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Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the Outcome-Sensitive Folk Concept of Reasonable

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Judicial Decision-Making

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 14))

Abstract

The reasonable person standard is of great importance to US criminal and tort law. According to the law, whether or not an agent acted reasonably does not depend on features of the outcome which are not under her control. Mock juror attributions of reasonableness, however, are shown to be outcome-dependent. A series of experiments reveals that this outcome-dependence does not constitute a bias, since the very folk concept of reasonableness is outcome-sensitive. Consequently, the law makes a mistaken assumption as to what kind of concept of reasonableness lay jurors will apply in court. This conceptual misalignment, it is argued, could lead to serious injustice in US trials.

I would like to thank Elliot Ash, Clark Barrett, Teneille Brown, Joshua Knobe, James Macleod, Dan Simon, Alex Stremitzer, Doron Teichman, Kevin Tobia, the participants of the workshop Experimental Methods in Law organized by Christoph Engel, the members of the Guilty Minds Lab Zurich and the Editors for very helpful comments and suggestions. Research on this paper was supported by an SNSF Ambizione grant for the project Reading Guilty Minds (PZ00P1_179912).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For discussion, see e.g. Fletcher (1985), Gardner (2001, 2015), Moran (2003, 2010), Westen (2008), Miller and Perry (2012), Zipursky (2014), and Tobia (2018).

  2. 2.

    Model Penal Code §2.02. (d).

  3. 3.

    UK Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 85 sch. 3(1) (Eng. & Wales) (“A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime […].”); United States v. Peterson 483 F 2d 1222 (1973); NY Penal Code Art. 35; see also Baron (2011).

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012) (stating that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must set “the just and reasonable rate”); 16 U.S.C. § 2621(18)(B) (2012) (stating that states should ensure “a reasonable rate” of return when authorizing utility companies). More generally, see Berger (1977).

  5. 5.

    Model Penal Code § 213.6(1).

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 2013); Elias v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

  7. 7.

    See e.g. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007), (“[T]he Court has repeated time and again that §1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’”); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (stating that “the standard of reason” regards anti-competitive trade restraints under the Sherman Act).

  8. 8.

    See e.g. Mayfield v. Koroghli, 184 P.3d 362, 366 (Nev. 2008) (stating that parties must deliver on contracts within a “reasonable time”).

  9. 9.

    Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977).

  10. 10.

    Gardner (2015), p. 36.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Alicke (1992, 2000), Nadelhoffer (2006), Macleod (2019), Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017), Tobia (2020b), and Güver and Kneer (2022).

  12. 12.

    For discussion, see Ripstein (2001), Gardner (2001, 2015), Moran (2003), Westen (2008), Miller and Perry (2012), Zipursky (2014), Tilley (2017), and Tobia (2018).

  13. 13.

    Zipursky (2014).

  14. 14.

    Tobia (2018).

  15. 15.

    For discussion, see. e.g. Wells (1982), Kelman (1991), Armour (1994), Moran (2003, 2010), Lee (2007), Simons (2008), and Nourse (2008).

  16. 16.

    This question, whose practical importance might even exceed the one of the other two debates has received next to no attention thus far. Two exceptions are the excellent empirical papers by Baron and Hershey (1988) and Kamin and Rachlinski (1995). The latter is limited to probability judgments in tort negligence, the former explicitly includes “reasonable” as a dependent variable, though mentions a plethora of other expressions in the same scale. Both studies have very low power, and neither of the two employs a clean within-subjects design, which—as will be argued below—is essential to a proper understanding of the folk concept of reasonableness.

  17. 17.

    Kneer (in preparation-a), see also Baron and Hershey (1988).

  18. 18.

    Kneer (in preparation-b), for the semantic framework, see MacFarlane (2014).

  19. 19.

    The same emphasis on the agent’s circumstances is found in the definition of recklessness (see MPC 2.02 (c)), where the “reasonable person” is substituted with “the law-abiding person”). Many commentators, however, treat negligence and recklessness as very similar, and the “law-abiding person” as a close cousin of the “reasonable person”. Both negligence and recklessness are a matter of running an unreasonable risk, the difference lying in whether the defendant did so knowingly or not. For discussion, see e.g. Dressler (1995) and Simons (2002).

  20. 20.

    For discussion, see e.g. Low (1987) and Dressler (1995).

  21. 21.

    Given that the law explicitly addresses the severity of the foreseeable consequences, one might think that the legal concept of reasonable care (and negligence) is outcome-sensitive. And in some sense, of course, it is: Holding probability fixed, it is considerably more unreasonable to embark on an action where a human life is at risk than an action that might lead to a broken finger. Importantly, however, the outcome-sensitivity thus understood regards possible outcomes. In the main text, when I write about outcome-dependence, I am interested in the influence of actual outcomes—whether or not the possible bad outcome does come to pass—on the assessment of the defendant’s behaviour. Differently put, when I write about the “outcome-dependence of reasonableness”, what is meant is not the ex ante, or epistemic, reading thereof, but the ex post, and thus partially metaphysical understanding of “outcome-dependence”. Thanks a lot to Kevin Tobia for pointing out the need for clarification in this regard, and for drawing my attention to the passage from Tort law.

  22. 22.

    For further discussion, see Kamin and Rachlinski (1995) and Rachlinski (1998).

