § 394, where Hegel explains that “This differentiation descends into particularities, which may be termed local spirits [Lokalgeister], shown in the outward modes of life, occupation, bodily structure and disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and ethical character of the peoples [des intelligenten und sittlichen Charakters],” (HW 10: 63; trans. modified, emph. added). In the Zusatz of §394 Hegel emphasizes further the particularization of the racial difference into “the plurality of local or national spirits” [in die Mannigfaltigkeit der Lokal- oder Nationalgeister] (HW 10: 63–64; trans. modified).
- 11.
Hegel establishes also a clear correspondence between racial and geographical differences. As we read in the addition to § 393, “The difference between the races of mankind is still a natural difference, that is, a difference that initially concerns the natural soul. As such, the difference is connected with the geographical differences of the territory where human beings congregate in large masses” (HW 10: 58; emph. added). Moreover, in the same Zusatz to § 393 he adds that “After having thus attempted to show that the differences between the continents are not contingent but necessary, we wish to determine, in a physical and spiritual respect, the racial diversities of humanity connected with these geographical differences” (HW 10: 58; emph. added). A paradigmatic case is the description of the African race (Afrikanische Rasse): “their mind is entirely dormant, it remains sunk within itself, it makes no progress, and thus corresponds to the compact, undifferentiated mass of the African land (HW 10: 60, 65).
- 12.
See Michael H. Hoffheimer, “Hegel, race, genocide,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 39 (2001): 35–62. With regards to Hegel’s rapprochement between races and peoples/nations, it is interesting to note that he speaks of the Negroes (Neger) as a Kindernation (HW 10: 59). Undoubtedly, Hegel never equates Völker and races, however he comstantly establishes correspondences that assign peoples to races.
- 13.
Robert Bernasconi, “With what must the philosophy of world history begin? On the racial basis of Hegel’s eurocentrism,” Nineteenth-Century Contexts 22 (2000): 171–201; Darrel Moellendorf, “Racism and rationality in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit,” History of Political Thought 13 (1992): 243–255.
- 14.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Vol. 1. Manuscripts of the introduction and the lectures of 1822–23 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 201.
- 15.
According to Hegel, the characterization of the multiplicity of local or national spirits concerns both natural history and the philosophy of history (Z § 394): “The naturalness of the spirit does not have the power to assert itself as the pure copy of the determinations of the concept; it proceeds to a further particularization of these universal differences and so descends into the plurality of local or national spirits. The detailed characterization of these spirits belongs partly to the natural history of man and partly to the philosophy of world history. The former science depicts the disposition of national character as affected by natural conditions, the bodily formation, the mode of life, occupation, and also the particular directions taken by the intelligence and the will of nations. Philosophy of history, by contrast, has as its object the world-historical significance of peoples, that is—if we take world history in the most comprehensive sense of the word—the highest development to which the original disposition of the national character attains, the most spiritual form to which the natural spirit dwelling in the nations ascends. Here in philosophical anthropology we cannot go into the details, the consideration of which is the responsibility of the two sciences just mentioned. We have here to consider national character only in so far as it contains the germ from which the history of nations develops. First and foremost it can be remarked that “national differences are just as fixed as the racial diversity of mankind … The unchangeableness of climate, of the whole character of the country in which a nation has its permanent abode, contributes to the unchangeableness of the national character” (HW 10: 44–45; trans. modified, emphasis added).
- 16.
Alison Stone, “Hegel and Colonialism,” Hegel Bulletin 41 (2020): 247–270.
- 17.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 324–351.
- 18.
Jong Seok Na, “The Dark Side of Hegel’s Theory of Modernity: Race and the Other”, Esercizi Filosofici 14 (2019): 49–71. See in particular: Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 35–64; Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005); Walter A. Kaufmann, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method,” The Philosophical Review 60, no. 4 (1951): 459–486; Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Terry Pinkard, Does History Make Sense? Hegel on the Historical Shapes of Justice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2017).
- 19.
Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 22–23.
- 20.
Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 493.
- 21.
Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 35–64.
- 22.
Ibid., 50. See also Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), 177.
- 23.
Ibid., 51–52.
- 24.
