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Carol Gilligan: What Gender Does to Moral Philosophy

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Thinking with Women Philosophers

Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 30))

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Abstract

Sandra Laugier aims at acknowledging the philosophical importance of Carol Gilligan’s work. She shows that the central point of this work, which she first established in In a Different Voice and pursues today in recent works such as Why Patriarchy Persists, is the idea of a “feminine morality” which, as Laugier maintains, is first and foremost feminist. By proposing to valorize moral values such as caring, attention to others, and solicitude, the ethics of care has contributed to modifying the dominant conception of ethics and has profoundly changed how we understand ethics. It has introduced ethical stakes into politics, weakening theories of justice by critiquing them, and Joan Tronto has emphasized the social and political stakes of care work. Laugier’s aim is to describe Gilligan’s ethics as political as such and not a first stage of the politics of care. The ethics of care draws our attention to the ordinary, to what we are unable to see because it is right before our eyes. It is an ethics that gives voice and attention to humans who are undervalued precisely because they perform unnoticed, invisible tasks, and take care of basic needs. And these humans are usually women, and often non-white women. Thus, the ethics of care constitutes a radical challenge to dominant moral philosophy. The “voice” Gilligan discovers is the ordinary voice of women. Gilligan’s work has also been undervalued within feminist theory for its alleged essentialism: its controversial claim that women share a “different” moral sensibility. But beyond this controversy, Laugier emphasises the fact that Gilligan’s work explicitly, and perhaps for the first time, marks the need to bring women’s voices into ordinary human conversation. Forty years later, what remains of this different voice is not only its promotion of an ethics of attention, but a starting point for an epistemology of ethics: the revelation that moral philosophy—the heart of the discipline—is not only historically the work of men, but is, in its very concepts, a patriarchal form of thought. Laugier’s final step is to claim that the very definition of ethics in philosophy is achieved by means of the exclusion of an entire domain and of a group of people whose contribution is essential to life and to the survival of society.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Carol Gilligan, “In a Different Voice: Looking Back to Look Forward,” unpublished lecture, Paris 2010.

  2. 2.

    Monique Canto-Sperber and Ruwen Ogien, La philosophie morale, Que sais-je 3696, (Paris: PUF, 2017), p. 3.

  3. 3.

    Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 28.

  4. 4.

    Ibid.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., pp. 28–9.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., p. 35.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., p. 36.

  8. 8.

    Ibid., p. 37.

  9. 9.

    Carol Gilligan, Making Connections: The Relational Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1990); Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider, Why Does Patriarchy Persist? (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018).

  10. 10.

    Carol Gilligan, “Moral Orientation and Development,” in Justice and Care, ed. Virginia Held (Westview Press, Boulder, CO: 1987), 43.

  11. 11.

    Again, a main point in Why Does Patriarchy Persist?

  12. 12.

    On this point, see Sandra Laugier, “The Will to See: Ethics and Moral Perception of Sense,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 34(2), pp. 263–281, and Laugier 2020a, b.

  13. 13.

    See Sandra Laugier, “What Matters: Ethics and Aesthetics of Importance,” in Stanley Cavell on Aesthetic Understanding, ed. Garry L. Hagberg (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

  14. 14.

    See Anne Lovell and alii, 2013.

  15. 15.

    Annette Baier, “The Need for More than Justice,” in Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

  16. 16.

    See L. Raïd, “Baier et la critique du libéralisme moral,” in Paperman and Laugier, eds., 2006.

  17. 17.

    Iris Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, ed. Iris Murdoch and Peter J. Conradi (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), p. 82.

  18. 18.

    Annette Baier, “Doing Without Moral Theory,” in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press: 1985).

  19. 19.

    See Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1969). Laugier 2013a, 2020b.

  20. 20.

    Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis, MN: 1985), p. 219.

  21. 21.

    Joan Tronto, Foreword to the French edition of Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for the Ethic of Care (Un monde vulnérable), trans. Hervé Maury (Paris: La Découverte, 2009), p. 15.

  22. 22.

    Joan Tronto, “Care as a Work of Citizens: A Modest Proposal,” in M. Friedman, ed. Women and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 130.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000), §415.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., §118.

  26. 26.

    Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher, “Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring,” in Abel and Nelson, eds., Circles of Care (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 40.

  27. 27.

    See Sandra Laugier, “Ordinary Realism in Ethics,” in Vosman, Bart, and Hoffman, eds. The Ethics of Care, the State of the Art (Leuven-Pariol: Peeters, 2020), pp. 113–136.

  28. 28.

    See Hilary Putnam, 2004.

  29. 29.

    Carol Gilligan, “Moral orientation and development,” in V. Held, ed., Justice and Care (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 43.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider, Why Does Patriarchy Persist? (Cambridge, Medford, MA: Polity, 2018), p. 6.

  32. 32.

    Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 19.

  33. 33.

    Gilligan and Snider, Why Does Patriarchy Persist?, p. 5.

  34. 34.

    See Tronto, and Sandra Laugier and Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, La société des vulnérables (Paris: Gallimard, 2020).

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Laugier, S. (2022). Carol Gilligan: What Gender Does to Moral Philosophy. In: Le Jallé, E., Benoit, A. (eds) Thinking with Women Philosophers. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12662-8_1

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