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Antitrust in Data Driven Markets & Legal Framework for Influencers, Native Advertising and Control over the Use of AI in Marketing

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Abstract

The digitalisation of markets has led to profound changes in the way goods and services are conceived of, produced, distributed, marketed and bought. The business model of platform markets has taken hold in the digital marketplace, and in many markets, users have become accustomed to being provided ‘free’ services against the payment of personal data and attention. In addition, the multi-purpose nature of data is coming to play an ever-increasing role in these markets. The advent of the digital era has had a profound impact not only on markets but also on those areas of the law that relate to these markets, among them competition law.

Viktoria Robertson contributed the introductory remarks, while Gerhard Fussenegger is the author of the substantive part of this report.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the English version, see here: BWB, https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Considerations_on_digitalisation_challenges_in_the_economy.pdf, accessed 26 August 2021.

  2. 2.

    Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (ECN+ Directive), OJ 2019 L 11/3.

  3. 3.

    At the time of writing, the antitrust amendment act 2021 was still awaiting approval from the first chamber of Parliament; see Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrechtsänderungsgesetz 2021 (KaWeRÄG 2021), 114/ME XXVII. GP (Ministerialentwurf).

  4. 4.

    See Bundeskartellamt, Case B6-22/16, Facebook of 6 February 2019. Facebook’s request for a suspensory effect of its appeal was initially granted by the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf (Case VI-Kart 1/19 (V), of 26 August 2019), but subsequently denied by the German Bundesgerichtshof (Case KVR 69/19, of 23 June 2020). In March 2021, the Düsseldorf Court sent a number of questions to Luxembourg in a request for a preliminary ruling; Case C-252/21, Facebook v Bundeskartellamt (pending).

  5. 5.

    On the evaluation, see here: European Commission, ‘EU competition law – market definition notice (evaluation)’ https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12325-Evaluation-of-the-Commission-Notice-on-market-definition-in-EU-competition-law, accessed 26 August 2021. For the evaluation results, see European Commission, ‘Evaluation of the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law of 9 December 1997’ SWD(2021) 199 final.

  6. 6.

    European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final.

  7. 7.

    Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrechtsänderungsgesetz 2021 (KaWeRÄG 2021), 114/ME XXVII. GP (Ministerialentwurf), introducing a new § 28a KartG.

  8. 8.

    European Commission, Summary of Replies to the Public Consultation on Evaluation of Procedural and Jurisdictional Aspects of EU Merger Control (2017) 4-7 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/summary_of_replies_en.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  9. 9.

    See BWB, Proposition Paper on Digitalisation and Competition Law (June 2020) 6-7.

  10. 10.

    On this, see for instance A. Reyna, Optimizing Public Enforcement in the Digital Single Market Through Cross-Institutional Collaboration (2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529198. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  11. 11.

    BWB, Proposition Paper 11-12.

  12. 12.

    BKartA and BWB, Guidance on Transaction Value Thresholds for Mandatory Pre-merger Notification (Section 35 (1a) GWB and Section 9 (4) KartG) (July 2018) https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitfaden/Leitfaden_Transaktionsschwelle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  13. 13.

    For Austria: ‘BWB informs: Amazon modifies its terms and conditions’ of 17 July 2020, available at https://www.bwb.gv.at/en/news/detail/news/bwb_informs_amazon_modifies_its_terms_and_conditions-1/.Accessed 26 August 2021. For Germany: BKartA, ‘Bundeskartellamt obtains far-reaching improvements in the terms of business for sellers on Amazon’s online marketplaces’ of 17 July 2020, available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/17_07_2019_Amazon.html. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  14. 14.

    Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (P2B Regulation), OJ 2019 L 186/57.

  15. 15.

    Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrechtsänderungsgesetz 2021 (KaWeRÄG 2021), 114/ME XXVII. GP (Ministerialentwurf).

  16. 16.

    Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen für ein fokussiertes, proaktives und digitales Wettbewerbsrecht 4.0 und anderer wettbewerbsrechtlicher Bestimmungen (GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz) BGBl I 2021/1.