Philip J. Kain, Hegel and the Other: A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 254; Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 340. Susanne Lettow suggests that there is no opposition between the two claims, as indeed, Hegel’s geological account of “racial diversities” refers to contemporary earth sciences instead of biology. Lettow suggests that “On the one hand, Hegel explicitly rejects a proto-biological, genealogical understanding of race as based on reproduction and heredity. On the other hand, he introduces an understanding of genealogy according to which ‘races’ are produced and reproduced by the earth itself.” See Susanne Lettow, “Re-Articulating Genealogy. Hegel on Kinship, Race and Reproduction,” Hegel Bulletin 42, no. 2 (2021): 256–276.
- 25.
Joseph Mc Carney, Hegel on History (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 143.
- 26.
Darrel Moellendorf, “Racism and rationality in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit,” History of Political Thought 13 (1992): 243.
- 27.
Ibid., 243–255.
- 28.
Alison Stone, “Hegel and Colonialism,” Hegel Bulletin 41 (2020): 247–270.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
Robert Bernasconi, “A Reply to McCarney,” Radical Philosophy 119 (2003): 35–37; Joseph Mc Carney, “Hegel’s racism? A response to Bernasconi,” Radical Philosophy 119 (2003): 32–35.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 332.
- 34.
Ibid., 331.
- 35.
Ibid., 330. See also Jong-Seok Na, “The Dark Side of Hegel’s Theory of Modernity: Race and the Other,” Esercizi Filosofici 14 (2019): 69.
- 36.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 325.
- 37.
As Seyla Benhabib highlights, “Geist which emerges from nature, transforms nature into a second world; this ‘second nature’ comprises the human, historical world of tradition, institutions, laws, and practices (objektiver Geist), as well as the self-reflection of knowing and acting subjects upon objective spirit, which is embodied in works of art, religion and philosophy (absoluter Geist).” Yet, in spite of thinking of Hegel’s conception of nature as always already mediated by spirit, Benhabib wonders to what extent Hegel’s concept of the Geist allows him to overcome the naturalistic understanding of gender of the modern age and “place the relation between the sexes in the social, symbolic, historical, and cultural world.” Seyla Benhabib, “On Hegel, Women and Irony,” in Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 29.
- 38.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 330.
- 39.
An exception is the creation of the State of Haiti as a Christian State, that Hegel mentions in the Encyclopaedia (Z §393, HW 10: 60). Hegel states here that the Negroes “not only have they, here and there, adopted Christianity with the greatest gratitude and spoken with emotion of the freedom they have acquired through Christianity after a long spiritual servitude, but in Haiti they have even formed a state on Christian principles.” See Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 47.
- 40.
One can still speak of a heavily naturalistic grounding in relation to both Hegel’s conception of race and gender. Hegel affirms in the § 393 of the Encyclopaedia that “The difference between the races of mankind is still a natural difference, that is, a difference that initially concerns the natural soul,” (HW 10: 58); similarly, in the § 165 of the Philosophy of Right, he writes “The natural determinacy of the two sexes acquires an intellectual and ethical significance by virtue of its rationality” (HW 7: 318). See also Patricia J. Mills, Women, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 43. For a different account of Hegel’s understanding of gender and race, see: Sue Easton, “Slavery and Freedom: Towards a Feminist Reading of Hegel,” Politics, 5, no. 2 (1985): 22–28; Susanne Lettow, “Re-Articulating Genealogy. Hegel on Kinship, Race and Reproduction,” Hegel Bulletin 42, no. 2 (2021): 256–276. In particular, see again Bonetto’s thesis against biological readings of Hegel’s conception of race: “Unlike many early nineteenth century anatomists, notably Camper, Soemmering and Cuvier, Hegel did not regard cranial capacity as a marker of racial or cultural hierarchy. Again, attempts by these anatomists to demonstrate that Africans (the Ethiopian race), on the basis of the shape of their skull, are closer to the apes than to human beings, do not conform to Hegel’s belief that we can know nothing of the ‘inner being’ of a man on the basis of his skull bone,” Sandra Bonetto, “Race and Racism in Hegel—An Analysis,” Minerva 10 (2006): 43.
- 41.
See note 16.
- 42.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), 163.
- 43.
Patricia J. Mills, Women, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 12.