  23. 23.

    On moral luck in general, see Nagel (1979), Williams (1993), and Hartman (2017). With a view to the law, see Enoch (2007, 2010); Enoch and Marmor (2007), for empirical work, see Martin and Cushman (2016) and Kneer and Machery (2019).

  24. 24.

    Alicke (1992, 2000); Alicke and Rose (2010); Nadelhoffer (2006); Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017); Bourgeois-Gironde and Kneer (2018).

  25. 25.

    Cushman (2008).

  26. 26.

    Kneer and Machery (2019).

  27. 27.

    Experimental jurisprudence is a young discipline which explores philosophical topics regarding the law by empirical means. See e.g. Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017), Bourgeois-Gironde and Kneer (2018), Prochownik et al. (2020) and Tobia (2020a) on mens rea attribution, Sommers (2019) on the notion of consent, MacLeod (2019), Knobe and Shapiro (2021) and Güver and Kneer (2022) on legal causation, Lidén et al. (2019) on the confirmation bias in guilt assessments, Strohmaier et al. (2020) on the hindsight bias in the law, Donelson and Hannikainen (2020) and Hannikainen et al. (2021) on Fuller’s theory of law, Struchiner et al. (2020) on the Fuller/Hart debate, or Tobia (2020b) on ordinary meaning and legal interpretation to name but a few. For reviews see Prochownik (2021) and Tobia (2022).

  28. 28.

    The Knobe effect, see Knobe (2003a, b); for reviews, see Feltz (2007); Cova (2016).

  29. 29.

    The epistemic side-effect effect, Beebe and Buckwalter (2010); Beebe and Jensen (2012).

  30. 30.

    Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017); García Olier and Kneer (in preparation); Prochownik et al. (2020); Tobia (2020a, b).

  31. 31.

    Kneer et al. (in preparation).

  32. 32.

    Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017); Bourgeois-Gironde and Kneer (2018) for French judges and lawyers respectively; Prochownik et al. (2020) for German law students; Kneer et al. (in preparation) for professionals in the UK, Poland, the Netherlands and Brazil; the Knobe effect—though not severity effect—also arises for US professionals, Tobia (2020a, b).

  33. 33.

    Cf. MPC 2.02 (c,d), and Dressler, 2015 §10.04.D, see also Homicide Act 1957 s3 and Gardner (2015). For discussion of the reasonable person standard with respect to negligence, see e.g. Fletcher (1970), Hurd and Moore (2002), Moore and Hurd (2011), Alexander et al. (2009) and Stark (2016).

  34. 34.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995); Kneer and Machery (2019); Frisch et al. (2021); Kneer and Skoczeń (2022).

  35. 35.

    For discussion see Rachlinski (1998); Teichman (2014); Wittlin (2016); Hoffman (ms.); Strohmaier et al. (2020); Kneer and Skoczeń (2022).

  36. 36.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995).

  37. 37.

    Kneer and Machery (2019).

  38. 38.

    The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), for discussion see e.g. Epstein (1992).

  39. 39.

    https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ke2ia5. The data for all three experiments is available under https://osf.io/3qudf/

  40. 40.

    Baron and Hershey (1988); Kneer (in preparation-a).

  41. 41.

    Baron and Hershey (1988).

  42. 42.

    https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=hp8zx4.

  43. 43.

    Baron and Hershey (1988).

  44. 44.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995).

  45. 45.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995).

  46. 46.

    Kneer and Machery (2019).

  47. 47.

    For instance by Kamin and Rachlinski (1995), as well as nearly all the papers on the “hindsight bias” surveyed by Rachlinski (1998). Note how rare it is to read about a hindsight effect rather than a hindsight bias. The problem is discussed in more detail by Kneer and Machery (2019), who explore the rationalistic interpretation of the hindsight effect at length. For excellent discussion, see also Teichman (2014), Wittlin (2016) and Brown (2022).

  48. 48.

    I’d like to thank Joshua Knobe for pressing me on this important point.

  49. 49.

    https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ng28n4.

  50. 50.

    Unsurprisingly, there is no significant difference across conditions for reasonableness ex ante (t(1,123) = −.103, p = .918), since the two conditions are—at that point—still identical (outcomes have not yet been revealed).

  51. 51.

    As expected, all contrasts remain strongly significant when one leaves those participants who did not respond with the exact probability of a harmful outcome in the dataset (N = 157). There was no significant effect of outcome on perceived probability post hoc, t(1,155) = −.715, p = .476. This suggest that, in explicitly specifying the probability in the scenario, we managed to limit its potential effect even without excluding all those who participants who did not report it correctly.

  52. 52.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995).

  53. 53.

    Kamin and Rachlinski (1995).

  54. 54.

    It does not matter whether the effect of hindsight on perceived probability is viewed as a bias or as a rational heuristic (as discussed in Sect. 4.4). The point here is simply that the effect of outcome on reasonableness is, at least in parts, independent of probability judgments (no matter how they are interpreted).

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  1. University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Markus Kneer

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    Bartosz Janik

  3. Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

    Maciej Próchnicki

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Kneer, M. (2022). Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the Outcome-Sensitive Folk Concept of Reasonable. In: Bystranowski, P., Janik, B., Próchnicki, M. (eds) Judicial Decision-Making. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11744-2_3

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