  17. 17.

    BWB, ‘RTR presents method paper on monitoring digital platforms prepared together with AFCA’ of 27 May 2020, available at https://www.bwb.gv.at/en/news/detail/news/rtr_presents_method_paper_on_monitoring_digital_platforms_prepared_together_with_afca/. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  18. 18.

    European Data Protection Board, ‘Statement of the EDPB on the data protection impacts of economic concentration’ of August 2018, available at https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_economic_concentration_en.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2021; European Data Protection Board, ‘Statement on privacy implications of mergers’ of 19 February 2020, available at https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_2020_privacyimplicationsofmergers_en.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2021.

  19. 19.

    Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Kartellgesetz 2005 – KartG 2005, as amended).

  20. 20.

    Currently, a more accurate date cannot be specified as the Austrian Federal Council (Bundesrat), the second house of the Austrian Parliament, voted on 15 July 2021 against the draft KaWeRÄG 2021. It is expected that the first house of the Austrian Parliament, the National Council (Nationalrat), which adopted the draft KaWeRÄG 2021 on 8 July 2021, will overrule the Federal Council's refusal to approve it in autumn 2021.

  21. 21.

    Cf § 4 Cartel Act: “For the purposes of this Federal Act, an undertaking shall be deemed to be dominant if, as a supplier or buyer (1) is not exposed to any or only insignificant competition, or (2) has a superior market position in relation to the other competitors.”

  22. 22.

    Digitalization Report, p. 4.

  23. 23.

    The Opinion Studienvereinigung hereby refers, inter alia, to the decisions of the European Commission case AT.40099 – Google Android; case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) and, concerning Merger Control, COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn; COMP/M.7217 – Face-book/WhatsApp; COMP/M.6281 – Microsoft/Skype and GC, case T-79/12 Cisco Systems and Messagenet/Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:635.

  24. 24.

    Opinion Studienvereinigung, paras 22 ff.

  25. 25.

    European Commission, case AT.40099 – Google Android.

  26. 26.

    Opinion Studienvereinigung, paras 25 ff.

  27. 27.

    Available at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Berichte/Algorithms_and_Competition_Working-Paper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5. Accessed 19 September 2021.

  28. 28.

    See Austrian Supreme Cartel Court (“KOG”), case 16 Ok 4/20d, Büchl/Peugeot.

  29. 29.

    See Sect. 3.1 above.

  30. 30.

    Together with the Federal Competition Attorney (Bundeskartellanwalt) as the second official competition authority in Austria.

  31. 31.

    Digitalization Report, p. 8 ff.

  32. 32.

    Opinion Studienvereinigung, p. 22.

  33. 33.

    ECJ, case C-74/14, Eturas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, para 38; ECHR 14 February 2019, case 5556/10, SA Capital Oy v Finland, paras 65 ff.

  34. 34.

    ECJ, case C-74/14, Eturas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, para 41.

  35. 35.

    Following the law (§ 4 (2) Cartel Act), an undertaking is considered of being rebuttable single dominant if it has a market share of (i) at least 30% or (ii) more than 5% and is exposed to competition from a maximum of two undertakings or (iii) has a market share of more than 5% and is one of the four largest undertakings on this market with a combined market share of at least 80%. An undertaking is considered of being rebuttable collective dominant law (§ 4 (2a) Cartel Act), if the undertakings concerned (i) have a combined market share of at least 50 % and consist of maximum three undertakings, or (ii) have a combined market share of at least two thirds and consist of maximum five undertakings.

  36. 36.

    Digitalization Report, p. 10.

  37. 37.

    The Austrian data protection authority (Datenschutzbehörde) ensures compliance with data protection in Austria. Austria was one of the first European states to have a data protection authority. The Data Protection Commission was created by the first Data Protection Act, Federal Law Gazette No. 565/1978. The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC was implemented in Austria by the Data Protection Act 2000 (DSG 2000). On 25 May 2018, the Basic Data Protection Regulation (DSGVO) and the revised Data Protection Act (DSG) formed the basis of Austrian data protection law.