- 44.
Ibid., 38–39.
- 45.
Jong-Seok Na, “The Dark Side of Hegel’s Theory of Modernity: Race and the Other,” Esercizi Filosofici 14 (2019): 62.
- 46.
Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, ed., All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave, Black Women’s Studies (Old Westbury, NY: Feminist Press, 1981).
- 47.
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex [1949], trans. H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman [1974], trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Antoinette M. Stafford, “The Feminist Critique Of Hegel On Women And The Family,” Animus, no. 2 (1997): 64–92.
- 48.
See Patricia J. Mills, Women, Nature and Psyche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
- 49.
See Luce Irigaray, “The Eternal Irony of the Community,” in Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian. C. Gill (Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 214–226; Susan M. Easton, “Hegel and Feminism,” in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London/New York/Sidney: Croom Helm, 1987): 30–55; Seyla Benhabib, “On Hegel, Women, and Irony,” in Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 25–43; Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2003).
- 50.
Patricia J. Mills, “Hegel’s Antigone,” in Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 84.
- 51.
Ibid.
- 52.
Seyla Benhabib, “On Hegel, Women, and Irony,” in Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 41.
- 53.
Tina Chanter, “Antigone’s Liminality: Hegel’s Racial Purification of Tragedy and the Naturalization of Slavery,” in Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought. Beyond Antigone?, ed. Kimberly Hutchings, Tuija Pulkkinen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 61–85; Tina Chanter, Whose Antigone? The Tragic Marginalization of Slavery (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2011).
- 54.
Tina Chanter, “Antigone’s Liminality: Hegel’s Racial Purification of Tragedy and the Naturalization of Slavery,” in Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought. Beyond Antigone?, ed. Kimberly Hutchings, Tuija Pulkkinen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 81.
- 55.
Ibid.
- 56.
Patricia J. Mills, “Hegel’s Antigone,” in Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, ed. Patricia J. Mills (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 72. See also Meryl Altman, Beauvoir in Time (Leiden: Brill, 2020): 116–346; Kathryn T. Gines, “Simone de Beauvoir and the Race/Gender Analogy in The Second Sex Revisited,” in A Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, ed. Laura Hengehold and Nancy Bauer (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 47–58.
- 57.
Alison Stone, “Feminist Criticism and Reinterpretations of Hegel,” Hegel Bulletin 23, no. 1–2 (2003): 95.
- 58.
Ibid., 97.
- 59.
Ibid., 98.
- 60.
Ibid., 93–109.
- 61.
Alison Stone, “Matter and Form: Hegel, Organicism and the Difference between Women and Men,” in Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought: Beyond Antigone?, ed. Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 211–232.
- 62.
Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2003), 155.
- 63.
Ibid., 160.
- 64.
Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1997).
- 65.
Charles Mills, “Philosophy and the Racial Contract,” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, ed. Naomi Zack (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 65. See Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity Press,1988).
- 66.
Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, ed., Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Thought. Beyond Antigone? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 252.
- 67.
Alison Stone, “Hegel and Colonialism,” Hegel Bulletin 41 (2020): 247–270.
- 68.
Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2003), 106.
- 69.
Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” [1984], in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press, 2007), 110–114.
- 70.
See Jamila M.H. Mascat, “Hegel and the Black Atlantic,” ed. Nikita Dhawan, Decolonizing Enlightenment (Berlin: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2014), 93–114; Michael Monahan, ed., Creolizing Hegel (London, Lanham: Rowman and Littelfield, 2017).
- 71.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 330.
- 72.
See the exchange between Bernasconi and Mc Carney: Joseph Mc Carney, “Hegel’s racism? A response to Bernasconi,” Radical Philosophy, no. 119 (2003): 32–35; Robert Bernasconi, “A Reply to McCarney,” Radical Philosophy, no. 119 (2003): 35–37.
- 73.
Teshale Tibebu, Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 344.
- 74.
Ibid., 344.
- 75.
Ibid., 345.
- 76.
Ibid., 345.
- 77.
Ibid., 345.
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Mascat, J. (2022). Race, Feminism and Critical Race Theories: What’s Hegel Got to Do with It?. In: Lettow, S., Pulkkinen, T. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13123-3_18
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