  38. 38.

    Digitalization Report, p. 5.

  39. 39.

    BWB, Fallstudie Amazon.de Marktplatz, 2019, https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads/standpunkte/BWB_Amazon-Fallbericht_20190717.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2021.

  40. 40.

    Case report, p. 8. The BWB hereby followed the European Commission’s recommendation that concerning two-sided markets it is essential to focus on the theory of harm and less on a market definition.

  41. 41.

    Cf, § 18 (2a) GWB.

  42. 42.

    Prepared and published together with the German Bundeskartellamt, available at https://www.bwb.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads/standpunkte/2018-07_Guidance_Transaction_Value_Thresholds.pdf.

  43. 43.

    See European Commission, AT.40099 – Google Android; AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping); or – concerning merger control - COMP/M.8124 – Microsoft/LinkedIn; COMP/M.7217 – Face-book/WhatsApp.

  44. 44.

    KOG, case 16 Ok 2/15b.

  45. 45.

    Concerning Austria’s approach to dominance and abuse, and also alternative legal concept, where dominance is not necessarily requested for pursuing an abuse, reference can be made to the national Austrian LIDC report, G. Fussenegger, F. Schuhmacher and R. Tahedl, Abuse of Dominant Position and Globalization & Protection and Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How, In LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition, Springer 2017, pp 27-44, by Mag.

  46. 46.

    In its source, the BWB refers not to the Commission’s practice but to a publication, i.e., S. Wismer, and A. Rasek, Market definition in multi-sided markets, OECD 2017, pp. 4 f., available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2017)33/FINAL&docLanguage=En.

  47. 47.

    See, e.g., KOG, case 4 Ob 214/97t, Filmverleihgesellschaft I; Austrian Cartel Court, case 25 Kt 48, 49/99, Leiner/Kika/Michelfeit.

  48. 48.

    Nahversorgungsgesetz, NahVersG, BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) No. 392/1977 as last amended by BGBl. No. 50/2012.

  49. 49.

    See KOG, case16 Ok 3/08, Sägerundholz.

  50. 50.

    See also Section 3 Act on Local Supply (which corresponds to Section 6 Cartel Act), which provides that proceedings pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 Act on Local Supply may not be taken as a reason by the defendant to exclude the undertaking affected (by a conduct as defined by those provisions) from further supplying or demanding on reasonable conditions.

  51. 51.

    Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 1984 - UWG, BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) No. 448/1984 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 49/2015.

  52. 52.

    Bundesgesetz über die Einrichtung einer Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (Wettbewerbsgesetz - WettbG), BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) I No. 62/2002 as last amended by BGBl. I No. 129/2013.

  53. 53.

    Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (BWB).

  54. 54.

    Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003 - TKG, BGBl. (Federal Law Gazette) I No. 70/2003 as last amended by BGBl I No. 44/2014.

  55. 55.

    Pursuant to Section 35 (1) of the Telecommunications Act, an undertaking is considered to have a significant market power if such undertaking, either alone or together with other undertakings, holds such a strong economic position that it has the capability of acting, to a considerable extent, independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately the consumers.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. bpv Huegel, Vienna/Brussels, Belgium

    Gerhard Fussenegger

  2. Vienna University of Economics and Business and University of Graz, Vienna/Graz, Austria

    Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson

Authors
  1. Gerhard Fussenegger
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  2. Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson
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Correspondence to Gerhard Fussenegger .

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  1. Addleshaw Goddard LLP, London, UK

    Bruce Kilpatrick

  2. Kobel Avocat Attorney-at-law, Geneva, Switzerland

    Pierre Kobel

  3. Këllezi Legal, Geneva, Switzerland

    Pranvera Këllezi

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Fussenegger, G., Robertson, V.H.S.E. (2023). Austria. In: Kilpatrick, B., Kobel, P., Këllezi, P. (eds) Antitrust in Data Driven Markets & Legal Framework for Influencers, Native Advertising and Control over the Use of AI in Marketing. LIDC Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07422-6_3

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